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 Abstract 
 
Abstract in English 
This study examines the production of Palestinian satellite television in the 
contemporary era. The focus is on cultural and children’s programs of two 
key stations, the Hamas-based Al Aqsa Satellite Channel (ASC) and the Fatah-
based Palestine Satellite Channel (PSC). The study interrogates how factors 
beyond simple factional politics come to impact the creation of cultural and 
children's programming. Even in the polarised political environment of the 
Palestinian territories, the study shows through close content analysis and 
qualitative analysis of production, including in-depth producer interviews, 
that overtly factional media outlets have become ‘defactionalised’ in terms 
of content and production values. ASC and PSC producers of cultural and 
children’s programmes are subject to the same technological, social, and 
economic constraints theorised by Julie D'Acci, Herbert Gans, Todd Gitlin, 
as other producers. However, the Palestinian context is also distinctive. 
Since the first and second intifada and the time of the Oslo Accords, the 
question of whether satellite TV can help transform the previously factional 
media of both Hamas and the PLO or the Palestinian Authority, is 
something this study seeks to investigate. Changes in audience reach and 
production techniques, in the evolution of Israeli occupation, and in the 
emergence of a new discourse of ‘Palestinianism’ have all impacted 
children’s and cultural programming in various ways. The result is to temper 
the role of purely factional politics and propaganda with some degree of 
‘defactionalisation’ of content and approach. Despite the factional structure 
of Palestinian media, this study argues that producers have striven to 
overcome divisions and to ‘defactionalise’ content and production values. 
ASC and PSC cultural and children’s programmes have thus contributed to 
a renewed sense of a shared identity among Palestinian people across and 
territories, despite existing within a system still characterised by a 
politically defined segmented reality. 
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Abstract in Dutch  
Dit onderzoek gaat over de productie van programma’s op de Palestijnse 
satelliettelevisie in de huidige tijd. Het is gericht op twee belangrijke 
zenders: Al Aqsa Satellite Channel van Hamas en Palestine Satellite 
Channel van Fatah. In het onderzoek wordt gekeken naar hoe factoren 
die de alledaagse partijpolitiek overstijgen de ontwikkeling van culturele 
en kinderprogramma’s beïnvloeden, zelfs in het sterk gepolitiseerde 
klimaat van de Palestijnse gebieden. De onderzoeksmethode is een 
nauwkeurige inhoudsanalyse in combinatie met kwalitatieve diepte-
interviews met producers. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat openlijk 
verzuilde (partijgebonden) mediakanalen te maken hebben met de 
technologische, sociale en economische motivaties en beperkingen die 
worden beschreven in het werk van Julie D'Acci, Herbert Ganz, Todd 
Gitlin en anderen. De volgende factoren zijn in het bijzonder van 
invloed geweest op de programmering: veranderingen in publieksbereik 
en productietechnieken, de ontwikkeling van de Israëlische bezetting en 
het ontstaan van een nieuw discours over ‘Palestijnisme’. Hierdoor 
spelen pure partijpolitiek en propaganda een minder grote rol.  In dit 
onderzoek wordt betoogd dat producers er ondanks de verzuilde 
structuur van de Palestijnse media naar streven om inhoud te ‘ontzuilen’. 
Culturele en kinderprogramma’s leveren daarmee een bijdrage aan een 
hernieuwd gevoel van een gemeenschappelijke identiteit onder de 
mensen in alle Palestijnse gebieden, hoewel deze programma’s toch 
voortkomen uit een systeem dat bepaald wordt door politieke 
segmentering. 
  
1 
 
1 Introducing the Research 
 
‘Even in cultural programming, in some situations we have to restrict 
ourselves to look for topics that do not appear to be pro-PA or pro-Fatah, 
but rather to look for issues that unite Palestinians’ (Interview: Abu 
Shammalah, 2013, producer and soundman of Palestinian Satellite 
Channel’s Cultural Flashes program).  
 
1.1  Problem Statement 
This study considers the question of how media professionals are 
influenced by their environment, including the influence of factions in 
agenda setting and programme content. In the context of satellite TV’s 
emergence in Palestine, the study shows, through examples of children’s 
and cultural programmes, how relatively non-factional – or 
defactionalised – program content can be negotiated by media producers 
through compromises in terms of themes and values. This enables 
producers in satellite TV in Palestine to mediate their messages on 
different levels, so that they may avoid the most overt forms of 
factionalism. Taking the example of satellite TV, this study suggests that 
the political influence of factional party elites is far from direct or 
inevitable in the new forms of media. Instead, a sense of Palestinianism, 
which is not entirely new, marks a departure, around 2009-2010, from 
the highly polarised factional situation between Hamas and Fatah in the 
preceding period. The issue of factionalism and the challenge of meeting 
the ethical responsibilities of journalists put enormous pressure on 
journalists and television producers in Palestine. The central question in 
this research is whether (or not) media content has been defactionalised, 
taking the example of two children’s and cultural programmes 
transmitted on Satellite TV, where one would expect the content to be 
less overtly political than in, say, news or current affairs programmes. 
2 CHAPTER 1 
 There are both international and Palestinian Codes of Conduct 
covering journalistic ethics, and we return to the Palestinian code in the 
concluding chapter, but the personal vision of media professionals is also 
subject to professional, logistical, ideological, social-cultural and political 
pressures. There are other pressures related to violations of Palestinian 
laws and the Israeli military occupation.  All these impinge on producers 
and content, and hence on what satellite TV media produces. Combined, 
such pressures influence media professionals and create the ‘media 
ecology’, or working environment in which they are obliged to produce 
TV programmes.  
 This first chapter briefly presents and justifies the use of key 
theoretical concepts of ‘factionalism’ and ‘defactionalisation,’ the overall 
theoretical framework of the research, the methodological approach 
adopted and and the choice of specific case studies analysed in the study. 
The process of quantitative content analysis is discussed and placed in its 
broader theoretical context, and the various stages through which the 
study will proceed, are explained, including the extended period of 
fieldwork in which the researcher engaged. A background is provided for 
each of the four media programmes that serve as case studies, including 
a summary of their overall content and their respective production 
environments, tied to the Al Aqsa Satellite Channel (ASC) and the 
Palestinian Satellite Channel (PSC) respectively 
 The study aims to fill a research gap with regard to how production 
decisions take place amidst an overall context of occupation. It considers 
how, even under such conditions, reduced polarisation among rival 
political factions, may be possible in certain forms of media. Content 
analysis was organised around carefully selected themes, including 
nationalism, resistance and social and cultural values, among others 
(themes elaborated on in Appendix 3, which guide in-depth content 
analysis in Chapters 6 and 7).  Some dominant media representations in 
the selected cultural and children’s programmes’ content are identified 
and analysed. The study presents a historical overview of media 
production in Palestine, and combines this with in-depth comparative 
analysis of content and production of four selected programmes. In this 
way, some substance is given to what is meant by ‘factionalism’ and 
‘defactionalisation’ in practice, within Palestinian media settings.  
 Attention is especially focused on how shared cultural symbols, 
artifacts and the historical heritage of Palestinian identity are expressed in 
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arts, culture, poetry and music, within the content of these four 
programmes, and as viewed by their producers and other staff. Content 
is analysed to show how production decisions and themes within 
children’s and cultural programmes in Palestinian satellite television can 
include – to varying degrees - both ‘factional’ and ‘defactionalised’ 
modes of media representation. This is the central issue addressed 
through an extended comparative content analysis, which involves close 
attention to the two political parties’ dominant media representations 
and their influence over how cultural and children’s programmes are 
produced. The aim of this study is to clarify how factionally influenced 
political ‘narratives’ that result from violent inter-factional conflict and 
competition, come to be translated – or avoided – within media 
narratives, taking the cases of specific children’s and cultural TV 
programmes as examples.  
 As each formerly partisan group tries to reach out through the media 
to larger segments of the national audience in Palestine and beyond, in 
the diaspora, this study highlights some of the compromises, influences, 
and decision-making processes involved on the production side. Of the 
two case studies, the Palestinian Satellite Channel (PSC) and the Al Aqsa 
Satellite Channel (ASC), PSC is closely associated with Fatah, and the 
second, ASC is identified with Hamas. From the Fatah-oriented PSC, the 
cultural programme ‘Wamadat Thaqafiyyah’ (Cultural Flashes) and the 
children’s programme ‘Shara’a Simsim’ (Sesame Street) were selected for 
analysis. Two programmes from the Hamas-oriented ASC were also 
selected: the cultural programme ‘Attikum Beqabs’ (Burning Brand) and 
the children’s programme ‘Row’ad Al Ghad’ (Pioneers of Tomorrow).  
 These two sets of programmes have generated both critical and 
positive commentary internationally and in the region. The work of Yael 
Warshel, and of New York Times journalist Shapiro, for example, 
positively evaluated the impact of the PSC’s Sesame Street on children’s 
ability to imagine peace in Israel and Palestine. However, these studies 
were conducted before the US Congress ended funding for Sesame Street 
in 2012 (Warshel, 2012, Shapiro, 2009). 
 The approach to Pioneers of Tomorrow has generally been more critical, 
especially after the ‘Mickey Mouse’-like puppet Farfur was allowed to die 
in martyrdom (Warshel, 2009). All four programmes of the two selected 
satellite TV channels, are placed in the context of their wider media 
4 CHAPTER 1 
environment in Chapter 5, and in-depth programme content is analysed 
in Chapters 6 and 7, which consider the question of how, and to what 
extent, defactionalisation of content was evident in the four selected 
satellite TV programmes. The selected study period is March 2009 to 
January 2010, immediately after ‘Operation Cast Lead,’ the 2008-2009 
Israeli war on Gaza. The selected study period also followed a ‘war of 
brothers,’ which had seen armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah 
forces. For the selected study period of 10 months, it was fortunate that 
archival TV episodes were available for all four selected programmes. 
There is a real lack of knowledge about the production (rather than 
consumption) of satellite TV programme content. Especially in post-
violence situations, factional, conflict-promoting content may come to 
be expected from the media. The aim of the study is to determine, 
through careful comparative media analysis, whether politically-driven 
media factionalism is evident or whether programme content in the four 
selected programmes, was largely ‘defactionalised’ through decisions 
made by producers. After a period of intensive in-fighting, can the trans-
formative power of satellite mass media communication provide 
examples of where Palestinian media works to reduce, rather than to 
intensify, factional ‘cold conflict’ in Palestine? The term ‘cold,’ applied to 
conflict, implies that hostilities are not open or expressed in overt 
violence, but are suppressed (Gerzon, 2014). 
Occupied Palestine is particularly suited for comparative research of 
media content, ironically because of the Israeli-imposed creation of two 
separated physical entities: Gaza and the West Bank. However, at the 
same time the very special features of the Palestinian case also limit how 
relevant the research findings can be for other situations in the region 
and beyond. What is observed is that each channel, ASC and PSC, have 
dominant themes in their programmes, and each has some distinct 
‘frames of analysis’ in each of the two territories, Gaza and the West 
Bank. This illustrates, better than most other cases could do, how 
factional and ideological divisions can come to shape the media een 
when factional agendas appear not to be dominant (Quneis, 2011). The 
dynamics involved in two forcibly separated sets of areas is also highly 
relevant to understanding the complex ‘clash of ideologies’ that can arise 
and can result in intra-Palestinian conflict. Potentially two ‘circuits of 
media’ can result, within one small nation (D’Acci, 2004).  
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1.2 Justification for the Study  
As argued by several Arab ministers of information, the growing 
attention to debates and dialogue among citizens on satellite TV has 
amounted to the creation of an ‘offshore democracy’ outside the direct 
control of political parties (Sakr, 2001: 150). The power of media is 
evident in the role that satellite TV producers play in making their 
stations into vehicles of culture. If factionalism and culture are inter-
connected, then each political faction in Palestine tends to use its culture 
and ideology to factionalise or defactionalise media production. Until 
quite recently, few studies focused on how the media operates after 
violent internal conflicts and under conditions of military occupation 
(Löffelholz, 2004; Warshel, 2012). This study hopes to contribute to 
filling this gap.  
 Since the situation in Palestine is highly distinctive, the study of 
Palestinian media is critically important, for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the area is under occupation by a third party, the state of Israel, which is 
the main reason for there being two forcibly separated entities, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Secondly, what happens in Palestine directly 
affects regional events due to the location of the Occupied Territories 
and the resources under the control of neighbouring nations. Due to its 
influence on global events, the Palestine case presents a unique 
opportunity to study the effects of how a factional media landscape can 
become defactionalised. Departing from the usual scholarly perceptions 
that the media in Palestine is highly politicised and religion-driven, this 
study focuses on a media landscape through the lens of children’s and 
cultural programmes. This landscape appears to counter the view that 
media content in Palestine is unavoidably polarised or factional 
(Sienkiewicz, 2010).  
With the so-called global ‘war on terror,’ Islamic movements have 
come to be associated, in much international political discourse of the 
‘West,’ with religious violence and extremism, leading to a loss of nor-
mative legitimacy of more overtly Islamic media content (White, 2011). 
Yet, at least some of the widespread violence prevalent in Palestinian 
daily life can also be perceived as a form of resistance against colonial or 
imperial occupiers (Tawil-Souri, 2009; Zureik, 2001; Gerner, 1994; 
Harlow, 1987; Chomsky, 1983). Its religious content, however, is rarely 
celebrated in this study, and more often blamed for subordinating 
6 CHAPTER 1 
women and excluding minorities, issues that are discussed later in this 
study, and especially in Chapter 8. 
Palestinians are known to be among the heaviest watchers of TV in 
the Middle East, as statistics from 2004 show. At that time, 94% of 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank had one or more TV 
sets in their homes (Thawabteh, 2010). Among those, 29% watched 
Palestine Satellite Channel (52% of these were in the Gaza Strip and 43% in 
the West Bank) (Thawabteh, 2010: 78). Another study specific to Gaza 
suggested that around the same period, 67.5% of the population in Gaza 
watched PSC programmes, while 75.5% watched ASC programmes (Al 
Zanon, 2010). The data is less clear in terms of percentages of 
Palestinians in the West Bank watching Al Aqsa Satellite Channel.  
Detailed and reliable media information, such as audience viewing 
figures, is a valuable commodity in contemporary Palestinian culture, and 
is used as a political tool for mobilisation here just as it is elsewhere. The 
figures mentioned above are estimates, and somewhat out of date. 
Generally it is hard to get hold of reliable data that includes viewer 
numbers across Palestine. How the lack of available quantitative data was 
handled by the researcher is explained briefly in a later section of this 
chapter, and then in more detail in Chapter 3.  
The latest technology is used by both Hamas and Fatah, including 
short message services (SMSs) to alert their supporters about public 
events and to allow the public to interact with TV programmes (Bishara, 
2009). This technique was first used by Fatah and PSC during the Israeli 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005; SMSs are now more often 
used by Hamas to promote viewer feedback and engagement with ASC 
TV programmes. 
Satellite media are important in terms of ‘factionalising’ information 
into sound bites. No media can be politically neutral, and even in an 
open pluralistic society, there will always be politically affiliated 
journalists and independent ones (Kester, 2008; Mellor, 2007; Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004; Mancini, 2000; Waisbord, 2000). Satellite TV has played a 
vital role in informing the public by reaching homes 24/7, without much 
requirement for interactivity or expensive equipment. The technology 
ensures that satellite TV can reach geographically dispersed audiences 
relatively easily, as was demonstrated in the case of the Arab Spring 
where there were few obstacles to satellite TV networks, which also 
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compete: ‘…in the political and religious playing fields… through the use 
of entertainment and pop culture’ as well as in news (Bishara, 2012:185).  
Satellite television rather than internet media was chosen, because in 
satellite TV, the production of media content is much more clearly dis-
tinguishable from the reception by ‘audiences’ than in social media. The 
production-reception distinction tends to break down in new social 
media. This makes it easier to analyse the specific role of producers, and 
their choices, in the case of satellite TV (Hroub and Quneis, 2011). 
One of the particular attractions for Palestinian audiences, of satellite 
TV as a form of media, is that its programmes are transmitted across and 
around some of the most segregated spaces and spatial divisions on earth 
– those between Gaza, Israel and the West Bank. Yet even satellite TV 
producers, and new forms of social media, cannot ignore the sharp 
divisions imposed between various parts of Palestine under military 
occupation, divided by the separation wall, checkpoints and legal 
barriers. This duality, as well as the striking lack of studies dealing with 
media operations after wars, makes the Palestinian case a fascinating one 
(Löffelholz, 2004). In the past, audience studies have been more 
common than studies of production content and decisions. This is 
another reason that the main focus of this study is both on program 
content and production processes and decisions in the two satellite TV 
channels, as they emerge in the four selected programmes (Mayer, Banks 
and Caldwell, 2009).  
According to several scholars (Greenfield, 2014; Skuse et al., 2011; 
Mares and Pan, 2013; Sakr, 2007) there is a real scarcity of analysis of the 
content and messages of children’s and cultural programming, not just in 
Palestine but also more generally. From a review of relevant literature, it 
seems that this study on the content and production process of selected 
media programmes is also more or less unique in its explicit reference to 
‘defactionalisation’ (Sieberer, 2013). It will combine an emerging 
literature on media content analysis with new approaches to analysing 
media and television production processes. The premise of this research, 
which underpins its central questions, is a situation in which two (or 
more) political factions of the political leadership own and directly 
control two (or more) separate media outlets. This research aims at 
contributing insights in a field in which little prior research is available. It 
does this through a painstaking content analysis of four children’s and 
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cultural programmes, combined with analysis based on extended 
interviews with producers from both ASC and PSC, who provided rich 
insights that informed the study, complementing the researcher’s own 
experiential knowledge of Palestinian media production (see Appendix 7 
for list of interviewees).  
The study found that Palestinian TV children’s and cultural 
programming producers include in their overall aims, the aims of: (i) 
educating people, especially children but also adults, and of (ii) 
documenting and reinforcing the national identity of Palestinians. Over 
time, these two kinds of thematic programming have increased, and have 
become products which donor groups are willing to support, for two 
main reasons:  
 Children’s and cultural TV programmes are media products that 
are expected to contain less overtly factionalised or party political 
content.  
 By funding children’s and cultural programmes, donors feel they 
are contributing in some way to the future of Palestinian people’s 
progress and development, and to forms of expression that 
encourage peaceful outcomes.  
 This research feeds into and seeks to inform such funders and 
decision-makers in the international and regional arena as well. These 
include some members of the US Congress and Senate who pressed for 
a freeze of USAID funding for the Palestinian TV programme ‘Sesame 
Street’ in early 2012. This call for a freeze came in response to Mahmoud 
Abbas calling at the UN for Palestinian statehood. Yet the study 
highlights that supporting children’s and cultural satellite TV does make 
sense as Palestinian media practices have evolved rapidly even amidst the 
first and second Intifada, and the wars that followed (Bishara, 2009). 
The driving role that media can play as a cultural force, is perhaps 
most evident in children’s educational programming (Kirkorian et al., 
2008). Even though little academic research has been done on the 
cultural and children’s programmes of ASC and PSC, some of these 
programmes have in the past been commented on in the international 
media, and in Western donor circles, as well as in the more immediate 
region of Palestine. There have been calls to end the broadcast of certain 
TV programmes by Israeli watchdog groups, most of these groups based 
in the US or EU. The producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow have been 
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accused of being too radical (Barker, 2010), and Sesame Street was alleged 
to have run ‘afoul of basic...guidelines’, not adhering closely enough to 
the requirements of donors that content should be standardized 
internationally (Shapiro, 2009).  
To date, the kind of research that has been done elsewhere on the 
role of media in fostering civil violence has not been done with regard to 
the case of Palestine (Zarkov, 2007; Payne, 2005). A growing number of 
researchers have questioned the effects of media bias on the part of the 
twin authorities in Palestine (Sienkiewicz, 2012; Abuzanouna, 2012; 
Thawabteh, 2010; Abu M’olaa, 2009; Kumsieh, 2009). Yet, to date, not 
much research has been done on Palestinian children’s media, in relation 
to the question of Palestinian identity and the overall context of 
occupation (Blank, 2011; Walshel, 2012).  
This study aims to extend available knowledge on these topics, and 
may contribute to an improved understanding of the politics of media 
production in post-conflict situations. The main focus of the research, 
however, is on something few researchers have dealt with – the local 
politics of Palestinian media production and how this influences 
production content. The topic is especially important in light of 
increasing understanding of how influential a role media can have in 
highly polarised and violent situations, and an awareness of media 
producers’ need to respect ethics and take seriously their 
responsibilities. These important ethical dimensions of the study are 
explored further in Section 1.6 of this chapter.  
The manipulation of media serves to perpetuate many conflicts, 
including those in Palestine, rather than open a pathway toward their 
resolution. And in the end, the public loses (Howard, 2015; Almoghayer, 
2010). History suggests that societies can grow and mature exponentially 
in times of peace. They tend to slowly descend toward self-destruction 
when engaged in perpetual war and violent conflict, conditions that can 
coexist with formal ‘peace’ agreements. Furthermore, violence disperses 
populations and thus can be said to retard intellectual and cultural 
growth, commerce, science and local opportunities (Keen, 2006; 
Swedenburg, 1995; Blaufarb and Tanham, 1989). The study of factional 
media within Palestine is of importance to media studies in general, 
particularly when it explores, as this study does, how Palestinian nation-
alism may override or start to work against internal differences among 
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the main political parties and factions that control the Palestinian media 
(Kananeh and Nusair, 2010; Massad, 1995; Swedenburg, 1995).  
1.3 General Background to the Study  
The pervasive influence of television on both children and adults 
remains an important part of many studies of media, despite the growing 
influence of social media. The main focus of this study, however, is on 
media production processes and on content rather than on audience 
reception or production (Mayer, 2009). Since the media are known to be 
prone to manipulation and distortion, especially because of short time-
horizons, seeking an end to factional forms of media expression can 
seem illusory, but is, nevertheless, vital in situations of actual or potential 
factional in-fighting (Kellner, 2004; Halliday, 1997).  
This PhD research builds on previous Masters-level work on express-
ions of factionalism in the printed news media in Palestine, immediately 
prior to the violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah in 2007, some-
thing also studied more recently by Beverley Milton-Edwards (Milton-
Edwards, 2013; Almoghayer, 2010). My own study showed how the 
Hamas-oriented Al Resala and Fatah-oriented Al Karama newspapers 
content tended to worsen antagonisms by using inflammatory language 
in reporting. Key issues were selected to illustrate this, including news 
coverage of corruption, financial reforms and military aid. Factionalism 
was evident in both the content and the withholding of critical 
information that could have benefitted dialogue and avoided damage to 
local communities and to the wider peace processes (Khalaf, 2008).  
Following the military confrontation between Fatah and Hamas in 
2007 and the Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008-9 and thereafter, many people 
in Palestine prefer to avoid such internecine, faction-based politics. In 
line with this wider move towards ending conflictual attitudes between 
the factions represented by political parties in Palestine, the present study 
looks at other forms of TV production besides news. Children’s and 
cultural programmes were selected, since one aim of the present study is 
to discover whether content and production were able to move beyond 
factionalism in Palestinian satellite TV media production after the ‘war of 
brothers’ in 2007 and the Israeli war on Gaza in 2008-9.  
 During the Fatah-Hamas clashes, ASC news broadcasts were 
noticeably active in defending Hamas-led government actions. The Al 
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Aqsa Satellite Channel is part of the Al Aqsa Media Network and was 
launched after Hamas won a majority of seats in the parliamentary 
elections of 2006. It mostly presents the views of Hamas leaders and the 
Islamic movement’s political discourses in its news coverage (Barker, 
2010). In the past few years, however, ASC has gained popularity among 
Palestinians and also across the Middle East, among others in cultural 
and children’s TV programmes (Alshaer, 2012). Evidence suggests both 
PSC and ASC are maintaining their popularity and ratings, including 
during the period of this study, as evidence from Al Zanon’s study 
already suggested, which showed that whilst two third of Gazans watch 
PSC programmes, three quarters watch ASC programmes (Al Zanon, 
2010). Reliable data is lacking for the West Bank, and for viewing figures 
of Palestinians watching other regional satellite channels, such as Al 
Jazeera and MBC. 
 Under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian 
Satellite Channel was initially established as a state television channel in 
1996. The Voice of Palestine radio station was also part of the Palestine 
Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), broadcasting from its headquarters in 
the Gaza Strip. In 1996, former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat 
appointed Fatah leader Radwan Abu Ayyash as overall Director of PSC 
(Jamal, 2000), and the US government funded PSC for two years, ending 
funding after 1998 (Brynen and El-Rifai, 2007). In 1999, PSC started its 
pilot broadcasting phase with 7 hours per day for approximately 6 
months on Nilesat moon, and then to Arabsat moon (these are both 
major satellite regulators in the Middle East). Until 2005, the PSC was 
administrated by Fatah’s minister of information Nabil Shaat (Sakr, 
2007), but in 2000, the PSC headquarters in Gaza were bombed several 
times by Israeli missiles.  
 Satellite media arrived relatively late in Palestine. Even beforehand, 
when Palestinian TV (the non-digital forerunner of the PSC) entered the 
scene, its lively imagery, characters and script brought about a profound 
change in how citizens received media messages and how TV operated 
as a media tool of political party organisations. Palestinian TV appeared 
relatively late in comparison with other Arab TV stations, and then fac-
tional messages and agendas enabled it to compete and spread more 
widely.  
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 Initially, PSC was the only satellite TV outlet which could be viewed 
outside of Palestine. The 2006 elections, however, brought both political 
changes and more local satellite TV channels. A distinctly Palestinian 
media has gradually and unevenly emerged, as Chapter 2 will show, from 
a series of conflicts and forms of occupation and colonisation. During 
every stage of Palestinian media development, foreign powers have 
exercised control, throughout the periods of the Ottoman Empire (not 
covered in this study but published in Omer, 2015), the British Mandate, 
Jordanian rule in the West Bank, Egyptian rule in Gaza, and the on-
going Israeli occupation. In addition, local factional agendas, Western 
patrons and donors and various civil institutions have impacted on the 
nature of the Palestinian media as it has emerged. The emergence of 
satellite TV, quite recently, is first outlined in this chapter, before 
Chapter 2 goes on to provide historical precedents and to contextualise 
this recent emergence of new forms of media, including satellite TV, in 
the Palestinian territories.  
Since local TV stations first appeared in Palestine in the early 1990s, it 
has become possible for those living in Gaza or the West Bank, Jeru-
salem or elsewhere, to pick up signals and watch TV through ‘receiver’ 
machines from Palestine, Israel, elsewhere in the Middle East and 
beyond the region. This poignantly highlights how freedom to move 
around the virtual world contrasts with the physical restrictions imposed 
on movement in and out of camps, of Gaza, of the West Bank and in 
and out of Israel. Such restrictions on physical movement across 
territories of historic Palestine are very evident in the separation wall and 
in multiple checkpoints.  
This study tentatively suggests that between the first and second 
intifada and the time of the Oslo Accords, the relatively positive and 
more peace-oriented influence of satellite TV, compared with the printed 
press and its relatively narrow focus on political news, became clear. It is 
also suggested that this may even have been a factor in reducing violence 
between Hamas and the PLO/Palestinian Authority to a ‘cold conflict’ 
rather than open hostilities and violence. Instead, such antagonisms 
become latent rather than being openly expressed through use of 
violence (Gerzon, 2014). 
Obviously, there are constant changes in the relations between Hamas 
and Fatah. Whereas Fatah began as a revolutionary organisation, it now 
takes part in state building, and its vision of attaining Palestinian 
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statehood is also apparent in much of PSC’s TV programming. Hamas, 
on the other hand, following Israel’s attack on Gaza in 2008-2009, began 
a process of reconstruction, by replacing what was destroyed during that 
time (Milton-Edwards, 2013). The ASC programme discourse started to 
include more international themes and actors, alongside the 
predominance of local themes and actors. In a nutshell, ASC represents 
itself as a Palestinian media outlet, humanistic in outlook but within a 
broader Islamic logic, whilst PSC sees itself as a more secular media 
outlet, with a nationalist logic first and foremost. Some of the content 
analysis later reveals that these self-perceptions do not always match the 
realities of programme content, however.  
 As factionalism has been gradually pushed aside, following the 2009 
national unity agreement, it was indeed hoped that Palestinian satellite 
media would start to focus on issues that unite rather than divide 
Palestinians. This is what the study explores - whether, since 2009, 
Palestinian satellite TV media producers of children’s and cultural 
programmes, have generally focused their coverage on values that 
reinforce national agendas, or not. One interesting aspect of this is to 
consider whether the intensified Israeli occupation, its impacts and 
shared forms of resistance to it in recent years, can help reinforce a sense 
of common Palestinian identity across the media (Tawil-Souri, 2009). A 
particular focus on the Israeli occupation may be one of the major 
reasons for the relative success of satellite TV stations in Palestine. PSC, 
in particular, became a main source of news, bringing accurate narratives 
related to the position of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority on the 
topic of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. On the other hand, ASC plays 
an important role in informing the audience with regard to the position 
of Hamas in countering negotiations, and in its inside coverage of the 
ongoing conflict and Israeli attacks (Alshaer, 2012). 
After a period of political polarisation in Gaza, the past few years 
appear to have been relatively calm in terms of political competition 
(Yousef, 2015). There has been a gradual move across the media towards 
new technologies. Viewers in Palestine, whether in Gaza or in the West 
Bank, can now read news headlines from around the world on-line. They 
can watch a choice of satellite TV channels through updated satellite 
dishes by pressing a few buttons on the remote control.  
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Palestinian TV channels compete with wider Arab satellite media. 
Going through the satellite channels in 2015, one finds a huge choice of 
TV stations, with the number of Arabic-language channels numbering 
over 850 by 2013 (Mussa, 2011: 24). The number of channels increased 
even more after the Arab Spring, especially among new political parties 
and movements that started their own satellite TV stations (Milton-
Edwards, 2013). Libya, for example, has approximately 19 TV channels, 
all accessible to any Arab citizen through the receiver box, even if the 
quality is highly variable. Channels provide space for entertainment, 
politics, culture, children’s programmes, sports and religion.  
In 2010, among Arab TV channels, 609 were privately owned, and 
124 were government-owned (Mussa, 2011:25). In terms of the focus of 
their content, 243 were public interest channels, 90 focused on music, 61 
on dramas, 37 on news, 59 on sports, 17 on business and the economy 
and 53 were religious channels (Mussa, 2011: 25). There were around 5 
children’s channels and 20 cultural channels at the same time. Among 
the main Palestinian TV outlets broadcasting within Palestine at the time 
of research, were Al Montada (The Forum), Falsteen Al Youm (Palestine 
Today), and Falsteen Al Ghad (Palestine Tomorrow). 
Palestinian satellite media have not yet attained the impressive level of 
diversity of Arab satellite TV. A majority of media outlets in Palestine are 
still linked to specific, narrow political agendas and cover news, culture, 
music, drama and sports, all in a single channel (Tawil-Souri, 2011). 
Being tied to specific political groupings or factions also means that 
Palestinian satellite TV may not have as much appeal beyond the 
Palestinian audiences at home and abroad. Their social, political, cultural 
and economic objectives may not appear as relevant outside of 
Palestinian audiences, and this may make it difficult for them to compete 
for larger viewing figures or sources of financial support.  
The large number of factional media outlets from the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip reflects the political division between the two most prom-
inent political parties, Fatah and Hamas (Al-Omari, 2010). At certain 
times in the past, TV media and satellite TV media, including those with 
children’s programmes and cultural programmes, have engaged in 
aggressive discourses which expressed, and may also have worsened, 
military confrontations between Fatah and Hamas. When Hamas won 
the majority vote in the 2006 elections, it also created ASC as its own 
media to compete with Fatah’s PSC. This enabled Hamas, at least 
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initially, to present its own point of view and advocate for its own 
political, economic and social agendas across Palestinian audiences. This 
in turn reinforced a schism in media structures, largely the result of the 
geographical division imposed by the Israeli occupation and the military 
blockade of Gaza (Rabbani, 2008).  
As one study documented, in 2009 around 80% of Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza relied on TV as their main source of news and 
information, rather than newspapers, as was the case a decade or so 
before (Al-Omari, 2010:57). A study by the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Center (JMCC, Poll 69, October, 2009 n.p.; JMCC, Poll 
26, 1998 n.p.) indicated that the number of Palestinians who owned 
satellite dishes was already high at the start of the first Intifada, and 
increased from 92% at the time of the second Intifada (2000-2005) to 
95.4% by October 2008 (Al Faqeh, 2011). This was a very different 
situation from that in the 1980s, when only one or two homes in each 
neighbourhood could afford to own a TV. Neighbours would gather in 
the house with a TV, to watch the evening news and then to discuss it.  
The number of factional TV and radio stations increased in Palestine, 
during and after the internal Fatah-Hamas conflict. Some studies have 
suggested that these channels, including the ASC and the PSC, played an 
important role in actually igniting violence (Hroub and Quneis, 2011). 
According to these studies, they did this by broadcasting incitement to 
violence, including provocative material that sought to justify military 
confrontation, for example in 2007. This in turn, may have enabled 
Hamas to maintain its control over Gaza and left the PA/Fatah with 
nominal control only over the occupied West Bank (Rabbani, 2008). 
Palestinian factions in both Gaza and the West Bank received permits to 
launch their own TV channels. However, in several cases, these licenses 
were not used to broadcast from within Palestine, and most TV channels 
continued to broadcast from outside the Palestinian territories (Al Behisi, 
2011). Unusually, both PSC and ASC made use of their licenses to 
broadcast from within the Palestinian territories.  
Since the Palestinian media are part of a larger network of Middle 
Eastern Arabic media, factional satellite media sometimes compete or 
work in alliance with outside media platforms. For example, the ASC 
works in the same model as Hezbollah Satellite TV channel Al Manar 
(Harb, 2011; Jumhour, 2009). Of course, local and external factionalised 
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agendas can also be influenced, or even imposed, by donors, which can 
result in selective programming choices. ‘There is no media without fi-
nancial support…[and] funding imposes conditions on the discourse and 
content’ (Al Faqeh, 2011: 21). It can be argued that over time a polarised 
media can reinforce a political Palestinian media culture that is divided 
into its respective parts, physically, virtually, or both (Skuse et al, 2011). 
The media tend to mirror a polarised society, with division among 
factions reflected back to the public of Palestinians at large, in Gaza, the 
West Bank, Jerusalem, Israel, and in the wider diaspora.  
In contrast to this is the view that the factionalism of the Palestinian 
media, including satellite TV media, does not only arise from, but in turn 
also reinforces, the fragmentation of Palestinian society and a high 
degree of internal social alienation (Jumhour, 2009). Palestinian audien-
ces may attempt to escape the factional media by tuning into other Arab 
satellite TV channels, as one study suggests (Al-Omari, 2010). One 
popular channel, Al Filistenya, attracts audiences with its satirical 
programming, something factional TV outlets generally do not include in 
their programming. This makes Al Filistenya a leader in the emerging 
Arabic comedy industry (Al Shayyeb, 2012). Overall, in a more 
competitive situation where audiences matter, most local TV stations are 
trying to break out of factionalism, and to gain higher audience ratings 
on some other basis, by broadcasting via UHF (Ultra High Frequencies) 
instead of VHF (Very High Frequencies) in an effort to reach out to 
wider audiences, including Arabic speakers beyond the Palestinian 
territories and the Palestinian diaspora.  
1.4 Objectives and Key Questions  
The objective of this research is to examine in-depth how factional 
media becomes defactionalised, by using some examples that can illus-
trate this, namely cultural and children’s programmes from two broad-
casting channels, Al-Aqsa Satellite Channel (ASC) associated with Hamas 
and the Palestine Satellite Channel (PSC), which is Fatah-based. The study 
has four aims:  
 To contextualise. The historical and social context of political 
struggle between two factions, both involved in Satellite TV content 
and production processes, is extremely important. The factional 
media are viewed as more proactive than passive, not only being 
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shaped by ideology during periods of relative political calm, but also 
fashioning such ideologies themselves. As Bielby and Harrington 
argue in their book, Global TV: Exporting Television and Culture in the 
World Market, almost every country around the world ‘produces 
television domestically within a distinctive national broadcast system’ 
(2008: 11). Additionally, this study links the production and content 
of selected Palestinian satellite TV media programmes with the wider 
context of satellite TV media across the Middle East and the longer-
term history of media in and across Palestine (Thawabteh, 2010; Al-
Hassani, 2010; Saleh, 2010; Kumsieh, 2009; Kraidy & Khalil, 2009; 
Sakr, 2001; Maiola and Ward, 2007). This helps to understand the 
active role and deeper workings of media in Palestine.  
 To examine content analysis thematically. The focus is on both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the content of children’s and 
cultural program on two Palestinian satellite TV stations that are 
factionally organised – but pehaps also ‘defactionalising’, during the 
study period of March 2009 to January 2010. Less attention is paid to 
overtly political elements of Palestinian media broadcasting, since this 
study considers the specific signs that cultural and children’s 
programming reflect wider elements of the national society, beyond 
the factions. It does this by identifying the presence and absence of 
pre-selected themes, and interpreting the quantitative data using a 
theoretical framework that is a synthesis of content analysis and 
media production approaches.  
 To theorise ‘defactionalised’ media production and trace new 
forms of emergent ‘Palestinianism’. Media production in factional 
and post-conflict societies can become another weapon in the battle 
for hearts and minds (Durham, and Kellner, 2001; Entman, 1993, 
2007). This study aims to explore how producers negotiate ‘circuits of 
media,’ and how they manage programming in a way that avoids 
factionalism. The aim is to contribute to conceptual clarification for 
academics and others interested in Middle Eastern media, of what is 
meant by ‘defactionalisation’. Collecting evidence about the content 
and production of satellite TV programmes in the two competing sta-
tions helps illustrate where the selected programmes’ forms of repre-
sentation and their content converge – or defactionalise – and where 
they are more polarised or factional. To put this in another way, this 
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study seeks signs of both ‘factionalism’ and ‘defactionalisation’, 
between Fatah and Hamas, through analysing media content and 
producers’ values, through the lens of selected children’s and cultural 
programmes (Abuzanouna, 2015; Sieberer, 2013). 
Above all, the study is an exploration of specific examples of what has 
here been termed: ‘media factionalism’ and ‘media defactionalisation’. 
Nine key themes were selected with field supervisors, following initial 
viewing of the programmes.  These were used to then code production 
content. These themes and their selection are justified in sub-section 1.6 
of this chapter. Though data on the production process is hard to obtain, 
it is important to answer the question of how ‘circuits of media’ translate 
into daily practices of producers. Different aspects of media production 
and content are explored, and the key interactions between media 
producers, their context, political elites, non-dominant groups and 
technologies are deduced.  
 As explained at the start of this chapter, the focus of the study is on 
four selected programmes - Sesame Street of PSC and Pioneers of Tomorrow 
of ASC both being children’s programmes, and cultural programmes 
which are Cultural Flashes, broadcast by PSC, and ASC’s Burning Brands. 
There is a strong comparative element to these choices, allowing some 
contrasts and similarities to emerge not only between two children’s 
programmes and two cultural programmes, but also between 
programming and content of the two competing satellite TV channels 
(ASC and PSC), each linked with competing political parties that are 
termed ‘factions’ in this study. For all episodes of the selected 
programmes, originally broadcast in the period March 2009 to January 
2010 (a total of 88 episodes,) the main research questions are as follows:  
1. What political, social and other contextual factors influence the 
day-to-day decisions of producers of these programmes and how 
do they communicate through media in a ‘factional’ or 
‘defactionalised’ way?  
2. In the local, regional and global context, how does the content 
and production of the four children’s and cultural programmes in 
these two satellite TV stations communicate issues in relation to 
the nine selected themes?  
The first main question relates to themes and content, and how these are 
influenced, represented and produced, whereas the second considers the 
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implications of how concepts are communicated, in relation to the no-
tion of defactionalisation of media. The first task is to observe the key 
themes that appear in both channels’ programmes, using a ‘circuits of 
media’ approach as proposed by D’Acci (2004). This also requires an 
element of analysis of the politics of representation, as proposed by both 
Stuart Hall (1997) and Richard Johnson (1986), among others. The 
second main question draws on a wider set of theoretical factors from 
the literature on media production (Mayer, Banks and Caldwell, 2009; 
Shoemaker and Resse, 1996; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980), in order to 
facilitate a better understanding of defactionalisation in the context of 
Palestinian media production. In addition, a number of sub-questions 
were identified, in relation to the broader questions above:  
a. What relevant economic and political factors have shaped 
programme content and production decisions in the selected 
episodes? 
b. Who influences day-to-day working practices and production 
processes in the two satellite TV stations, and decision-making in 
the production of the selected children’s and cultural 
programmes?  
c. Are non-dominant groups reflected in, or able to influence, 
content and production in the four selected programmes? 
d. What are the critical ‘sites’ in the ‘circuit of media’ for each sta-
tion’s programmes in terms of factionalism and ‘de-factionalising’ 
television content? 
These four sub-questions help operationalise the way in which the 
two main overarching questions are addressed. The first two sub-
questions contextualise production processes and content. The third asks 
about non-dominant actors, and the fourth sub-question examines some 
critical ‘sites’ in the ‘circuit of media’ of each station’s programme 
content. Overall, the answers require examples and analysis of their 
significance, drawing both on content of episodes and producer-oriented 
evidence of whether and how the ASC’s and PSC’s children’s and 
cultural programmes were relatively defactionalised during the relevant 
period of analysis. 
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1.5 Factionalism and Defactionalisation of Media  
It is clear that media in conflict zones, including the Palestinian media, 
can be used as a form of incitement, regardless of whether the conflict 
involves violence or is a conflict of words without overt violence. The 
responsibility of media for incitement of violence was reasserted legally 
in the ‘media trial’ of producers and journalists at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The history professor Nahimana and 
others were found guilty of crimes of incitement of genocide, and of 
genocide (Kaid, 2011; Thompson, 2007). Since official TV media outlets 
can present issues ‘either as exaggerated media fantasy or [as] instigated 
from the outside’ (Bishara, 2012:185), this kind of conflict, involving 
indirect rather than physical violence, is precisely what Palestinian media 
has been accused of at times, including by Western politicians and media. 
The role of the media in relation to violence and conflict – including 
conflicts with religious overtones – is recognised in both popular and 
scholarly discourse (Abu M’olaa, 2009; Zarkov, 2007; Payne, 2005).  
 Biases in reporting on the Middle East and beyond and the effects of 
such biased reporting on global events have been well documented 
internationally (Bishara, 2012; Dickson, 1994; Patterson, 1993). 
Following the 2006 elections, the Hamas Islamic movement entered 
mainstream politics and introduced a new dimension to broader 
Palestinian politics, in the form of religion-based resistance discourses 
(Brown, 2010; Brittain, 2008). Different definitions of factions and 
factionalism are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 (see for example 
Boucek, 2009; Boucek, 2012). According to one academic observer, 
factional media tend to embrace forms of ‘simplistic oppositional 
discourse’, with each side aiming at hegemony (Abu-Lughod, 2004). 
Early research already indicated that media in Palestine was subservient 
to particular ‘factional’ forms of power struggles.  
 The role of the media, post-conflict, as key actors and not just as 
passive rapporteurs, is now widely acknowledged in scholarly literature 
(for recent reviews, see Flew and Waisboard, 2015; Fridh and Wingren, 
2015; Pink, 2015; Dimaggio, 2009).However, in the modes of expression 
of two factions – one with a strong ‘religious’ identity, and the other with 
a renowned history of secularism – appearances may be deceptive (Al 
Barghouti, 2012; Daouwd, 2011). Later chapters will show that content 
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does not smoothly equate with the factional basis of ASC and PSC as 
media outlets.  
  The conflict between Hamas and Fatah was played out in the media 
even prior to the outbreak of physical violence between the two factions 
in June 2007. This conflict was conducted in a highly polarised way 
between two factions, one labelled ‘religious’ by its critics, or ‘funda-
mentalist,’ and the other, ostensibly nationalist, being labeled ‘moderate’ 
or ‘secular’ by the other side, and as overly willing to compromise. Each 
side used the media to fight this war of words, which according to the Al 
Quds newspaper (2010) started to appear in sound bites using TV chan-
nels. From a Western perspective, the squabbles were between a secular 
Fatah and religious Hamas. Yet, in media reporting in the period prior to 
June 2007, hostility between the two factions was not always expressed 
through religious or secular narratives. Other issues could take priority, 
such as mutual accusations of corruption or of a lack of legitimate 
leadership or political vision (Al-Omari, 2010; Khalaf, 2008). 
 Even so, for the US and European politicians and public officials, a 
sharp distinction is still drawn between two polarised ideologies, 
distinguishing the secular nationalism of Fatah from the Islamism of 
Hamas (Yousef, 2013). Regionally and internationally, the reactions to 
both PSC and ASC programmes, particularly children’s programmes, 
have sometimes been intense. Media outlets ranging from America’s 
National Public Radio (NPR), ABC, The New York Times, UK’s The 
Telegraph, BBC and scores of Arabic media outlets and bloggers’ spheres 
in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen and Jordan, have all commented on 
these programmes. Some have praised their programmes in glowing 
terms and others have responded mockingly or more critically. The 
online version of Der Spiegel (2007) reported: ‘Children who watch 
“Tomorrow’s Pioneers” might learn to rattle off the names of world 
leaders better than those who grew up with the real Mickey.’ “We will 
win, Bush!” Farfur1 squeaks at one point. “We will win, Condoleezza! 
We will win, Olmert! We will win Sharon.” The Daily Mail online edition 
(July 23, 2008), under the heading ‘Pictured: The TV rabbit preaching 
hatred and telling young Muslims to “kill and eat Jews’’’, described the 
Al Aqsa Satellite Channel (ASC) as a TV station that teaches hatred to 
children. Some scholarly studies have also discussed what is seen as the 
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politicisation of children’s TV programmes, especially of ASC (Warner, 
2015; Fuenzalida, 2015; Shmueli, 2014).  
 Although this view of rising extremism is still popular in the Western 
media, in the past few years, Fatah and Hamas have started to compete 
through discourses, through media and in political and religious arenas, 
with some surprising results. After examining how children’s and cultural 
television programmes are produced, and analysing their content, the 
more polarised view of Palestinian political realities may not apply, or at 
least not in the specific cases of ASC and PSC children’s and cultural 
programmes considered here, and not during the selected study period 
(March 2009-January 2010). In other words, the ASC and PSC may not 
simply be media extensions of two distinct factions involved in 
Palestinian governance; and their producers may have some capacity to 
move content beyond a narrow bi-polar factionalism (Sienkiewicz, 2012).  
 As argued by Mansour (2013), anyone who has followed PSC 
programmes in the past few years would notice that, especially since 
2009, the channel started to reach out to more diverse Palestinian and 
Arab audiences, as a direct result of improvements in programming. The 
Palestinian national administration started to pay closer attention to 
cultural and intellectual affairs, and not only to politics, news and peace 
negotiations. Mansour was Head of Planning at the PSC when the 
fieldwork for this study was conducted, and his argument can be viewed 
in one of two ways. Either he could be exaggerating the reach of the 
PSC, or he could be highlighting the efforts of the PSC to produce less 
factional media content, especially since 2009. Mansour himself has 
played a leading part in the PSC’s shift of focus towards more intellectual 
and cultural programming, which can be taken as a possible indicator of 
a trend towards ‘defactionalisation’, away from media factionalism.  
 A similar message was conveyed in an interview with the head of 
PSC’s programming, who stated: ‘we are tired of politics and blood – 
some people also want to listen to a poem, a song, or a child singing’ 
(Interview: Al Shafi, 2013).2 Palestine TV (another way of referring to 
the PSC) began to sense that even Palestinians living inside Israel felt a 
sense of ownership of the channel’s programmes, since they were calling 
in and offering suggestions as to what they would like to see (Mansour, 
2013).  
Just like PSC, ASC also became aware of the relevance of new 
developments as it started to shift its focus, away from focusing 
 Introducing the Research 23 
 
 
exclusively on news and politics, towards more cultural and educational 
programmes. The ASC’s editorial board, established in 2006, began to 
shift their message from local to more regional and even global 
audiences, who came to depend on ASC as a window into what was 
going on in Palestine, and especially inside Gaza (Interview: Al Bardawil, 
Head of ASC’s Board, 2013). This internationalisation of the audience 
also encourages compromise on some production decisions that 
influence content, as channels compete to gain hegemonic power over 
audiences (Gramsci, 1971). This made the ASC consider reviewing its 
vision so that it maintained the Islamic constants and principles, but was 
also more aware of attracting and keeping more diversified audiences. 
This is significant, since as Al Bardawil said in an interview with the 
researcher (2013): ‘…children’s and cultural programming are among the 
few areas not affected by the bones of factionalism.’ This study critically 
assesses this statement.  
Since the internal fighting of 2007, both the ASC and the PSC have 
attempted to appear to speak for broader and more universal interests. 
They both wish to become the voice for all Palestinians and beyond, per-
haps hoping to become a voice of authority in the manner of Al Jazeera 
or the BBC in current affairs. However, to do so they must appeal to 
more universal ideals than those implied by factionalism, and this must 
be reflected in the content of programmes, in relation to the key themes 
explored later in this chapter. If media moves beyond factionalism then 
the content of programmes should, by definition, speak to more than 
factional audiences. Examining the tensions and trends of efforts to 
move beyond factional satellite TV content, is something worth 
exploring in order to be able to established whether Palestinian satellite 
TV shows signs of moving away from more factional forms of media 
production of the past. 
 Cultural debates on Palestinian TV have always revolved around the 
politics of representation, including that which has been visible in chil-
dren’s programming (Tawil-Souri, 2011). Although each station can be 
seen as overtly political in its goals, what this study explores is how com-
petition for growing satellite TV audiences can shift dynamics of 
representation and contestation, perhaps resulting in less overtly ideolo-
gically media content, and in a shift of production values in the direction 
of media ‘defactionalisation’.  
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Factors such as the economic constraints on producers, and how this 
influences the content of media production, are also considered in this 
study, though mostly in passing. Economic stability plays an important 
role in the professionalism, and the lack thereof hampers most 
Palestinian media professionals. Perhaps with better economic prospects 
and a reasonable quality of life, more media professionals could afford to 
adhere to higher ethical and professional standards (Al-Omari, 2010). 
Journalists without a stable income to cover their basic family essentials 
and those of their family are more likely to be prone to 
unprofessionalism. They may feel obliged to forfeit their ethics in order 
to attain their basic minimum needs. In this way, the media environment 
is affected by the economic climate, and this in turn influences the 
quality of TV programming offered by Palestinian satellite media to the 
public. For instance, the financial capacity of the ASC is much lower 
than that of the PSC.  
Movement restrictions in Palestine and the terrible economic 
situation have both forced senior media professionals to move out of 
Palestine in search for new opportunities, usually through finding work 
with foreign media organisations. Overall, processes of de-escalation of 
factionalism have received little attention in the past, but they do take 
place in this adverse economic climate. The everyday compromises 
involved in production processes within Palestinian satellite TV stations 
like ASC and PSC have received relatively little academic attention so far. 
Since not everything can be covered in Chapter 1, on-going debates 
around definitions of factionalism and defactionalisation, and how these 
relate to other, related concpets, are returned to in more depth in 
Chapter 3.    
1.6 Synthetic Methodologies  
As a useful yardstick for assessing the extent of ‘defactionalisation’ in 
cultural and children’s satellite TV programmes, the ‘circuits of media’ 
approach, associated with D’Acci (2004), is used alongside content 
analysis methods. This mixed methodological approach draws on the 
successful research of Shoemaker and Reese (1996), which is itself based 
on a combination of the work of Gans (1979) and Gitlin (1980). Gans’ 
and Gitlin’s studies are used as part of the theoretical framework, to 
produce a synthetic, or mixed, overall set of methodologies for this 
study. This kind of approach is seen as useful to examine both media 
 Introducing the Research 25 
 
 
content in relation to specific programme episodes, and production, 
including factors that influence the people who produce media 
programmes. Institutional factors (socio-historical context, cultural 
artifacts and production processes) will influence the content of 
children’s and cultural programming in Palestine as elsewhere, and will 
all be identified in this study. For divided and conflict-riven societies, it is 
especially important to be aware of how a complex mix of factors 
influences content and production decisions in relation to specific 
programmes, like ASC and PSC children’s and cultural programmes.  
 This study will explore the extent to which PSC and ASC as 
institutions, and the media professionals working inside them, are trying 
to find compromises and adjust their messages so as to avoid alienating 
viewers. And it will ask how they do this whilst pleasing those who 
provide the funds. Each station may recruit people who do not 
necessarily believe in or follow the faction associated with that station, 
though such people will rarely make it to senior or controlling positions.  
 To keep track of the 10 months of data, and to make sense of the col-
lected materials and interviews, the methodology is divided into three 
parts. For the purposes of content analysis, 160 episodes of the four 
programmes were obtained – and 88 were selected randomly to be 
analysed. These included roughly equal number of episodes of two 
cultural programmes ‘Wamadat Thaqafiyya’ (Cultural Flashes) produced by 
ASC and ‘Attikum Beqabs’ (Burning Brands) produced by PSC, as well as 
two children’s programmes: ASC’s ‘Row’ad Al Ghad’ (Pioneers of 
Tomorrow) and PSC’s ‘Shari Simsim’ (Sesame Street). Originally the plan 
was to select 10-15 episodes of each programme, in order to create a 
manageable sample. Eventually it was agreed with field supervisors to 
select 23 episodes of each children’s programme, and 21 episodes of 
each cultural programme. This selection was done randomly, covering 
the entire period of 10 months, from the second half of March 2009 to 
the middle of January 2010.  
 The content of programmes will be analysed using key themes 
identified and agreed with field supervisors after initially viewing all 
episodes. These themes are seen to be of importance in the local context, 
whether they are present or not in the content of programmes. The 
themes were selected to assist in assessing how ‘defactionalised’ or 
‘factionalised’ media content seemed to be.3 Fuller definitions are 
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provided in Chapter 3.5 and in Appendix 3. The final list was agreed in 
consultation with two field supervisors and other experts, and includes 
themes seen as significant for analysing content in both children’s and 
cultural programmes in relation to how factional or defactionalised such 
content might be.  The nine selected key themes for content analysis are 
as follows:  
 nationalism  
 religious values  
 citizens’ rights and obligations 
 resistance  
 social values  
 cultural values 
 political values  
 educational values  
 entertainment  
These nine particular themes were selected for three reasons.  
1. First, in early viewing of episodes of TV programmes, these 
themes were found either to occur frequently or to be notably – 
and sometimes surprisingly - absent.  
2. Secondly, several of the themes related to debates around 
‘enhancing democratic communications’ in Palestine 
(Abuzanouna, 2012:51). The specific thematic content of PSC 
and ASC children’s and cultural programmes could then be 
linked with attention to the ‘democratisation’ of Palestine. As 
Arab ministers of information recently declared, new forms of 
media can become a kind of ‘offshore democracy’ in the Arab 
World (as quoted in Sakr, 2001: 150). Citizens’ rights were 
included as a proxy for democratization, given the context of 
overall Israeli occupation.  
3. Thirdly, some of the themes represent significant gaps in current 
research. Prominent Palestinian scholar Thawabteh (2010), in 
Palestinian Media Map: Production Congestion and Consumption 
Dispersion, suggests that specific issues, including the politics of 
resistance, need to be better understood in relation to production 
and content of Palestinian media. This theme has therefore also 
been included.  
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Chapter 3 will present the methodology in more detail, but it is 
already important to explain that these themes for content analysis were 
selected through a ‘grounded’ process of first watching all episodes 
several times. The themes were then selected as they appeared, and some 
were retained as significant, while others were not.  Some themes that 
did not appear were also retained.  All the themes were then discussed 
with field supervisors in Gaza. To capture the most significant content, 
each key theme was coded separately by watching the episodes again, 
and categorised in wider summative codes, in a slow but methodical 
process designed to help answer the main research questions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994:56). This was done using a standard form designed to 
enter thematic data for content analysis (see Appendix 1).  
Looking at different episodes, and looking closely at the narratives, 
text and image content was central to the content analysis. The approach 
adopted was to conceptualise ‘factionalism’ in a post-conflict situation as 
being largely about shifting content and media practices. It is worth 
noting that earlier research on factionalism in the printed press – also 
using coding of content – found that only the relatively ‘independent’ 
Palestinian newspaper Al Quds did not make use of religious or factional 
forms of expression and narratives in its news reporting (Jamal, 2000).  
1.7 Fieldwork amidst Dissonance: practical and ethical 
considerations  
This study is neither intended to delegitimise any of the parties 
researched, nor to discredit their motives. Rather, the study suggests that 
both sets of media producers may be only partially aware of the out-
comes of ‘their’ media representations, as expressed in programme 
content and production decisions. As Hall (1997) stated, such ideologies 
are not always consciously formulated, but mostly unconsciously. To 
collect evidence, I engaged in an extended period of field research that 
has allowed me to combine a strategy of content analysis with semi-
structured interviews with TV producers and other production and 
media personnel (for their names and positions, see Appendix 7).  
Each media channel will have its specific political culture or media 
culture as well as its own organisational culture. However, all of this is 
distinct from what is called ‘culture’ in cultural studies or anthropology. 
Culture can broadly be defined as what a researcher ‘has found and could 
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attribute successfully to the members of that society in the context of his 
[or her] dealing with them’ (Goodenough, 1976: 5). However, faction-
alism is not so much about culture, as about politics. The primary 
principle of a factionalised media is political, not cultural, and this means 
that in factional media, political considerations tend to have a strong 
impact on programme content than cultural influences.  
However, since ideology does not entirely shape the content of 
programmes, the experience of being a ‘scholar-practitioner’, conducting 
in-depth interviews in a context where the researcher had worked for 
some time, helped make ‘the familiar strange,’ reinforcing a sense of 
rediscovery and of exploration during fieldwork (Erikson, 1984:62). 
Going further, in-depth interviewing helped to make ‘the obvious’ ‘even 
more clear’ as well (Spindler, 1982:15). As some researchers suggest, 
such in-depth interviewing, in a context with which the researcher is 
familiar, can be used to: ‘deepen and sharpen our understanding of the 
complexities of conflict-ridden societies’, including our own. Thus, for 
instance:  
In-depth interviews can be conducted with rebels in a remote jungle to 
understand their reasons to fight, with political leaders in a post-conflict 
country to explore how they perceive international peace building initia-
tives … the research method of in-depth interviewing is used to learn of 
individual perspectives on one or a few narrowly defined themes. The 
questions used to guide the interview are often semi-structured, i.e., the 
researcher has formulated a set of questions that all interviewees will be 
asked (Brounéus, 2011: 130). 
The aim of such interviews has been to complement the quantitative 
dimension of content analysis. In addition, documents from the Ministry 
of Education and Higher Education, and the Ministry of Culture in the 
Palestinian territories have been useful sources for background 
information. To strengthen understanding of producers’ decisions, the 
semi-structured interviews were conducted during fieldwork; both in 
Gaza and, by using Skype, in West Bank. The interviews revealed how 
each satellite TV channel’s producers chose to deliver an interpretation 
of the world that emphasised the importance of their allied factional 
political actors in shaping reality on the ground. Such interviews revealed 
how factional media operated, as a means of power; and the interviews 
also revealed how producers sought to resist the temptations of 
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factionalism, by making decisions about programme themes that had 
goals beyond the support for one’s own faction. 
The focus of semi-structured interviews was on the interactions 
between producers and programme creators, on the criteria used for 
reviewing materials before airing them, and on the intervention of 
political and religious authorities in the processes of media production and 
their eventual airing on satellite TV. The views of the media production 
crew were essential for the research, as they provided a more 
contextualised understanding of processes of production in relation to 
the analysed content. There were two journalists who only agreed to be 
intervieweded under condition of strict anonymity. To honour this 
agreement, both were referred to as Interview: journalist, where their 
views were cited.  Given the sensitivity of their straightforward answers, 
I was grateful to both of them for agreeing to talk, and also of course to 
all those who agreed to being cited in this study.  
It might appear that for a Palestinian journalist it should be quite 
straightforward to conduct this kind of research on the Palestinian 
media. Being a practicing journalist, and a scholar-practitioner, the 
researcher is indeed in the unusually fortunate position of having a 
‘reflexive’ approach to the subject matter of this thesis (Pink, 2015; 
Mayer, Banks and Caldwell, 2009: 10). However the research process was 
also hampered by the researcher’s insider status, as far as mobility and 
access to the West Bank was concerned.  As is more fully analysed in 
Chapter 3, the research process had its own dynamics and complications 
that represent the downside of the researcher’s ‘insider’ status in Gaza. 
Some ‘insider experiential knowledge’ may well have helped the 
researcher obtain material and interviews that would have proven 
impossible for others to identify, or find. This will help ensure that the 
study contributes original scholarship around how programmes are 
produced, and what can be known about this process.  
The aim has been to contribute to new knowledge and to engage in 
on-going debates about media practices during ‘cold conflicts’ generally, 
and in Palestine specifically. This aim follows on from the 
recommendation of D’Acci (2004) to focus on specific ‘socio-historical 
sites’ in media work. During the selected period of 10 months, between 
March 2009 and January 2010, media content and production conditions 
were formed by dominant social practices at the time. Therefore, analysis 
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of context and content are both essential to help appreciate how, during 
that ten-month period, selected programme content came about and 
what its meaning was in relation to factions, factionalism and moving 
beyond them.  
 The semi-structured interviews centred on the production processes 
involved in making the four selected TV programmes, and this allowed 
the respondents the freedom to expand their answers and express what 
is not always visible from analysing media content, especially choices 
made behind the scenes and the reasons some choices were not made 
(Wiethoff, & Gehring. 2012). As several scholars have argued, content 
analysis on its own is not a sufficient method for understanding how a 
kind of media is produced, or the implications of different kinds of 
content (Morgan 1993). This is why it is important that staff and media 
producers add the deeper context of what they have produced and why.  
This contextualises the understanding that emerges of how events and 
PSC and ASC programming are shaped.  
 Selected for their flexibility, semi-structured interviews were expected 
to yield a better understanding of the content and modes of production 
in cultural and children’s TV programming than a more structured or 
survey-type set of questions. Interviews were face-to-face, relatively 
informal in some cases, and were often conducted while also observing 
the production process of the TV programmes. The aim was not only to 
extract information, but also to grasp the dynamics of the social realities 
operating inside media institutions like ASC and PSC. The research has 
taken into consideration the growing voices within media studies and 
social sciences, calling for greater balance and synthesis among various 
qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches, which are no 
longer seen as alternatives, but as complementary (Clark, 2006).  
As Clark puts it, carrying out fieldwork in the Middle East requires 
the researcher to contend with ‘political authoritarism and violence, anti-
Americanism… deep cultural differences related to religion and, as a 
result, gender’ (Clark, 2006: 417). Setting up interviews with producers of 
factional media has proven to be a challenging task, not only because of 
some producers’ unwillingness to participate, but also because both TV 
outlets experience different dilemmas that they expressed from the 
moment of first contacts about this research.  
Within PSC, producers were understandably careful about making 
comments and statements that related in any way to how the PSC is 
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funded or the role of donors.  As a matter of priority, they wanted to 
ensure the research findings would not upset any of their donors. 
However, for the ASC, the questions revolved instead around the 
background of the researcher, and what kind of specific questions the 
researcher would want to ask. ASC producers did not want to contribute 
to any type of research that could be used to delegitimise the Hamas-
oriented media or its programmes.  
Given these reservations expressed by interviewees, the researcher 
finds it appropriate to discuss some dilemmas involved in the 
interviewing process. Trust is influenced by how interviewees perceived 
themselves and the researcher, in terms of seniority, collegiality and 
shared professional and perhaps political values. The process of 
interviewing involved a delicate balance between maintaining these 
forms of trust, overcoming distrust, and obtaining critical insights by 
probing further and asking more from the interviewees than they might 
have intended to disclose. Media producers in Gaza and West Bank 
resembled ‘closely guarded communities’, as identified in one study 
(Mayer, Banks and Caldwell, 2009).In another context, it was similarly 
noted that a significant concern during fieldwork is: ‘Addressing practical 
issues of gaining access to closely guarded communities; the impact of 
professional identities on types of disclosure in the field; and the “trade-
offs” between research and work’ (Mayer, Banks and Caldwell, 2009: 10).  
Face-to-face interviews were mostly held during 1-2 hours sittings, 
often within the production site for ASC – for Pioneers of Tomorrow and 
Burning Brands, or over the telephone with the PSC producers of Sesame 
Street and Cultural Flashes. On two occasions, the researcher had to return 
for a follow-up interview to address questions that needed a bit of 
clarification or to draw out more information from producers about the 
content analysis carried out during the course of the same year. The re-
searcher interviewed the head of the ASC Board of ASC, Dr. Al 
Bardawil, and Mr. Al Shafi, head of PSC programming, who were proven 
to be willing to assist by ‘snowballing’ (Berg, 2004, 36), identifying others 
who would be the right people for the researcher to interview. The 
researcher was referred to Al Bardawil and Al Shafi by on-the-ground 
producers who preferred all research questions to be dealt with at a more 
senior management level.  The 26 open-ended questions posed to those 
interviewed are listed in Appendix 2.  
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One of the interviewees found some of the questions uncomfortable, 
highlighting why it is appropriate to make a note of this and discuss why 
and how rapport and trust must first be built if uncomfortable topics are 
to be addressed. The researcher tried to avoid leading questions in the 
first round of interviews – however, after screening and content analysis, 
he tried to establish a deeper understanding of why the programmes 
appeared as they did, where less factional content was obvious. In 
addition, the researcher had to listen to his interviewees without 
objecting to their views, so as not to risk ‘…the curtailment of the 
interview or the self-censorship of the interviewee’ (Clark, 2006: 420). 
1.7.1 Interviews at the PSC 
Unlike with the ASC, setting up interviews with PSC producers and staff 
proved difficult, for various reasons, mostly logistical and the effects of 
occupation. Upon return to the field, the researcher found that the PSC 
no longer had an office in Gaza. Travel restrictions and denial of travel 
documents to permit access to the West Bank by the Israeli authorities, 
meant the researcher could not travel to the West Bank. The only other 
option was to rely on phone calls and e-mails. The researcher’s request 
to Mr Riad Hassan, an aide of President Abbas, for access to programme 
materials and for introductions to PSC staff, too a full year to be 
handled, and was only finally resolved when a diplomat travelled to 
Gaza.  
 Only after a written appeal to President Abbas, did Mr Ahmed Al-
Hazzouri, head of PSC, give permission for his staff members to take 
part in interviews for this study. The response came after encouragement 
from Dr Nabeel Khateeb whom the researcher met at a Geneva media 
conference and who, as a minister, believed in the relevance of this 
study. Among those interviewed were some internal PSC staff members, 
and some ancillary staff involved in programme production. Below, each 
one of my interviewees in Gaza and West Bank is briefly introduced.  
Saleh Shafi (PSC Senior official). The researcher had not been familiar 
with the work of Mr Shafi, and vice versa. Mr Shafi, a Fatah nationalist, 
met with the researcher twice in his PSC Gaza office - a relatively new 
location. Mr Shafi was a PhD candidate, which provided a common base 
from which to build rapport and trust. He understood, from face-to-face 
discussion, the role of a researcher asking questions, including those 
which might have seemed difficult or unanswerable. Mr Shafi showed 
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flexibility and allowed this researcher to talk to all the people involved in 
production, and to watch sections of some episodes. In the second 
interview, when he was confronted with the result of content analysis, he 
accepted the findings, and found some results surprising, including the 
lack of explicit religious content, something discussed further in 
Chapters 6 and 7. It is doubtful Mr Shafi was free to say all he wanted, 
and despite his senior position, he was cautious when being interviewed. 
He understood that, under the de facto authority, he could be held 
responsible for any statement he made.  
Mr Imad Al Asfar (Head of Programming Unit, PSC). The 
researcher was not able to meet with Mr Al Asfar face-to-face, but he 
seemed an open-minded, intellectual type of person. We communicated 
via telephone, but Mr Al Asfar preferred to answer my questions via e-
mail. As self-critical of Fatah and PA, he proved – throughout the 
questions – his willingness to engage in a serious academic interview. 
However, on some occasions, and unlike Mr Shafi, he expressed his bias 
against Islamist thinking in general. The researcher then had to express 
neither agreement, nor disagreement. This helped Mr Al Asfar to open 
up more and facilitated the building of rapport and trust. I made sincere 
efforts to show him that I would do my best to simply listen and keep an 
open mind. 
Mrs Layla Sayeigh (Head of Sesame Street workshop). Establishing 
contact with Mrs Sayeigh proved extremely difficult, as she is external to 
the PSC setting. Mrs Sayeigh expressed how busy she was, and the re-
searcher tried several ways to get in touch. After several months, contact 
was made with Mrs Sayeigh, via her daughter, with the help of colleagues 
at Columbia University. From this point onwards, Mrs Sayeigh proved 
she wanted to engage in the interview process, even though when I did 
send her questions, she left some unanswered. Next, I called to request a 
90-minute interview via telephone, which happened some months later. 
During the interview, Mrs Sayeigh refused to show any real identity in 
depth – but dealt with all questions, except those concerning budgets 
and how finances were allocated and distributed. Mrs Sayeigh 
recommended the researcher should ask her financial officer for answers 
to these particular questions.  
Mr Mohammed Abu Shammalah (Sound Man, formerly for Cul-
tural Flashes). The researcher noticed a gap in the flow of information 
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from Cultural Flashes, since none of those involved in this programme 
in the past worked for the PSC any more by the time the interviews were 
being arranged. However, Abu Shammalah – not a top producer but a 
soundman involved in on-the-ground production of Cultural Flashes – 
was one staff member who could still contribute in a face-to-face 
interview. The information he provided was mainly concerned with the 
psychosocial context and the production process, and dealt with the 
Gaza de facto authority, from the perspective of someone working for 
PSC. As an outsourced staff member, he showed more flexibility in 
engaging in honest discussion, and was not strongly affiliated with Fatah. 
Mr Abu Shammalah seemed to have appreciated the researcher’s 
invitation to participate, as an expert involved with the show. The value 
of speaking to those who are involved directly in the production process, 
and not only to managers, has been stressed by in other studies (Mayer, 
2011; Mayer, 2009).  
1.7.2 Interviews at the ASC  
Getting interviews and materials was relatively easier in the case of ASC 
than in PSC. This was for several reasons. Firstly, the researcher could 
meet ASC staff face-to-face and thus found it much easier to make 
arrangements. Also, the researcher had existing contacts with several 
Hamas-affiliated journalists, and was able to lobby for interviews 
through them. Establishing rapport was also relatively easier, given the 
immediate presence of the person interviewed in the room, with the 
researcher, and our common backgrounds in Gaza. Generally the 
interviews conducted in Gaza went well, with the field supervisor, Dr 
Ahmed Al-Turk, facilitating a couple of interviews by advocating among 
satellite TV professionals that I was someone critical to talk to. He also 
stressed that I did not seek to create problems or take up too much of 
the interviewees’ time. This helped to open doors in cases where 
producers might otherwise have been reluctant to see me.  
Dr Salah Al-Bardawil (Head of the Board of the ASC). Dr Al-
Bardawil was interviewed twice in his capacity as head of the ASC Board. 
He holds the highest authority in ASC and seemed to view the researcher 
as someone who needed in-depth answers and explanations of events. 
Dr Al-Bardawil is a top leader of Hamas and a lawmaker, elected in the 
2006 elections, who previously worked as a university Professor of 
Arabic Literature in Gaza, and he often appears on TV. Trust was built 
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by openly explaining the purpose of the doctoral research, and 
explaining that there was no intention of undermining or delegitimizing 
either the PSC or the ASC. Dr Al-Bardawil also acts as a spokesman for 
the Hamas parliamentary group, and met with the researcher in the 
Hamas spokesman office, where he works. Despite a couple of 
interruptions by reporters coming in for quick interviews – for which Dr 
Al Bardawil apologised graciously – he was generous in allowing time for 
the two interviews. The second interview was to request answers on the 
basis of the outcome of content analysis, conducted by the researcher. 
Dr Al Bardawil had requested the operational definitions of selected 
themes and then agreed to comment on the second set of questions 
related to why some percentages were high, and others low or moderate. 
This proved a very useful follow-up interview.   
Mr Samer Abu Mohsen (Head of the ASC’s Programming Depart-
ment). As a senior ASC staff member, Mr Abu Mohsen’s trust was 
based on his being a neighbour of the researcher. We often saw one 
another in the nearby mosque at prayer time. Mr Abu Mohsen provided 
time for the interview, and also facilitated the researcher’s access to 
archives and other written materials. Known for his moderate position 
within Hamas, he is also very active in his media role, and brings 
journalists together regardless of political affiliation. He was aware of the 
researcher’s involvement as a journalist, but the relationship of trust was 
based not so much on collegiality as on neighbourliness. The interview 
occurred at the ASC’s headquarters and was pleasantly relaxed and also 
informative.  
Mr Younies Abu Jarad (Presenter/producer Burning Brands). In 
addition to being both a presenter and a producer for Burning Brands, Mr 
Abu Jarad is also a poet and an ambitious TV personality, who often 
appears to be modeling Palestinian TV in the same style as Al Jazeera. 
Mr Abu Jarad is a proud affiliate of the Islamic Movement and dedicated 
to the study of history, having obtained his MA in Modern History. Fol-
lowing a short meeting over coffee, at the ASC headquarters, Abu Jarad 
suggested we conduct the interview at the Palestinian Writers Union, 
where he an active member. Initially, the interviewee was tense and 
reluctant to engage with some of the questions asked, concerning the 
lack of women’s participation in the ASC programmes, for instance. 
However, he remained calm until at some point the interview was 
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interrupted by a phone call, and after this, he appeared to become less 
trusting, and even stated that some of my questions sounded 
‘intelligence-oriented’. I reassured him this was not the case, but even so, 
this proved a difficult interview, and quite tense. Abu Jarad refused to 
deal with one of the questions, which asked about ‘compromises’ made 
in terms of content for the sake of reducing factionalism. In the end, he 
suggested that ‘compromises’ was the wrong word, and suggested using 
the word ‘sacrifices’ instead.  
Mr Ayman Al Amriti (Producer of Pioneers of Tomorrow). By 
interviewing Al Amriti, in his capacity as producer of Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
I was able to discuss and examine what could be viewed as a controver-
sial show. The researcher knew the producer, only recently, in his 
capacity as member of the production team. The interview took place at 
Al Amriti’s private production company, which was less pressured than 
at the ASC headquarters, given his busy schedule there. On one 
occasion, he had to end the interview, postponing it to the next day, due 
to an emergency. Mr Al Amriti engaged in all forms of questions and 
seemed to have a special interest in how production takes place, not just 
in ASC, but across the whole Arab region. He acknowledged that having 
been raised in the environment of the mosque had shaped his 
personality, but also that his studies in Fine Arts had made him take 
production and décor seriously when producing a programme.  
 
Producers were contacted prior to, as well as after, the viewing of 
episodes of specific programmes, and their remarks, placed alongside the 
results of content analysis, helped to make sense of what was emerging 
from the content analysis. The heads of programming of both television 
stations were approached for discussion on the initial findings. On some 
occasions, to cross-check analysis done, a board member was 
approached for a post-analysis discussion to verify and clarify the 
remaining material.  
Through these interviews, and other, informal talks, I drew on 
experiential knowledge, and a network of contacts, especially in Gaza. I 
introduced myself as an independent researcher, who had worked for 
international media outlets, and not been closely associated previously 
with either of the two main ‘factions’ whose media he was now 
researching. In the field research, I made an effort to provide clear and, 
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where possible, prior information on the objectives and expected 
outputs of interviews with producers, officials and scriptwriters of both 
TV stations.  
However, the most challenging part of the whole research process, 
both for PSC and ASC programmes, was the actual copying of 
programme content. This took many months, since it involved acquiring 
video tapes, copying them, and then exchanging them for new ones. This 
proved the greatest obstacle to obtaining data, since without securing 
archived (data) materials from the actual programmes of the PSC and 
ASC, content analysis could not take place. Neither of the two TV 
stations seemed to expect anyone to conduct ‘independent research’ on 
the actual content of children’s and cultural programmes. The archives 
of recordings of the programmes from the research period, proved very 
difficult to locate and even harder to access them and gain permission to 
copy the material.  
In a complex process one researcher had described (Figenschou, 
2010), I was gradually able to identify a group of ‘media elites’ who were 
acting as gatekeepers in the media and who held key positions within 
Fatah and Hamas, controlling access to ‘factional’ media outputs. This 
situation is not unusual or new in the Middle East, as Palestinian elites 
across Palestine have managed to ‘influence and shape the media, 
including regional satellite channels’ for many decades (Figenschou, 
2010:695). However, the result was that ‘editorial content is ultimately 
attributable not to people outside the elite but to political agendas that 
reflect patterns of elite ownership and control’ (Sakr, 2007:6). Such elites 
can also control who gets to do what research, and can have access to 
which material.  
 Techniques for accessing data and interviewees have been discussed 
continuously in the literature on media elite groups, as they are often 
difficult to penetrate. As argued by Figenschou (2010) for the Middle 
Eastern context more generally, there is a lack of critical and 
independent research institutes, and little understanding of what kinds of 
methodologies researchers use to analyse production and media content. 
In the Palestinian context, most universities remain under the direct or 
indirect control of political groups. Critical researchers can be suspected 
of working for and promoting foreign interests, and this also helps 
explain a serious shortage of academic publications and journals on 
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media communications in the region (Figenschou, 2010; Ayish, 2008a). 
The lack of first-rate, critical academic media programmes at universities 
in the region has also been noted (Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007: 162).  
 Due to especially difficult access and movement, imposed by the 
Israeli blockade on Gaza, it has already been explained that the 
researcher was obliged to conduct many interviews for this research via 
telephone, or to ask questions and obtain responses through e-mail. It 
took an appeal to the Palestinian president himself, as mentioned before, 
before archival materials were released, after a permit was issued by the 
PSC for this purpose.4 Such measures were not needed to conduct 
interviews, but in Palestine in particular, ‘studies of production inevitably 
involve and animate complex, and sometimes problematic, relations 
between researchers and their human subjects’ (Mayer, Banks and 
Caldwell, 2009: 5), even where the researcher would be regarded as an 
insider in relation to the Palestinian setting. Furthermore, my position as 
a professional journalist working mainly in Gaza as a ‘scholar-
practitioner’ implied that I had to negotiate my interviews and other 
contacts very cautiously, including inside Gaza (Mayer, 2009). 
When, after more than six months of high-level requests, it became 
apparent that travel to West Bank would simply not be permitted, 
another strategy had to be devised.  Neither PSC nor ASC showed much 
enthusiasm about the study being conducted, perhaps fearing that the 
research would reflect critically on their programme output and 
production processes. Given the importance of the political economy of 
media production, it was not surprising that producers were mostly 
unwilling to release valuable information with regard to finances and the 
costs of episodes of the various programmes. In this reluctance, the 
researcher recognised Arab media officals resorting to ‘bureaucracy’ to 
avoid divulging important but sensitive information (Figenschou, 2010: 
971). The researcher was able to obtain some of this kind of financial 
information from secondary sources, and later could verify a few details 
in interviews and discussions with the heads of the two TV stations, but 
most details were not available. Those statistics that are available provide 
estimates that vary considerably. Some were, however, confirmed as 
accurate by all parties involved.  
Sometimes the producers asked about the research methodology. 
This happened, for example, when the head of the Board of ASC, Al 
Bardawil, questioned some of the operational definitions of themes (see 
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Appendix 3) as used for content analysis. He queried why the themes of 
religious values, for which frequencies of appearance were low for both 
ASC programmes, were defined as they were.  This result was quite 
shocking to him. Where relevant, the operational definitions were shared 
with him and with other interviewees, to ensure proper responses from 
the production and editorial teams of both PSC and ASC programmes.  
Every producer of cultural and children’s TV programmes has his or 
her personal vision of how things are organised in the TV station where 
they work or which they are affiliated with. These personal versions have 
been called ‘propriospects’ of cultural knowledge by one author 
(Goodenough, 1981: 111). They are important and should not be 
overlooked. I have tried to ensure sufficient space in the text of this 
study to ensure that these visions of the interviewees are able to be 
expressed and are integrated into the analysis.  
1.8 Outline of Chapters  
Following this Introduction to the research topic as a whole, Chapter 2 
traces the historical foundations of the Palestinian media’s configuration 
today. Although the roots of Palestinian media can be traced to the late 
years of the Ottoman Empire, Chapter 2 starts with the years of the 
British Mandate, and focuses especially on the period since the 1948 
Nakba (or Disaster), critical for the emergence of a distinctly Palestinian 
national – but also in some ways factional – media. When Palestinians 
became displaced en masse, as discussed in Chapter 2, there gradually 
emerged, within the printed press, a form of media that tended to be 
politically and personally ‘factional’ in orientation and structure. This 
tended to undermine strong emerging notions of shared Palestinian 
identity, expressed in anti-colonial and anti-occupation nationalism that 
aimed to bring all people and territories of ‘Palestine’ together.  
Chapter 3 provides the reader with the necessary explanations of how 
theoretical and methodological considerations mesh, and describes the 
key conceptual tools that made close analysis of satellite TV content and 
production possible, the main data of this study. Chapter 4 traces various 
elements that compose the background to the working environment of 
the media in Palestine, looking at the various constraints imposed on 
media producers as a result of Israeli occupation, among other factors.  
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Chapter 5 discusses ASC’s and PSC’s cultural and children’s 
production and programming, tracing the background and vision of each 
of the two TV outlets first of all, and examining the structure of the four 
programmes compared in this study. Some initial comparisons in content 
between them are outlined, with a few examples. The chapter concludes 
by addressing one of the research questions, on the role that journalists 
play in children’s and cultural TV programming.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, the central questions are explored further by 
looking at potential links between production and content through a 
‘circuits of media’ approach.  These two chapters are mainly a dense 
description of the occurrence of selected themes in all episodes of the 
ASC’s and PSC’s children’s and cultural programmes, with each theme 
dealt with in turn. Chapter 6 first considers content themes and 
production values as they appear in children’s programmes on ASC and 
PSC. Chapter 7 then deals with both content themes and production 
values for PSC.  These two chapters follow D’Acci’s (2004) framework 
for understanding the critical circuits of media production processes. 
The different themes presented in these two chapters are each fully 
discussed with reference to specific and identified episodes in which they 
either appear often, appear a little, or do not appear at all. The question 
of why content appeared in this way is central to these two chapters, and 
Chapter 7 concludes by applying the model of Gitlin (1980) and Gans 
(1979) to examine the influence of key individuals and specific 
organisational routines on content. Chapter 8 then offers key findings on 
the defactionalising of media content and emergent forms of 
‘Palestinianism’ in media production and content.  
From a general understanding of history, context and shape of the 
two media outlets, followed by content analysis and closer examination 
of the production process, we arrive at a better understanding of how 
producers in Palestinian satellite TV may be trying to move beyond 
‘factionalism’ in both children’s and cultural programs. We note in 
Chapter 8, the re-emergence of Palestinianism’ in this study. In Chapter 
8, this is discussed in more detail, along with some insights drawn from 
the study as a whole, especially in relation to the role of technology, the 
role of ‘domestic’, regional and international competition and the role of 
women’s voices and minorities. Chapter 9 is the Conclusion, and returns 
to the overall findings, including a few recommendations on how to 
move forward for the media in Palestine, through a formal code of 
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conduct. This last chapter links specific cases in this study to the wider 
field of media research in conflict and post-conflict situations.  
 
 
 
 
Notes  
1 Farfur is the ASC’s Mickey Mouse character who was killed in the final episode 
of Pioneers of Tomorrow.  
2 Please note that all interviews are provided in this format: Name, year. Full 
details of the location and date of interviews and of the role of the interviewee, 
are provided in a later section of this chapter.  
3 These factors were selected following in-depth discussion with the field 
supervisors, Professor Khader Khader and Professor Ahmed al Turk, both of the 
Islamic University in Gaza. After that, external assessors, including Professor 
Nafeed Barakat, were asked to check their relevance. There was considerable 
debate about how to identify and select themes that could best reveal ‘factional’ 
and ‘non-factional’ or ‘defactionalised’ content. 
4 After weeks of negotiations with the ASC’s Board of Directors, the researcher 
got access to the data – some extra months were needed to secure materials from 
the PSC in Ramallah, partially because the researcher had not been given a permit 
by Israel to conduct the research – despite interventions by the Netherlands 
authorities. Yet, the materials were handed over after contracting a company to 
copy materials on behalf of the researcher. The process involved contact with the 
aide of President Mahmoud Abbas and other ministers. In regular situations, 
such materials would be available online, but because of the conflict, material that 
is aired is never kept for later use – as if both the PSC and ASC do not want to 
refer back to these periods once a national unity deal is signed. See Clark (2006) 
for some of the difficulties of fieldwork in sensitive environments.  
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2 A Short History of Media in Palestine: Perceptions and Perspectives 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the media is presented as a key vehicle of expression of 
an emergent sense of distinctive Palestinian national identity. In line with 
Benedict Anderson (2006: 34-39), the media can be seen as one of the 
key tools for constructing an ‘imagined community’ of Palestine and 
Palestinians. The chapter starts with the suggestion of Anderson that 
nationalism starts to take modern forms with the appearance of print 
media in the national language (Anderson, 2006). This chapter explores, 
roughly chronologically, and by type of media, the connection between a 
sense of emerging Palestinian identity and the structure and content of 
media outlets. The chapter covers the emergence of media in Palestine 
through three key phases: (i) the British Mandate, following the collapse 
of the Ottoman Sultanate; (ii) the Israeli occupation, settlement and 
expulsion of Palestinians from their land from 1948 onwards; (iii) the 
two intifadas, Israeli wars and inter-factional fighting of recent years. 
What this chapter will show is how media has successively reinforced 
both national imaginaries of Palestine and the sense that Palestinians are 
subject to factional forces and influences, which divide them.  
 Through a broad historical narrative, based on archival work in local 
repositories, the chapter explores potential meanings of the term 
factionalism, relating it to notions of partisanship, clannishness, elite 
influences and, eventually, to nationalism. Media has been factionalised 
to the extent that print or other media express sectarian, political and 
factional divisions in society, especially in relation to inter-elite rivalries 
(Quneis, 2011). However, national imaginaries have tended to resurface 
during critical periods, and are never entirely absent, being expressed 
alongside narrower, more factional forms of expression and 
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identification in the printed press. Technologies of media start with the 
earliest printing presses right up to contemporary satellite media and 
social media, and new forms are still emerging in the present. However 
we start with the British mandate and end some time in the 1990s.  
2.2 Background: Media under the British Mandate  
(1920-1948)  
During the first two years of World War I (1914 to 1916), the Ottoman 
state stood against the French and British, and was eventually defeated in 
the middle of the war. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 divided up 
the territories of the former Ottoman Empire between the two new 
imperial powers. In claiming victory, the British and French were also 
acquiring the wealth and possessions of the old order, and one of these 
possessions was Palestine. The Balfour Declaration proclaimed the 
establishment of a new national home for the Jewish people in Palestine 
(Schneer, 2010). After four centuries of Ottoman rule, the British 
Mandate that originated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, started in 
1920 and was to last almost thirty years.1  
The Constitution that governed the press during the Ottoman 
Empire had remained in force throughout the British Mandate period 
(Jarrar, 2009). During World War I, no newspapers were produced in 
Palestine (Najjar, 2005; Bin Yousef, 1987). Right after the end of the war, 
some 18 new Palestinian newspapers appeared, including two Jewish 
newspapers and one British government paper. The printed press in 
Palestine once more started to be distributed throughout the region (Abu 
Hasheesh, 2005; Al-Sherif, 1979). From the 1920s onward, telegraphs 
transmitted news in record time from around the globe to newspaper 
headquarters in Jerusalem (Hanainia, 2008). The revolution this 
produced in the print media can perhaps be likened to the impact of 
information technology on the media in recent years.  
During the British Mandate era, development of a distinctly 
Palestinian media went hand in hand with establishment of a nationalist 
political movement. Already in the 1920s, Palestinians, despite their 
diversity, were starting to think of themselves as one people, with a 
common national identity and shared history (Khalidi, 2006; Anderson, 
2006). This trend would intensify with the end of the British Mandate 
and the establishment of the state of Israel on Palestinian land.  
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 Simply stated, the early Palestinian nationalist movement emerged 
under the British Mandate, feeding on Arabs’ feelings of betrayal as a 
result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and Balfour Declaration of 
1917. Both documents contained conflicting promises to local Arab 
populations, Palestinians, and new Jewish settlers (Pappé, 2006). In the 
1930s, with the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, what had been 
gradual Jewish emigration into Palestine intensified, and Britain became 
more accommodating of Zionist movements than Ottomans had been.  
At first, after the First World War, an emergent sense of common 
identity among Palestinians, Arabs and Jews started to emerge in the 
press in Palestine. Later, however, new political realities led Palestinian 
Arab media in Palestine to openly oppose further Jewish immigration 
into the region. For example, more voices emerged warning that such 
immigration was intended to grab the land of those who had lived there 
for generations, especially the Arabs. Earlier, under the Ottomans, one 
author, writing under the pen name of “M” in Al-Quds (August 3, 1908) 
had welcomed Jewish immigration, stating: ‘They came to Palestine to 
build and develop it and live with its people, and therefore we have to 
live with them as brothers’ (Hanaina, 2008: 125). The Balfour 
Declaration’s promise to establish a national homeland for Jews changed 
this vision, and was therefore rejected by the Palestinian press on behalf 
of non-Jewish populations in Palestine. The polarisation of the press 
over the issue of Jewish settlement during the inter-war years has led 
some academic historians to refer to this as a period of ‘factional 
journalism’ in Palestine (Abu Shanab, 2001:21; Bin Yousef, 1987:18).  
At the start of the British Mandate, overall the media in Palestine 
started to become markedly politicised, with almost 50 new publications 
(48) appearing, including 8 political journals, 13 art magazines, 5 
economic publications and a number of religious and humour 
publications (Najjar, 2005, Al Gharib, 1978). Cultural expression 
flourished alongside political newspapers and journals, with the arts and 
literature being explored through short stories, novels and poetry, all of 
this playing a significant part in the expansion of media during this 
period, especially among Palestinian Arabs (Khouri, 1976).2 One of these 
literary magazines was Zahret Al Jameel (The Beautiful Rose), founded in 
1921 by Jameel Al Bahri in Jaffa. Its name was shortened a year later to 
Al Zahra (The Blossom) (Yaghi, 1980). Following a political dispute, 
however, Al Bahri was assassinated shortly afterwards.  
 A Short History of Media in Palestine 45 
 
 
With the establishment of the Communist Party in Palestine in 1919, 
new newspapers emerged that sought to defend workers’ rights. There 
were 13 printing presses in Palestine, and the early twenties witnessed 
even more openly political newspapers appearing, including Lisan Al 
Arab (The Tongue of Arabs), started in 1921 in Jerusalem by Ibrahim 
Salim Al Najjar and Ahmed Izzat Al Adami, two Lebanese journalists. 
This publication supported a British policy based on ‘even-handedness’ 
towards Jews and Arabs living in Palestine. In 1923, several more 
newspapers were founded, including Al Heqooq (The Rights) by Fahmi 
Al Hussaini (Suliman, 1987). More significantly, in 1924, when seven 
more newspapers entered the printed press, some major factional 
newspapers appeared, including Al Jami’aa Al Arabya (The Arabic 
Federation) under Munief Al Hussini, a supporter of Federalism, Sawt Al 
Haq (Voice of Truth) and a Palestinian Communist party newspaper, Ila 
al Amam (Forward). In 1925, Sheikh Abdullah Al Qalqali started a new 
publication Serat–ul–Mostaqeem (The Straight Path) and also revived the 
Filistin newspaper, originally started in 1911 during Ottoman rule (Matar, 
2010).  
Most historians place the rise of the Palestinian National Movement 
to these few crucial years, from 1923 to 1939. During this period, as 
Britain’s strategic objectives and the Zionists’ intentions became more 
obvious, there was a turning point for local media and for the National 
Movement. Awarness of widespread opposition to turning Palestine into 
a national home for Jewish people started to produce marked divisions 
in the printed press in terms of their agendas and arguments. Some 
newspapers, like Filistin, published anti-British Mandate views while 
other publications, such as Lisan Al Arab, looked to the British to 
protect the Arab populations from Jewish settlers’ expansionist, state-
building ambitions (Najjar, 2005; Mahafza, 1989; Bin Yousef, 1987). The 
growth of the printed press at this time played an important part in 
providing expression for those who were becoming part of the National 
Movement (Khalidi, 2006). As competition for leadership of the 
emerging movement deepened among political elites, more newspapers 
representing various political interests and speaking to their own 
supporters began to emerge (Najjar, 2005). Al Jami’aa Al Arabya, for 
example, represented the Arabic Palestinian Party. The famous Filistin 
newspaper was owned by a Greek orthodox who advocated pan-
Arabism and supported the Al Defa’a party (Defense Party) founded by 
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Ragheb Al Nashashibi (Abu Hasheesh, 2005). These competing interests 
did not really develop into full factional journalism until later, with the 
Nakbah of 1948. In the 1920s and 1930, a few newspapers like Al 
Yarmouk (1924), Al Jazeera (1924) and Al Etyhad Al Arabi (Arab Union) 
remained independent and were not governed by the more factional 
agendas that appeared in other papers and magazines (Yohsa’a, 1974).  
Despite growing opposition to plans for mass Jewish settlement, 
there was political stagnation during the inter-war years and this resulted 
from the in-fighting between two major Jerusalemite families, the Al 
Hussainis and the Al Nashashibis. These two rival clans were perpetually 
locked in rivalry around leadership of the National Movement at this 
time (Najjar, 2005). The factionalism that arose was pilloried with great 
sarcasm by Mustapha Al Ghalaini who in 1924 published a poem 
warning the public not to follow their leaders into such in-fighting. The 
poem included the following lines: ‘…They [the public] think leadership 
is a dome built on a foundation of gold… [which] they glorified. But 
glory itself refuses to be violated’ (Al Zahra magazine, 1924).3 
Clashes over leadership among elites at this time foreclosed the 
possibility that some other potentially important actors and individuals 
would lead the National Movement later. One notable example is the Al 
Khalidi family, considered among the oldest and most educated in 
Jerusalem, and known for making its collection of historical documents 
available to the Palestinian and wider public (Al Sharif, 2011). Factional 
conflicts started to influence the Palestinian political and nationalist 
movements in the later inter-war years, and continue today. This shows 
that today’s factionalism in the media can sometimes have deep roots.  
2.3 Factions without Factionalism  
Between 1930 and 1935, the rapid growth of the Palestinian media was 
shaped by new developments in printing, in information gathering, and 
in knowledge acquired from the experience of the print media of other 
countries and the emergence of Palestinian political factions (between 
1932 and 1935). By 1935, there were six distinct Palestinian political 
factions, and soon they would be joined by many more. During this 
period, each political faction favoured their own particular newspapers, 
which were used as platforms from which to advocate for their own 
factional agendas, promote their own policies, oppose British policies in 
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their own way, and recruit new members. This pattern, established in the 
1930s, would set a trend for the next few years of factional fervour (Al 
Sharif, 2011; Al Hout, 1986). Although the British authorities made it 
difficult for journalists to work, another 43 new newspapers were 
established between 1930 and 1939 (Najjar, 2005), including 17 political 
newspapers, 9 cultural publications, 8 religious journals, 2 scout 
publications, 1 economic magazine, 4 education and science newspapers, 
and 1 industry magazine.  
The print media in the British Palestine mandate became daily as well 
as weekly and monthly, with 8 of 17 political newspapers being 
published daily. As in 1908-1909 under the Ottomas, the late 1930s were 
marked by a pre-war flourishing of the press. This period, from 1932 to 
1935, is still widely regarded today as one of the highpoints of literary 
output in the history of Palestinian media and publishing (Al Sharif, 
2011; Najjar, 2005; Bin Yousef, 1987). A growing critical mass of 
publications meant that more and more diverse political voices were able 
to find expression. Although political parties were able to express their 
political views through their newspapers and other publications, so were 
other sections of the public, including women and minorities. Although 
each party had its own outlets, during this period of flourishing debate, 
this did not result in the marked factionalism noted in the earlier years of 
British rule.  
 Instead, the mid-1930s can be characterised as a period of ‘factions 
without factionalism,’ in media terms. As early forms of nationalist 
identity started to emerge, early notions of Palestinianism were slowly 
emerging. Historically speaking, the roots of what Dina Matar terms 
‘proto-nationalism,’ were emerging at this time. In her book What it 
Means to be Palestinian, Matar quotes Yezid Sayigh that: ‘the experience of 
being socially and politically marginalised effectively transformed 
Palestinianism from a popular, grassroots patriotism, into proto-
nationalism’ (Matar, 2010: 56). As intense confrontations with the British 
authorities increased, and in the years 1936-1939 this revolt gained 
strength. Zionism was increasingly geared towards seizing huge areas of 
land for rapidly growing numbers of Jewish settlers coming into 
Palestine, and as this happened, discontent had grown among Arab and 
Christian Palestinians in particular, from the late 1920s onward. The 
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Filistin newspaper of August 30 1930, quoted one outraged farmer who 
stated:4  
‘I sell my land and properties because the government is forcing me to pay 
taxes… in a time that I don’t have the necessary tools to support myself 
and my family. Under these conditions, I am forced to take loans with 5% 
interest due after one or two months. This [i.e., not being able to repay the 
debt in so short a time] forces me to renew my debt over and over again, 
adding more cost on the original debt. This condition will force me, in the 
end, to sell my land in order to repay some of the debt.’  
Media coverage of Zionist land appropriation increased the spread of 
anger among Palestinians. On 23 March 1930, the Filistin published an 
editorial, after Lord Balfour died on March 19, which said: ‘Balfour died, 
and his declaration should die with him.’ The Arab Federation newspaper 
wrote on 13 August 1930: ‘Oh Palestinians, kick out this Zionism with 
your feet, and stand face to face with Great Britain.’  
Britain reacted to such dissenting coverage with different types of 
retaliation (Najjar, 2005; Al Kayali, 1968), including the arrest of 
journalists, and even the execution of three prominent political activists: 
Atta Al Zir, Mohammed Jamjoum and Fouad Hijazi. Their executions 
were carried out by the British government and Jewish combatants. 
Many newspapers then began a 40-day strike to protest against these 
executions. After the strike, the Filistin wrote: ‘Force enabled us to speak, 
and the crime was committed on the podium’. Al Yarmouk ran another 
headline that listed the names of those killed on its front page. 
According to the archives of Al Zuhour (17 June, 1930), the three men 
were executed one after another at 8, 9 and 10 am, during which time all 
the church bells and mosques sounded their mourning. Even today, their 
names are still remembered and Palestinian children learn about their 
heroism in school, and in national songs (Matar, 2010). 
During this turbulent period, internal disputes still took place, as in 
Jaffa, for example, where a long-standing dispute between Roman Cath-
olics and Muslims continued over ownership of a cemetery (Najjar, 
2005). Factions would use newspapers to spread their own political 
messages. Yet, despite this, from print media archives and other 
documents it appears that political revolt was able to moderate 
factionalism, as some broadly shared perspectives started to emerge 
among most newspapers, regarding the need to return and retain the 
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land, around shared opposition to mass Jewish immigration, and of the 
need to protect the rights of workers and farmers (Najjar, 2005). 
Different sections of the press would also call for an end to colonialism 
worldwide at that time.  
Throughout this period, the press improved its content, quality and 
professionalism. Palestinian reporters worked internationally, from Saudi 
Arabia and Syria to Egypt, including Yousef Yassin, Mahmoud Al 
Khaimi, Abdelhadi Erfan and Mosallam Bseso (Al Aqqad, 1967). With 
the improvement of standards of professional journalism, the 
distribution of newspapers, including Palestinian newspapers, also grew. 
Old land-owning families and highly educated elites no longer had a 
monopoly on political parties, and on the media. For example, a year 
after the Fourth Conference for Community Labor in 1922, Arab 
workers formed the Palestinian Community Party (PCP), with the aim of 
actively resisting the British Mandate. The party gained popular support 
throughout the Arab region (Mahafza, 1989). The party had strong ties 
with women’s organisations and other progressive groups working in 
Palestine (Mahafza, 1989). This strong association with women’s groups 
distinguished the Palestinian Community Party from other parties at the 
time. The communist approach of including women in the revolutionary 
movement influenced the party.  
Moscow recognised the PCP as a national, progressive Arabic party, 
opposing imperialism (Mahafza, 1989). In 1929, the party slogans called 
for the ousting of the British and an end to Jewish immigration to 
Palestine. Rather than Jerusalem, the party chose Beit Safafa, a village 
close to Jerusalem, populated mainly with poor farmers, for its meetings 
and headquarters. The movement worked hand in hand with the 
National Movement in 1933 by calling for a boycott of Zionist and 
British products. Communist Party newspapers that supported the party, 
farmers and workers (Najjar, 2005; Abu Shanab: 2001) included Al Ghad 
and Al Etyhad. The latter is still published today.  
2.4 Women’s Voices in the Middle East 
The role of women journalists and publishers during the inter-war years 
needs further attention, especially since women’s role is not often 
mentioned in other publications on the media in Palestine. Nonetheless, 
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we do know from research by Suliman (1987) that women worked on 
the layout of newspapers, in printing presses, and in some cases wrote 
op-ed articles that voiced ‘the woman’s point of view’ on current issues, 
including under the Brtish Mandate. In this way, messages were being 
relayed to a wider and wider audience of those opposed to Zionism, and 
the role of the press in informing more sections of the population, 
including women and young people, started to be recognised as crucial 
by some editors and newspaper owners (Suliman, 1987).  
 All in all, the records and archival materials of the Palestinian press 
show that in the inter-war years, intellectuals, farmers, and women living 
in Palestinian villages and cities increasingly came to rely on newspapers 
to get their information. After the Al Buraq revolution in 1929, this had 
become a real concern for the British Mandate, with the Shaw 
Commission (Miller, 2010) explicitly stating: ‘Palestinian farmers are 
more politically aware than many of the Europeans, despite the high 
illiteracy rate among them’ (Alloush, 1975: 22). This included the women 
farmers, whose political activity increased at this time, and started to be 
reported on in the press. In response to this rising awareness, a new law 
introduced in 1932 imposed strict controls over what could be reported, 
and the British authorities started to imprison those who opposed the 
Mandate, and this included women (Suliman, 1988). 
From the start of the 1920s, the press focused some attention on 
women’s issues. This mainly related to the household, but it also 
included commentary and news on women as part of local agricultural 
communities, and sometimes in politics and public life (Najjar, 2005). 
One story stands out in this respect. In 1929, a group of 200 women 
organized an Al Quds Conference in support of the, until then very 
male-dominated, National Movement. On 30 October 1929, in Sawt Al 
Sh’aab (The People’s Voice), the event was reported as the ‘First Arab 
Women’s Conference’.  
The women’s conference focused on stopping Jewish immigration to 
Palestine and putting an end to the Balfour Declaration. The Palestinian 
press reported on these demands at the time (Najjar, 2005). In the same 
year, Christian and Muslim Palestinian women demonstrated together in 
front of foreign consulates in Jerusalem, also attracting media attention. 
The Filistin and Al Defa’a newspapers viewed their own (male) 
journalists’ presence alongside the female protesters as a form of paternal 
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protection. Articles in these papers listed the names of the women 
organizing the protest, to bring attention to their role. 
Women’s affairs became more visible in the rest of the printed press 
as well, at this time. In the Al Karmel newspaper, for example, part of its 
layout was dedicated to a ‘Women’s Journal.’ This offered women the 
chance to write in with opinion pieces (Al Karmel newspaper: 1926). 
Articles with headings like ‘To the daughter of my town,’ ‘A word to the 
wife,’ and ‘Marriage and Partnership’ were published, mainly about 
family relations. But when Sadej Nassar, herself married to Najeeb 
Nassar, owner of the Al Karmel newspaper, was arrested by the British 
authorities in 1935 for political activism against the Balfour Declaration, 
this was widely reported on (Moghannam, 1937). The British extended 
her incarceration period from 3 to 6 months, and other Palestinian Arab 
women, political activists and journalists like Asma Tobi, Samira Azzam 
and Mary Shehadeh, publicly defended Nassar and protested against her 
continued imprisonment. Moghannam (1937) documented the first 
broadcast on Palestinian Radio of a women’s affairs programme. 
Mofeeda Al Dabagh introduced the programme, which covered social 
and family topics. Women also used this programme to communicate 
their political messages, including objections to foreign expansion into 
Palestinian lands under the British Mandate.  
The British tended to punish Palestinian journalists for opinions they 
(the British) found unacceptable by shutting down newspapers. In 
response, the Palestinian press protested against such one-sided 
censorship. In the People’s Voice newspaper, it was argued: ‘All 
newspapers should enjoy press freedom… you don’t stop the Jewish 
press, while Arab press overflows with calm peace and contentment, and 
we see Jewish press spouting venom and poison … leading to chaos and 
unrest’ (People’s Voice, 2 December 1929). In 1929, women had also 
become involved in the Revolution that took place, gaining 
unprecedented attention in the Palestinian media, and provoking a harsh 
British government response (Suliman, 1987) toward both the press in 
Palestine and in neighbouring countries. As repression on male 
journalists and editors was stepped up, if anything women became more 
active during this period of unrest and uncertainty for the printed press 
(Najjar, 2005).  
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2.5 Elite Competition, Factionalism and the Arab Revolt  
As women started to have a more active role in the Palestinian media 
and in politics, so did youth. A constant sense of being treated unjustly 
and oppressively under the British Mandate motivated Palestinian youth 
to organise a conference in 1932. This established a new political party, 
the Istiqulal (Independence Party), which also launched a paper named 
Al Kefah (The Struggle). The aim was to promote Arab products and 
establish cooperation between the working class and farmers. In the 
same year, the Palestinian Youth Party was also established by Rasem Al 
Khalidi and others. In 1935, the new leader, Yacoub Al Ghussien, 
launched the Al Kefah newspaper, though this did not last long due to 
financial difficulties.  
Under a law introduced by the British in 1935, an editor-in-chief of a 
newspaper had to have a university degree (Najjar, 2005; Suliman, 1987), 
an elitist and discriminatory condition, in the light of the growing trend 
of women, workers and farmers towards self-organisation. The National 
Defense Party (NDP) was established by Rageb Al Nashashibi when he 
failed to win in the Jerusalem municipal elections. Journalists and editors 
like Issa Al Issa of the Filistin newspaper joined the political faction of Al 
Nashashibi, a wealthy group of individuals, the cultural and social elite, 
including those from Al Quds (Khila, 1974).  
Some elites were complicit at this time in the loss of land to Jewish 
settlers. Three main newspapers spoke on the elites’ behalf, including the 
Filistin, the Miraat Al Sharq (Mirror of the East), and the Serat–ul–
Mostaqeem (The Straight Path) (Najjar; 2005; Najjar, 1975). In a historic 
newspaper article on 3 December 1934 (Filistin, 1934)5, these founders of 
the NDP pledged to end their role as middlemen, trading and mediating 
in the sale of land to Jewish settlers. Instead, they pledged themselves to 
the full liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a government of 
national unity. However, some historians doubted that these elites could 
survive outside the close relationships maintained with the British under 
the Mandate. To some extent, this reliance on the British echoed the 
elites’ previous relations with the Ottomans (Khila, 1974).  
For some historians, the most important single moment in the pre-
Second World War history of nationalism in the Palestinian media is the 
Arab Revolt of 1936-39 (Abu Shanab, 2001). In 1935, Sheikh Izz al-Din 
al-Qassam was killed and a series of nationalist and popular Palestinian 
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workers’ uprisings began. In the ‘Arab Revolts,’ Palestinian nationalist 
armed groups confronted British troops and Zionist gangs, over jobs 
and land appropriated for Jewish settlers. An interesting movement at 
this time tried to bring solidarity among Jewish and Arab workers, but 
failed because of religious divisions. Jewish organisations’ factionalism 
was echoed by factionalism among Palestinians. Intense rivalry followed 
for Palestinian leadership, again involving the Al Nashashibis and Al 
Hussinis. Their own ownership of massive tracts of land meant they 
were less vulnerable to seizures than poorer Palestinian farmers and 
workers, however, and this led these elites to largely ignore the Zionist 
threat of land seizures, until it was almost too late (Al Namy, 2010).  
Jamal Al Hussini then presented his own party, the Arabic Palestinian 
Party (APP), as opposed to the elitist NDP of Ragheb Al Nashashibi. 
The objectives of Al Hussini’s Arabic Palestinian Party included the 
liberation of Palestine, resistance to establishing a national Jewish home 
in Palestine, and closer connections between Palestine and the 
surrounding Arab territories and countries, to form a common front 
among Arab political factions in Palestine (Al Hout, 1986). In fact, the 
APP did establish this wider network, with offices opening up new 
channels of communication with the leadership in Saudi Arabia, Yemen 
and Jordan (Al Hout, 1968, Al Kayali, 1968). Well-funded, the APP had 
nine newspapers to advocate on its behalf, including Al Jami’aa Al 
Arabya (The Arabic Federation), Al Wedha Al Arabia (Arabic Unity) and 
Al Nidal (The Struggle). The party established two English language 
journals: The Arab Federation and The Arab Times (Abu Shanab: 2001).  
 In 1935, the NDP split when Dr Hussein Fakhri Al Khalidi - who did 
not agree with the Party’s approach of negotiating with the British - 
created his own political party, Al Islah (the Reform Party). Khalidi 
lobbied both Christians and Muslims and maintained good relations with 
the Al Hussini family (Abu Fakher, 2003). At this time, most political 
parties were centred on Jerusalem, the capital, and extended their 
influence to Palestinian villages and towns from there, usually to the 
region of origin of the party leader or faction (Najjar, 2005; Al Dajjani, 
1989). 
What made the Reform Party unusual was that, although officially 
launched in Ramallah, it included among its founding members the 
mayors of Ramallah, Gaza and Bethlehem, in addition to scores of 
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lawyers. The Party was the first to bring together reforming elites from 
different parts of Palestine. The Reform Party did not create its own 
‘factional’ newspaper, and relied on the existing and extensive media 
outlets of the Al Hussini family (Abu Fakher, 2003). The Reform Party 
called for a new treaty between Arabs of Palestine and the British, 
modelled on the 1935 treaty between Britain and Iraq. Al Bendek, then 
mayor of Bethlehem, and in the Reform Party, did not even use his own 
newspaper, Sawt Al Sh’aab (People’s Voice) as a platform for his party, 
perhaps reflecting his interest in reversing the dominant factionalism of 
the media at that time.  
The British authorities could not control the expansion of the 
Palestinian printed press, and instead introduced the Palestine 
Broadcasting Service (PBS) in 1936, as part of the BBC (Al-Omari, 
2010). PBS broadcast in English, Arabic and Hebrew. Palestinian 
newspaper archives document the first time on PBS radio that a Jewish 
news announcer used the Hebrew phrase Eretz Yisrael (the land of 
Israel), sparking negative reactions in the Filistin in its edition of 2 April 
1936. This would be a taste of things to come.  
2.6 Palestinian Journalism Post-Nakba (1948-67) 
After 1948, Palestinian media were trapped inside occupied lands along 
with the remaining 150,000 Palestinians who were not expelled during 
the war of 1947-48. In the West Bank and Gaza, under military rule, the 
press was governed by oppressive laws (Ayalon, 2004). Great Britain 
officially handed Palestine to the State of Israel in the middle of 1948, in 
line with the Balfour Declaration’s stated aim of creating a Jewish state in 
Palestine. This was immediately followed by the UN Partition Plan 
(Schneer, 2010). Britain also supplied the Zionists who took over the 
State of Israel with the weapons and political support they needed to 
secure military victory over Arab nationalist forces.  
 Even before the 1950s, a new form of media expression, known as 
‘resistance journalism,’ began to emerge in Palestine in reaction to the 
consequences of the Nakba. Small publications like the “Falstinana” and 
the ‘Nida Al Hayat (The Call for Life), the ‘Filisteen Al Thawra (Palestine 
the Revolution), the Al Hadaf (The Target) and the Al Horrya (Freedom), 
promoted a culture of armed resistance to military occupation, from 
shortly after the Nakba and the 1948 war onward (Al-Omari, 2010; Abu 
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Shanab: 2001). From the Nakba until the 1950s or so - although some 
newspapers were distributed from the West Bank - Palestinian media 
mostly survived from within the institutional set-up of the Jordanian 
media. This ‘channel of resistance’ benefited both sides, and followed the 
devastation of the Arabic printed press in Palestine (Abu Hasheesh, 
2005; Christoph and Seebold, 2001).  
 When a coalition of Arab forces did fight back in protest at the 
military occupation of Palestine, they had little chance of winning a 
military victory because of huge difference in both the size of the 
weapons arsenal and the level of external support, after the expulsions of 
1947-1948 had left the Palestinian political authorities in disarray (Al 
Namy, 2010; Gordon, 2008).  
Once the state of Israel was established, Palestine was divided. The 
West Bank fell under the control of what was then referred to as Trans-
Jordan, and control of Gaza was given to Egypt. The West Bank 
remained under Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967. Until 1955, when 
Jordan issued a new law that forbade an editor-in-chief of a newspaper 
from holding another job, Ottoman laws continued to apply to the press 
in Jordan. As the rest of Palestinian land came under the control of the 
newly declared state of Israel, in Gaza the printed press was still in its 
infancy; most Palestinian printing presses were still concentrated around 
Jaffa, Jerusalem and the West Bank.  
Some newspapers and publications were halted completely during the 
1948 war. Others kept printing, including the Filistin, which continued 
publication during the war and resumed production in February 1948, 
after relocating offices to Amman. The newspaper became a loyal 
defender of King Abdullah (Matar, 2010; Najjar, 2005) and called for 
Palestinians to accept Jordanian citizenship. After Issa Al Issa died in 
1950, the newspaper moved to Jerusalem in 1952 and was headed by 
Kamal Nasser. Records show that the newspaper improved in content, 
layout and coverage and thus became more competitive with other 
newspapers (Abu Shanab, 2001). The Filistin was eventually shut down 
by Jordanian decree, after which it merged with the Al Manar, and re-
emerged as the Al Dostoor (The Constitution). 
The Al Defa’a (The Defence) ceased publication in Jaffa after the war, 
but started publishing again from Cairo in 1958, and was distributed 
from there to Jordan and the West Bank. A few years later, the Al Defa’a 
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was moved to Jerusalem and started to print from the Islamic Orphans 
House (Abu Shanab, 2001) with Sadek Al Shanti as the person in charge. 
The editor-in-chief was Al Shanti’s brother, Ibrahim Al Shanti. The Al 
Jami’aa Al Islamyah (The Islamic Federation) also resumed printing after 
the war and was considered one of the major newspapers at the time. Its 
first edition was published in Jordan in 1949, with Haider Al Farouqi 
serving as editor. However, this newspaper did not last long. 
The Al Jihad (The Struggle), another newspaper, was originally 
established by Mahmoud Abul Zalaf, who also served as its editor-in-
chief, and Salim Al Sharif, its managing editor. This paper continued 
publishing until 1953 (Abu Shanab, 2001). The Al Awfoq Al Jadeed (New 
Horizons) was an art and culture magazine introduced in 1961 in 
Jerusalem, until it was banned in 1966. The Fatat Al Belad (Daughter of 
the Nations), was started in 1950 by the Al Fatah Association in 
Ramallah, and was the only outlet advocating women’s rights. The 
magazine covered family affairs and women’s issues, ensuring the 
newspaper had a higher level of readership than many others at the time. 
Gaza shares a border with Egypt at Rafah, so it is natural for the two 
populations to have had a close relationship in the past. When the 1948 
war was over, the United Nations pressed for a truce between Egypt and 
the newly established Israeli state on 24 February 1949. As a result, Gaza 
remained under Egyptian control. Following the 1956 war, Palestinians 
became more active on their own behalf, and Gazans were keen to 
further their own education, hoping to use their awareness to mitigate 
the unbearable poverty and harsh conditions already becoming evident 
in Gaza at that time (Nasser et al., 2011).  
In 1948, Gazan media still had a set of technologies that was very 
different from the printed presses elsewhere in Palestine. Most news was 
in the form of wall articles, handouts and fliers in schools, or at festivals 
and cultural events. However, after 1950, newspapers, photography and 
media art began to appear more and more in Gaza (Abu Shanab, 2001). 
The newspaper business in Gaza was daunting due to Gaza’s lack of 
financial and human resources, unlike the West Bank, which was better 
funded and more centralised. Egypt also imposed strict censorship, 
demanding that newspaper articles in Gaza should be officially approved 
two days prior to printing (Abu Hasheeh, 2005; Al Dalou: 2000).  
Other constraints made it difficult for Gaza’s media to compete with 
the comparatively low publication and distribution costs in Egypt, 
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including financial limitations of local investors. Despite all these 
obstacles, several small-scale newspapers were funded locally and 
brought the voice of Gazans into the printed press, and much later to a 
wider audience via the internet. The Al Saraha (Honesty) was available 
from 1952 to 1963 and published by a small printing shop owned by the 
Abu Shabaan family who published the paper at a social club for 
Communist Palestinians. The editors were Saed Felfel and Moeen Bseso, 
later replaced by Abuel Khawaled Al Saqqa, who gave the paper a new 
content and layout. The Ghazzah (Gaza) was printed from 1950 to 1964 
by a publishing house owned by Kamaleldeen Abu Shabaan. The 
Ghazzah was considered one of the most widely distributed and popular 
newspapers in Gaza at the time. The Alleowa’a (The Brigade) was 
published from 1954 to 1961 by Hajj Mussa Al Sourani, Dr Salah Abu 
Kmael and Mouneer Al Rayyes, and was the voice of traditional national 
parties. The Al Wehda (The Unity), was published from 1954 to 1964 by 
Majed Al Alami, and was one of the most party-based newspapers, 
expressing the politics and views of the Ba’ath Arab Communist Party. 
The Al Mustaqbal (The Future) magazine, was published from 1952 to 
1956, by Mohammed Jalal Anayah and was a vehicle for authors of his 
choice as well as for his personal friends. Zuhir Al Rayyes and 
Mohammed Al Radwan began publishing the Al Tahrir (The Liberation) 
in 1956. The newspaper has a record of professional editors running its 
editorial desk. (Abu Hasheesh, 2005). The Akhbar Falstin (Palestine 
News), which appeared in 1964, was the official newspaper for the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and received technical 
support, supervision and training of its staff from Egypt’s Today’s News 
Association Akhbar Al Youm (Abu Hassesh, 2005). After that, the 
newspaper received support from the PLO. 
2.7 Perceptions of the Press under Israeli Occupation  
Only two decades had passed since the 1947 Nakbah (the Catastrophe) 
and the Israeli war of 1948, before a new war broke out in June 1967 
between Israel and Arab States, with the latter defeated by the former. 
As a result, all of Palestine now came under Israeli control, as did large 
areas of land in Egypt, Syria and Jordan. After the Naksa (the Israeli war 
of 1967), the Palestinian press in Gaza and the West Bank faced a 
dramatic recession. Most newspapers stopped publishing, which created 
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a news gap that was filled by Palestinians using alternate methods of 
distribution, which included radio stations, leaflets, graffiti on walls, 
handouts and wall posters in churches and mosques. Israeli occupation 
gave rise to the short-lived Al Youm (The Day) newspaper. It was 
followed by Al Anbaa (The News) in 1967, which had a better chance at 
maneouvring the Palestinian population by addressing them in their own 
language, Arabic. Despite the large Israeli financial support behind Al 
Youm, it was never widely circulated, and had few readers (Abu 
Hasheesh; 2001). The Israeli authorities established unions for villages, 
instead of more nationalist representatives, and established the 
newspaper Al Maraa (The Mirror) which also failed to attract many 
readers.  
 At any rate, the above-mentioned three newspapers were the topic of 
intellectual squabbling among Palestinians, divided about whether or not 
to accept them (Al-Omari, 2010; Christoph and Seebold, 2001), at a time 
when Palestinian newspapers were subject to licensing by Israel. 
Disagreement was caused by the general assumption among Palestinians 
and other Arabs that Israeli occupation was still temporary. The longer 
the Israeli occupation lasted, the more Palestinians realised the crucial 
role media outlets would play in bringing Palestinian concerns to local, 
regional and international audiences. This is why Palestinians soon began 
to seek permits to establish their own media outlets. In total, from 1967-
1987, less than two dozen permits were issued to news media outlets in 
Arabic, in Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, by the late 
1980s, an estimated 40 local, regional and international media offices 
were established inside Palestinian territories. 
Whether through the British Mandate and laws from 1945, or under 
Israeli military ‘emergency’ laws implemented in 1948, the Palestinian 
press was tightly controlled. Israel used several methods to oppress the 
media, including closure of newspapers under the pretext of their not 
abiding by the general rules of military occupation. Some offices were 
closed for a few weeks or months at a time, others were shut down 
permanently (Burton, 2015:120, Al Faqeh, 2011: 19). Other methods of 
oppression included sending journalists into exile due to their political 
affiliation or following editorial statements hostile to Israeli occupation 
(Azoulay and Ophir, 2012). In 1974, Israel expelled Ali Al Khateeb, 
journalist and editor-in-chief of Al Sh’aab (The People), as well as 
journalist Hassan Abdeljawwad Farajneh. Akram Haniyeh, another well-
 A Short History of Media in Palestine 59 
 
 
known editor-in-chief of Al Sh’aab, was also expelled some years later, in 
1986. The kidnapping and assassination of Palestinian journalists was 
also a common Israeli response. In 1975, journalist Yousef Nasser, 
editor-in-chief of Al Fajjr (The Dawn) disappeared, as did Hassan 
Abdelhaleem, a reporter at the same magazine, who was kidnapped and 
later found dead.  
Journalists including Bashir Al Barghouti, Radwan Abu Aish, Hamdy 
Faraj and Abdelatif Ghait were all put under house arrest for writing 
against Israeli practices under military occupation (Fridh and Wingren, 
2015; Al-Omari, 2010). Israel carried out what were called administrative 
arrests and hundreds of media employees were detained, including Walid 
Salim, Mahmoud Al Ramhi, Hassan Abdeljawwad, Zyad Abu Zyad, Talal 
Safi, and Fawzi Al Shoubaki. The Israeli administration prevented or 
hampered newspaper distribution by not allowing equipment and 
materials to be transferred between Palestinian villages, towns and cities, 
thereby seeking to prevent the circulation of information, and impose 
isolation on scattered populations (Al-Omari, 2010). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, despite all these obstacles and forms of 
repression, Palestinian media continued to produce new publications 
including: the Al Quds from 1967 onward, which was the very first 
Palestinian-controlled newspaper to appear after Israel occupied 
Palestine. It was published in the West Bank and in Jerusalem, and 
distributed regionally and beyond (Najjar, 2005). The founder of the Al 
Quds was Mahmoud Abuel Zalaf, and his name still appears on the front 
page of the newspaper to this day. 
The Al Quds newspaper, one of Palestine’s most important 
newspapers, is still published in both the West Bank and in Gaza Strip. 
Its roots go back to 1951 when it was known under the earlier title of Al 
Jihad. In 1967, it became Al Quds. The newspaper appears to favour the 
PA and PLO leadership, although nowadays it attempts to present more 
balanced coverage of events (Al-Omari, 2010). For many years, Israel did 
not allow the PA to distribute Al Quds in Gaza as part of a general policy 
meant to isolate Gaza after Hamas won elections there (Al-Omari, 2010). 
Ironically, the Israelis need not have bothered to ban Al Quds in Gaza 
Strip, since in 2009 it was banned by the de facto authorities, for being 
perceived as hostile towards the Hamas version of Islamism (Fridh and 
Wingren, 2015). 
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First published in 1995, after the PA was established, the Al-Ayyam 
(The Days) newspaper belongs to Al Ayyam publishing house in 
Ramallah and its editor-in-chief Akram Hanyeh is close to PA and Fatah 
leadership. The newspaper has suffered financially in recent years, and 
had to reduce its staff, and survive by publishing advertisements. 
Following critical reporting on Hamas, this paper too was banned in 
Gaza, by the de facto Hamas government. The Al Manar (The Lightstand) 
newspaper, started in 1992, and was one of the few genuinely 
independent newspapers published in Jerusalem. The newspaper leans 
toward the perspective of Fatah, with a nationalist liberation agenda, but 
also defends the rights of all Palestinians with its coverage of abuses 
against civilians across all Palestinian territories, inside Israel and beyond.  
Introduced in 1993 by Nabil Amro, a member of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council who held several ministerial positions over the years, 
the Al Hayat Al Jadeeda (New Life) had its staff enrolled in the PA salary 
scheme (Abu Haseesh, 2005). This inevitably influenced their coverage 
and gave PA officials a platform from which to express their positions. 
The de facto government of Hamas also banned this newspaper from 
Gaza, also for allegedly being hostile to Hamas.  
Although several other newspapers are worth mentioning, for the 
historical record (and more can be seen in Appendix 4), during the past 
couple of decades, under the Palestinian Authority, the three leading 
newspapers have been Al Quds, Al Ayyam and Al Hayat Al Jadeeda.  Their 
survival is a positive development for Palestinian media despite the 
difficult circumstances caused by Israeli occupation and the restrictions 
this imposes on Palestinian editors, journalists and publishers. In the case 
of Gaza, even today, the majority of Gaza’s journalistic production is still 
smaller in terms of circulation than for the West Bank media, and the 
media in Gaza is still funded mainly by political factions and by 
individual elite families. This division of the printed press between West 
Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza helps explain why satellite TV has become 
such an important form of media for the political authorities in Gaza as 
well as in the West Bank. This can also start to explain the pressures on 
producers to defactionalise so as to appeal to wider audiences, beyond 
those confined in each of the several segregated territories of Palestine.  
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2.8 New Perspectives on Palestinian Media since 1994 
Middle Eastern scholars vary in how they define contemporary 
Palestinian media, and how far back they trace its origins. However, for 
the purposes of this study, I see 1994 as the starting date for a new phase 
in the history of Palestinian national media, first because the Oslo 
Agreement was signed in 1993 (Al Turk, 2008; Abu Hashesh, 2005), and 
second because in 1994, as mentioned, Israel for the first time issued the 
Palestinian Authority a license to organise mass media including a TV 
station, the Palestine Satellite Channel (PSC). The children’s programme 
and cultural programme of this same channel (in its satellite variety) are 
part of the main focus of this study. Secondly, although almost 20 years 
have passed since the Oslo Agreement, not much has changed in 
Palestine despite the rapid growth of satellite TV media outlets as already 
traced in Chapter 1. The year 1994 is a significant year, however, since it 
marks the start of a period that can be called ‘contemporary’ in relation 
to media in Palestine.  
In 1994, the PA was at last able to establish a Palestinian Broadcasting 
Corporation (PBC) during the early post-Oslo years. The first Palestinian 
TV and radio stations started broadcasting from inside Palestine under 
the supervision of the Palestinian authorities. The PA control freed the 
media from the external restrictions imposed on print media by the 
remaining British-based Jordanian laws. Censorship previously imposed 
on factional and political content by the Israeli military was also 
significantly reduced during the early post-Oslo Agreement years. 
Although censorship is hard to measure, one study estimates that for this 
period, compared with earlier years, censorship of the printed press was 
roughly halved (Al-Omari, 2010: 33). In addition, other media such as 
radio and TV started tooo be granted licenses, where previously these 
had been refused.  
Soon Hamas started to win elections and started to counter the PA’s 
largely factional media perspectives and news, and this – in turn - 
challenged Fatah’s policies and media agendas. 1994 thus also marked 
the start of a period of marked polarisation, including in television and 
the printed press, and of factionalism. Despite, or perhaps because of the 
new freedoms acquired during the post-Oslo period, these years were 
characterised in an interview with the chief correspondent of Al Jazeera, 
as a ‘period of polarisation’ (Al-Omari, 2010: 23). 
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 In the post Oslo Agreement period, the PA was given the 
opportunity to work on broadcasting and media, including by building 
media institutions, news wires, and radio stations. They received Western 
aid and training for Palestinian journalists (Forgione, 2004) and 
production staff. In 1995, the PA introduced the Palestinian Publication 
and Publishing Law, the first law to be presented as a draft by the PA’s 
Minister of Media to former President Yasser Arafat. The law was 
approved later the same year, and annulled previous laws, including the 
Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli laws that had 
previously been in force. The new law was complex, containing 50 
articles, each with several sub-clauses. The hope was that the new law 
could help address Palestinian aspirations for greater freedom of 
expression. Despite its complexity, the law was approved, mainly 
because Palestinians felt the need to have a law they had designed 
themselves to govern the media, rather than one imposed by other 
authorities. 
Unfortunately, from the start, the law itself was criticised for violating 
press freedoms (Burton, 2015; Abu Hasheeh, 2005). In a study 
conducted around 1995, 228 journalists from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip took part in a survey. Almost two-thirds, 59%, of them felt there 
were implicit redlines they could not cross or bypass in terms of what 
they reported under the new law. Over half, 53%, stated that their 
written reports and articles were censored by their editors, usually to 
avoid a negative reaction from the (Palestinian) authorities (Al-Omari, 
2010). And 63% stated they had adopted voluntary forms of self-
censorship in response to this general situation of uncertainty (Al-Omari, 
2010: 52). 
The Palestinian Center for Human Rights was critical of the new 
media law, considering it to restrict press freedom, by not providing for 
the possibility for courts to review cases of press freedom violations. It 
was also unclear whether the law was transitional or was meant to be 
permanent. In Jerusalem, it was claimed that Israel did not allow the PA 
to directly control or interfere with Palestinian media expression, seeing 
this as something under exclusive Israeli control (Al-Omari, 2010). This 
meant that freedoms granted by the new law were quite limited in 
practice, especially in Jerusalem, because of other restrictive measures 
imposed under Israeli occupation, which Palestinian media could 
challenge, but not ignore (Al Dalou, 2000). 
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The tight controls aimed at excluding Hamas and Islamic Jihad from 
Palestinian media outlets during the 1990s and early 2000s, were widely 
believed to be the result of security coordination between the PA and 
Israel to crack down on Islamists. This left as little space as possible for 
the Islamic discourse associated with Hamas and other Islamist factions. 
At the same time, articles by leftist writers hardly saw the light of day. 
This led to demands by Islamists and by Palestinian leftist factions to 
have their own media outlets. As one researcher noted, such conflicting 
demands played into the hands of the Israelis, and the media became ‘the 
main tool for two squabbling parties, each trying to use it for their 
interest…[which was] similar to free indirect service to the Israeli 
occupation’ (Yousef, 2015: 250).  
In some cases, Palestinian media offices and personnel were even 
attacked by rival Palestinian clans and factions for their ‘biased’ media 
coverage. PA security forces did not offer much protection against these 
kinds of attacks (Al-Omari, 2010). There were physical attacks against 
local factional media, and also against local journalists and media 
professionals who worked for various international media agencies 
(Fridh and Wingren, 2015). One example was the attack on the journalist 
Saifeldeen Saheen, who worked for Al-Arabya. He eventually fled in 
2007, and was later granted asylum in Norway.  
When satellite media first started to broadcast in and around 
Palestine, Islamist leaders were not allowed to appear on air. This same 
tactic was used by Israel in 1993 when it forbade the appearance of the 
PA leadership in TV broadcasts, for what were claimed to be ‘legal and 
political reasons’ (Al-Omari, 2010: 33). Banned from satellite TV 
completely in an effort to prevent their voices from being heard, Islamic 
political factions then more or less predictably started to establish their 
own media outlets (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013). They distributed 
leaflets, posters and newspapers, placed messages on radio stations and 
created online websites until they acquired satellite TV channels of their 
own. Thus, a medium ordinarily used to express the views of dominant 
powers, started to express different kinds of ‘factional’ views not 
previously heard.  
In parallel with a notable rise in the number and range of media 
outlets across Palestine, Palestinian universities also started to run 
courses and offer degrees in journalism and media, including TV 
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broadcasting, print media, radio, and later, on-line journalism. The 
Association of Arab Journalists, created in 1979, was renamed the 
Palestinian Journalists Syndicate (PJS) in 1994. From the viewpoint of 
many journalists, this was a great step forward, marking the creation of a 
professional body that could potentially provide support to journalists 
across Palestine. However, unfortunately, but maybe not that 
surprisingly, the PJS also ended up serving factional interests, and was 
closely aligned with Fatah (which offered its leaders wages through the 
PA Ministry of Finance.) Rather than being national in their agendas, or 
adhering more closely to journalistic professional standards, the PJS itself 
quite soon became factionalised (Abu Hasheesh, 2005; Christoph and 
Seebold, 2001).  
As was discussed above, after the PA was established, a number of 
new media outlets sprang up, and these included the Wafa News Agency. 
This was established by a factional decree from Fatah’s PLO in 1972. In 
1994, both the Palestine Satellite Channel and the Palestine Radio were 
launched by an order issued by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat to Radwan 
Abu Ayyash. The TV signal was at first carried on the Egyptian satellite, 
Nilesat. Also in 1994, the Ministry of Media was created with US and EU 
financial support. Most staff working in the media’s administration and 
production had no formal journalism or media training, however. A few 
years later, in 1999, the Palestinian State Information Service was created 
under the direct supervision of, and with funding from, President Arafat.  
From July 1994 until the beginning of the second Intifada in 
September 2000, the Ministry of Media issued 148 licenses to 
newspapers, local radio stations, TV stations and magazines (Al-Omari, 
2010: 70). Many of these permits were granted to political factions and 
non-governmental organisations. By 2004, the Palestinian Ministry of 
Media had recognized 32 local TV stations, including Palestine TV, 
which was based in Gaza City, while others were in the West Bank (Al-
Omari, 2010: 70-72). The Ministry of Media was headed by Fatah 
leaders, and so was the PSC. Overall, the PA’s Ministry of Media had 
monopolised the granting of licenses, and allocated them almost 
exclusively to loyal Fatah-related media and related factional, commercial 
and compliant independent media outlets. 
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2.9 Palestinian TV Becomes (More) Factional  
Without the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington 
(1993), followed by the Oslo Accords, there would not have been an 
opening for contemporary national Palestinian media or Palestinian TV 
(on the Accords, see Bauck and Omer (eds.), 2013), since prior to 1993, 
Palestinians were without visual media of their own. They had to rely on 
print media to articulate their point of view and rely on Israeli TV 
channels in Arabic such as ‘Jordan Channel One’, ‘Egypt Channel One’ and 
‘Egypt Channel Two’ (Kuttab, 1993; Kuttab, 2010) for information about 
the world around them. Eventually, new professionals looked for 
alternatives to challenge the style and content of Palestine TV (Batrawi, 
2001) and a new wave of private TV channels started to appear. One of 
the first TV station was established in Nablus by a college student, who 
had majored in physics and constructed his own TV transmitter 
(Daraghmeh, 2000).  
As with the printed press, so too TV media outlets started off as 
family enterprises. Private TV stations could broadcast from homes, 
even from a tiny room, for example in Gaza. As with many early printing 
presses, staff members were mostly family members including husbands, 
wives and even children (Masri, 2000; Nazzal, 2000 cited in Batrawi, 
2001). Among the 32 TV stations in existence across Palestine by the late 
1990s, content and programming quality varied greatly. Almost 60 
percent of content was entertainment and culture, around education, 
sport and religion counted for 5 percent each. Politics made up just 
below 25% of content (Batrawi, 2001). Private TV stations survived 
financially on advertisements in the commercial breaks. After a license 
from the Ministry of Information was received, the booking of a 
transmission frequency came with tight regulations. 
The relative success in terms of audience figures of Nablus TV caused 
others to consider establishing their own TV stations. This type of local 
TV station was appreciated by the general public, especially in Northern 
West Bank villages where the Palestine TV signal was weak (Batrawi, 
2001). People also appreciated alternative stations that represented the 
opposition, including leftist political factions and Islamists (Batrawi, 
2001:4). Being both socially and politically marginalised reinforced a 
sense among Palestinians of a shared identity (Matar, 2010: 58). At least, 
the advent of privately owned TV stations made it possible for different 
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social and political groups to interact. Private media also became an 
alternative to Fatah-affiliated TV stations during the outbreak of the 
Intifada (Iz Al-Deen, 2000:13). This was because few of the big TV 
station staff remained embedded in villages and cities at times of overt 
risk to themselves. 
Private TV channels started to blen cultural and political 
programming into what one scholar termed a ‘culture of resistance’ (Al 
Batrawi, 2001: 19). Al Batrawi argued that such programming enhanced 
popular Palestinian culture by focusing on inherited music, folk 
traditions and the arts. He believed that by combining popular and ‘high’ 
culture in one format, private TV stations helped equalise the social 
status of elites with that of ordinary Palestinian people. Some scholars 
have evaluated the experience of private Palestinian TV media as 
extremely successful, especially given all the political, social and 
economic constraints on production of Palestinian media in general (Al 
Faqesh, 2011; Al Batrawi, 2001; Iz Al-Deen, 2000).  
Of course, the inherited factionalism embedded in people’s daily lives 
in different parts of Palestine did not simply disappear after the Oslo 
Accords were signed. In fact, factionalism became a practice for groups 
and individuals seeking ways to promote their own narrow agendas, 
which reinforced the factionalism of Palestinian TV. Though it was 
slightly encouraged by the pioneering experience of private TV, factional 
Palestinian TV went hand in hand with factional Palestinian print media 
as platforms for informing the Palestinian public. The mixture of both 
print and TV media in this historical account is intentional, as neither 
can go without the other in presenting an overview of the roots of 
factionalised media during the intra-Palestinian clashes of 2007 (Yousef, 
2015: 249).  
After the establishment of the PA, as previously discussed, several 
local cable TV stations were broadcasting from Palestine albeit with 
limited range. Cable TV stations are rarely discussed in the historical 
record as they tended to be relatively small, with localized city audiences 
in Nablus, Jenin or Bethlehem; they were also short-lived due to closure 
following government pressure (Al Batrawi, 2001: 8).  
Right after the PA established Palestine TV in 1994, the Palestinian 
Ministry of Media granted 82 licenses for TV and radio stations (Al-
Omari, 2010:11), including 32 local TV stations besides the PSC and 
ASC, all of which broadcast to global audiences, and 28 local radio 
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stations. These smaller, mostly private TV stations tended not to cover 
all public needs, and larger stations, such as Palestine TV, broadcast the 
views of only one party, with a lot of attention to the activities of the 
President. The priority of PTV was noted as to ‘broadcast…news related 
to the President, then news related to the officials in the PNA, and only 
then do they remember issues that do not relate to the authority’ (Pick, 
1997). Coverage includes live coverage of Friday prayers, and news about 
governmental and factional (Fatah and Hamas) activities.  
Control of media ownership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
varied from governmental, to factional and independent groups. The line 
between governmental and factional entities has become blurred in the 
contemporary period, and the term ‘factionalism’ can also refers – as 
during previous eras - to widespread partisanship and clannishness of 
much of the Palestinian media’s structure, ownership and content, 
especially where news is concerned. For instance, much PSC news 
programming still reflected the views of just one party until quite 
recently even though the PSC is supposed to be independent (Al 
Batrawi, 2001: 4-5). For some time, Palestinian TV was not openly 
informative enough to broaden public opinion.  
2.10 Conclusion 
After the general Palestinian elections of 2006, spaces were opened up 
for a new wave of Palestinian satellite TV channels, freed from direct 
Israeli control, and concentrated in Gaza, and, to a lesser extent, in the 
West Bank. Today, the broadcasts of these satellite media are watched by 
Palestinians keen for information regarding their own daily lives, and 
seeking to interact with the wider world outside. Satellite and web-based 
media have facilitated the capacity of Palestinian culture to transcend 
geographical and censorship borders. However, because of the 
diversification of media channels and forms of expression, this latest 
trend may also reinforce a tendency towards factionalism. Media 
factionalism that was first associated with the clannishness of media 
ownership and affiliation in the early twentieth century in relation to the 
printed press. This has to some extent been replaced by factionalism 
based on territorial separation of political factions in the divided lands of 
historical Palestine. Three distinct areas are held apart by military rule 
and physical barriers: Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  
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As argued by Dina Mater and Zahera Harb in Narrating conflict in the 
Middle East (2013), the media has potential as a vehicle for expression of 
feelings of wider Palestinian nationalism. This study, which draws on the 
work of Benedict Anderson on nationalism as a sentiment projected 
onto ‘imagined communities’, corroborates many of the findings of this 
chapter (Anderson, 2006: 34-39). Central to Anderson’s argument is the 
idea that nationalism is encouraged by the appearance of the print media, 
through which elites can start to imagine themselves as sharing identities 
beyond the clan, village and place of worship. Indeed as the historical 
account in this chapter suggests, the idea of the Palestinian nation first 
started to be articulated in a few relatively independent publications.  
 This chapter has provided the background, perceptions and 
perspectives around media under British rule, after 1948 under Israeli 
colonisation and then after the Oslo Agreement which was supposed to 
end military occupation. Each phase successively reinforced the national 
imaginary of a united Palestine, inhabited by people who thought of 
themselves as Palestinians. Whilst Palestinians’ political identities were 
being factionalised, their national and cultural identities were being 
reimagined as relatively unified.  
 Historically, some continuities in the ambiguous role of the media in 
relation to nationalism and Palestinian identity, have been pointed to in 
this chapter. It appears reasonable to expect that more non-news media 
content might help shift media beyond the narrow factionalisms of the 
past. This includes children’s and cultural programmes like those selected 
for this study. To explore further how media operates both as a force for 
expressing sectarian, political and factional divisions in society and as a 
force for imagining their opposite, the next chapter introduces an 
analytical framework, explains the key conceptual tools used in the rest 
of the study, and explains the methodological processes involved in 
drawing deeper insights from the findings in this study. 
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Notes 
 
1 The historical background of the press in Palestine under the Ottoman Empire is the 
subject of a chapter (published under the name Omer) by the author (see Omer, 2015).  
2 There was an arts magazine, The Arab College Magazine, initiated by Ahmed Sameh Al-
Khalidi in 1927. Rawdet El Maref (The Meadow of Knowledge), another art journal, 
continued to publish until the end of the British Mandate. Al Ghad (Tomorrow Magazine) 
was published in Bethlehem in 1938 (see Yaghi, 1980).  
3 The source was found on photos in a Gaza library without page numbers.  
4 Scripts were collected from undated photographs in the Gaza library. 
5 Scripts were collected from undated photographs in the Gaza library. No page numbers 
were available. Al Defa’a, (The Defence) ceased publication after the war in Jaffa, but 
started publishing again from Cairo in 1958, and was distributed from there to Jordan and 
the West Bank. A few years later, Al Defa’a was moved to Jerusalem and started to print 
from the Islamic Orphans House (Abu Shanab, 2001), with Sadek Al Shanti as the person 
in charge. The editor-in-chief was Al Shanti’s brother, Ibrahim Al Shanti. Al Jami’aa Al 
Islamyah (The Islamic Federation) also resumed printing after the war and was considered one 
of the major newspapers at the time. Its first edition was published in Jordan in 1949, 
with Haider Al Farouqi serving as editor. However, this newspaper did not last too long. 
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3 
Towards an Analytical Framework  
for Understanding Factionalism and 
Defactionalisation in Palestinian 
Satellite TV 
 
‘If you ask me, the New York Times is factional’ (Noam Chomsky, in 
conversation, 20 November 2011).  
‘[whether something is factional or partisan]…seems more a matter of 
convention than of principle’ (Noam Chomsky, in conversation, 27 
November 2015).  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will theorise the key concepts central to the study, as 
presented in Chapter 1, especially ‘factionalism’, and the process of 
moving beyond factionalism, termed ‘defactionalisation’ in this study. 
Each of these terms is related to the wider context of the contemporary 
media in Palestine. Some key political and social explanations for 
factionalism and its opposite, defactionalisation, are considered. The 
analytical framework will later be applied to the content and production 
processes of children’s and cultural satellite TV programmes of the ASC 
and the PSC, during the chosen research period from March 2009 to 
January 2010. This chapter discusses an appropriate theoretical 
framework with which content and production dimensions of the four 
selected programmes can be analysed and explained. This framework is 
derived by juxtaposing a ‘circuits of media’ approach, that considers the 
factors influencing producers, with a form of thematic content analysis 
that facilitates comparative work. In this way, children’s and cultural 
programmes of the two selected Hamas and Fatah-oriented satellite TV 
channels, ASC and PSC, will be analysed in later chapters (4, 5, 6 and 7), 
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and these analyses integrated in the last two chapters of the thesis 
(Chapter 8 and 9). In the last part of this chapter, the content analysis 
framework is operationalised in preparation for Chapters 6 and 7, which 
focus on how the key themes appear in the content of all 4 programmes. 
3.2 Redefining Terms: ‘Factional’ or ‘Partisan’?  
According to recent studies, media content mirrors the relationship 
between governing entities and the social entities they rule over (Flew 
and Waisboard, 2015, Skuse et al, 2011). Media has been very effective in 
shaping political realities in Palestine, since it reflects both public opinion 
and the expectations and opinions of ruling elites (Peterson, 2015). 
Media in Palestine still continues to play a significant ‘public information’ 
role, delivering information about administrative policy and changes 
resulting from legislative decrees to the population, something that 
started under Ottoman rule and continued under the British Mandate.  
 Media can be seen as set of spaces that connect people – for instance 
for the purposes of imagining themselves as one people or nation, and as 
a historical territory (Matar, 2010; Anderson, 2006). By the same token, 
media can divide through forces such as party political divisions, 
location-based identities, and personal forms of rivalry and factionalism 
(Hroub, 2012). Arguably, although occasionally in the past there were 
examples of national media spaces, more recently media in Palestine has 
started to provide more room for genuine popular opinion to be 
expressed. In Chapter 8, it is suggested that a re-emerging sense of 
‘Palestinianism’ is evidence of this emergent national media that tends 
to focus less on factional content. With its IT-based and satellite 
branches, media has to reflect public opinion more than in the past, and 
cannot remain about one-directional flows of information directed 
towards supposedly passive audiences as in the past. New media 
technologies have enabled more diverse constituencies to express their 
views in the media, and not only in the news. Palestinian women, young 
people, religious minorities, creative artists and intellectuals including 
those in the diaspora, increasingly have their views aired. 
 One challenge for this study is to arrive at a satisfactory definition of 
factional media, and factionalism. In the absence of such a definition in 
the wider literature, a specific definition of factionalism and of its 
reversal – defactionalisation - will need to be operationalized in the 
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research process. One early pioneer of media studies, Harold Lasswell 
(1931: 49), provided an influential definition of a faction as ‘any 
constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of 
particular persons or policies’. Historically, especially since the end of the 
Ottoman Empire, media outlets in Palestine have been associated in 
various ways with specific, sometimes party-based and sometimes highly 
personalised, factions. So it may be correct to use the local term, and call 
them ‘factional’.   
 The work of Ralph Nicholas (1966) represents another effort to 
define what ‘faction’ is and therefore what ‘factionalism’ might mean. 
His definition remains relevant since his work gained attention when first 
published, as a serious attempt to formulate a socio-anthropological 
definition of factionalism in peasant societies. For Nicholas, factions are 
political conflict groupings that are provoked into a sense of self-
identification behind a particular leader. A faction differs from other 
political institutions or forms of organisation in that the individual 
faction leader (usually a ‘he’ rather than a ‘she’) plays a critical organising 
role, over and above other formal political divisions, institutions and 
political ideologies. As ‘a political activity or phenomenon,’ factional 
conflict involves ‘organised conflict over public power’ (Nicholas, 1966: 
52) that emerges in a highly personalised form, taking the shape of 
struggles over the ‘mechanisms of control over human and material 
resources,’ mainly between groupings, fragments, factions or parties 
rallying behind specific individual leaders (Nicholas, 1966).  
Factions can be distinguished from political parties as such, both 
‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ ones, since unlike factions, in general, 
political parties at least: ‘…purport to represent distinct interests within 
the public, rather than interests of their leadership’ (Nicholas, 1966, 53). 
Hamas and Fatah have both competed in elections, at least once, yet 
there are good reasons to consider them to operate as factions rather 
than as political parties in the usual sense. How they operate within the 
broader Palestinian national movement is reflected in the local 
terminology used for both Hamas and Fatah in Arabic, since they are 
referred to as Fasae’l, a term whose closest translation is factions; the 
Arabic term, Ahzab, which translates as political parties, is much less 
often used when referring to Fatah and Hamas (Abuzanouna, 2012; 
Tuastad, 2013).  
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This has influenced the use of the term factionalism in this study. In 
Arabic, both Hamas and Fatah also term themselves ‘factions’ rather 
than ‘parties’, since they identify as factions of the wider National 
Movement. It does seem that in Palestine today, as to some extent in the 
past, the term ‘factions’ has greater salience in elite and general public 
opinion and in media discourse than the term ‘political parties’ (Al 
Ghudrah, 2005).  
Since neither Fatah nor Hamas can claim to be ‘more Palestinian’ 
than the other, given this standoff, their ‘factional’ differences have 
tended to become more apparent. Historically, leadership conflicts have 
been nurtured under the specific political and cultural conditions of 
different parts of Palestine. Those conditions were described in more 
detail in Chapter 2, which noted the appearance of a certain Gazan 
exceptionalism also during earlier periods. Traditionally, Fatah was the 
more secular of the two, and Hamas the more religious. Yet each faction 
is associated with a: ‘set of discourses, stories, images, spectacles, and 
varying cultural forms and practices that generate meaning, identities, 
and political effects’ across Palestinian audiences, and beyond (Durham 
and Kellner, 2001: 6).  
Within any society, public opinion can be swayed by the use of key 
motifs, both textual and visual. Journalists within a particular faction are 
likely to make use of such well-known idioms, for ‘cultural texts are 
saturated with social meanings, they generate political effects, 
reproducing or opposing governing social institutions and relations of 
domination and subordination’ (Durham and Kellner, 2001: 6). 
When the media’s agendas, producers and content are dominated by 
factions, we can speak of ‘factional media’, a media that informs the 
public about the actions, policies and objectives of one of the two or 
more respective factions. A defining element in factional media is the use 
of media to vilify the rival faction, as part of an effort to consolidate 
power (Daouwd, 2011). The ultimate objectives are to gain or retain 
power, to control information, and to eliminate competing ideas and 
rival factions that may undermine that power (Daouwd, 2011). A 
politically driven media discourse is often used as a means to prepare the 
ground for justifying ‘future actions’ (Leudar et al, 2004: 244). This self-
justificatory logic of factional media representations helps to understand, 
for example, how factional news coverage is produced. 
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In this research, I use the term ‘factional media’ to define the way the 
Al Aqsa Satellite Channel (ASC) and the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation 
(PBC) of which the PSC is a constituent part, have operated during 
much of their existence. In so doing I build on Nicholas’ (1966) 
anthropological understanding of factions, using the term ‘factional’ to 
express and emphasise how both the ASC and the PBC/PSC have 
generally expressed highly personalised frames of political leadership. 
Another study, by Jewell and Olson, explored factions in US party 
politics, and sees factions inside political parties as being either 
economically, ideologically, ethnically or geographically-based, or based 
on personal ambition of a specific leader (Jewell and Olson, 1982). In 
Palestine, factions tend to combine personal ambition with ideological 
and geographical polarisation.  
Finally, the term factional is preferred as more accurate than the more 
widely used ‘partisan media’ (Dautrich & Yalof, 2009). According to 
Nicholas, partisan groups do claim to be working in the service of the 
greater public, whereas this is not the case for factions, which are 
explicitly oriented towards a specific leader and set of policies that may 
not be in the public interest, but which benefit the leader, or leaders, and 
their followers. The term ‘factional media,’ as opposed to ‘partisan 
media,’ indicates those media outlets that openly, and even 
unapologetically promote the interests of their own leader above the 
interests of other leaders or even of the majority. Partisan media also do 
this, but try to give the impression of serving the broader public interest 
at the same time.  
Partisan media as a concept is most often used to understand the 
divisions within the media, for example in the United States, Hong Kong 
or United Kingdom (Kuyper, 2014; Levendusky, 2013a; Lee, 1985). This 
study views factional media as distinct from partisan media, a distinction 
that is significant in the specific geopolitical context of Palestine. With 
the rise of new political parties and factions in emerging post-
authoritarian states such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, the 
tendency for media in the Middle East region to become factional in 
terms of content, has if anything risen. Political party-based and faction-
related media outlets are growing in numbers, both in satellite TV and in 
the printed press, magazines and on-line.  
Prior to the rise of commercial media, individuals produced 
newspapers, ‘the penny press,’ and small home-produced publications. 
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They flourished and sank without leaving a trace, most of them failing to 
become established. Later, partisan media emerged, which,  ‘…appealing 
mostly to [audiences]… who already agreed with the political position 
advocated… eventually became big business, and government printing 
contracts…[so that] partisan publications became a regular part of the 
spoils system’ (Dautrich & Yalof, 2009: 263).  
The quotation from a conversation with Chomsky, cited at the start 
of this chapter, ‘If you ask me, the New York Times is factional’ 
(Chomsky in conversation, 20 November 2011), does not imply that 
factionalism in the PBC/PSC and ASC can be compared with factional 
forms of content and expression in media outlets like Fox News and 
MSNBC in the US. Of course, Satellite TV stations like Fox News have 
their own political bias, one that supports Republican agendas. 
Meanwhile MSNBC and other ‘cable’ networks tend to support the 
Democratic Party (Terwilleger and McCarthy, 2011). Perhaps if the PSC 
and ASC could be described as ‘factional’, MSNBC or FOX might be 
viewed as ‘partisan’. If it helped the Fox brand in its search for 
commercial viability to become Democrat, then it would find the means 
to change its political line. Since Fox News seeks commercial viability 
first and foremost, it is not strictly personal or factional. Factionalism is 
evident for the PSC and ASC, however, as ‘switching sides’ would simply 
not be an option. This too explains why it is important and interesting to 
consider the problem of defactionalisation in their case.  
There are also some similarities between partisan media and factional 
media. Both share the characteristic of inspiring loyalty among staff. 
Even without overt controls, such loyalty can result in a relatively unified 
set of media messages. For factional, but not partisan media, loyalty can 
even reduce news and programme production costs. Exploitative 
relations and poor working conditions are part and parcel of factional 
media situations, where strong political affiliations may lead journalists 
and others to accept lower pay than would otherwise be the case, since 
they are working for a cause they believe in and for leaders who inspire 
them (Sutter, 2001). In both cases, media ownership is generally related 
to political parties and their top leaders, often to one single individual. 
However, in factional media, this loyalty is not strategic or commercially-
based; it is mainly personal (Dautrich & Yalof, 2009). In factional media 
settings, journalists and producers not only toe the party line; they also 
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need to consider the personal views and interests of specific dominant 
leaders, able to define personally what factional interests are.  
By contrast, unlike the argument of Chomsky cited at the start of this 
chapter and unlike CNN’s relationship with the Democrats, the ASC is 
actually an integral part of Hamas; it cannot ever stop being Hamas. The 
ASC openly promotes Hamas military wing agendas and values, and 
even carries commercials promoting the activities of Hamas’ military 
wing (Field notes, 2013). The same applies to the PSC, which reinforces 
the image of the National Guard and of Preventive Security, all security 
forces led by Fatah leaders (Sienkiewicz, 2012). This heavy sense of 
political commitment and overt, unapologetic bias is largely missing in 
the partisan media of the Fox News type. This type of media can be seen 
as a form of ‘lightly’ affiliated media, not owned outright by a political 
party, but leading from behind, through general affiliation, as it were, 
rather than on the basis of the unquestionable loyalty and devotion that 
characterises factional media (Levendusky, 2013b). Scholars describe 
partisan media stories as ‘framed, spun, and slanted so that certain 
political agendas are advanced’ (Jamieson et al 2007: 26). In contrast, in 
factional media stories are not just slanted, but are virtually 
indistinguishable from the official positions of the faction’s top 
leadership.  
More recent work on factions by Boucek helps to make the point that 
factions have been defined in many different ways over time in different 
contexts (Boucek, 2009). The definition of a faction in the Palestinian 
media context, as used in this study, comes closest to the definition of 
earlier thinkers like Hume, Burke and V.O. Key, for whom factions are 
equated to ‘political machines’ serving mostly personal interests (Boucek, 
2009: 459; Boucek, 2012; Benedict, 1985). Taking into account these 
various elements of a definition, for this study, factional media will be 
defined as the situation where a group based around personal ambitions 
and ideological goals:  
a. conceptualises its audience as groups and individuals who approve 
of one political faction’s dominant positions;  
b. is overt in its privileging of narrow and even individual factional 
interests over the wider interests of the general public (economic, 
social, political interests);  
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c. is funded primarily by competing political, as opposed to corporate 
or governmental, sources, and  
d. vilifies competing faction(s) as a means to gain support for its own 
leadership’s positions.  
Among scholars working on factions within parties, few would use 
this specific definition, which is tailored to the particular context of 
media in Palestine. Factionalism is recognised by its distinctive features, 
in which the press and other media as actors are seeking to narrowly 
control public opinion, to shore up support for an individual and his 
faction, whilst attacking the integrity of the competing faction or factions 
(Boucek, 2009; Boucek, 2012).  
3.3 Theorising Defactionalisation and ‘Palestinianism’ 
A crucial problem is where to locate the production of meaning and 
ideology in the mass communication processes, and how to characterise 
processes of agency and interpretation, in this case organised around 
factions, or not as the case may be (Hallin and Mancini, 2012; 
Sienkiewicz, 2012; Tawil-Souri, 2011). In Marxist and critical theory, the 
power of the media has been related to how media messages serve the 
interests of specific groups, political factions or economic and class 
interests. Power relations between Hamas and Fatah and their supporters 
and media audiences linked to them are not the main focus of this study, 
however. Instead, the focus is on ways in which the Hamas and Fatah-
related media – and especially satellite TV channels – represent reality to 
either build political and cultural consensus (Khalaf, 2008) or in order to 
undermine such consensus (Khalaf, 2008). This is likely to be true of 
cultural and children’s programming as well as of the news.  
 Reversing or limiting factionalism may require restoring ‘the role of 
media events in integrating society, affirming…common values, 
legitimating its institutions, and reconciling different sectional elements’ 
(Curran and Liebes, 1998: 4). Seeing the media as part of wider efforts to 
restore hope implies that the media can play a constructive role in de-
escalating violent conflicts by communicating messages and themes that 
cut across, for instance, different sectors of Palestinian society. In 
relation to the Hamas-Fatah conflict, it is vital to flesh out an 
understanding of their use of the media. To do this, the study seeks to 
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‘place the media within wider social, economic and political settings’ 
(Keeble, 1997: 2). Of course, no local context can be studied in isolation 
in the present era. Globally, there are many other contexts in which the 
concepts of factional journalism and media ‘factionalism’ or 
‘defactionalisation’ could apply, as the opening quotations from 
Chomsky at the start of this chapter suggest. Not only in obvious war or 
post-war areas do warring factions attempt to control the details of 
reporting in the press. In ‘advanced democracies’ too, media control can 
take on perhaps subtler, but also quite ‘factionalised’ forms. In both 
Hamas and Fatah media, factionalism tends to find expression through:  
‘…selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering 
of information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping debate within the 
bounds of acceptable premises’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 298; 
Hjarvard, 2003). 
As Greenfield (2014) noted in Mind and Media: The Effects of Televison, 
Video Games, and Computers, TV has a powerful effect and tends to take 
over time, attention, and the cognitive development of children and 
young people. Its influence in shaping children’s habits and expectations 
makes it a powerful medium for shaping future citizens. Media 
influences need to be understood in specific settings, but unlike in most 
media research, the influence of media on audiences is not the main 
focus of this study. Instead, this study focusses on the ‘supply side’, 
looking at the production process and at the content. This supply side 
(i.e., content and production) is important because it enables us to zoom 
in on how television representations of reality relate to wider debates and 
developments in Palestinian society around a set of key themes, as 
already described in Chapter 1. 
When we seek to understand how media content is produced in a 
latent conflict situation, where there has been violence and not just a 
‘war of words’ between different factions, we might reasonably hope that 
‘defactionalisation’ would follow after the end of violence. In this 
chapter, ‘defactionalisation’ is introduced and theorised as a central 
concept used in the study, to express how even factional media may 
reflect wider trends to avoid the logic of factionalism, and in the case of 
ASC and PSC, to overcome the legacies of violent factionalism that 
arose especially in 2006-2008, between Fatah and Hamas.  
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 Analysing media producers’ positions, the degree of their polarisation 
or convergence in content, involves the identified themes, their presence 
or absence in the different episodes of each programme during the 
selected study period. Thematic content analysis of this type is an 
established means of making sense of TV production values and is 
presented in Chapter 6 and 7 in relation to children’s programmes and 
cultural programs respectively (Thawabteh, 2010). In Chapter 8 an 
emerging sense of ‘Palestinianism’ is detected in ASC and PSC 
programmes, indicating a likely less factionalised media future in 
Palestine. As argued by Yezid Sayigh, interviewed by Dina Matar (2010), 
factional media has largely been forced on Palestinians, who because 
they find themselves politically and socially isolated, are forced to make 
choices about which political groups to follow and be loyal towards.  
Defactionalisation implies de-emphasising inter- and intra-party 
conflicts and ending mediatisd appeals that reinforce divisive sub-
national identities and agendas. In a nutshell, moving beyond 
factionalism is termed defactionalisation in this study. This notion 
conveys the idea that complicated internal conflicts can be overcome by 
focussing on non-divisive in relation to the programme content of media 
outlets which represent competing factions. The following chapters will 
show that when themes are explored and illustrated using content 
analysis, and when producers reflect on their choices and constraints, it 
becomes evident that both the ASC and the PSC are moving beyond 
factional media agendas in their cultural and children’s programmes, 
both in terms of contents and in terms of production values.  
 Palestinianism (Matar, 2010) is examined more closely in Chapter 8, 
and may appear to result from defactionalisation. It also represents a 
renewal of Islamic rhetoric, however, and a departure from secular 
nationalism of the PLO variety, for instance. Palestinianism as a new 
form of nationalism thus poses renewed challenges to the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine, and does so from a broadly religious perspective 
informed by strands of political Islamist ideology. Edward Said (1994:4) 
used the term ‘Palestinianism’ to refer to the motivating ideology of the 
Palestinian resistance movement in the 1970s. He marks this period as a 
fresh beginning for Palestinians, stating ‘Palestinianism, then, is an effort 
at repatriation… a transition from being in exile to becoming a 
Palestinian once again.’ Similarly, in this study, the term Palestinianism is 
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associated with the Palestinian National Movement, involving a 
transition from faction-oriented media to a more pan-Palestinian form of 
media.  
 Less factional media content may also mean less ‘security’-oriented 
media, enhancing a sense of being opposed to whatever comes from 
Israel as occupying power. A renewed sense of this common cause can 
quite clearly be seen emerging in the Palestinian satellite TV stations, 
ASC and PSC. This was evident both in interviews conducted for this 
study, and in the content of children’s and cultural TV programmes 
broadcast by ASC and PSC during the the period under review. 
3.4 Comparing Different Approaches to Analysing Media 
Content and Production  
In Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, Herman 
and Chomsky (1988) adopt a political-economic approach, similar to that 
of some other scholars in the field (McChesney, 2008; Durham and 
Kellner, 2001). The approach adopted in this study can be distinguished 
from a political economy approach, in which money or capital are taken 
to be the key and the ultimate determinants of the media’s content, 
factionalised or not. The approach in this study can also be distinguished 
from a ‘media effects’ approach, in which viewers are seen as ‘impacted’ 
by media in various ways. Instead, this study considers various layers of 
power relations, and acknowledges agency at all levels, particularly at the 
level of media creators and producers.  
 Whilst certainly limited by economic and political constraints, 
nonetheless they have real creative choices and make decisions during 
the production process that can move the media beyond and away from 
factional agendas.  An appealing aspect of a Gramscian approach is that 
it provides a way of thinking about economic power and dominance 
without losing sight of the role played by the human agency of the 
dominated and oppressed.  
3.4.1 Theorising Media Compromises  
In my position as a ‘scholar-practitioner,’ (Mayer, 2009) observing fellow 
media professionals, I have noticed one key feature that begs further 
explanation, beyond the historical account given in Chapter 2. This is the 
tendency, already noted, of many working in the media in Palestine to 
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make compromises and engage in self-censorship. My experience of 
many years of work in the media in Gaza is that the militarisation of 
Hamas and of Fatah creates subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle forms 
of intimidation, which can translate as pressure on journalists and 
producers, including those who work for ASC and PSC, to avoid 
expressing certain views considered hostile to the ideas or agendas of the 
dominant faction. This can lead media professionals to keep their 
opinions private, to prefer silence rather than open expression, and to 
carefully avoid explicit disagreements. Staff are not easily open about 
these constraints, and often compromise so that they can maintain trust 
but still negotiate over content and how it is framed (Allen, 2013).  
 Under such conditions, self-censorship and compromises with 
political faction positions can be noticed by someone familiar with the 
context, and this can constrain the ability of media professionals to 
control the pace of media ‘defactionalisation’ in relation to thematic 
content and production values. ‘Defactionalisation’, which reverses 
factionalism, does become easier once violent clashes between Hamas 
and Fatah give way to latent and non-violent form of inter-factional 
competition instead. After lethal clashes in 2007-2008, the situation 
started to improve in 2009-10, which is the period this study focusses on.  
 Without adopting the orthodox Marxist position that media simply 
‘reflects’ the material interests of dominant capitalists, a Gramscian 
understanding of power relations helps to analyse the practices and 
politics of media compromise. Media producers decide to give in at 
certain points on some of their preferred themes, in order to secure 
wider audience appeal, rather than preach to the converted alone.  Being 
prepared to compromise, and move away from factional agendas, and to 
promote defactionalisation is a significant process that this study seeks to 
identify and theorise. Such a move towards making compromises:  
‘…helps the progressive force to triumph, albeit with its victory tempered 
by certain compromises and limitations. It is reactionary when its 
intervention helps the reactionary force to triumph – in this case too with 
certain compromises and limitations, which have, however, a different 
value, extent, and significance than in the former’ (Gramsci, 1992: 464-
465).  
Inspired by such insights about media practices, Stuart Hall, in a well-
known article, ‘Encoding/Decoding,’ has argued that producers cannot 
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fully control the final meaning of what they produce (Hall, 2010). When 
‘…the viewer takes the connoted meaning from, say, a television 
newscast or current affairs programme… and decodes the message…we 
might say that the viewer is operating inside the dominant code’ or frame 
of reference (Hall, 2010: 570). D’Acci has taken further this idea that the 
consumer plays an active part in making meaning from a given media 
text, and has detailed the variety of factors that complicate, although not 
completely negate, the ability of media producers to impart intended 
messages to audiences (D’Acci, 2004). Domination can coexist with 
compromise, not in a way that reduces everything to the binary of 
resistance or consent, but instead in a way that involves shifting the 
balance of power relation. Gramsci refers to this as: 
‘….spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to 
the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group [i.e. the producers of factional media]. This consent is ‘historically’ 
caused by the prestige [and factional ownership], which the dominant 
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of 
production…[the] apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ 
enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or 
passively’ (Gramsci, 1971:145).  
Of course, there will be strict financial limits to what content media 
can produce in both the PSC and ASC TV channels. There are also 
certain restrictions on what can be conveyed in terms of content on 
satellite TV. Restrictions on free expression and content are technical, 
legal, political and economic. For D’Acci’s ‘circuits of media’ approach, 
there are also restrictions on what audiences and sponsors will find 
acceptable in terms of content and messages, mediated through social 
norms and cultural values. D’Acci (2004) has thus demonstrated how 
specific elements in Taiwanese society ‘…have been understood and 
experienced by their incorporation as moments in various competing 
discourses’ in the Taiwanese media (D’Acci, 2004: 438). According to 
one study:   
‘D’Acci’s study exemplified the argument that meaning can, in fact, never 
be guaranteed—neither in the construction of media texts nor in their 
reception; and it certainly cannot be read simply off of ownership 
structures…Rather, the entire circuit of production is one of constant 
ideological negotiation and discursive struggle in the attempt to frame 
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representations within a specific socio-historical context’ (Havens et al., 
2009: 243). 
The relevance of considering the concept of hegemony in analysis of 
media production and thematic content is that it can help explain why 
media cannot simply force ideas down viewers’ throats. Instead, once 
there is competition, as in satellite TV, media producers have to make 
compromises if they are to appeal to wider audiences. The ‘circuits of 
media’ of d’Acci itself draws on a Gramscian notion of hegemony. This 
approach will be especially helpful for looking at processes of 
defactionalisation of content within specific children’s and cultural 
programmes, and embedded within a structurally factional satellite TV 
media environment (D’Acci, 2004).  
The different factors are said, according to the ‘circuits of media’ 
approach, to influence media producers, and can also help explain the 
many compromises producers in Palestine, whether in Gaza, the West 
Bank or elsewhere, are obliged to make on a daily basis, working within 
the world of Palestinian media.  
D’Acci’s is far from being the only ‘circuits of media’ approach, but it 
is one of the best-known and influential. Several other studies employ 
closely related concepts, like ‘media circuits’, as in Hall (1980), Johnson 
(1986/1987), Gough-Yates (2003) and Crewe (2003). D’Acci’s model is 
used here because it takes into account several different factors involved 
in media production and appears as one of the more inclusive 
approaches. The same applies to Gans and to Gitlin and their theoretical 
perspectives, which are only two among a great many approaches to the 
analysis of media content. Whereas the approaches of Gans and Gitlin 
make explicit reference to external factors that can influence content, 
most other, related approaches do not say much about this dimension 
(Tuchman 1977; Fishman 1980; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986b).  
Hall already proposed the idea of a circuit or feedback loop between 
media producers and audiences, long before the internet revolution, and 
in this model, audiences and their expectations actively shape media 
content. Hall envisaged a media ‘structure produced and sustained 
through the articulation of linked but distinctive moments - production, 
circulation, distribution/consumption and reproduction’ (Hall, 1980: 
117). This point has been made more recently by Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996), who also built on Herbert Gans’s and Todd Gitlin’s seminal 
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studies and insights (Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). The more recent work of 
Marc Lynch (2006), Voices of the New Arab Public: a discussion on Iraq, Al-
Jazeera, and the Middle East Policy Today, uses a similar approach, also 
grounded in a Gramscian framework. It is acknowledged in such studies 
that:  
‘…the new Arab public is more than just Al Jazeera. It is defined by the 
rapidly expanding universe of Arabs able and willing to engage in public 
arguments about political issues within an ever-increasing range of 
possible media outlets… dozens of competing satellite television stations, 
independent newspapers, state-backed official media, and even on-line 
news sites. It comprises Islamic networks and mosques, NGOs and 
transnational organizations, and prominent public figures and intellectuals’ 
(Lynch, 2006: 21-22). 
All three of the studies mentioned above look mostly at content, but 
also place this content within the wider context of how media is being 
produced. Similarly to such arguments, in this study too, the Palestinian 
public is understood as: ‘composed of multiple, overlapping publics that 
should be defined not territorially but in reference to a shared identity 
and a common set of political arguments and concerns’ (Lynch, 2006: 
22).  
Adopting a theoretical model that looks at media through the lens of 
struggles for hegemony, means that thematic media content needs to be 
analysed to show both how ideas are transmitted from producers to 
audiences, but also how different forces outside and inside the media 
influence both production choices, content and values expressed in the 
media. According to Gramsci (1992: 706-707), ‘(i)deology is identified as 
distinct from the structure, and it is asserted that it is not ideology that 
changes the structures but vice versa.’ It is hoped that this study can 
nonetheless offer deeper insights into how a structurally factional media 
can start to produce children’s and cultural programmes where both 
media content and production values appear to move beyond 
factionalism, and to become more defactionalised.  
A Gramscian approach enables us to avoid falling into the trap of 
setting out the simple expectation – which may then tend to be fulfilled 
through a bias in data collection – that PSC simply transmits the views of 
Fatah, including in its children’s and cultural programmes, and that ASC 
does the same in relation to the views of Hamas. The main question to 
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be asked during content analysis is: what aspects don’t seem ‘typical’ of 
Fatah or Hamas views, and why are they there? Of course, answering 
this question involves looking at how compromises are made in 
production values and in program content. 
     Making political, production-related and social-cultural compromises, 
TV producers cannot avoid being aware of the contextual environment of 
their own media production, whether they are producing news, cultural 
programmes or children’s TV (Gitlin, 1980). Content analysis can be used 
to show how these compromises are expressed, and to suggest why certain 
decisions may or may not have been made, and why a different kind of 
content may have been avoided. Applying the notion of hegemony to 
Palestinian satellite media also makes it clear that media hegemony is 
always something ‘piecemeal’, and is never ‘totalising or permanent’ but 
subject to multiple on-going compromises, which constantly reshape and 
restructure the media over time (Gramsci, as cited in Hall, 1977: 339). 
[Hegemony as]  
‘…the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by 
the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group 
enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 12).  
As key constituent parts of the National Movement, this insight can apply 
to both Fatah and Hamas.  The historical analysis in Chapter 2 already 
suggested this theoretical position, without theorising the compromises 
and negotiations that were revealed.  
Let’s illustrate the Gramscian approach by taking an example. The 
ASC might wish to go on air and transmit, through children’s and 
cultural programmes, messages about being a devoted Muslim. However, 
this kind of message might not have the intended effect on viewers. This 
means that ASC may have to make compromises and negotiate this 
outcome in other ways than through directly instructing children and 
adults about what it means to be a ‘good muslim.’ This may be why ASC 
cultural and children’s programmes do not explicitly insist that viewers 
should be devoted Muslims, nor express the view that they risk going to 
Hell if not.  Such an approach might well be counter-productive.  
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Thus the ‘circuits of media,’ explored in the next section, is a 
Gramscian-inspired approach to media production, that goes beyond the 
individual agency or opinions of media producers themselves, and their 
own subjectivities. According to D’Acci:  
‘Hegemony is the process by which various discourses in a social 
formation come to achieve positions of relative power in negotiations and 
struggle with other discourses. Cultural studies, for its part, is dedicated to 
analysing the operations of power’ (D’Acci, 2004: 434).  
Along the circuit of different moments in the media circuit, from 
design through production and distribution, the individual and group 
reception of programming content complicates and influences how 
producers as individuals and as professionals, decide to communicate 
and frame specific political and cultural messages. Though producers 
may intend to serve the interest of a specific party or faction, for 
example, in producing a children’s programme or a cultural programme, 
the manner in which they actually present and edit the programme 
content will not be dictated by the faction in any direct way.  Instead, 
thematic content and production values of specific TV programmes will 
result from a complex, discursive process of negotiation between 
producers, distributors and consumers (D’Acci, 2004). In Palestine, such 
processes of negotiation involve funders, political bosses, the Occupiers, 
and also constituencies not as often heard, such as women, youth and 
religious minorities.  
3.4.2 Theorising ‘Circuits of Media’  
The framework adopted for understanding what factors are involved in 
influencing media content in the ASC and PSC children’s and cultural 
programmes is derived from Julie D’Acci’s work. She introduced an 
integrated approach to media studies known as ‘circuits of media,’ which 
has proven especially useful for scholars working in the field of 
television studies within ethnography, cultural and media studies 
(D’Acci, 2004). Combined with this, the studies already mentioned by 
Gans (1980) and Gitlin (1980) are useful since they help to analyse media 
content (in their case, news content.) In this section, these approaches 
are introduced and justified in terms of how they work together to drive 
the theoretical and analytical framework of the rest of this study. 
Synthesising these approaches can help make sense of data collected and 
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collated from the selected ASC and PSC satellite TV programmes. 
Eventually, this will enable us to address the central research questions 
elaborated in the first chapter of this study.  
Critical scholarly work focusing on the media industry has been 
expanding rapidly in the past few years. Like other studies (e.g., Johnson, 
2013 and Haven et al., 2009), D’Acci’s theoretical framework has been 
widely recognised in media analysis research. The ‘circuits of media’ 
model also draws on Johnson’s earlier model (1986, 1987) of ‘circuits of 
production and media studies’, and is inspired by Hall’s (1980) path-
breaking encoding and decoding model for analysing media content. 
D’Acci’s framework can be complemented by recent studies by Mayer 
and others in media production analysis (Mayer, 2009). As one study 
explains:   
‘Production studies gather empirical data about production: the complexity 
of routines and rituals, the routines of seemingly complex processes, the 
economic and political forces that shape roles, technologies, and the 
distribution of resources according to cultural and demographic 
differences’ (Mayer, Banks and Caldwell, 2009: 4). 
 The approach adopted in the present study is intended to be flexible, 
reintroducing aspects of media production studies in order to encourage 
more multi-dimensional explorations of several interrelated aspects of 
the media cycle: media as cultural artifact; media as production and 
media as socio-historical context (D’Acci, 2004; Mayer, Banks and 
Caldwell, 2009). In using these three dimensions to examine the media 
production of the PSC and ASC, it is useful to point out that this 
‘circuits of media’ model presents these dimensions as ‘spheres with 
broken lines in order to represent porous and analytical rather than self-
contained and fully constituted domains’ (D’Acci, 2004: 431).  
From this perspective, viability both involves producers seeking to 
gain wider acceptance among their audiences and - at the same time -  
keeping up the image of their channel as avoiding factionalism and as 
promoting national unity. And as Haven et al. expressed it, the meaning 
of text cannot simply be deduced from ‘…ownership structures and 
advertising interests. Rather, the entire circuit of production is one of 
constant ideological negotiation and discursive struggle in the attempt to 
frame representation within a specific socio-historical context’ (Haven et 
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al, 2009: 243). Each of the three sites of production will now be 
examined in turn. 
(i) The first site is that of media as cultural artifact. Artifacts are 
taken as evidence of the messages media outlets try to convey to 
their audiences. Each distinguishes one television channel from 
another, and part of this difference will be easily measurable, 
especially when sound bites combine with visual images or videos, 
to demonstrate a particular set of popular cultural references. 
Among the most popular cultural artifacts are the Palestinian 
traditional dress, the Kuffiyeh, the Dome of the Rock, the national 
dance, or Dabka, and photos of Palestinian refugees from 1948, 
during the Nakba. Other symbols include the flag, the olive tree, 
traditional cookery and recipes, and kitchen and farming utensils. 
Non-visual artifacts can be harder to document. The use of music 
and songs, references to poetry, and to Palestinian folklore, and 
the use of metaphors in stories, as just some examples. To clarify 
this further, considering cultural artifacts as one of the contested 
sites of media production is a useful means of testing how culture 
informs what is produced, as mediated by technological and 
economic considerations. A cultural artifact might be ‘…evident in 
the formal dimensions of particular programmes; or it might focus 
on the reception and the various in-home technologies – capital as 
domestic goods – of viewers from different socioeconomic strata’ 
(D’Acci, 2004: 433-434). When examining the difference of themes 
between the relatively high-budget production of Sesame Street and 
the low-budget production of Pioneers of Tomorrow, the notion of 
shared cultural artifacts can explain why at times themes may 
overlap, and even look similar between these two otherwise quite 
contrasting programmes. Given political polarisation of party 
factions across Palestinian territories, when examining Cultural 
Flashes, Burning Brands, Sesame Street and Pioneers of Tomorrow, and 
looking at dominant factors shaping media content of these 
cultural and children’s shows, one might expect ideology to play a 
prominent role (Hallin and Mancini, 2012; Sienkiewicz, 2012; 
Tawil-Souri, 2011). However, surprisingly, later in this study this 
appears not to be the case.  
(ii) The second site in the circuit of media production in D’Acci’s  
framework (2004: 433) is conceptualised as ‘encompassing all 
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phases of the production’, and as ‘…the overall institutional 
context from which programming emerges and is regulated.’ To 
take just one example to illustrate the production process itself, as 
a site of media production, it was found that production teams in 
Sesame Street engaged in community-based ‘testing’ of their themes 
and characters. They organised meetings with the public, for 
example, going to schools to show them the programme episodes, 
each new season, using different voices, outfits and styles to gauge 
the reactions of children and assess their preferences. This 
involved coordination with both civil society organisations in the 
West Bank and the Ministry of Education in Ramallah. No 
outreach of this kind was found in the case of Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
perhaps because ASC had a much tighter budget. However, the 
more restricted and ‘traditional’ presentation styles might also be 
an ideological choice, as it seemed to be preferred by ASC in both 
its cultural and children’s programming. In Sesame Street, the 
Palestinian production team responded to external constituents, as 
well as local audiences of children in Palestine (or at least West 
Bank). Experts from New York regularly ensured that the 
programme contents remained within global Sesame Street norms 
and standards. According to an interview with one of the Sesame 
Street producers, they needed to get approval at each stage of the 
production process. In filming, screening, reviewing and finally 
prior to transmission, the global editorial management in New 
York had the final say (Interview: Sayeigh, 2013). This brief ‘thick 
description’ of the production processes and styles in PSC and 
ASC Satellite TV programmes for children, already reveals how 
each has its own distinctive organisational culture and type of 
production process. These, in turn, will influence the content of 
the children’s programmes in the two Palestinian stations, as 
Chapter 5 and 6 will clearly show (D’Acci, 2004). PSC and ASC 
producers each face distinct social and institutional constraints and 
outlooks, which became more apparent as the actual production 
process was discussed with staff. After all, the processes of 
production involve constant ideological negotiations and ongoing 
discursive struggles between media practitioners and those who 
employ them, as well as with funders and audiences.  
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(iii) The third site is that of the socio-historical context. Conducting 
content analysis also means examining the political, social, and 
economic settings of a particular theme or type of content. The 
context of such themes or ideas, surrounding it in time and place, 
provides it with specific meaning, unlikely to come through in 
content when taken in isolation. While comparing children’s and 
cultural programming of the PSC and ASC, this will offer us a 
sense of how unique/ordinary the presented programmes/ideas 
were. One of the strengths of the ‘circuits of media’ model is that 
it re-introduces some key insights from media industry studies, 
side-lined in media studies for some time by the tendency of most 
media scholars to focus on audience responses or on analysis of 
media discourses and language use. The ‘circuits of media’ concept 
thus refocuses attention on ‘all phases of the production moment 
or the industry as the overall institutional context from which 
programming emerges and is regulated’ (D’Acci, 2004: 433). Like 
D’Acci’s work, this study isis concerned with all phases of the 
production process, and places media production in its wider 
cultural, institutional and historical context (the latter in Chapter 
2).  
In analysing these three sites of media production in a connected way, 
the theoretical perspectives of Deciding what’s news (Gans, 1979) and The 
whole world is watching (Gitlin, 1980) contribute to the analysis of the 
evolving shaping of media content. The research of Gans and of Gitlin 
pays close attention to individual media producers, their socialisation, the 
routines that exist within their organisational set-up, and the wider socio-
cultural contexts of media production, including audiences and 
ideologies, in ways that overlap with the third element in D’Acci’s 
circuits of media model. 
Although conducted separately, the studies of Gans and Gitlin 
complement one another and present elements of a common 
framework. Their overlapping hierarchy of influences model is 
composed of five types of explanations, which have also been identified 
by other scholars who reviewed the field of content analysis in relation 
to news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). The five ways of explaining how 
media content is formed will now be listed. Each set of explanations is 
briefly elaborated on in connection with the PSC and ASC. They are: the 
socialisation and attitudes of media workers; media organisation and 
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routines; social reality; influences of other social institutions and forces; 
ideological positions. Each of these is now considered in turn:  
 
1. Firstly, content is influenced by the socialisation and attitudes of 
media workers. This is a ‘communication-centered’ approach where 
psychological factors influence single individuals involved in media 
production. Factors to consider include personal, professional and 
political attitudes, and how producers’ professional training can influence 
how they view the ‘norms’ of their social reality. In the case of PSC and 
ASC, we would need to understand the personal, professional and 
political attitudes of staff working on children’s and cultural 
programmes, by viewing them as firmly embedded in their particular 
upbringing and training. An example can be found in Sara, the main 
character of Pioneers of Tomorrow of ASC. Her personal experience 
includes having seen her home demolished by Israeli bulldozers as long 
ago as in 2003, when she was just eight years old. This experience 
influences how she performs in the show, and how she communicates 
her memories and thoughts as a child to other children (Interview: Al 
Bardawil, 2013). Experiential influences emerge quite evidently also in 
the case of the presenter of the PSC’s Cultural Flashes. The education he 
received during a relatively ‘liberal’ training at a European university 
influences the social reality he constructs, which as one producer 
described it makes him: ‘a Palestinian poet who is ideology-free’ 
(Interview: Al Asfar, 2013). When he uses specific, agreed norms related 
to the training he received outside of the local culture, these norms 
permeate his programme, and are unlike the values of someone who 
might have experienced education at a local Islamic school, for instance.  
 
2. Secondly, content is influenced by media organisation and 
routines. This dimension of the media production environment suggests 
that working practices, rules and unspoken habits of a specific TV 
station will affect how individuals work and how content selection is 
made. With regard to the format of programming, media channels have 
more or less centralised policies of content control. Some operate 
through an ‘inverted pyramid,’ which implies that the story is 
constructed from the point of view of producers or journalists 
(Shoemaker and Mayfield, 1987: 21). The ‘media organisation and 
routines’ type of explanation is useful in explaining PSC and ASC 
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producers’ decisions. It can also help to explain editorial policies and 
political endorsements as they operate inside these organisations. Thus, 
this type of explanation can be used to explain why, for example, PSC 
producers might have a different editorial position from ASC producers 
with regard to selection of words and phrases used in children’s 
programs, and the choice of guests. Patterns of ownership, terms of 
employment, and financial and content control would also fall under this 
second dimension.  
 
3. Thirdly, content reflects social reality. This can appear quite naive, 
since it simply proposes that the content of programming reflects wider 
social realities beyond the media institutions.This apparently simple 
insight underpins a great deal of audience-based media research 
(originally by Gans, 1979 and Gitlin, 1980, and elaborated on by 
Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). If we take an example from PSC’s cultural 
programming, in some cases, guests are invited to present poetry on 
nationalism and resistance, suggesting that the TV host is 
accommodating the tastes of his audience. However, demands by 
viewers who wish to interact with the programme are also expressed 
through sms’s and telephone calls received during the programme. What 
this suggests, is that compromises are made between two sets of realities: 
those of media producers and the institutions they work in, and those of 
audiences who consume, or ‘buy into,’ the programme content. In fact, 
both PSC and ASC tend to view reality through the prism of 
compromises that aim to reconcile each station’s editorial positions with 
the preferences of their viewers. Thus, this third dimension can be linked 
with the two previous ones, which pointed to routines and organisational 
influences on media content. In this research, certainly all these aspects 
of reality will be examined, in terms of how they influence media content 
and producers’ and journalists’ decisions.  
 
4. Fourthly, content is influenced by other social institutions and 
forces. This approach moves beyond the power of the TV station and 
producers to assert that other factors like audience feedback, and 
economic and cultural forces, can decide the content of programming. 
This means producers have to respond to public demands in order to 
maintain and expand their audiences. In the case of factional media, the 
PSC and ASC are also dependent on aid and sponsors for their shows. 
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This poses an external factor of influence on the station, including 
economic and cultural forces, which help to determine content. The 
PSC, for example, often gets civil society organisations to sponsor some 
of the shows, on the condition that specific values and themes are 
promoted within the community. According to Arroyave (2012: 206), 
‘Scholars have coined terms such as events and pseudo-events to 
highlight how external forces may impact news content.’ A pseudo-
event, a term coined by Boorstin (1961), refers to ‘synthetic news,’ in 
other words: ‘…events that do not occur spontaneously but are planned 
with the purpose of getting media coverage’ (Arroyave, 2012: 206).  
 
5. Fifthly, content is influenced by ideological positions, for 
example to maintain the status quo. As proposed by hegemonic 
understanding, media content is arguably influenced by the ideology of 
the owners, producers and other staff of the TV station. For those who 
wield economic influence and power, their specific interests can be 
transmitted in a way that appears political rather than simply self-
interested, and this in turn can help ensure the status quo remains 
unchallenged. This insight can be usefully applied to all four TV 
programmes under scrutiny, to examine, for example, how a live TV 
presentation can be interrupted by a phone call from a Minister of 
Information watching the show, who expresses his (or her) dislike of the 
approach taken by programme staff. Whilst not common, this kind of 
influence on content was reported by some of the interviewees.  
 
Later, in Chapters 6 and 7, the selected key content themes, including 
nationalism, resistance and religion, among others (as identified in 
Section 1.6), will be considered in detail within the content of the four 
selected media programmes. Factors external to the media environment 
also need to be understood, to appreciate how they too can shape media 
production decisions and themes. By looking outside of what is 
produced by the ASC and PSC media, we see how themes discussed in 
these media are shaped by developments elsewhere, including the 
relaxation of political tensions between Palestinian factions, a structural-
level change which may influence producers to steer clear of overt 
factionalism in the content of programmes. 
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A socio-historical approach to media content forms the basis for 
Chapters 2 of this study, and of Chapter 5, where wider social 
institutions and the wider context of occupation are examined in terms 
of how they interact with media content. In this light, one particular 
reason for the defactionalisation stands out from all others, and will be 
explored: the 2008-9 war by Israel on Gaza. By means of content 
analysis, the study explores how, after this event, Palestinian producers 
started to react to popular demands for reform and for reconciliation 
between Hamas and Fatah supporters. In examining Cultural Flashes, 
Burning Brands, Sesame Street and Pioneers of Tomorrow, and looking at 
dominant factors that have shaped media content of these cultural and 
children’s shows, we see more than the ideology of the two factions of 
which they form a part.  
3.4.3 Combining ‘Circuits of Media’ and ‘Factors Influencing 
Media Content’ 
An adapted variant of the ‘circuits of media’ framework of analysis is 
applied in this study to help understand various institutional factors 
influencing both the content of Palestinian TV in relation to children’s 
and cultural programmes, and production values. Quantitative data starts 
to be interesting once it is analysed qualitatively, and this reinforces the 
need for the kind of mixed methodological approach adopted in this 
study. In response to a question about combining quantitative with 
qualitative data, Noam Chomsky noted: ‘There is no contradiction; 
you’re looking at problems from several perspectives, each of which 
yields some useful insights’ (in conversation, 27 November 2015). This 
study starts with contextualization, and continues to quantitative content 
analysis, using specific themes for coding 88 episodes of the four 
selected programmes. The findings of this quantitative analysis were then 
presented to production staff during interviews, and formed the basis for 
detailed follow-up discussions with some of them. The mixed 
methodological approach was briefly justified in Chapter 1.  
In later chapters (Chapters 4 and Chapter 8) this study deals with 
some key influences on content and production: technical reasons, 
competition, financial restrictions, and intimidation by security 
apparatuses. As will now be discussed, the Gitlin and Gans model of 
‘media influence factors’ can fill some gaps in D’Acci’s ‘circuits of media’ 
model.  
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By using elements of D’Acci (2004) on the one hand and of Gans 
(1979) and Gitlin (1980) on the other, and combining approaches arising 
from slightly different perspectives, the strongest elements in each 
theoretical framework can be combined to produce a synthetic analytical 
framework that underpins the present study. This is where D’Acci’s 
approach is complementary to that of Gans and Gitlin and together they 
provide a good way of bridging media studies and cultural studies.  
To further explain the selected combination of the two theoretical 
frameworks, it should be mentioned that a straight cultural studies 
approach would not be adequate to understand the ideologies, framings 
and principles of production behind both the PSC’s and ASC’s 
production. If, for example, the approach taken by Lynch (2006) were 
used for the analysis of ASC content, one would not be able to explain 
the Puppets of Haneen and Karim, Farfur and Nassour.  In other words, 
a straightforward media studies approach, based on content analysis, 
could not explain how the selected children’s and cultural programmes 
moved beyond factional agendas to include themes that ‘defactionalised’ 
the media. The more subtle messages conveyed around specific themes 
in children’s and cultural programmes would not be as evident without 
the broader contextual element being central to the analysis. 
3.5 Working with the Analytical Framework for Content 
Analysis  
Placing thematic content analysis and analysis of the context of media 
production processes under a single overarching framework of the 
‘circuit of media’ helps integrate various elements of this study. This 
relatively flexible and multi-directional approach can bridge the gap 
between cultural and media studies (Mankekar, 1999). Methodologically 
speaking, media content analysis is a well-established approach that has 
been in use since the 1920s and 1930s. It includes, but is not limited to, 
investigations of the content of TV news productions (McNamara, 
2010). Since the early 1950s, studies based on content analysis have 
proliferated in the fields of mass communication and social studies. 
Scholars have studied soap operas, cinema and TV, and from the mid-
1980s onwards, content analysis of different media formed an integral 
part of most Media Studies degrees. For example, in one study it was 
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found that content analysis formed part of 84% of the media studies 
courses at US universities (Neuendorf, 2002).  
What is more important than the widespread use of this method of 
analysis, however, is how we gain access to the deeper meanings of the 
factors that help shape, for example, the content of children’s and 
cultural programmes produced by the ASC and PSC. In relation to 
factional and defactionalised content, this research proposes a qualitative 
form of content analysis that looks at the selected programmes, studying 
the text closely to determine key moments and absences of themes that 
may demand further explanation. The study aims at understanding 
patterns of high, intermediate and low frequencies of theme occurrence. 
An example is the case of the PSC, linked to Fatah, which would 
normally not be expected to talk about religion as much as the ASC, 
linked to Hamas. However, a quantitative media content analysis carried 
out on programmes of both the ASC and PSC showed precisely the 
opposite of what was expected. Religion was significantly more present 
in PSC programmes than in ASC programmes. Although ostensibly a 
nationalist, secularist channel, the PSC was found to have more explicit 
religious content in its programmes, or at least in its cultural programme, 
than the ASC, which is closely related to Hamas. This observation begs 
for some specific explanation, and some of these surprising – and not so 
surprising - findings from the thematic content analysis are the main 
focus of Chapters 6 and 7.  
As explained in Chapter 1, content analysis was considered the most 
appropriate method for analysing factional media. A total of 10 months 
of broadcasts of cultural and children’s programmes, i.e., of Burning 
Brands, Cultural Flashes, Sesame Street, and Pioneers of Tomorrow (40 episodes 
for each programme x 4 programmes = 160 hours in total), were aired in 
the selected period of March 2009 - January 2010. All programme-series 
were on air during the field study period in 2012-13, with the exception 
of Sesame Street for which US funding had been halted before fieldwork 
began. The name Burning Brands changed in 2014 to Zoom In, but the 
overall goals of the programme remained the same, despite a widened 
focus on regional intellectual issues.  
Whilst quantitative thematic analysis of content is fairly standard, 
there are no agreed guidelines or standard methods for qualitative 
analysis of content, and the delicate task of making sense of data 
collected through viewing programme episodes (Polit & Beck 2004). 
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Quantitative analysis is easier to conduct, but provides a less nuanced 
result than qualitative analysis. Originally designed from studies by 
scholars like Denzin and Lincoln (1994), Mayring (2000), Robson (1993), 
Silverman (1993), and Miles and Huberman (1994), quantitative media 
content analysis methods vary from one study to another, depending on 
the skills and analytical abilities of the researcher (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2010; Hoskins, 2004). A quantitative approach is limited in 
its flexibility, since at the start the researcher needs to decide on the most 
convenient categories around which to analyse content thematically 
(Weber 1990; Polit & Beck 2004). Elements of the quantitative 
approach, in the form of tables resulting from analysis of content, are 
included in this study (for full details see the tables, arranged by program, 
in Appendix 6). However, more significant is the qualitative analysis used 
to make sense of and contextualise these numerical measurements, 
which are only a he starting point for the present research.  
The researcher’s priority was to identify a qualitative content analysis 
approach that could yield rich insights, using the selected examples and 
over the course of the research period. For this purpose, Miles and 
Huberman (1994) presented an excellent, if not the only relevant, model 
for understanding the patterns of factional media’s production of 
cultural and children’s programmes. This model involves the application 
of three techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994:29):  
1. selecting apparently typical/representative examples;  
2. selecting negative/disconfirming examples;  
3. selecting exceptional or discrepant examples.  
The selected examples of qualitative content analysis as applied by 
Miles and Huberman (1994) are used mainly to identify the boundaries 
of the ASC and PSC satellite TV programme episodes, and to explore 
the views reflected in the content. The identification of discordant and 
extreme tendencies in the content of the four programmes offered a 
useful way into the examination of typical, expected and exceptional 
patterns in the findings related to media content, something that could 
be linked to factionalism and evidence of defactionalisation. 
In a review, useful at that time, Miles and Huberman (1994) compiled 
a techniques guide book based on a review of the work of 126 
researchers in the field. Since its publication, their synthesis has become 
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a classic discussion of how to manage data collection during fieldwork. 
An added benefit of qualitative research is that it can yield empirical data 
that has ‘generalisability’ (McNamara, 2010; 15). By using sampling 
procedures, a synthetic or mixed-method approach also makes it possible 
to explore discourses at various stages in the media production process, 
widening the range of possible ‘factional’ and ‘defactionalised’ patterns 
that can be identified.  
In this way, quantitative and qualitative content analyses are 
combined to examine patterns, tendencies and exceptions that appear 
within the episodes of the four satellite TV programmes. This can 
generate further possible explanations of why certain characteristics 
appear in the way they do. Locating content analysis within D’Acci’s 
(2004) ‘circuits of media’ approach also reaffirms that, whilst ideology 
may shape cultural and children’s programming, especially for factional 
media, other factors, such as producers’ culture, market forces and new 
technologies, can counter factional influences, moving production and 
content away from factionalism and towards defactionalisation.  
Content analysis was selected to examine elements within children’s 
and cultural programmes on satellite TV, elements that may not be 
wholly explained through the ideology of the faction or dominant 
organisation. For example, if a text is found in ASC’s children’s 
programme Pioneers of Tomorrow, in which children are urged to be good 
Muslims and support Islamic values, this does not require much 
explanation. It would simply represent the standard views of Hamas. If, 
however, the same show preaches that children need to establish a 
Palestinian nation, based on values that transcend religion, this is 
noteworthy and requires further exploration, since it suggests the 
influence of other factors besides the standard ideology of Hamas. 
Further examination might be needed to find out if children’s 
programmes on ASC consistently include themes not obviously in line 
with Hamas values. Similarly, one would question the factional nature of 
PSC production and content if an episode of one of their programmes 
raised doubts about the policies and practices of President Abbas. From 
within the ‘circuits of media’ theoretical framework it is possible to 
explain such deviations from factionalism. Perhaps, in order to compete 
with ASC, PSC producers need to appear less factional and ideological; 
they might attract a wider audience if they appear relatively independent 
from Hamas.  
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Combining quantitative with qualitative content analysis sheds more 
light on such compromises, and the need to explain them. If both PSC 
and ASC want to appeal to viewers beyond the constituencies of Fatah 
and Hamas, both are involved in the circuit of media, and they must 
compromise through give and take. Thus, in one case, in a satirical 
programme called Ala'a Watar (Country hanging by a thread) Amira 
Rishmawi, host of this PSC TV series, publicly challenges the statements 
of the Palestinian Authority and of Fatah. That she is allowed to do so 
may be to reassure the audience they are watching a critical show, and 
that PSC is not a one-sided, factional channel. Rishmawi’s reputation for 
political critique means means she will try not to disappoint the trust 
audiences place in her ability to send up the political authorities in this 
way (Sienkiewicz, 2012).  
Content analysis of media necessarily involves the use of sampling 
procedures. Sampling is usually done in qualitative research with the aim 
of producing sound generalisations. For the research described here, it 
means that the findings and conclusions from representative samples of 
the selected TV programmes must be generalised. In terms of sampling, 
a much-used form of qualitative data analysis is the one proposed by 
Miles and Huberman. They suggest that a simplified format of a 
checklist is the most suitable form for a sampling exercise (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 34). Applying these sampling criteria to cultural and 
children’s programming within the Palestinian factional media has 
proven to be a useful exercise. Before the start of fieldwork in Gaza, it 
was agreed that sampling criteria should meet the following conditions:  
1. The sampling strategies must match the theoretical framework as 
well as the research questions. This matching includes the 
presentation of cases in the form of categories that are relevant to 
the theoretical framework. A mixed approach, involving deductive 
principles and inductive understanding was proposed, and was to 
be used in case of factional media where the factional or non-
factional (defactionalised) thematic content had not been 
researched in depth, but only in a fragmentary way.  
2. The selected sample needed to be more or less representative of 
the phenomenon of factional media. As proposed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 34), this should be part of ensuring that the 
researcher’s observations enhance generalizability of the findings 
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of analysis. For this purpose, 88 of the total of 160 episodes were 
selected for closer analysis.  
3. ‘Thick description,’ a term coined by anthropologist Clifford 
Geerz (1973), is also important to help produce more in-depth 
analysis of the quantitative measures that arise from looking at 
content, to go beyond observable external events, to include 
various meanings given by people to such events.  
4. Analytical generalisability is more important in this type of 
research, than statistical generalizability based on quantitative data.  
5. Samples should produce credible descriptions of media production 
and further justifications that are recognizable in actual life; in 
other words, accounts of media content should be convincing to 
those familiar with the context.  
6. Sample strategies should be ethical. Miles and Huberman argue 
that the researcher should assess whether the methods/sampling 
selected imply risks or benefits for the study groups. This 
researcher considers similar issues of ethics that are described 
below and were already introduced in Section 1.7 of Chapter 1.  
To sum up, the content analysis was organised by noting all the 
themes identified and defined in Chapter 1, seeing when they appear and 
looking closely at the narrative/text, imagery and context in which they 
appear. Breaks in the same episode were included as they often related to 
the topic of the episode. For example, the ASC showed text stating “we 
will return” (POT20), with an image of militants of Al Qassam Brigades, 
the military wing of the Islamic Movement of Hamas. Each episode of 
the programmes viewed was broken down into individual scenes and 
these scenes were observed more than once, to check whether the first 
observation had been accurate. In this way, patterns and comparisons 
obtained are not only quantitative but also qualitative. Parallels and 
contrasts were noted between the ASC and PSC programmes and among 
and within episodes of single programmes. Next, discrepancies, patterns 
and absences that needed further explanations were identified. These 
explanations are provided – in detail – in Chapters 6 and 7. To give an 
example, when it is said ‘Allahu Akbar’ (God is Great), the expression is 
not taken as evidence of religion being a value, since it occurs so 
frequently in the speech of many Palestinians that it should not be 
interpreted as a religious expression as such.  
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To summarise, the content analysis section is organised in the same 
way as was done in several other studies on other contexts (Iraq, Al-
Jazeera, Middle East Politics, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, in Lynch, 
2006; Liebes, 1997; Wolfsfeld, 1997a). The first part outlines all the 
earlier mentioned themes found in the 4 programmes during the 10-
months observation period. In total, 4 programmes x 40 episodes per 
programme x 1 hour per episode = 160 hours were aired. The second 
part outlines all the factors that were found to affect media content, 
including economic, political and external factors. The third part 
presents the analysis of the themes and how they relate to the factors 
that were found earlier. In the conclusion, analytical generalisation is 
used (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 As Table 3.1 shows, in the 88 programme episodes were randomly 
selected of the potential 160, just over half. These were all observed, and 
the key themes for content analysis: nationalism, religious values, 
citizens’ rights and obligations, resistance, social, cultural, political and 
educational values, and entertainment, were all checked for. Table 3.1 
shows that, whilst some expected themes did occur, some were quite 
infrequent and one did not appear at all. There is notably less presence 
of ‘controversial’ themes such as religious values and politics than of 
more ‘consensual’ themes, like social values, education and, especially, 
cultural values. This may be because cultural and children’s programmes 
avoid ‘controversial’ issues, given that their audiences may prefer to 
confine politics to the news, or religious values to religious programmes.  
 However, it was remarkable that not only religious and political 
values, but also nationalism and resistance were minor themes in the 
overall content. This is not something one would expect, given the 
media environment outlined in Chapter 4. Indeed, the themes of 
nationalism, of resistance, and of citizens’ rights, appeared in 10 per cent 
or less of episodes. Citizens’ rights and obligations, which had been 
expected to be a significant theme, did not occur at all in any of the four 
programmes. Interestingly, educational values, a distinctly depoliticised 
theme, appeared in almost half of all episodes overall.  
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Table 3.1 
Content analysis by theme (all 88 episodes)  
Theme Category Yes*  No  
Nationalism and National Discourse 
Frequency 11 77 
Percent 12.5 87.5 
Religious values 
Frequency 7 81 
Percent 8 92 
Citizens Rights and Obligations 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Resistance and Resistance Literature 
Frequency 9 79 
Percent 10 90 
Social values 
Frequency 28 60 
Percent 32 68 
Cultural values 
Frequency 36 52 
Percent 41 59 
Political values 
Frequency 16 72 
Percent 18 82 
Educational values 
Frequency 43 45 
Percent 49 51 
Entertainment 
Frequency 34 54 
Percent 38.5 61.5 
* - to the nearest 0.5 per cent  
  
Themes for content analysis in this study can be defined operationally in 
the following ways (see also Appendix 3 for more detail).  
 
 Nationalism and national discourse: refers to common 
Palestinian heritage, traditions and the identity of Palestinians, as 
connected to the collective entity of Palestine.  
 
 Religious values: refers to observance of both Christian and 
Muslim or other religious rituals and ceremonies. The phrase 
‘religious values’ does not refer to what is deemed good or 
unacceptable behaviour, or to usual blessings and greetings in 
Islam and Christianity, since these are in daily use for non-
religious purposes as well. 
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 Citizens rights and obligations: refers to people’s right to 
express themselves, including the right to organise, economic 
and social rights, the right to decent education and a dignified 
life.  
 
 Resistance and resistance literature: refers to all values 
dealing with defending the self and family from Israeli military 
occupation, whether peacefully or using armed resistance, and 
including through economic boycott.  
 
 Social values: all references to social relationships, especially to 
friendship, loyalty, thrift, family structure, neighbourly relations 
and community reciprocity. Attitudes towards authority and 
order are included in social values.  
 
 Cultural values: references to the whole of Palestinian history, 
culture, tradition, symbolism and everyday norms of cultural 
practice. Note that this is close to the use of the term ‘cultural 
artifacts’ in D’Acci’s framework.  
 
 Political values: focus on questions of state authority, law and 
formal public institutions. There is overlap here with citizens 
rights, since political values extend to groups like refugees, 
prisoners, those indefinitely detained and those facing house 
demolitions, arrests, torture.  
 Educational values: includes all values focusing on school and 
even pre-school learning about language, numbers, classical and 
colloquial Arabic, life skills, social behavior and peer-group 
relations, whether taught in a serious or in a more entertaining 
way. 
 Entertainment: an enjoyable atmosphere of entertainment and 
relaxation for children, consisting of songs,  games, crossword 
puzzles, books, vocabulary games and stories, outdoor play, and 
even pets (see Appendix 1, used to design the content analysis 
table with field supervisors in 2013). 
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 The selected themes defined here, and first presented in Chapter 1, 
can be broken down into categories and frequencies as in Table 3.1, 
which covers all four programmes, and shows the average incidence of 
each value during the research period of March 2009 to January 2010. All 
these themes were used for identifying the content of cultural and 
children’s programmes. It was challenging to consider these themes in 
relation to both children’s programmes and cultural programmes. For 
instance, identifying educational values as a theme in cultural 
programmes was much harder than in the more obvious thematic 
educational content of children’s programmes.  
 Themes of nationalism appear with a quite similar frequency, varying 
between 9 and 17 percent, for the ASC and the PSC, respectively, in 
their children’s programmes (see Tables 10 and 28 in Appendix 6), 
compared with just 10 percent overall for all 4 programmes as shown in 
Table 3.1. This suggests that, at least during the selected research period, 
producers were more willing to include an element of nationalist rhetoric 
in children’s programming than in cultural programmes, a surprising 
finding perhaps. As far as religious values in children’s programmes are 
concerned, it was not that surprising to find that Pioneers of Tomorrow had 
a significantly higher occurrence of religious values than Sesame Street, 
where religion was mentioned in only one episode. Thus, the occurrence 
of religious values varied from just over 30 percent for Pioneers to just 4 
percent of Sesame episodes. The way in which the themes were coded 
had been checked by two other researchers, just to avoid confusion. It 
might be perceived as controversial, but the principle of coding was that 
religious values were identified as a theme of content even if there was 
no direct quotation from a religious text or from discussions around 
existence and spirituality. Two of the media producers interviewed 
explicitly requested to see the coding used for ‘religious’ values in the 
content analysis. They wanted to verify whether the researcher and they 
themselves, as media producers, were interpreting religious values in the 
same way. In the end, the same definitions were shared by both sides.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
In order to understand media production cultures, and to analyse 
programme content, a synthesis of relevant academic knowledge about 
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production modes and media environments has been seen as essential to 
this study. The aim of this chapter has been to contribute in filling a void 
at the conceptual level regarding media factionalism and how media 
content and production may shift away from factionalism. With regard 
to understanding media cultures and the historical significance of various 
forms of media content, however, it has also been stressed that no 
theoretical synthesis will be adequate for a full understanding. Only by 
getting out of the library and into the screen-rooms and directly into the 
field, to analyse content, interact with media producers, and test out 
academic knowledge about media production and content, i.e., analyse 
the way the media works in its proper context, will the researcher be able 
to get meaningful results.  
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4 The Palestinian Media’s Working Environment 
 
‘After all, we cannot just be dopey, we have to adjust to people’s needs in 
order to make sure people take us seriously’ (Interview: Al Bardawil, 
2013).  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will reflect on the professional context of the Palestinian 
media, providing a general understanding of the media environment and 
the factors that influence and constrain performance of media producers 
in such an environment. Along with Chapter 8, this chapter seeks to 
address the first main research question: 1. What political, social and other 
contextual factors influence the day-to-day decisions of producers of these programmes, 
and how do they communicate through media in a ‘factional’ or ‘defactionalised’ way? 
A set of factors is elaborated that pose constraints on the choices open 
to Palestinian media professionals in general and those in satellite TV in 
particular. This chapter starts by identifying a number of criteria for 
assessing media freedoms and capacities.  
 The discussion will also consider how forms of cultural and political 
power influence the production environment of satellite media TV in 
Palestine. The impact of Israeli occupation on the daily life of Palestinian 
journalists includes constant threats and frequent disappearances, 
frequent violent arrests, torture and periods of imprisonment. In some 
cases, these continuous pressures have resulted in exile (Daraghmeh, 
2003).  
 The psychological pressures on individual journalists are aggravated 
by economic despondency and the overarching constraints imposed by 
the Israeli blockade and occupation of Gaza, and by repression in the 
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West Bank and Jerusalem. Constraints are imposed by the security 
apparatuses of the respective Palestinian authorities as well, operating as 
they do in Gaza and the West Bank. The role of Hamas and Fatah own 
security apparatus will be returned to later, and will be explained.  
4.2 The Media Working Environment  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has stressed since the 
1940s that media workers, like other types of workers and professionals, 
need to be able to carry out their tasks under conditions that provide 
adequate opportunities for training and reasonable levels of 
remuneration (ILO, 2014). Moreover, the ILO stresses the need for 
security of employment, to avoid situations where political authorities, 
like factions, or even commercial interests, can exploit the professional 
and personal vulnerabilities of journalists through paying for the writing 
of articles that favour their (i.e. the dominant parties’) interests. From a 
labour rights perspective, the freedom of the media, based on respect for 
truth and human dignity, depends on reasonable working conditions for 
journalists. Instead, a ‘social network approach of Palestinian public 
relations’ is very apparent, as in the media of Hamas, for example, and 
the role it plays during elections in getting out the voters (Zaharna et al, 
2009: 238).  
Most research suggests that decisions and views of media 
professionals in Palestine can be comprehended only when the wider 
political, cultural and psychological circumstances of Palestinian society 
are appreciated and understood (Al Turk, 2008; Al-Omari, 2010; Jamal, 
2000). Media professionals are, after all, simply human beings, and are 
affected by the environment they live in and by their general situation in 
daily life. Some media producers’ ideas reflect a wider reality, which is 
delivered to the public through images and sound bites that reflect 
personal experience, and that are based on cultural attitudes that may (or 
may not) be shared by their audiences. His or her level of education and 
training, political affiliations and religious faith, can all play an important 
role in shaping a media professional’s point of view. To take just one 
example, according to the presenter and producer of the ASC’s Burning 
Brands:  
‘…we tend to avoid introducing topics that harm religion or morality, and 
[tend] not to invite a guest who is not acceptable morally and religiously, 
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and not to bring in topics that could hit the unity of Muslims, Arabs or 
advance sectarianism’ (Interview: Abu Jarad, presenter and producer, 
Burning Brands, 2013).  
This perspective certainly plays a role in shaping the production 
process. What the interview with Abu Jarad made clear was that the type 
of education he had had at the Islamic University meant that his thinking 
was already geared towards a fairly narrow social network of mainly 
Islamic poets and writers, and that they, in turn, played a crucial role in 
shaping his understanding of what was ‘appropriate’ in terms of ASC 
content. Abu Jarad’s statement reflects a dominant strand of thinking in 
Gaza, and his comments would be very differently received by audiences 
in the West Bank, for example. 
4.3 Socio-Historical Contexts of Media Production  
Even when such debates and controversies are not represented in the 
media, they affect the production process. This also applies to the four 
selected programmes analysed in this study. According to Abu 
Shammalah, who works as a field-producer and soundman for Cultural 
Flashes of the PSC:  
‘In most situations our on the ground production was never derived from 
news production… we received clear instructions from the management 
of the programme to focus on purely cultural issues which were not 
represented in media, but in community debates – for example in 
traditional medication using honey is a common remedy used by people – 
we had to bring this as it happened in the community, although it was 
invisible in media discourse’ (Interview with Abu Shammalah: 2013). 
As far as social values are concerned, women’s rights groups too 
began to mobilise through their social networks. Discussing specifically 
Palestinian social values became more popular among NGOs, and these 
discussions started first within women’s groups affiliated to the Women’s 
Affairs Centre. One study by a women’s group suggests that domestic 
and gender violence both increased during the period of factional 
conflict and the war on Gaza by Israel, and that child poverty had also 
increased dramatically (Shamon, 2009). Not surprisingly, given the 
intensity of violence and occupation, children and Palestinian society in 
general have been observed to have an increasing number of social and 
behavioural problems following the war, with a negative impact on the 
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lives of human beings, women and children in particular (Shamon, 2009). 
An increasing rate of divorce was noted by women’s groups as a sign 
that women’s relationships with their husbands had worsened because of 
the political division and the military confrontation. This created 
additional, longer-term problems for Palestinian children besides the 
usual obstacles of living as a child under occupation (Arts, 2012). The 
context of constant sleeplessness, anxiety and trauma from violence, may 
explain some of the educational difficulties children have been 
experiencing from 2008 onwards (Shamon, 2009).  
Once again, as with educational debates, this debate about family 
violence and poverty did not begin in the media. It arose among the 
Palestinian public (Llosa, 2012), in response to a perceived increase in 
incidents of family violence, as well as to a rising number of males 
migrating abroad to find work after the war and leaving their families 
behind, isolated and exposed to poverty. These signs of deteriorating and 
damaged social relations and values were barely addressed in the ASC – 
or PSC – in discourses of the selected satellite TV programmes.  
In relation to children’s educational difficulties, a large part of this 
discussion came out of human rights groups, and revolved around the 
national education curriculum. Once again, the content of the four 
programmes selected did not reflect these debates during the study 
period (2009-2010). The PSC and ASC, in general, were not reflecting 
the debates going on in the local environment. Yet, media programmes 
cannot operate in a vacuum. Satellite TV channels may decide to control 
which topics should be discussed and debated in their programmes, but 
if over time they fail to reflect on widespread public concerns and 
discourses, they risk losing touch with, and losing, their viewers.  
4.4 Media in Palestine: External Constraints  
Other external constraints are crucial in this discussion of satellite TV 
programmes in Palestine, and can be seen as part of one of the sites of 
D’Acci (2004), namely the ‘socio-historical context,’ which was 
introduced in Chapter 3. Closer analysis of cultural and children’s 
programming will help reveal how media professionals and producers 
perform their work under the current status quo. First, it is useful to 
highlight some external constraints and influences that may not be 
evident from content analysis and interviews. These ‘behind the scenes’ 
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factors are largely taken for granted by those who work in the Palestinian 
media environment, whether in Gaza or the West Bank. Whereas 
Palestinian media producers and journalists and others producing 
programming inside Israel face a different set of influences and 
constraints, they cannot divorce themselves from the Occupation. 
 This part of the chapter introduces some key external influences and 
constraints on Palestinian media professionals, including the Occupation, 
specific cultural values, and the problems caused by violence and 
insecurity following Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Other relevant 
concerns are the status of Palestinian refugees, principles of human 
rights, including the right to return, and resistance to settlement 
expansion, as well as pervasive patterns of arrests, torture and 
disappearances. All these external factors, especially those resulting from 
the economic blockade, add to the already quite notable psychological 
and economic pressures on Palestinian media professionals. All these 
environmental issues play an important role in restricting the room for 
manoeuver of Palestinian media professionals, forcing them to come up 
with more creative and innovative forms of media expression and 
content, within the strictly constrained environments in which they are 
working.  
4.4.1  Occupation: economic consequences  
Whatever moves towards peace there have been in the recent past, with 
negotiations and agreements, the continuous reinforcement of Israeli 
state controls and army occupation has not faltered or been reversed. 
The gradual, progressive and intended loss of the Palestinians’ control 
over their own natural resources has continued apace, leaving 
Palestinians deprived of essential and inalienable rights to aquifers, 
streams, wells, agricultural land and roads (Gordon, 2008). Resources 
taken over by Jewish settlements and outposts built on Palestinian land 
confine Palestinians to the least desirable land. Israeli settlements have 
access to high ground water; Palestinians do not (Finkelstein, 1995). It is 
not only in the domain of natural resources that Occupation makes its 
mark, however.  
In this study, power is understood as the ability to dictate agendas and 
decide which issues should be talked about, especially in relation to 
media production (Sienkiewicz, 2012). In Palestine, the power of media 
is always conditioned by the power of the Occupation, as well as by 
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differing degrees of factionalism and defactionalisation of Palestinian 
media outlets themselves. In this way, the ability of satellite media to 
exercise its influence, and to project power, is shaped by its relationship 
to the socio-economic and political-cultural systems within which it 
functions, and which therefore need to be outlined in more detail 
(Sienkiewicz, 2012; Zaharna et al, 2009; Jamal, 2000).  
Since the start of the Israeli occupation, the main discussion in the 
Israeli press around the economy of the occupied territories (Gordon, 
2008) has centred on two sets of debates. The first relates to the need to 
merge the Palestinian economy with Israel’s economy, so as to support 
Israeli producers’ access to the Palestinian consumer market. The second 
set of debates involves measuring Jewish Israeli settlement in the 
Palestinian occupied territories, with a focus on mapping specific areas 
economically and militarily occupied by the settlers, whether settlement 
in these areas is officially approved or not (Al Turk, 2008).  
The overall goal is for Israel to control the Palestinian society and 
render it ‘safe’ by both economic and ideological means. Of course, the 
Palestinian media too are strangulated by the economic strategy of Israel, 
which in turn worsens the state of the Palestinian economy itself, on 
which the ASC, and to some extent the PSC, depend for their 
investments and budgets, in addition to the funds they receive from 
donors, which may be quite unpredictable.  
The situation is worsened by the strategy of the Israeli authorities to 
regulate and control, through their dominant economic relationships 
with the West Bank and Gaza Strip, any room for manoeuvre of the 
local political institutions, of media outlets based in the territories, and of 
producers, journalists and other media staff (Abuzanouna, 2012). The 
constant disruption of the Palestinian economy and its productive base 
creates disruption for the ‘circuits of media’ in Gaza and the West Bank 
as well. This gives the Israeli state and economy a complete chokehold 
on the occupied populations through economic and military means of 
dominance.  
Strangulating the independent Palestinian economy, through land 
seizures, border controls, lethal military actions and destruction of 
infrastructure, especially in Gaza, has not prevented Israel’s economy 
from growing more industrially and technologically advanced as cheap 
labour sources have been replaced with hi-tech industries. Any capacity 
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for competition from Palestinians and Arabs, generally, has been pre-
empted and nipped in the bud (Sienkiewicz, 2012; Gordon, 2008).  
In addition, trade restrictions have result in the enforced dependence 
of all Palestinians, including those who invest in local industry, farming 
and in the media, on Israel. Israel is the main source for raw materials, 
for funding, and for inputs and technical support of all kinds. The 
longer-term economic impacts of both refugee displacement, and of 
colonial Zionist settlements, have been well documented (Abuzanouna, 
2015; Longo et al., 2014).  
4.4.2  Occupation: arrests and the psychology of fear  
Like some other media professionals around the world, Palestinian 
media professionals live in a kind of political and psychological pressure 
cooker. Production crew members, whether reporters, cameramen or 
make-up artists, can simply be arrested for doing their work. They may 
be abducted, or forcibly exiled, for no apparent reason other than that 
they are thought to make media material hostile to Israel, or just to ‘set 
an example,’ and deter others from working in the media.  
 Scores of journalists in Gaza and West Bank receive death threats, 
including by phone and sms. Regular attacks occur, even in daylight, on 
journalists, who have their laptops seized, files destroyed, images wiped 
clean, and cameras confiscated. Even if they are only suspected of 
publishing sensitive issues, they can be arrested, tortured, and may even 
disappear or be killed. As some research has shown, media professionals 
in Palestine are under constant psychological, physical and professional 
pressure, and this can influence their performance and their 
independence (Al-Omari, 2010).  
 The expansion of Jewish-only settlements is one issue Palestinian 
media professionals are unable to avoid, even if they would want to. For 
one producer, it was unfortunate that media attention for settlement 
expansion sometimes led to inadvertent neglect of less visible social and 
cultural issues within the Palestinian community itself (Interview: Abu 
Mohsen, 2013). Since 2007, media crews have organised several strikes, 
in protest at the obstacles and restrictions imposed by Israel, and also by 
Hamas and Fatah, on media freedoms. Strikes started after the 
kidnapping of former BBC correspondent, Alan Johnston, in 2007. 
There were many cases of beatings and arrests of journalists around that 
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time and ever since (MADA, 2014). Most of the strikes were to demand 
greater media freedom and to ask for protection of media crews working 
in Palestine.  
Another factor which cannot be ignored when evaluating the media is 
the psychological environment which interconnects with the socialisation 
of media professionals. As will emerge later, when interviews with media 
producers in Gaza are discussed in more depth, media producers 
confirmed that they were affected by frequent and lengthy daily power 
outages, which make it a priority for them to be able to cope with crises 
that arise at work. Shortages of equipment and inadequate equipment 
maintenance were also problems for producers in their daily life 
(Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013).  
Gazan producers do not only report the crises, they live the crises 
too. West Bank media producers face a similar situation. Producers in 
the West Bank are reliant on the budget margins provided by donors. 
This means their jobs are constantly threatened, not necessarily by the 
political authorities, but by the prospect of withdrawal or freezing of 
donor funds, often for reasons that have nothing to do with local 
dynamics. When the funding for the Palestinian Sesame Street was frozen 
in 2011, it affected the performance of the media crew and undermined 
their job security.  
Israel’s policy of arresting, restricting and disrupting the freedoms of 
Palestinian individuals, under the excuse of self-defence, is most visible 
when Palestinian civilians exercise their right of resistance. Such 
resistance is often met by counter-violence from fully armed Israeli 
troops, accompanied by armed, and often illegal, settlers. Arrests, 
including those of media professionals, are a programmed, routine 
policy. Arbitrary arrests are routine under each successive Israeli 
government, as a means to control Palestinian civilians under 
occupation. The number of arrests of Palestinians since 1967 has been 
estimated at over 800,000 (UNOCHA, 2012), including men, women, 
children, pregnant women and the disabled. Arrests are accompanied by 
intimidation, harassment and torture, also used during interrogation and 
detention, as evidenced by numerous independent reports (Falk, 2013; 
Jamal, 2001).  
Such pervasive patterns of arbitrary arrest are of a wider concern to 
Palestinian media professionals, who are often the first victims. The 
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arrest practices, started by the Israeli military in the first Intifada, until 
now present a constant threat to media professionals who, due to the 
nature of their work, are forced to interact with the Israeli military at 
checkpoints, villages and hotspot areas. The PA and the de facto 
government in Gaza have followed the same method, of arresting media 
professionals who seek to report on violations by the Israeli security 
forces. In May 2011, Palestinian photographer Mohammed Othman was 
shot in the spine while covering a Nakba protest at the northern border 
of Gaza. Holding a camera is often seen as no better than holding a gun. 
Other media professionals were sentenced by Israeli authorities to years 
in jail, for example because they refused to disclose their sources of 
information and refused to share their contacts with Israeli media 
(Bishara, 2013). 
The issue of Palestinian prisoners ‘holds a prominent position in 
Palestinian satellite media’ (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013). No day passes 
without media professionals being occupied with a story related to 
prisoners. In news and political programmes, prisoners are often 
discussed in the broader context of ending occupation and violent 
conflict. The fate of incarcerated Palestinians is considered critical to 
achieving an eventual, so-called solution to the Palestinian – Israeli 
stalemate (Al-Hassan, 2010). The case of prisoners is considered a public 
opinion issue, which has shaped the production of media as it currently 
exists. There are no exact numbers of how many media professionals 
were arrested, but generally speaking, in such a small society as Gaza and 
the West Bank, almost every journalist knows some media staff members 
who are in prison.  
The Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedom 
(MADA, 2014) has documented several cases of arrest, torture, and 
banning of TV stations and newspapers. For example, Israeli troops 
attacked the Al Ayyam newspaper in Ramallah in 2014, in order to warn 
staff members to stop printing Gaza-based newspapers and distributing 
them in Ramallah. Similarly, journalists were interrogated by Israeli 
security apparatuses in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  
The reality of mass incarceration, administrative detention and the 
conditions of imprisonment are frequently discussed issues in the 
political environment. Therefore, they co-determine the content that 
Palestinian media has to address. Other issues include borders, access to 
water resources, Jerusalem, Israel’s invasive wall, security and the 
 The Palestinian Media’s Working Environment 115 
 
 
siege/blockade of Gaza. All these issues are interconnected and highly 
complicated matters that have a profound relationship to the way in 
which various Israeli governments employ religious, economic, security 
and legal pretexts to protect their status quo.  
In any case, conditions on the ground continue to influence and 
shape the content of satellite media, and the daily circumstances and 
events for media producers are largely affected by the reality around 
them. One example is where media are embedded within the military, 
and in effect protected by them, as with the journalists who accompanied 
US military units invading Iraq in 2003 (Lynch, 2006). The same applies 
to Palestine as well, e.g., in locations where daily attacks and riots 
between Palestinians and Jewish settlers take place. There is no doubt 
that Palestinian political environments play a critically important role in 
shaping media production (Bishara, 2013; Bishara, 2012; Al Turk, 2008; 
Al-Omari, 2010). Most contemporary governments around the world 
rely on mass media to achieve their goals. 
In the context of Palestine, in addition, the goals of Hamas and Fatah 
are reinforced by media professionals’ motivation in using their work to 
further the ‘noble’ cause of opposing Israeli occupation, intimidation and 
arrests (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). This goal motivates journalists in 
Palestine, even when they themselves become the target of arrests. This 
is why one can assure that any given prevailing political philosophy is 
one of the most important factors determining the media system in any 
state. Political environments also help shape the nature of press freedom, 
by outlining sets of laws and legislations which determine the models of 
such media freedom (Matar and Harb, 2013). Israeli security forces are 
not the only ones to harass journalists and media professionals – Hamas 
and Fatah also practice arbitrary arrests, mistreatment and arbitrary 
detention. This was particularly marked during the years 2007-2013, 
when civilians paid the price for political rivalry between the two 
factions. Since May 2014, the harassment of media professionals by 
Palestinian parties has reduced somewhat.  
Media producers in the West Bank face, at the same time, donor or 
sponsor restrictions that they are expected to abide by, whilst also 
dealing with the financial, logistical and political consequences of Israeli 
occupation and the political agendas of Palestinian factions from within. 
What this results in is that in these tiny pieces of land, where people live 
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under occupation, there are very few means to ensure the survival of 
media freedoms and principles.  
There is a need to study methods of decision-making that are inter-
connected to the physiological environment. In some situations, media 
producers of live shows such as Pioneers of Tomorrow have to be ready to 
decide how to deal with unforeseen circumstances while airing the 
programme. For example, one producer (Interview: Al Amriti, producer 
of Pioneers of Tomorrow, 2013) referred to a situation where a child who 
was a guest on the show was comfortable so long as cameras were off-
air, but who started crying the moment the show went live. As well as 
being traumatic for the child, this is daunting for producers, since many 
children in Gaza and West Bank are traumatised by the war. Collective 
trauma makes it difficult to witness to terrible tragedies suffered by 
people, and adds a burden for media professionals who wish to ‘tell the 
truth’. 
4.5 Media Producers in Palestine: Local Constraints and 
Opportunities  
In this section we move away from constraints and pressures imposed by 
the overarching realities of Israeli Occupation on media producers and 
journalists in Palestine, towards the more ‘horizontal’ pressures and 
opportunities for producers that result from forces operating largely 
within and across Palestinian society and politics. With a view on 
outlining the conditions that exacerbate or reduce the grounds for 
‘factionalism’ and ‘defactionalisation,’ this section considers how to 
move beyond polarised and militaristic agendas. The producers and 
senior managers of the PSC and ASC were introduced in a short ‘who’s 
who,’ in Chapter 1 (see section 1.7). The producers who were the most 
informative included Al Bardawil and Abu Jarad, both of the ASC, and 
Al Asfar and Al Amriti of the PSC, the latter interviewed remotely but 
being helpful and open. In the rest of this section, various pressures on 
these journalists will be explained in more depth.  
4.5.1 Professional and ideological pressures 
Programming production is a process which includes brainstorming 
ideas, locating budgets, finding actors and guests, planning logistics and 
following up with implementation. Each phase of production is subject 
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to several forms of professional and logistic pressure. In most cases, 
programmes have specific times for airing, either live or pre-recorded. 
This translates into time pressure and deadlines that have to be met. This 
type of pressure is part of the professional’s daily routine. In Palestine, as 
elsewhere, event-chasing is also a part of the media’s job, though perhaps 
less so in children’s and cultural programming. Nonetheless, the PSC and 
ASC make sure that shows run on time – otherwise, according to Al 
Amriti (Interview: 2003), there is a risk that phone calls start coming in 
from regional observers. This occurred, for instance, when Pioneers of 
Tomorrow ran late for technical reasons.  
As in the case of the PSC and ASC, there is some evidence, despite 
denials, that factional media places political and ideological pressure on 
media producers. One can observe these types of pressure in the field, 
for example when presenters of Burning Brands corrected their use of 
terminology during audience participation, replacing the term ‘Israel’ 
with ‘Zionists’ or ‘usurper entity.’ Political and ideological pressures are 
put on media producers in Palestine through requiring them to adhere to 
internal guidelines, or through personal influence on producers of those 
up the factional ladder. Generally, political systems in all countries rely 
on media to do the key work of communication (Al Turk, 2008).  
Each organisation has rules and guidelines that regulate its satellite 
media. For example, the ASC’s rules and regulations focus on Islamic 
identity, as the ASC states in its motto ‘aiming towards an Islamic 
media.’ This can imply, for example, that male staff members may be 
discouraged from regular, direct contacts with young women at the TV 
station. This does not fit in with the belief of all those who work at the 
ASC, as some do the precise opposite of avoiding contact when they are 
outside the workplace of the TV channel (Yousef, 2015). There is a 
distinct lack of participation of young women in ASC programmes and 
they are also missing from the production process. At PSC, on the 
contrary, internal regulations (El-Obeidi, n.d.) ensure that women are 
well represented among producers and presenters of most programmes 
on the TV station.  
Political and ideological pressures influence staff recruitment 
processes, and in factional media this is based mainly on political 
affiliation, but also as the discussion suggests here, on gender and 
perhaps class. In the Palestinian situation in general, the high degree of 
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political factionalisation has a deep impact on many aspects of the media 
work. Even ideas concerning the decoration of studios are politicised 
(Abuzanouna, 2012), especially when political factors combine with 
ideological pressures.  
One may argue that the presence of political factions with conflicting 
agendas and interests has made the case of Palestinian media a 
particularly good example of what happens when political and 
ideological pressures clash. This is documented in the latest Israeli wars 
in which ideological perspectives and political considerations were 
present in the performance of Palestinian media crews (MADA, 2014). 
In order for media producers to maintain their jobs, they have few 
options besides giving in to ideological pressures imposed by factional 
TV stations. This is why, on some occasions, political elites who own the 
TV channels tend to complain that some staff members are even more 
ideologically committed than their bosses (Interview: Al Bardawil: 2013).  
4.5.2  Social-cultural and economic pressures  
Programming and editorial decisions are made by media crews. In ASC, 
for example, most journalists are guided by social norms and regulations 
that define what is haram, or not permitted by Islamic values.  Thus it is 
unlikely, if a Palestinian poet made explicit reference to sexuality in his 
poems, these would be unlikely to be broadcast, since they would be 
viewed as unacceptable from a conservative religious point of view.  
Socio-cultural pressures influence the transmission of programming 
content and impact the process of selection of guests. Media crews select 
content that meets what they view as the needs of society.  
Gramsci helped in explaining how the media compromises in order to 
retain a certain level of dominance: ‘the fact of hegemony presupposes 
that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups 
over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise 
equilibrium should be formed’ (Gramsci, 1971: 216). Social development 
is essential in any society, as it aims toward achieving rapid social change 
and it spreads unified culture among readership. This makes the 
profession of media producers most delicate, because the selection of 
topics, which aim at developing new ideas (Skuse et al., 2011), could 
pose a potential challenge to more traditional sectors of society. In terms 
of children’s programming, the ASC has to deal with this more than the 
PSC, because the latter imports foreign guidelines regulating the content 
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of Sesame Street. This is not the case with Pioneers of Tomorrow. Therefore, 
embedded crews in Gaza are more likely to be exposed to this kind of 
pressure to comply with a form of ‘political correctness’.  
The factors and circumstances mentioned above all negatively affect 
journalistic performance and journalists’ interest in their work.  There are 
additional forms of pressure related to the political environment: media 
body elections and violations of press freedom. These additional factors 
are briefly mentioned below.  
4.5.3  Other political pressures  
When the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994, there was an 
immediate need to reorganise the Syndicate of Palestinian Journalists, a 
union which offers membership to professional journalists. Prior to the 
establishment of the PA, there was no stable presence of media. The PA 
brought in many media professionals, artists, writers and intellectuals 
who were invited to form media organisations. Some consider this a 
form of 4th estate (media) sovereignty for Palestinians, particularly after 
the establishment of the PA news agency. The syndicate was indeed 
reorganised, in accordance with the new situation following the 
Palestinian elections in 1996, which brought forward a new political 
entity. This political change was followed by geographical change and 
division in the Palestinian media sector when Hamas won legislative 
council elections in 2006. This resulted in special political circumstances, 
which negatively affected the work of Palestinian media. The body of 
media was divided, which made Palestinian factions start looking for 
media allies and search for their own journalists. This form of Israeli-
imposed geographical division augmented the political division between 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, separating journalists even more. 
Palestinian media crews have had to cope with delays and obstacles in 
covering the Syndicate of Palestinian Journalists elections – including a 
fight over who should represent them (IFJ, 2014). The reasons were 
purely political. Fatah dominated the Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate, 
and refused the elections. Hamas then created its own trade union or 
professional organisation, known as the Palestinian Journalists Block 
(Abu Dher, 2007). Independent media professionals were left in the 
middle, not knowing whom to turn to. Both sides pressured media 
professionals to deal with them by obtaining licenses and membership. 
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Undoubtedly, all of this has created stress on Palestinian media 
professionals who experience that the political division is also affecting 
their own affairs.  
The delay in elections meant that several labour issues were kept on 
hold, including labour rights and rights of media professionals who are 
injured during military attacks and who cannot claim compensation from 
their employers due to the weakness of the trade union that should 
represent them. The delay in elections also made it difficult for media 
professionals to deal with other Arab and international syndicates – both 
Fatah’s syndicate and Hamas’s syndicate claim they are legal. 
Independent media professionals have called for elections, but these calls 
have never been taken seriously by any of the parties.  
Most international human rights lawyers, including Palestinians, agree 
that Palestinians have the right to resist the Israeli occupation under 
international law (Burke, 2015; Bishara, 2012). The right to resist attack 
is largely based on legal principles of safety of the person, self-
determination of nations, respect for the human rights and dignity of the 
person, three key principles of the international human rights law 
(Donnelly, 2013: 36-40). The widely shared view among Palestinian 
intellectuals is that multiple forms of resistance will persist until Palestine 
is freed from occupation, and Palestinians have their own state, in which 
they can enjoy meaningful, participatory forms of citizenship for their 
own populations (Al Turk, 2008; Khalidi, 2006).   
4.5.4  Cultural influences  
The significance of the cultural power of satellite media has grown 
markedly in recent years. This cultural power is rooted in the richness of 
local identities in Palestine across the centuries. The strong influence of 
Palestinian culture can be gauged from its intellectual contributions in 
art, literature, music, clothing and cooking, which are very distinct and 
unique and are still flourishing despite the geographical divisions that 
have carved up historical Palestine into different sub-national regions 
(Abu-Ghazaleh 2007). The artistic diversity of Palestinian culture, 
its long history of traditional popular arts, both in the Christian and 
Islamic traditions, is transmitted by the PSC and ASC, as well as by 
other, smaller satellite media channels. Contemporary Palestinian culture 
also remains closely connected to the cultures of several other countries, 
including Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, Egypt, and beyond. 
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Ever since 1948, when persecuted Palestinians fled their homes, the 
question of nationalism and national identity has tended to dominate the 
interest of Palestinians and of the media in Palestine. In satellite media 
this is reflected, for example, in an emphasis on the work of artists and 
poets who seek to rediscover and reclaim Palestinian cultural identity and 
connections with the past, and with Palestinians’ ancestral lands and 
culture. Palestinian cinema is also very much present in the satellite 
media. Hundreds of films have been produced by Palestinians living in 
Palestine and in the diaspora. These films are aired on Palestinian, Arab 
and (in translation) international satellite TV channels. According to one 
estimate, some 800 films have been produced in Palestine, by Palestinian, 
Arabs and non-Arab filmmakers since 1948. Many of these films focus 
on land, identity and nationalism (Jacir, 2007; Al-Zubaidi, 2006:9).  
Palestine’s intellectual capacity has enriched Palestinian programming 
on satellite media, with a clear role for Palestinian academics and cinema 
critics (including Al-Zubaidi himself, who had his education in 
Germany.) Intellectuals who had their education in European schools 
have managed to bring back knowledge to local universities. Stories 
about traditional professions and crafts that Palestinians have been 
familiar with for hundreds of years, including hand-made embroidery, 
pottery and ceramics, give Palestinian satellite TV a special character. 
Palestinian cities are portrayed on satellite media through the names and 
poems of Palestinian poets. A new form of political activism gives voice 
to nostalgia for the homeland, and is dedicated to keeping the 
attachment to Palestine alive and present like a ‘heart beat’ connected to 
nostalgia (Ball, 2014:135). Movies broadcast include Palestine 
revolutionary films, some of which have also made it to international 
audiences. Examples are: They Don’t Exist (1974), Children Nonetheless 
(1980), and Born out of Death (1981), as cited in an online article by Jacir 
(2007).  
Another form of power embedded in satellite media resides in 
Palestinian folklore, which is an expression of Palestinian culture. 
Hekayaat (stories), oral history, dancing, proverbs, jokes, myths, 
traditions and norms are part of the content of satellite TV media. 
Dabka (national dancing) retains a special presence in TV media, just like 
traditional clothes in cultural TV programmes. For example, Tatreez, 
embroidered dresses with different shapes, colours and patterns 
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representing certain villages and extended families, are frequently 
featured in broadcasts. The Palestinian black and white Kuffiyeh, worn by 
former president Arafat as a headscarf, has become a global symbol on 
satellite media, and represents the Palestinian struggle for freedom from 
oppression.  
The Palestinian culture represented in the programmes of the TV 
media is not only about symbolism. The social environment is of vital 
importance in shaping cultural sustainability and continuity, as well as 
innovation and creative ways of imagining realities outside the 
constraints of the occupation. Media producers must work in a society 
composed of groups interconnected through the many-layered social 
fabric that includes differences in political ideology, class, gender, age 
and social rank. This shapes media producers’ intellectual and 
psychological choices, and these choices are noticeable in programme 
content. Interactions between Palestinian and Israeli culture have taken 
different routes. For example, Israel claims ownership of Tatreez and 
Hummus, among other cultural symbols and foods. Whilst this created 
almost no discussion in the Israeli media, it was much debated among 
Palestinians who commute to Israel for business or health care.  
4.5.5  Background: codes of conduct for the media  
Media ethics are a set of ethical values and principles which media 
workers commit to during their work. Media organisations should – just 
like their staff - be committed to a code of ethics, and share the values of 
honesty, integrity and balance, all essential parts of any good media 
organisation. Factionalism and the challenge of meeting ethical 
responsibilities, as a theme, is part of the essence of this study and 
should be connected to the International and Palestinian Codes of 
Conduct for the Media. Values like honesty, integrity and balance are 
now becoming part of written codes of conduct approved by the 
Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate. These codes of conduct are meant to 
address the lack of professional values among journalists and media 
reporters who often either become victims of pressure by political 
parties or become tools used by the factions. In either case, their 
credibility and ethics are put at stake. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, legislations and codes of conduct continued to evolve and 
develop in step with the evolution of the profession and prevailing social 
changes. The codes of ethics governing the relationship between media 
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workers and their employers and profession were extended to 
accommodate growth factors (Ward, 2004).  
 In reviewing codes of conduct honoured in different countries, one 
discovers common values: respect for human life, the defence of justice 
and human rights, with variations resulting from different traditions, 
cultures and religions, such as the principle of gender equality and 
democracy, as stated by researcher Tiina Laitila (1995). She studied codes 
of ethics adopted by European media professionals to guide and regulate 
their own performance. Her study included 31 countries, enabling her to 
discern the reasons behind similarities and differences in the codes of 
conduct of different countries. She identified 61 principles, fitting into 
13 categories, and summarised the categories under 6 headings.  
Media ethics usually include three basic dimensions: law, freedoms 
and (media) ethics. The absence of any of these dimensions poses a 
threat to the integrity and content of media programming. Without 
freedom, the content of programmes becomes mundane propaganda or 
sheer commercialism, even if it is ‘liberation propaganda’ as described by 
Harb (2011:33) with regard to the historical, cultural, organisational and 
religious contexts in which the Hezbollah TV outlet operates.  
Without media laws, the profession lacks legal protection, is 
vulnerable to distracting squabbles, internally and with the public and 
with sponsors. Media without media ethics becomes corrupt and its role 
as critical, candid watchdog is damaged. Central to most codes of 
conduct for journalists is the need to defend their right of expression as 
professionals. This means rejecting direct and indirect threats and bribes 
to media producers, journalists and media outlets, and clearly 
emphasising the right of criticism, open debate and the need for ethical, 
investigative and ‘balanced’ reporting.  
The creation of ‘principles of social responsibility’ dates back to 1995, 
when Palestinian president Yasser Arafat declared a Press and 
Publications Law, aimed at regulating media work and providing clear, 
solid guidelines. Political and legal frameworks of neighbouring countries 
influenced the content of this law. The Palestinian Basic Law, amended 
in 2003, in principle grants freedom of expression, similar to those 
provided for by international laws. However, the Press and Publication 
Law has been deemed in violation of basic Palestinian and international 
laws (Mendal and Khashan, 2009). Article 4 of the Public Basic Law 
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guarantees freedom of media, but Article 7 of the Press and Publication 
Law restricts publishing that critisises the general political system. 
Similarly, publishers are asked to deposit copies of articles with the 
government before they are distributed, and this regulation contradicts 
Article 27 of the Palestinian Basic Law, in which media censorship is not 
permitted. Furthermore, Article 10 of the Press and Publication Law 
contradicts international standards in that it prohibits media from 
contacting foreign authorities, with the exception of correspondents. 
The Palestinian Code of Conduct for Journalists is in Appendix 5.   
4.6 The Security Apparatuses: Realities of Occupation  
Although the situation of military occupation is more obviously violent 
in Gaza, it is coercive in both Gaza and the West Bank. Palestine is 
divided into three distinct and separated territorial areas, with no direct 
physical contact to one another. The Gaza Strip, the West Bank and 
Jerusalem are each geographically distinct, fenced areas, each an 
isolated island, a miniature part of Palestine, and each surrounded by 
security walls, fences, and by inaccessible beaches. The Israeli army’s 
military presence is pervasive. Each part of Palestine falls under a 
different set of security services, has a different judicial system, and 
distinct laws and regulations apply. This reflects the hold of the Israeli 
state over each area, an influence by design, which is geared towards 
enforcing segregation and separation of the three components of 
Palestine, and undermining their potential for reunification and 
collaboration (Finkelstein, 1995).  
This very specific situation, different from any other, means there is a 
clear and apparent need to fully contextualise the impact of the 
security apparatuses within each of the three areas on local media 
production and content. This influence on media content happens 
locally in many ways. One set of influences is more positive and the 
other mainly negative. Neither the ASC nor the PSC are able to operate 
independently within Jerusalem or among Palestinian communities inside 
Israel. This makes the relationship between security apparatuses and 
media producers very tense, given the latter’s hunger to reach wider 
audiences. In the West Bank, one consequence is that certain forms of 
media content become difficult to produce. For example, the PSC is not 
able to record cultural performances inside Nazareth for broadcasting. 
Interviews and fieldwork done in this study revealed that, on some 
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occasions, the PSC and ASC were forced to pay an intermediate media 
company, one licensed inside Israel, to record such performances 
elsewhere, so that they could be broadcast. Restrictions like these 
ultimately affect final content, since people under direct military 
occupation are reluctant to express their true feelings and frustrations, 
knowing they could risk punishment – or in the case of the ASC even 
military action - for doing so. Both in Gaza and the West Bank, 
producers have to deal, directly and indirectly, with the illegal actions of 
Israeli soldiers on a daily basis (Goldstone, 2011). 
The ASC is unable to gain access to West Bank intellectuals and poets 
for Burning Brands. This too affects the contents of the programme, since 
at least half of the Palestinians in Palestine are not fully represented in 
the programmes. This may explain, for example, the relative absence of 
women’s voices and minority voices in ASC’s programmes. Only those 
in Gaza can be fully included. Should the ASC gain satellite access to 
West Bank stations, something that did not occur during the period of 
this study, the Gazan public would still feel disproportionately 
intimidated by both the security forces of Israel and the military forces of 
Hamas. The channel’s main correspondent has been arrested by the 
PA security apparatus for reporting for a Hamas-affiliated media outlet.  
Even those who support Hamas, and want to make intellectual 
contributions to Burning Brands and/or Pioneers of Tomorrow, still fear they 
might be arrested (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). The ASC producers 
are aware of this silencing of certain points of view, and of the problem 
of access. They also tend to agree that the absence of West Bank poets 
and intellectuals, for instance, has a negative effect on the quality of 
programme content. The ASC administration decided to compensate for 
this evident gap by involving guests and contributors from abroad.  
Likewise, the PSC’s Cultural Flashes suffered from a similar shortage of 
material related to the cultural life of people living in Gaza. Direct 
intimidation or indirect threat prevented them from obtaining such 
material from Gaza. According to field-producer and soundman Abu 
Shammalah (Interview, 2013): 
‘as a result of our work for PSC Cultural Flashes, we started to get 
problems with the security apparatus… we were restricted and when we 
worked on the ground we become quickly targets for security personnel as 
individuals and not as Palestine Satellite TV’. 
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As he put it, there is some self-censorship on the side of both Fatah 
and Hamas, with “both sides avoiding operating in different settings [and 
preferring to operate]…only where their security apparatuses are in 
control.” This is also a way to avoid escalation of partisan rhetoric in the 
media. The same kind of thing can happen to the ASC when trying to 
produce in the West Bank, of course, but in Gaza the ASC has the ability 
to minimize the power of the security apparatuses. The ASC’s media 
producers enjoy warm relationships with local internal security officials, 
who almost always grant them permits for filming. 
The ASC has been more at ease since it is in full control of content in 
Gaza, where the Hamas internal security apparatus supports the core 
missions of the ASC as a media provider. In the case of the PSC in the 
West Bank, on the contrary, as field producer and soundman Abu 
Shammalah (2013) acknowledged in an interview, production on the 
ground has been shrunk, so as not to result in any confrontation 
with security apparatuses, both Israeli and Palestinian. Land Day is a 
special event that Palestinians mark annually. When they wanted to 
cover the commemorations, the PSC’s media crew and the organisers of 
the Land Day commemorations reportedly did not get permission from 
Gaza’s de facto authorities. The PSC’s producers were then not able to get 
around this restriction and were obliged to present an ambiguous 
segment of a Cultural Flashes episode (CF10) (Abu Shammalah, 2013). 
Both sides tend to avoid operating outside areas in which their own 
security apparatuses are in control. 
In the West Bank, media content for the PSC’s producers is 
influenced by restrictions on freedom of movement and daily 
intimidation and arrests of Palestinian by Israeli security apparatuses. 
However, in the West Bank, the relative harmony between President 
Abbas of the Palestinian Authority and the PSC management at least 
produced one dominant vision of the meaning of nationalism, in the 
form of Palestinianism. When interviewed, the PSC’s producers denied 
that this situation resulted in any pressure or intimidation imposed upon 
them. However, PSC’s programme content is undoubtedly shaped by 
this situation of consent and mutual engagement (Interview: Al Shafi, 
2013).  
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4.7 Financial Restrictions and International Agendas  
Another factor is the constant financial pressure that reduces media 
outlets’ choice of content, studio space and materials. Studios are often 
used for multiple purposes and thus contain a range of different 
background materials. Obtaining new or replacement equipment can be 
difficult. The producer of Pioneers of Tomorrow, for example, had to apply 
to the Board of the ASC in order to purchase a new sofa for the show, 
which he got after lobbying the Board members (Al Amriti, 2013). Yet 
sometimes, when funding shrinks, media producers are forced to think 
of more creative ways of cutting on costs.  
 As is the case for any media outlet, financial resources and logistical 
support are key to allowing producers to amplify their messages, and 
reach wider audiences, using all the human skills available to them. 
Whilst access to capital can be a creative and positive tool, it can also 
prove destructive and can negatively influence the content of 
programmes, if wider communications policies are developed in 
agreement and consultation with influential and ‘moderate’ regional 
and international supporters. In the case of ASC and PSC, despite having 
regional and international financial support, the political ‘megaphone 
effect’ (Bloch and Lemish, 2003) of polarised messages was not that 
visible in children’s and cultural programmes, at least not during the 
selected period of study in 2009-2010.  
Compared with the West Bank, in Gaza, it even more difficult to 
obtain equipment and materials due to the blockade imposed for several 
years by Israel. The PSC has 1,300 staff members in total, all working for 
television and in various sections of the PA public relations department. 
The 2013 general budget for the PSC was around $39.4 million, 
including operating costs and salaries (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). In 
comparison, the ASC has fewer staff (around 400), with operating costs 
and salaries at around $5 million in 2013 (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013).  
If one looks at satellite media as a commercial project, then all 
broadcast items should be adapted to attract viewership. When funding 
was frozen for the PSC’s Sesame Street in 2011, following a vote in the 
UN, the show had to cease production and actors stopped receiving 
their wages (Interview: Sayeigh, 2013; Cheslow, 2012). In the case of 
Burning Brands of the ASC, when the presenter asked about the possibility 
of meeting face-to-face with poets and artists from other Arab states, 
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similar to what is done in Yousri Fawda’s show ‘Special Visit’ on Al 
Jazeera, the proposal was rejected due to financial constraints on the 
ASC. 
Economic pressure also results from a media crew’s need to avoid 
specific topics, in order not to lose contracts and work opportunities. 
For instance, discussing children’s rights and blaming international or 
local groups for lack of attention to this problem could result in lost 
contracts. One media professional experienced something similar, when 
he upset a UN agency by showing boxes of expired medications, 
dumped in Gaza’s agricultural land (Al Rantisi, 2015).  
Some journalists lost work after criticising local human rights groups, 
and civil society leaders ganged up against the journalists who dared 
question the role of these human rights groups or were critical about 
mistakes committed by medical doctors (MADA, 2014). Work 
opportunities can indirectly affect the selection of programme topics 
covered, especially when dire economic conditions are closely connected 
with people’s social relations. In the same sense, media producers 
obviously cannot do their job without the financial means to maintain 
themselves and their families.  
 With 1,300 staff, the PSC has far more staff than ASC, which has 
around 400. Not all these 1,300 in PSC staff work for television; some 
work in various sections of the PA’s public relations department 
(Forgione, 2004). As also noted earlier, however, at almost $40 million 
per year, the budget of the PSC’s programmes is far higher (Interview: Al 
Shafi, 2013) than ASC’s budget for programmes, which is estimated at 
around $5 million per year (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013) for a similar.  
Financial restrictions may be on factor that forces media producers to 
look for methods to defactionalise media content, so as to appeal to a 
wider audience and reduce costs. During the time of this study, the 
ASC received its core funding from the Islamic movement of Hamas. 
Soon after Hamas took control of Gaza, it was forced into political 
isolation upon the tight shutdown of Gaza’s borders in 2008. The 
resulting loss of revenues for Hamas forced it to review costs and 
budgets and to continue with only what were seen as essential themes 
and topics in ASC’s production. One result of the budget cuts was that 
the cultural and children’s programming was managed with very little 
intervention by political elites and with minimal budgetary support 
(Alshaer, 2012; Falk, 2013; Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013). 
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This was an awkward situation to handle, considering that the 
factional political elites are the ones that provide financial support. When 
political and economic embargoes are in place, banks are under pressure 
and budgets are cut. This brings a tightening of belts and under such 
conditions of scarcity those working in media may feel the need to 
compromise on their messages and appear more moderate. As Head of 
the ASC’s Board, Al Bardawil (2013) saw it as of great importance to 
maintain a level of harmonisation in media production, a very much 
needed approach if tensions are to be reduced in a post-conflict context. 
To save on costly programming, the political elites funding the ASC 
and PSC had little option but to increase the share of cheaper kinds of 
programming, like cultural and children’s programmes. Budget 
restrictions led to a lack of state-of-the-art equipment, so the ASC’s 
producers did not have access to High Definition equipment to improve 
image and sound quality needed, for example, for state-of-the-art news 
and drama. Although the ASC’s staff members are willing to work, often 
without payment, to serve their party’s interest, this cannot offset the 
pressures of funding shortages on defactionalising of content through 
the drive to economise.  
Both channels have had difficulties in keeping skilled staff. At least 
one in four staff members working on the television programmes left for 
better jobs, either abroad or with other, non-factional, media outlets. 
Naturally, this staff turnover affected the media content. In children’s 
programming, there is little other option to cut expenses than to rely on 
ready-made cartoons or pre-recorded clips, either produced abroad or 
imported from other channels. The ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow used 
cartoons and songs that were produced abroad. Another example of this 
was found in episode PoT08, which taught children the morals of taking 
care of their parents when they get older. In this case, the video 
emphasised the moral message the producers wanted to share with 
children.  
Similarly, as was confirmed in an interview with the head of the 
Palestine Sesame Street workshop, the PSC’s Sesame Street borrowed 
materials from other Sesame Street workshops around the world. 
(Interview: Sayeigh, 2013). There was also borrowing of content, as in 
episode SS03, where characters from US Sesame Street were used when 
Tali snored and Almo wanted to sleep. All of these were economy 
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measures that tended to push content towards defactionalisation. Such 
economies were needed, even though, as Al Bardawil put it (Interview, 
2013): ‘…our staff members are raised in such a way as to sacrifice their 
life, as well as their time’ for the media station they work for.    
All this diversity requires a budget for production work outside the 
studio, something that was missing in most of the Pioneers of 
Tomorrow’s episodes. With a few exceptions, there was simply no budget 
for such filming outside of the studio. For example, sending a satellite 
unit (SNG) to follow a child or sending a film crew outside the studio or 
local area implied additional production costs that could usually not be 
met by the ASC. Pioneers of Tomorrow was also guided by the principle that 
Gaza must be represented as being under a blockade, and that first there 
was a need to raise awareness of the occupation, and to use all means, 
including children’s TV programmes, to break that occupation. 
4.8 Beyond the Hamas-Fatah Conflict?  
Palestinian journalists’ largest concern has always been the territorial 
fragmentation and the severe restrictions on their freedom of movement, 
rather than factional media content or the ‘war of words.’ However, 
there is an obvious form of control by Palestinian journalists in the field 
of cultural and children’s TV programme production (Interview: Al 
Shafi, 2013). It might be that media professionals and journalists work so 
closely together that professional boundaries become opaque. This 
journalistic dominance leads to a less central role for media producers. 
Ideally, the ministries of media, civil society and media groups, as well as 
media professionals who studied media and learned from the experience 
of prominent TV personalities should become more familiar with the 
requirements of dialogue and how the media professionals need to 
produce media content in an as balanced manner as possible. When 
owners of a TV channel believe a journalist can do a one-man-operation, 
is capable of handling everything related to production, sound, lighting, 
and editing, then producers find themselves marginalised or pushed out. 
On the ground practices prove that journalists have also become hosts 
for TV programmes, as well as producers at times.  
The lack of a Palestinian body to organise the media and press has 
made it more difficult for journalists to preserve professional distinctions 
between journalism and production. In the case of Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
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cameramen who are used to short footage for news production also film 
the children’s programme (Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013). The same goes 
for Cultural Flashes, where someone on the team involved with SNG 
broadcasting for Breaking News is also the producer of a cultural show 
(Interview: Abu Shammalah, 2013).  
In any case, there is a blurring of the lines within the staff between 
those with work experience in media production but lacking specialist 
education and training in journalism (Galtung and Fischer, 2013), and 
professionally trained journalists. This is especially seen on the technical 
side, involving lighting, camera work and video editing. ‘Unfortunately, 
due to this confusion in job description, or in studio multi-tasking, there 
is constant accusation from journalists against media professionals that 
not everyone who sits behind a microphone is a journalist and not 
everyone carrying a camera is a cameraman’ (Interview: Al-Shafi, 2013). 
In the early years of the Intifada, Palestinians regarded everyone 
associated with media as a journalist. The situation currently is slightly 
different, since the de facto government in Gaza has given licences to 
dozens of media-production companies, most of which are producing 
programmes and films, mainly for TV.  
The question should also be asked as to whether the network of 
journalists is actually of help in reaching out to artists, poets, and public 
figures (Interview: Abu Shammalah, 2013). A journalist who may have 
no professional education except on-the-ground experience and being 
well-connected to the community, may nonetheless be more capable 
than a professional media producer, who might not have the same easy 
access to local communities (ibid). However, the term ‘producer’ is seen 
as rather problematic from the point of view of those who have that role 
(Al Shafi, 2013; Al Asfar, 2013; Al Amriti, 2013). In  the PSC’s 
programming,  those running the production engines refuse to be called 
‘producers’ by journalists who want to give them a more respected status 
in the community they deal with.  
Interestingly, there seems to be a specific form of ‘specialty’ in the 
field of media – as the same producers who work on culture 
programming are more likely to be doing other programmes as well. 
Sometimes, the ASC’s host of Burning Brands, Younies Abu Jarad, is seen 
giving news briefings or hosting other shows as well. Although this is not 
part of his job description, it has shaped his ‘socialisation and attitudes’ with 
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the ASC (Shoemaker and Rees, 1996; Gans 1979; Gitlin, 1980) – at least 
in conversation. He is originally a poet and now a media producer and 
show host. It seems that some staff must be multi-taskers. The role he 
plays is mostly shaped by his interactions outside the studio, including 
his contacts with social groups (D’Acci, 2004). A similar thing is seen in 
the PSC’s production unit where Cultural Flashes used Palestinian 
producer Wael Mansra also as one of the cultural editors of the 
newspaper Al Ayyam, and as one of the administrative heads of PA’s 
ministry of culture. A similar thing happened with co-host Amani Abu 
Hantash, whose interests lie in culture, language and literature. Walid Al 
Sheikh is a well-known poet, and he has served as co-host as well. The 
three co-hosts are not journalists, but media personalities.  
The fact that these three co-hosts appear on air could raise concerns 
among journalists, who still believe, despite the co-hosts being experts in 
their own specific fields, that anyone running a show must be a 
(specialist) journalist. Media producers see this issue as problematic, 
especially when they need to use equipment, such as lighting and sound 
apparatuses, that belongs to journalists, and given the fact that the 
primary focus of TV channels is still news coverage. To avoid this 
contentious issue, stations began using other companies with their own 
specialised cultural and children’s media production teams. 
Government control appears weak, as there are indications of a 
collapse of social capital in Palestine, where trust and cooperation, 
considered to be indicators of social capital, have been eroded 
historically by internecine violence and political competition (Khalidi, 
2010). Trust across the Palestinian territories has all but collapsed. The 
breakdown in social capital has contributed to the dismantling of 
Palestinian society from the Palestinian family outwards. Trust and 
cooperation within political factions can appear stronger than local, 
domestic family ties, which may be stretched by the political factionalism 
in which family life is unavoidably embedded (Tawil-Souri, 2007). One 
reason for this is the result of the behaviour of Palestinian political elites 
who, even after 8 years, continue to extend the conflict by postponing a 
reconciliation dialogue and failing to reconstitute Palestinian social 
capital (Bauck and Omer (eds.), 2013; Rabbani, 2008). When Israel 
divides factions against one an other, by making dialogue difficult, this 
tends to boost the polarisation of Palestinian political life, thereby 
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reinforcing a tendency for factionalism already embedded in political 
structures and spatial separation.  
Most nations transitioning through a period of national liberation to 
governance by political elites enter a stage of chaos and conflict (Bishara, 
2012). However, the case of Palestinian political elitism is different 
because it has entered a stage of chaos and conflict before the process of 
liberation from Israeli occupation has ended. This added chaos and 
conflict has had a negative impact on the unity of Palestinian society and 
has eroded trust between members. This makes it very difficult for media 
producers to function.  
Any initial positive impact of political elites has been replaced by 
negative trends that emerged after the establishment of new elites (the 
PA was formed in 1993) that differ from prior elites, which were part of 
the original ideological Al Aqsa Intifada. The main goal of Al Aqsa 
Intifada activists was to sacrifice themselves for the sake of society and 
the Palestinian cause. More than other social factors, the role of 
Palestinian political elites has negatively influenced the formation of 
social capital, including the roles of civil society, religion or even family 
(Al Barghouti, 2012; Khalidi, 2010). This negative influence has 
increased as a result of the fighting that erupted between Fatah and 
Hamas. This is further elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Among researchers, there is clear recognition for the positive role 
civil society played during the Intifada in strengthening Palestinian social 
capital; its contribution was equivalent to the role played by a state 
(Torrse, 2013), which, in the case of Palestine, is absent due to the Israeli 
occupation. This role of civil society, in substituting for the state, 
decreased significantly after the division of Gaza and the West Bank 
between Hamas and Fatah respectively. This weakened the formation of 
Palestinian social capital needed to combat the influence and dominance 
of political elitism. Palestinian society is unique in many ways, as it was 
largely established around Palestinian factional organisations, including 
NGOs linked to these factions. Evidence of this can be found in the left-
wing dominance of pioneering human right groups and cultural activists 
in Palestine.  
Furthermore, the positive role that the family played in the coherence 
of Palestinian society due to the trust among its members has also 
decreased after the cold conflict between Fatah and Hamas. In Palestine 
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there seems to be a preference for political affiliation over family 
relations. Loyalty to political groups rather than family groups has 
impacted social issues like marital options and divorces, which are 
decided on the basis of factional affiliation rather than on familial ties. 
Employment within both the PA and the Hamas de facto government is 
strictly reserved for political affiliates. More independent thinkers and 
professionals are excluded or pushed out (ICHR, 2003). Over the years, 
especially in Palestine media, contexts have been ignored.  
People working within government or civil society sectors can be 
fired for their more liberal political views. A culture of fear has arisen 
among families that prefer not to get involved in political affiliations in 
order to maintain their benefits and keep jobs (Yousef, 2013). Ideological 
diversity and pluralism does not necessarily mean that religion plays a 
negative role in social capital formation.  
The state of the division between Fatah and Hamas is responsive to 
international conditions dominating the Middle East (Abu Dher, 2010). 
The two Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008-2009 and 2012 appeared to reduce 
the divisions between the two sides, because of shared Palestinian 
resistance, which encouraged greater cooperation - and less competition 
- between the two sets of political elites. During the two Israeli wars on 
Gaza, Fatah and Hamas fought together against Israeli tanks. However, 
Fatah lost control of Gaza and Hamas confiscated Fatah’s armaments, 
just as Fatah took control of West Bank and took control of Hamas’ 
armaments (Hroub and Quneis, 2011).  
Trust between Fatah and Hamas has risen and fallen on many 
previous occasions. It generally increased when both sides equally 
committed to previous national agreements in Cairo, Doha and Mecca, 
and decreased rapidly when either of the parties refused to cooperate in 
implementing prior agreements, including, for example, the agreement 
around preparation for elections in 2011. Continued division between 
the two rival regimes is bound to change the internal dynamics of both 
Fatah and Hamas (Khalaf, 2008) and to affect any workable framework 
for ending the Israeli occupation that involves the cooperation of both 
Hamas and Fatah (Bauck and Omer, 2013). 
The nature of the Hamas-Fatah division is echoed in the rhetoric of 
Fatah’s and Hamas’s factional satellite TV stations in the way they 
approach dealing with the occupation. The secular/religious tension 
between the parties is one of the factors that contribute to ongoing 
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confrontation and cold conflict. The Hamas-Fatah conflict led to 
squabbling between the elites when Hamas decided to take part in 
governance (Al Turk, 2008).  
Hamas’s entrance into the political arena was a good practical test of 
the extent to which Palestinian elites believe in or ignore principles of 
democracy and whether or not they are able to manage conflict over 
political position. The political elites of neither Fatah nor Hamas believe 
that the opposing side views them as worthy of political partnership. 
Unfortunately, this mutual lack of trust has resulted in the evolution of a 
culture of violence. There is a widespread belief that use of harmful force 
is the only option for resolving the conflict. The situation has 
deteriorated to such an extent that there is a constant dispute about ‘the 
message,’ and who controls the microphone, as well as who says what, 
where and when, and who has the final say.  The ‘war of brothers’ leaves 
all aspects of Palestinian society in limbo, awaiting a solution.  
Following the chaotic situation generated by the ‘war of the brothers,’ 
children’s and cultural programming, produced by media professionals 
who tend to de-factionalise the content of programmes, could have 
become a departure point for reconciliation. There is evidence that this 
involved a deliberate attempt to defactionalise the content of media 
(Interview: Abu Mohsen, the ASC’s head of programming, 2013). Media, 
however, still has to contend with the influence of political elites whose 
ethics are less than ideal. One option to defactionalise’ media and reduce 
the influence of political elites is to link media protocols to some sort of 
regulatory structure. This could generate guidelines for media ethics and 
linkage to international and Palestinian codes of media conduct. 
Condit suggests that the dominant forces in a society ‘must articulate 
a worldview that accommodates a broad range of interests, not merely 
the leading group’s interest’ (Condit, 1994: 206–7). The ASC’s 
administration came to the conclusion that such compromises are in no 
way meant to be spontaneous gestures of goodwill, but that, instead, 
production in the ASC and PSC is a ‘negotiation among elite and non-
elite groups and therefore always contains interests of non-elite groups, 
though to a lesser degree’ (Condit, 1989: 119).  
Unlike some producers interviewed at the ASC, PSC staff were more 
outspoken about the need for defactionalisation of programming and the 
broadcaster’s vision. The head of PSC’s producers, Al Shafi (Interview: 
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2013), made this clear, stating: ‘I am convinced as a producer that I 
should have a contributing role in ending the political division which we 
are paying the price for…We must have a role.’ In this context, 
producers are aware of their limits, but are also aware that if 
compromises are not made, they risk losing viability and audiences. ‘We 
cannot be dim-witted… we have to deal with changing circumstances 
around us’ (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013).  
A statement like this suggests that those working at the ASC at the 
production level are fully aware that this also means change in the overall 
vision away from former factionalism. As Strinati noted, inspired by a 
Gramscian perspective, hegemony is not a fixed set of ideas. Rather, in 
applying this to the Palestinian media of both the PSC and ASC, it is 
‘shifting a set of ideas by means of which dominant groups strive to 
secure the consent of subordinate groups to their leadership, rather than 
as a consistent and functional ideology working in the interests of a 
ruling class by indoctrinating subordinate groups’ (Strinati, 1995:170-1).  
In the case of the PSC and ASC, logically, the structure and TV outlet 
need to be presented before a more detailed discussion of the vision of 
each TV channel. To link this to the theoretical framework of this study, 
both the PSC’s and ASC’s media practices have some resonance with the 
concept of ‘bones.’ This concept refers to the core structure of the ideas 
and beliefs of Hamas, and how these have been ‘affected’ in the past by 
factionalism, in which hegemonic power is expected to be strong. The 
PSC adopted a more open and even ‘counter-hegemonic’ approach, 
struggling to defactionalise the media. This posed a challenge to the 
dominant principles of what constitutes legitimate and normal political 
approach. The urge to have a role in ending the political division seems 
to have come with a clear intention of compromises in vision, which 
ultimately affect production and programming. The interviews have thus 
given some evidence that ‘defactionalisation’ is a goal. Only a more 
detailed analysis of content (in Chapters 6 and 7) will confirm whether 
this is the case.  
4.9 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has offered a general understanding of the working 
environment of Palestinian media professionals and has identified some 
of the key constraints under which their media work has to be carried 
 The Palestinian Media’s Working Environment 137 
 
 
out. The influence of satellite media has been explained, and the reader is 
now more acquainted with the ways in which media producers and 
professionals in Palestine have to respond or adapt to the difficult 
context in which they operate, under several sets of external and internal 
constraints. What should be clear, even from this short account, is that 
media producers and professionals in the Palestinian context have to 
deal with pressures that differ markedly from the pressures experienced 
by media colleagues in other locations, where the media operates more 
or less independently, and without excessive economic and psychological 
pressures and constraints, such as in Sweden, the US or the Netherlands, 
for example.  
This chapter has presented the contextual background for a deeper 
understanding of how Palestinian media producers negotiate their 
complex working environment. It helps to understand how, as we will 
see in later chapters, satellite media producers and journalists still manage 
to make sense of working under almost impossible conditions in both 
Gaza and the West Bank. Satellite TV can be considered one of the most 
modern modes of mass communication, as well as one of the most 
‘risky’ ones, since it attracts all age groups and all kinds of opinions. 
There have been growing controversies around children’s TV 
programmes in recent years, as television – especially satellite TV – has 
come to be viewed as a powerful messenger and as children are viewed 
as vulnerable to whatever values and narratives satellite TV programmes 
offer them (UNICEF, 2010). In Chapter 5, the comparative context of 
the systematic content analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7, is outlined. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, broad comparisons are drawn between the two 
selected children’s programmes and the two selected cultural 
programmes, in terms of their content. The ASC and PSC are also 
compared, with regard to the content of their children’s and cultural 
programmes. Some examples are given to illustrate similarities and 
differences. First Chapter 5 will address two research questions, building 
on the last point raised in this chapter about the key political and social 
influences on those involved in the production processes and decisions. 
It will also be important to consider how non-dominant groups, 
especially women and religious minorities, influence content and 
production.  
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5 
Contextualising ASC and PSC 
Children’s and Cultural Programming 
and Production  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with the programming and production, in terms of 
structure and content, of the four selected media programmes, and will 
provide the basis for the more in-depth comparative discussion 
presented in Chapter 6. In this chapter, some background factors that 
influence the content of Palestinian satellite media are considered. The 
main focus is on programming and production processes that inform the 
specific production decisions, and on the specific content analysed in 
Chapter 6.  
A growing interest and an increase, in terms of volume, in children’s 
and cultural programming on Arab satellite media in general is having a 
significant impact on the public, which can be linked to changes in the 
working environment of media producers in Palestine. Although the 
West Bank falls under PA control, and Hamas controls Gaza, both areas 
are also fully under Israeli occupation. This makes for a doubly 
challenging environment for media producers to work in. Some of the 
problems arising from this complex situation were described, in general 
terms, in Chapter 4. Free movement of people is impossible in the areas 
mentioned, and this seriously affects media crews’ access to newsworthy 
events taking place outside the confines of Gaza or the West Bank. Their 
ability to physically move in order to exchange knowledge and be 
exposed – in person - to new patterns of media production, for instance 
in neighboring countries in Europe or further afield, is severely 
restricted. However, the advent of social media, YouTube and other 
forms of communication, such as Skype, has opened up new 
opportunities for information exchange, without (much) control by 
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border guards. Such communication is, of course, is subject to different 
kinds of surveillance.  
The PSC and ASC will be discussed as two different forms of 
Palestinian satellite channels, in relation to the ‘circuits of media’ 
theoretical framework of D’Acci (2004) and a Gramscian (1971) 
understanding with a special focus on both channels’ visions, aims, 
programming, budgets and personnel. In addition, the media production 
and sets of procedures for broadcasting of both channels will be 
discussed.   
After the previous chapter, which dealt with the first main research 
question, this chapter paves the way for addressing the second main 
research question: In the local, regional and global context, how does the content 
and production of the four children’s and cultural programmes in these two satellite 
TV stations communicate issues in relation to the nine selected themes? First, the 
vision and programming of both TV channels is presented. Next, the 
themes in the content of cultural and children’s programmes, that are the 
central focus of this study, are analysed and compared. Both TV 
channels are shown to be very different in terms of their key points of 
thematic focus, their agendas and the overall structure of the 
programmes. In Chapter 6, the two children’s programmes are 
compared. Then, in Chapter 7, the two cultural programmes are 
compared. This is followed, in Chapter 8, by a discussion of the 
influence of non-dominant groups, especially women and children, on 
the programme content, along with a discussion of the newly emerging 
forms of ‘Palestinianism.’  
The researcher aims at highlighting both the vision and structures that 
drive production in each satellite TV channel. Also, in this chapter, 
elements of the analytical framework chosen for this study are used to 
interpret how the programmes of both channels – the ASC and the PSC 
– compare, in broad terms. The views of some interviewed producers on 
this matter are included, where relevant. In deciding on content of media 
production, sometimes producers respond to a factionalised audience by 
providing more factional content to gain audiences and public support. 
At other times the demands of audience imply that defactionalisation 
should take place (Hroub and Quneis, 2011). Each channel is examined 
in turn, and their cultural and children’s programmes are then compared.  
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5.2 PSC: Palestinian Satellite Channel  
The origins of the PSC were presented briefly in Chapter 1.3. From its 
start onward, the PSC had a close relationship with the PLO. In addition, 
the vision of PSC derived from the wider vision of the PLO and then, 
later on, the vision of the Palestinian Authority. Finally, the 
programming and the structure of employment in the PSC show a 
reasonable degree of professionalism. 
5.2.1 The PLO and the PSC  
When Hamas won a majority in the election of 2006, President Abbas 
ordered Gaza staff to sit at home and moved the management of the 
operations of the PSC and the Voice of Palestine radio from the Ministry 
of Information to his own Presidential Office (Daraghmeh, 2010). 
Furthermore, during the 2007 Fatah-Hamas clashes, the TV channel 
clearly adopted the opinions of Fatah, with Fatah leaders and PA 
spokesmen frequently appearing on air. Hamas confiscated all equipment 
and archives of the channel (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). Still, despite this, 
the PSC became popular, not only in Palestine, but also across the 
Middle East, through its cultural, arts and children’s programmes as well 
as daily news feeds. This included Shara’a Simsim (Sesame Street) aired by 
the PSC and produced in cooperation with the Al Quds Institute of 
Modern Media in Ramallah. Eventually, however, the PSC started 
broadcasting from its new headquarters in Ramallah. When it went on 
satellite, the PSC also had to look for sponsors for some of its (satellite) 
TV programmes. Regardless of whether the sponsor is the local 
telecommunication company, ‘Jawwal’, the European Union or USAID 
(Sienkiewicz, 2012), they will usually want to exercise some control over 
content.  
The PSC started off in a small room in the Presidential Office 
(Interview: Al Shafi, 2013), and has since then expanded to become an 
organisation with its own independent headquarters, but without 
independent funding. Palestine satellite TV, like several other media 
outlets, has been subject to hacker attacks since its first broadcasts. In 
1995, the German government offered to replace all its equipment, as a 
gift to the studios, but Israel refused to allow the equipment in and 
returned it to Germany (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). In 2000, Israeli 
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troops targeted the buildings of the PSC and its transmitters in most 
Palestinian cities, causing further damage.  
5.2.2 The PSC’s vision 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the vision of Palestine TV sprung from the 
need to build a viable Palestinian society following the Oslo Accords. It 
was hoped that by providing capacity building for both society and 
individuals, the aspirations for liberation, freedom and a stronger 
Palestinian state could be met (PBC, 2013). The PSC represents itself as 
a transparent form of media, committed to protecting the cultural and 
political diversity of Palestinians, in accordance with the Document of 
Independence of 1988 and the Basic Palestinian Law.  
 The PSC started with the vision of commiting itself to promoting 
Palestinian interests inside Palestine and abroad – in the words of the 
PBC (2013), the need for change and transformation was ‘crystal clear,’ 
as was the need to respect the rule of law. The PSC aims at gaining 
public credibility by offering information about and questioning people 
in decision-making positions, whatever their allegiance or loyalties may 
be. One of the proudly stated visions of the PSC is to strengthen the 
visibility of Palestinian cultural production, with particular attention to 
poets, artists and intellectuals from across the political spectrum of 
Palestine. As stated by the PBC, its compass is directed towards 
Palestinian unity and it opposes the use of the media for ideological or 
factional agendas (PBC, 2013). In other words, the PSC does not want to 
portray itself as being swayed by factional influences, but as a relatively 
independent media institution, with a vision that transcends factional 
divisions among Palestinians and their leaders.  
The PSC’s focus is on a unified Palestinian identity through the 
implementation of democratic principles, representing itself as open-
minded about diversity and interested in enriching Palestinian culture 
and traditions through cultural programmes. In the official media 
discourse of the PBC, the aim of the PSC is to achieve the following 9 
goals (PBC, 2013):  
1. Show how cultural monuments and civilisation of the Palestinian 
people contribute to Palestinian development, and spread this 
knowledge more widely among the cultures of the world.  
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2. Unite all inherited creative and cultural Palestinian experiences to 
be used in accordance with national principles.  
3. Strengthen the relationships at all levels of the Palestinian people 
on the one hand, and of the rest of the Arab world on the other. 
4. Keep pace with the evolution of Palestine and Palestinian nationals 
in all aspects of their lives, including the economic, social and 
cultural dimensions. Ensure that the Palestinian culture is 
connected with all other nations’ cultural expression.  
5. Address Palestinian public opinion in Palestine and the diaspora.  
6. Inform people of the positions and decisions of the Palestinian 
National Authority, Palestinian legislation and politics, so that 
people can contribute to processes of state building and to civil 
society on the basis of democracy and diversity.  
7. Adhere to the traditions of the Palestinian people by giving the 
chance for freedom of expression and for publications. In 
addition, guarantee all rights according to Arab and international 
conventions, as approved by the PLO.  
8. Focus on humanitarian interests, as principles for religious belief, 
democracy, human rights and protection of citizens’ rights.  
9. Maintain a distinguished national Palestinian character through 
social and cultural TV programming, and do not allow damage to 
affect any specific category of the Palestinian society.  
What is obvious in these goals is that they have been formulated by 
officials of Palestine TV and managers, directly involved in production, 
who are appointed by the PA. There is very little reference to these kinds 
of (mainly cultural) aims in any laws or presidential decrees. Interviews 
suggest that the Ministry of Information did not play a part in putting 
these aims together. And, in most cases, the PSC did not coordinate with 
other ministries of the Palestinian Authority in formulating these goals 
(Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). As is clear from the wording, the emphasis is 
on depoliticising the PSC’s agenda, and on focusing on cultural 
expression, cultural resources and making inter-cultural connections.  
5.2.3 Programming at the PSC 
The programming policy of the PSC is designed by the heads of the 
programme departments, along with the programme producers, who 
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decide every quarter what they want to broadcast. However, the process 
of media production goes through a set of steps and procedures (see 
Figure 2 in Chapter 7). According to the head of TV programming at 
Gaza’s PSC, Al Shafi (Interview: 2013): 
 Each producer presents a proposal with an outline of ideas, 
objectives, costs and target.  
 After proposals have been presented, the general coordinator of 
the PSC passes them on to the head of the channel that has the 
authority to approve or decline them. 
 Selection of programmes is highly dependent on the taste and 
priorities of the heads of programme – and in most cases the TV 
invites experts, but their views are not always taken into 
consideratio. 
 The final go/no-go decision is made by the general chairman.  
Due to the geographical separation, staff from Gaza cannot meet with 
staff from the West Bank. Proposals by Gaza staff are apparently 
different from those of West Bank staff, especially because of the 
military confrontation between the two competing political parties. For 
example, during my field research, I found some evidence of forms of 
self-censorship by PSC staff members who felt intimidated by Hamas 
security in Gaza, and therefore refused to broadcast any ‘negative’ or 
overly critical material on Hamas. The PSC’s programmes were mostly 
produced in Gaza where the headquarters were located, but in 2007, 
production and the headquarters both moved to the West Bank. 
The PSC still struggles, financially, in both places. As Al Shafi (2013) 
states, in most cases his staff members start long arguments with heads 
of financial departments who do not understand the need for hiring taxis 
that are ready at all times for crew working on cultural programmes, and 
when cameras are needed for covering breaking news. The PSC began to 
merge with Palestine TV for its on-the-ground reporting, in order to 
save on budget and expenses. In any case, on-the-ground crews address 
local issues while the satellite channel addresses both local and global 
audiences.  
In interviews, heads of staff emphasised that the relationship between 
TV management, Fatah leaders and PA officials does not compel them 
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to take orders (Al Shafi, 2013; Al Asfar, 2013), and that the crew works 
freely, expressing the views of the general Palestinian society. However, 
some of the facts on the ground contradict such accounts and prove 
there is a link. Al Shafi (2013) stated that he is a PA employee and is paid 
from Palestinian tax money. When asked whether the PSC can take 
orders from above, he admitted that, occasionally, the President’s Office 
takes objection to content of programmes, which then has to be 
adjusted, or modified, immediately. He also acknowledged, however, that 
the PSC has facilitated more moderate leaders from the opposition to 
appear on programmes. This may suggest a process of making 
‘compromises’ and reformulating depictions of different political 
opinions. This would help to maintain hegemony ‘where certain 
compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the 
leading group should make sacrifices’ of a media-content kind (Gramsci, 
1971: 373), so that both the PSC and the ASC do not lose their 
audiences.  
There is a hierarchical structure which regulates the work within the 
PSC. The organisation is divided into several departments. The 
department of news and political programming is in charge of the news 
(in Arabic, English, Hebrew and French,) and deals with political 
programmes. The department of programmes is in charge of co-
ordination, décor, and production units. The department of engineering 
is in charge of montage, filming, graphics, SNG and lighting equipment. 
Financial and administrative departments handle personnel and financial 
affairs. There is also a department of public relations and a similar 
department for marketing. 
Recruitment at PSC is usually done in one of two ways. One way is 
direct employment by the PA chairman. This is commonly used for 
hiring senior staff, who are often recruited not on the basis of their 
media experience and skill, but rather because of their ‘history of 
struggle,’ contribution and loyalty to Fatah and the PLO. A second way 
to recruit staff members is through the chairman of the PSC, depending 
on the needs of the heads of departments. The decision to hire is then 
taken by the PA chairman. In most cases, jobs are not announced and 
recruitment is not based on equal opportunities (ICHR, 2003). In some 
cases, staff members are not qualified for the job, but happen to show 
loyalty to political factions and start to learn the required skills on-the-
job (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013).  
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One way to minimize a possible negative impact of staff who are not 
sufficiently qualified when hired is to provide in-service training sessions 
and workshops. These can be organised both locally and abroad, and 
media producers can benefit from them. Criteria for selection should be 
based on merit and on qualifications, however, and not on personal 
relationships and favoritism (ICHR, 2003). In recruitment talks, local 
producers felt they did not get as fair a chance as others and had to take 
jobs with international production units or news wires. There are two 
main reasons for this: a) the freezing of aid to the PA and b) low and 
unreliable wages.  
As for human and logistical resources within PSC, in the past few 
years, hundreds of staff members in Gaza were laid off and lost work. 
Yet they still receive regular wages, paid by the international community 
in an attempt to demoralise and delegitimise the de facto administration 
inside Gaza, namely Hamas. In general, PSC has buildings and offices 
for TV in the West Bank – though most of these buildings were not 
specifically designed for media production. One of the strengths of PSC 
is the large number of media producers and experts working in different 
fields (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). 
Funding for PSC largely comes from two sources: the office of 
President Abbas, and the PA’s general budget. The first source shrank 
during the period of study, after Israel refused to deliver taxes collected 
on behalf of the PA (Daraghmeh, 2010). To support PSC, the Ministry 
of Finance then assigned funding from the general budget instead of that 
of the president’s office. In addition to these two basic sources of 
income there is financial support from European and Arab states 
(Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). In some cases, contributions have come in 
the form of permissions to, free-of-charge, use materials, plays, songs 
and media contents produced abroad. The general budget of the PSC is 
estimated to be around 155 million NIS [$39.8 million] (Interview: Al 
Shafi, 2013). Two thirds of the budget is spent on staff salaries (ICHR, 
2003). Salaries of staff members vary between 1000 NIS and 7000 NIS 
per month. This is paid in addition to privileges to senior staff members. 
Professional production crew with low income tends to switch jobs by 
heading to international media groups, which offer better wages and 
more security – this has become a bone of contention within the 
administration of the PSC (Interview: Al Asfar, 2013).  
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5.3 ASC: Al Aqsa Satellite Channel  
Al Aqsa’s origins were briefly introduced in Chapter 1.3, where its close 
connection with Hamas was first outlined. In this section, the origins of 
the ASC, its core purpose and overall vision, are revisited. In addition, 
attention is paid to how its producers negotiate their role within the close 
relationship between the ASC and Hamas. 
5.3.1 Origins and creation of the ASC  
At its start-up, the ASC went through a pilot phase of eight-hour daily 
broadcasts for about two months. After that, it began broadcasting 24/7, 
addressing the Arab world through NileSat moon. It started as an 
Islamic channel with a Palestinian identity and a focus on local, regional 
Palestinians and those in the diaspora. At first, the focus was mostly on 
issues related to the Palestinian cause, Jerusalem, prisoners and the rights 
of Palestinian people. The channel aims at fostering the Islamic Ummah 
(collective community of Islamic peoples).  
The ASC represents a new release for Islamic TV production in the 
world, by addressing first the child, then the older youth and, last, the 
rest of the community. It has relied for 100% on Palestinian production 
crew (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). Crew members take their 
education and training in Palestinian institutions. The bulk of Al Aqsa 
programming is concerned mostly with defending the land, the nation, 
and retelling the plight of prisoners, martyrs and their families, caused by 
Israeli occupation and siege. Its broadcasts focus largely on Israel’s plans 
to Judaise Jerusalem, and the theme of the Palestinians’ right to return is 
a daily part of its broadcast and message to the world. 
The ASC has faced several attempts at having it shut down, by 
Palestinians, Israel, regional and international bodies. The attempts 
included the arrest of their crew members, banning them from travelling, 
and targeting journalists who worked for the ASC during the last war 
(Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). Also, in 2010, the ASC frequency was 
taken off air by French official broadcasting regulator Eutelsat, choking 
the ASC’s broadcasts in France. In the same year, the United States 
Treasury imposed sanctions on a Hamas-affiliated bank and on the ASC 
(Barker, 2010; Zanotti, 2010). Despite the ban, the ASC continued to 
broadcast using alternate airwaves. 
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Shortly after, the US Congress blacklisted the ASC as a terrorist 
organisation. The ASC has become known internationally for producing 
a popular but controversial children’s programme, Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
with ideological values that sparked international scrutiny and 
accusations (Jüntzel, 2008). International bodies, including Human 
Rights Watch, continue to criticise the programme, in which Farfur, a 
Mickey Mouse-like character, appears to be a combination of a political, 
a cultural and a religious figure (Alshaer, 2012). The accusers keep 
blaming the ASC for broadcasting Jew-hating material and for anti-
Semitism.  
However, Israel’s 2009 attack on Gaza, during which the ASC’s 
headquarters were bombed by Israeli aircraft, brought it some sympathy 
from wider (i.e., not just Palestinian) audiences.  Despite all harassments 
suffered, the channel continues broadcasting, from unknown locations, 
as a sign of the steadfastness of the Islamic movement of Hamas 
(Alshaer, 2012). Al Aqsa TV is officially competing with the PSC, which 
represents the views of Fatah and the PLO (Alshaer, 2012). Several 
vilification campaigns were carried out by Hamas against Fatah leaders 
and the PA’s security apparatuses, especially prior and during the 2007 
military clashes. The ASC’s involvement in the justification of the 
internal military confrontation between Fatah and Hamas was the reason 
for it being called the ‘mouthpiece of Hamas black militia,’ as put 
forward in several of the PSC’s shows (El-Obeidi, n.d.).  
According to Fathi Hammad, former minister of the Interior and 
head of the Board of the ASC Network, the Al Aqsa channel has worked 
hard to maintain a free media, away from pressures and external 
influences. The ASC is actively producing films and documentaries made 
in Asda City for Media Production in Gaza.  
5.3.2 The ASC’s vision  
The ASC aspires to be the first satellite channel in the Arab and Islamic 
world of its kind, combining all aspects of life, including intellectual 
issues, themes of Islam, culture and religion within the Islamic Ummah, 
and defending the Palestinian cause in the memory of all Arabs and 
Muslims (Aqsa, 2013). The dominant logo of the channel is the golden 
dome of the Al Aqsa mosque. As described in the channel’s mission 
statement, this is an attempt by the station to try and cover Palestine in 
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general and look at the Al Aqsa mosque as an important, essential 
direction for Muslims as the place of the ascent of prophet Mohammed, 
in recognition of the belief in the holiness of the land and the right of 
Palestinians and Islamic Ummah/Nation, within it. The station’s image 
of the dome is surrounded by a circle, referring to the Arab and Islamic 
outreach of Al Aqsa mosque – representing a form of protection against 
all attempts to Judaise Jerusalem (Aqsa, 2013).  
Al Aqsa’s curriculum is based on Islamic thinking, which is meant to 
be broadcast to the Arab Islamic states and Muslim communities around 
the world. The ASC focuses on Islamic values and principles guided by 
Islamic faith and worship as a lifestyle. The use of classical Arabic in 
stating the case of Palestine has priority, as the ASC attempts to respond 
to accusations by Fatah supporters (in conversation) that it is breaking its 
mission and giving way on national principles.  
The Board of the ASC comprises 7 selected experts on media and 
culture. Apart from an office in the West Bank, closed down by PA 
security in 2007 amidst the factional, internal fighting, the ASC has 5 
offices across the Arab world, in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and 
Jordan. The media discourse of the ASC, as outlined by Al Aqsa (2013), 
includes several points that appear ambiguous in relation to factionalism 
and defactionalisation:  
1. Put an emphasis on national, Arabic and Islamic constants, and 
on Palestinian suffering. 
2. Avoid phrases and expressions of challenge, for example 
suggesting Palestine as a power equivalent to Israel.  
3. Establish a dialogue between mind and emotions by transferring 
the ball into the Israeli court, and frankly considering Israel as the 
occupying power.  
4. Avoid turning the international community into an enemy, and 
discriminate between the positions of different (e.g., Western) 
states.  
5. Constantly speak of the need for security and peace for both 
states.  
7. Do not reject UN resolutions, but, instead, focus on demanding 
that Israel implements such resolutions.  
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8. Put emphasis on the Palestinian cause as a basic human cause, 
which the international community should be held responsible 
for.  
9. Increase discussion about the right to establish a Palestinian 
State, among all countries of the world, with emphasis on 
accepting the 1967 [contiguous] borders, and considering it a 
point of consent between all Palestinians.  
10. Focus on phrases and idioms which still have great significance 
in Western thought, such as ‘the right to defend Jerusalem,’ 
‘ethnic cleansing,’ expressions that are related to wars that 
happened in Europe, including the First and Second World War 
and the Bosnian war.  
11. Compare Israel’s crimes with global war crimes and repeatedly 
mention the names of war criminals and the countries in which 
they have been convicted.  
There are a total of 400 staff members at the ASC, the majority of 
who are young men. At the time of this study, only 7 women were 
working in the organisation. These women were working mostly in 
production, and one TV host was a young woman. The ASC is divided 
in 6 main departments: engineering, general programmes, political 
programmes and news, production, administrative affairs, and financial 
affairs. The engineering unit is responsible for all decisions related to 
equipment, network, lighting and filming, SNG and computer networks. 
The general programming department is the main body. It generates 
ideas for programmes, studies them and figures out if they are relevant 
for implementation. The department is in charge of preparation, 
coordination, production, producers, hosts and documentary films 
(Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). The department of political 
programmes and news is responsible for decisions related to the content 
of news programmes, politics, and reporting on negotiations between 
Israel, Fatah and Hamas. It has several sub-units, including for editing, 
the website, a unit for West Bank reporters, for news production and for 
monitoring (Interview, Abu Mohsen, 2013).  
The production unit is divided in two parts: production and graphics, 
the latter being responsible for the use of sound and colour in 
programming. The administrative department is in charge of personnel, 
job descriptions and recruitment, review of work and contracts 
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(Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). The administrative department also 
handles public relations and services, including transport and drivers. 
Not surprisingly, the financial department deals with tenders and bids, 
stores, auditing and cashiers, as well as with managing the ASC’s 
relationship with clients, donors and banks (Aqsa Annual Report, 2013). 
During the 2008-2009 and 2012 Israeli wars on Gaza, the ASC 
performed at full capacity from five different, unknown locations. The 
station tried to make sure there were always 4 staff members – a host, an 
engineer, an editor and a producer – in each of these locations 
(Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). Staff members can be on duty for 24 
continuous hours. When working overnight, staff members stay in the 
same building within each location, for safety reasons. The public was 
puzzled when, after Israeli missiles hit the headquarters of the ASC, and 
other TV channels showed photos of the equipment of the TV station 
burning, the ASC still continued to broadcast. The secret to this was 
their strategy of placing 3 or more broadcasting facilities outside 
headquarters, for use as back-ups during any attack by Israel (Interview: 
Abu Mohsen, 2013). Editors stayed for up to 22 days in one location, 
living there and continuing to broadcast news to the outside world.  
5.3.3 Programming on the ASC  
TV programming comes from an idea or set of ideas combined into one 
format in order to achieve a specific goal – which may be comprised of 
words, sound effects and music, as well as live imagery. The creation of a 
programme begins ideally with the producer hosting a brainstorming 
meeting in which he outlines his thoughts and presents them to the head 
of his unit. Each programme has aims and objectives focused on 
education, politics, culture, entertainment and religion. However, in the 
case of the ASC, whatever meets the objectives and vision of the channel 
is likely to get approval from the management. There are different 
patterns in the ASC’s media production, depending on the nature of the 
programme (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013), as live shows are always 
different from pre-recorded ones and political news productions are very 
different from cultural news productions – each programme has a 
different format, style and structure.  
For the ASC, TV programme planning is essential. The planning is a 
hierarchical process (will be discussed later in this chapter) involving 
leadership at different levels and and a certain flow of information.  The 
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goals of each TV show are gradually met by using all available resources 
and possibilities in the field of logistics, engineering, financial and human 
resources. ASC uses programming cycles (or ‘circles’) by dividing up the 
annual work schedule and spreading it out over circles, each lasting for 
several months – ranging from 3, 4 to even 6 months. The structure of 
these circles is decided upon by regular staff members, who pass on the 
programming plan, or circle, to a higher administrative level. This 
process is lengthier than what we showed earlier for PSC, and according 
to Abu Mohsen (Interview: 2013), involves several more steps:  
 Each head of programme presents his proposals to the overall unit 
chief of programming – as a set of episodes for each intended 
programme planned for production.  
 This unit chief has the responsibility to study such proposals and 
present them to the higher committee of programmes. 
 The committee reviews and discusses the proposals with regard to 
compatibility with channel policy and then either approves them 
(if deemed necessary with suggestions for modifications) or rejects 
them.  
 Each department’s administration then makes decisions with 
regard to the programme’s production, prepares the week’s 
detailed schedule and allocates staff to the various production 
tasks. 
 The coordination unit of ASC is responsible for issuing the 
programme schedule, which is then distributed to all departments.  
The management of programming is considered the heartbeat and 
brain of the organisation planning for most of ASC’s productions. The 
station relies largely on man-in-the-street reactions for the evaluation of 
its programmes. Its research department attempts to measure how much 
impact the programme has had in terms of public rating and discourse. 
Funding for the ASC still lacks official record and no specific 
numbers regarding the general budget are available. However, one fact 
was established through an interview with the head of the Board of the 
ASC (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013). He stated that funding came directly 
from the budget of the Islamic Movement of Hamas, and that there was 
no other (external) funding. The funds available to Hamas go first to its 
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military and then to its media. Al Bardawil (Interview: 2013), head of the 
Board of the ASC, denies any claims that there is funding coming from 
the de facto ministry of information in Gaza or any other external bodies. 
Since the ASC is a medium that carries a public message, private 
sponsorship is unlikely to happen, as is the case for PSC programmes, 
several of which are funded by countries, commercial firms and NGOs, 
as discussed earlier on.  
The ASC’s annual budget, estimated at around $6 million (Abu 
Mohsen, 2013) is largely spent on operational expenses and staff-
members’ salaries – ranging from $350 - $1100 per month for 
production crew (Al Bardawil, 2013). Professional staff is unlikely to opt 
for other jobs, as the work with Hamas requires their exclusive 
commitment. This is seen as a form of loyalty to the Islamic movement 
– viewed by Al Bardawil himself as an added value to the ASC, where 
crew members still loyally work even if they don’t get paid on a regular 
basis. ‘If we want to work in accordance with working criteria, when it 
comes to payment, the ASC will be out of business’ (Interview: Al 
Bardawil, 2013). The ASC’s budget cannot be compared with that of 
much larger media outlets like Al Jazeera, MBC or Al Arabiya, and not 
even with that of most other local, non-factional media outlets.  
When the ASC started, the selection criteria for media crew were 
based on factional affiliation and on media workers’ socialisation and 
attitudes (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Gans 1979; Girlin 1980). Hamas 
membership or supporter status would be expected from staff. However, 
it seems that when the ASC expanded to address global audiences, the 
Board began looking for professional staff from other factions too. Such 
staff is, nevertheless, still controlled by programme heads who remain 
Hamas loyalists. As for the selection of producers, the ASC’s recruitment 
committee hires on the basis of education, personal knowledge of staff 
members, ‘and an ability to pin down the issues of pain’ (Interview: Al 
Bardawil, 2013), and also an ability to structure all aspects of 
programming. After all, the producer, planning producer, and presenter 
work closely together.  
5.4 An Overview of Children’s Programmes 
This section first introduces the structure of the two selected children’s 
programmes, with examples illustrating practice. The main difference 
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between the two children’s programmes is the degree to which they 
entertain. Sesame Street is more entertaining than Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
which tends to adopt a more ‘serious’ approach to education. The 
noticeable gender difference between Burning Brands and Cultural Flashes 
is not evident for the children’s programmes, at least not in the same 
way.  
5.4.1 Structure of the two programmes 
For the media, Palestinian cultural identity has ‘countless ramifications at 
the level of production, first for workers in all aspects of the industry’ 
(D’Acci, 2004:345). For producers, like Abu Shammalah, who found 
themselves living in a political divide, between constant calls for 
Palestinian reunification and fear of the Gaza security apparatus, 
‘Palestinianism’ is the cultural-historical basis for the ASC’s 
programming. From a more materialistic point of view, it is evident that 
Sesame Street had access to much larger budgets for overall production 
than Pioneers of Tomorrow. Hence, a much greater variety of audio-visual 
technologies could be used in Sesame Street, to make the imagery 
appealing to children of all backgrounds. Thus, Sesame Street is relatively 
sophisticated, in terms of puppetry equipment, stage props and 
possibilities of filming outside the studio, when compared to the fixed 
set and limited props of Pioneers of Tomorrow. The following observations 
show this contrast in more detail: 
Budgetary restrictions and religious values combine to influence the 
way the programmes look. The set of Pioneers of Tomorrow does not 
change from episode to episode; it always remains the same. This reflects 
not only the much lower budget available, but probably also the 
‘seriousness’ of the producer’s intentions. Only on one rare occasion did 
Nassur make an outside appearance in Pioneers of Tomorrow, to meet 
hundreds of children at Asda Media Production City, at a site where 
Jewish settlements once stood. Children were celebrating Eid al Fitr, 
following celebrations at the end of the Holy Month of Ramadan. 
Perhaps this explains how and why this rare departure from the fixed 
setting of the studio was authorised and funded.  
Each episode of Sesame Street has a different variety of ingredients 
(with different games, crosswords, short stories, children playing musical 
instruments,) and uses props like seesaws, cameras, soft-toys and live 
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pets or animals. All this, and more, is present in almost every episode of 
this PSC programme. None of this is considered inappropriate for 
children from PSC’s perspective, but some of these forms of educational 
entertainment are viewed as un-Islamic from an ASC point of view. 
However, as content analysis will show, the specific problems of children 
living under occupation are not as fully acknowledged by Sesame Street 
producers.  
 This may be because in 2009-10, the programme had to more or less 
reflect, or could not stray too far away from, the priorities of the 
international donors supporting it. The risk of losing support was always 
present, and soon materialised, when funding was cut for Sesame Street in 
2012. Funding was still frozen at the end of 2015, because of the 
resumption of discussions between the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and 
Hamas. Such constraints on format also influenced the content, 
production themes and values of ASC cultural programmes, compared 
with PSC cultural programmes in Chapter 7. In terms of both content 
and format, even the BBC noticed that when children went for outings 
in PSC’s Sesame Street, they never seemed to come across any checkpoints 
or any signs of the occupation at all (Diab, 2012; Warshel, 2012). In the 
ASC studio, on the other hand, they seem to be constantly confronted 
with the harsh realities outside the studio.  
5.4.2 Comparing context: gender, culture and religion 
In Sesame Street, as Chapter 6 will discuss in more detail, the focus tends 
to be more on children’s entertainment, fun, education and health, as the 
action moves from one scene to another, rapidly moving through the 
dialogue within the studio, for example, to an educational section where 
guest children are suddenly introduced. This also happens in between 
sections of ‘Breaking News,’ introduced by Puppet Haneen, jumping 
from a reminder to children about Tree Day to ‘who is going to win the 
Bon Bon’ (SS11 and SS05).  
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Image 5.1: Sesame Street (SS07) Seesaws of Kareem 
 
 
Image 5.2: Pioneers of Tomorrow (PoT16) discussing friendship 
 
Sesame Street tends to get into several topics directly, without much, if 
any, introduction from the host. It usually starts with Puppet Haneen, 
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who expresses curiosity or wonders about something happening around 
her that she does not understand.  
 In Pioneers of Tomorrow, each episode actually has a different focus, 
though the general tools used are all similar. Sara Barhoum, the young 
TV presenter of Pioneers, opens phone lines for live viewer-participation. 
This often happens at a point in the sketch where Nassour (one of the 
Puppets) makes a mistake, which everyone witnesses on TV. Presenter 
Sara then asks the children a question as to whether what Nassour did 
was right or wrong. For example, on one occasion, he lied to his father, 
saying he did not attend school. Then he faced a problem when his 
parents discovered he slipped and broke his arm near the school 
(PoT13). During the study period, the show triggered phone calls from 
children within Palestine, as well as from people in Algeria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and sometimes even from people in the 
UK. The show focuses mostly on themes of resistance, nationalism and 
religious discourse.  
 Unlike in Sesame Street, where children were introduced to other 
cultures and languages like Chinese (SS06) or the use of scientific 
equipment like microscopes to examine insects (SS21), this kind of 
scientific educational theme was not found in any episode of Pioneers of 
Tomorrow during the period of study. Pioneers of Tomorrow, in contrast, 
tended to use classical Arabic themes throughout.  
 Introductions to books were also used to help viewers extend their 
knowledge of a topic with further reading and learning. For example, in 
one episode (SS06), lessons on planting seeds and beans were offered, 
including plant nutrition (air, water, sun, soil.) The presenters talk with a 
marked local accent when discussing educational issues. Sesame Street 
offers extra ideas and alternatives, like the growth-enhancing effect 
music can have on young plants. Just as in any other country, a central 
element in Sesame Street is learning the basic (Arabic) alphabet, associating 
each letter with common everyday images and phonemic sounds, i.e., ‘S’ 
stands for ‘Sahifa’ Newspaper, or ‘M’ for Saroukh ‘Missile’ (SS17). The 
programme offers viewers lessons on water and energy conservation 
(SS06). However, changes in focus could be seen as a problem when 
values are not connected to, or move away from, the original values, for 
example when advertising education on growing ‘green beans.’ 
 Where Sesame Street uses images and experiences from other nations, 
like a Chinese child writing the alphabet (SS06), Pioneers of Tomorrow has, 
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through its production process, also tried to connect with the outside 
world, in different ways. Pioneers presenter Sara Barhoum, along with 
other children (male and female,) wearing head coverings in the studio, 
started a show by stating ‘how beautiful for a Muslim to meet all those 
he loves, but more beautiful to meet with you my beloved children – 
greetings to Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, Gulf States, Egypt, Libya 
and Sudan’ (PoT03). Then she reminded the children of their 
relationship with Allah through the daily five prayers, memorising the 
Holy Quran, and attending Faith and Quran seminars.  
The puppet Nassur started by welcoming, and reminding children in 
the studio not to forget their prayers/Fajr in the mosque (PoT03). Sara 
followed up by reminding children who watch Pioneers of Tomorrow of the 
need for dignity and hard work in achieving what others may consider 
‘impossible.’ Also, following the steps of Islamic scholars like Al Razi, 
Khowrzmi, Ib Sina (Avicenna) and Al Hassan Al Basri, Nassur moved 
on to say that deep-rooted Islamic civilisation will return and that ‘we are 
going to repeat the meanings of dignity and pride followed by victory.’ 
Puppet Nassour continued with the remark that ‘we will return to Jaffo, 
Akko, Led, Tal el Rabi (Tel Aviv), Al Ramleh and Jerusalem’ (PoT08).  
 Both TV programmes insist on using Palestinian names of cities and 
the language of Arab nationalism, although in Pioneers of Tomorrow this is 
more apparent, and fed by the spirit of religion. Sara continued and 
Puppet Nassour assured the viewers that all Palestinian prisoners will be 
freed from Israeli jails. The discussion included martyrs, who were 
referred to as being ‘more generous than us by sacrificing themselves,’ 
and outlining three options: ‘either you will be the victor, or the injured 
or the martyr – choose which one,’ going on to say that ‘if you don’t 
wish to be any of these three, then jump out of the Pioneers of Tomorrow 
ship… and go to the ship of frustration and defeat’ (PoT07). 
The wording of Pioneers of Tomorrow emphasised national values, with 
Sara telling the Aqsa mosque: ‘don’t be sad, one day we will liberate you 
.’ Puppet Nassour then assured that ‘one day all the children will pray in 
Al Aqsa mosque’ (PoT15). In this same episode, programme host Sara 
took a pause before she offered condolences to the public for one of the 
children - Sheren Al Serhi - a friend of the show who recently deceased 
due to Israel’s ‘banning her from traveling for health care.’ Then 
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gratitude was extended to a female donor in Qatar for offering support 
to the Pioneers of Tomorrow programme.  
With regard to inserting intervals or breaks, Sesame Street does not 
seem to have a policy. Instead, it makes a fairly disorganised transition 
between different sections of the show. Pioneers of Tomorrow, on the other 
hand, for example has short video clip breaks showing a frightened child 
running away from Israeli bombings, among rushing ambulances, 
casualties and people running in panic, and the sound of a child holding 
a small toy singing ‘leave my land, and let me alone with my toy’ 
(PoT19). The same video clip shows houses, mattresses, pillows, rooms 
and furniture that are typical of the ones used by average Palestinians. 
Sesame Street is a bit different here, by showing a lifestyle that is slightly 
westernised (in clothes, living and even having a dog living inside the 
house with a family) (SS05). This kind of thing would never be seen in 
Pioneers of Tomorrow. 
As far as programme discourse is concerned, Sesame Street steers away 
from religion-based content and has very few references to national 
symbols. The programme structure is presented in a way that leaves little 
time for breaks or messages, except for cartoons that pop up in between  
its main section and the section of ‘breaking news’ in which Haneen, for 
example, announces that one of her friends, Majd, who needs dental 
treatment, should not be afraid to face the dental procedure or not to 
fear waking up in darkness (SS15). In Pioneers of Tomorrow, the topic of 
happiness has been associated with doing good work, preparing well for 
exams (Pot05) and having faith in Allah. In contrast, Sesame Street 
portrayed the theme of happiness differently, as shown in one video with 
songs and images of western-looking children playing on the beach with 
mothers wearing bikinis, something which looks pretty foreign even to 
children (SS07). Pioneers of Tomorrow used similar images, but of 
Palestinian children playing on the beach of Gaza (PoT08), and avoids 
the use of western imagery, fashion, or concepts that contradict the 
traditions and religious values of the Palestinian people.  
Pioneers of Tomorrow focuses on talented individuals with ‘creativity,’ 
and brings children into the studio who have something to share. In one 
case, 8-year old Hind shared a powerful song about daily life under the 
occupation. Six-year old Lamees recited by heart the poem ‘Identity 
Card’ by Mahmoud Darwish. She would not have been able to use a tele-
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prompter, the use of which is limited to the presenters of the daily news 
(PoT20).  
5.5 Comparing Cultural Flashes and Burning Brands 
This section will first introduce the structure of each programme, and 
then give some examples of how this works in practice. To sum up on 
cultural programming, both programmes ended up with having poets, 
artists and authors sharing their experiences and works. The main 
difference between them was in terms of the gender participating in 
them, which is discussed in more detail later. There was a noticeable 
gender participation difference between Burning Brands, which relies 
mostly on male experiences, and Cultural Flashes, which engages both 
men and women in a more or less equal fashion. This reflects the 
different internal policies of both TV channels. Both see women as an 
important component of Palestinian society, but whereas in Cultural 
Flashes the decision is made to actively include women in the programme, 
in Burning Brands their role is less direct, and less visible, suggesting that, 
in the latter programme, inclusion of women may be deliberately 
avoided.  
5.5.1 Structure of the two cultural programmes  
The question of national and cultural Palestinian identity has implications 
for producers across the media industry, and cultural programmes are no 
exception to this (D’Acci, 2004:345). The presenters of Cultural Flashes 
operate as a team, together and individually, providing possibilities for 
different sub-components in the programme. Image 3 shows the woman 
presenter of Cultural Flashes with one of her co-hosts. Amani Abu 
Hantash is the permanent face of the programme, a woman presenter 
who appears on her own at times, and, some other times, in 
companionship of a co-host or guest. Budgets do influence production 
styles and – indirectly - the themes addressed, and in the case of cultural 
programming, the difference between the PSC’s programme Cultural 
Flashes and the ASC’s Burning Brands is almost as big as in the case of 
children’s television. The static quality of the ASC’s children’s 
programmes can also be seen in their cultural programme, Burning Brands, 
whose host and presenter, and also producer of the programme, Younies 
Abu Jarad, appears at the centre of the screen. Image 4 shows him 
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appearing in formal dress, in a tranquil setting that looks like a modest 
and serious library, or in a purpose-built studio set. The overall 
impression is that of a scholarly, serious programme, sober and 
reflective, and, indeed, much of the show is taken up by the presenter 
talking directly to the audience. Thus, budgetary restrictions and religious 
values combine to determine what the programmes look like.  
 
 
Image 5.3:  
Amani Abu Hantash (right) and co-host Walid Al Sheikh, Cultural Flashes 
 
 
 
Image 5.4: The Presenter of Burning Brands, Younies Abu Jarad  
 
 As far as the cultural programmes are concerned, it is noticeable that 
many themes are either present in every episode or not present at all. In 
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Cultural Flashes, for example, all episodes feature both cultural and 
political values as a theme. In Burning Brands, cultural and political values 
were also the two most frequently occurring themes, in 62 percent and 
38 percent of the episodes, respectively. This suggests some overlap in 
themes between the PSC and the ASC. Zero content was registered for 
four themes in the ASC’s programme Burning Brands, whereas three 
themes did not appear in the episodes of the PSC’s programme Cultural 
Flashes. For the ASC’s programme, these ‘blind spots’ were religious 
values, citizens’ rights and obligations, educational values and 
entertainment. For the PSC’s programme, the missing themes were 
religious values, citizens’ rights and resistance literature.  
 In Cultural Flashes, unlike in Burning Brands, the themes of educational 
and entertainment values did feature, appearing in 38 and 33 percent of 
the episodes, respectively. The main surprises, which require further 
discussion and some explanation, are probably (i) the non-appearance of 
religious values in ASC’s Burning Brands episodes analysed for content 
values, and (ii) the absence of resistance literature in PSC’s Cultural 
Flashes, contrasting with its appearance in just under one quarter (24 
percent) of the episodes of ASC’s cultural programme Burning Brands. 
Each of these findings is revisited later on in this chapter, which 
considers children’s and cultural programmes from a broader, 
comparative perspective and seeks to explain presence and absence of 
values as identified in the tables presented so far. Each theme is dealt 
with separately, as shown in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6.  
 One of the top cultural programmes of the PSC, Cultural Flashes is, in 
terms of structure, similar in each episode. In general, it breaks down 
into four sections of around the same length, about fifteen minutes each. 
This pattern remained constant over the entire period of study. Cultural 
Flashes starts with Nabd al Balad (‘The Pulse of the Country’). Two young 
presenters, Amani Abu Hantash and Walid Al Sheikh, appear (shown in 
Image 5.3), casually but smartly dressed, and speak in elegant, classical 
Arabic as they begin a review of a range of cultural activities of the 
current week, taking place throughout the occupied Palestinian 
Territories (CF12). They stand in the studio together and present topics 
to the camera, including cultural events such as art exhibitions, music 
concerts and new movies. Occasionally, they show pre-recorded 
interviews done after these events had taken place and ‘vox pop’ random 
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interviews in which people share their - apparently unscripted - views on 
different topics. For example, after Alice in Wonderland, an American 
fantasy movie, was screened during Christmas (CF22), pre-recorded 
interviews, conducted with members of the Palestinian Christian Arab 
community who had watched the film and expressed their views on it, 
were shown. This interactive element is a common feature of the 
programme.  
The second part of the programme is Dot Thaqafa (‘Dot Culture’). 
This is about a range of cultural activities that can be found on-line. This 
section of the programme often starts with some poetry or other 
writings being recited. The presenters (the same young ones as before) 
review websites that carry cultural content. They check Palestinian and 
other Arab websites for news that is of interest in relation to Palestinian 
national culture. For example, a news flash at elalimbaratur.com reflected 
on the anniversary of the death of French novelist and playwright Jean 
Genet, who was praised for his work on bringing French literature to the 
world (CF19 and CF22). When love poems are read out, for example by 
Moroccan or Egyptian poets, the links are also provided in the 
programme, and links to translations – if available - are provided for 
texts in English. Further time may be spent introducing YouTube videos 
of related songs, music, theatre, and other artistry, depending on how 
relevant they are to the theme of that particular show (CF07).  
Fe el Baal (‘In the Mind’), the third part of the programme, involves 
one of the two presenters talking about the biography of a particular 
individual, a cultural figure, celebrity, poet, artist, novelist or musician, 
for example. National novelist and storyteller Mahmoud Shukair was 
invited on the show to talk about his travel, his experiences, and about 
what had shaped his experiences (CF08). This is usually followed by 
short, pre-recorded interviews by the same presenter, with people who 
have been closely associated with the person, and who then share their 
views on that particular person, mentioning his/her position and 
achievements in enriching Palestinian culture. People thus profiled have 
something in common: most of them are dead writers and poets. When 
it comes to interviews, the guests who are invited to comment have no 
specific collective label; they are scholars, journalists and cultural 
administrators of all sorts (CF 03, CF 14 and CF 16).  
In the last section of the show, ‘Reportage,’ the two presenters return 
and present both in-studio interviews and interviews pre-recorded 
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outside the studio, usually with one or more creative figures with 
distinguished cultural achievements in the general field of the arts in 
Palestine. An example was literary critic Dr. Mai Naief, who talked about 
Gaza-born poet Hasseb Al Qadi (CF22). People invited for the 
interviews could include visual artists, literary figures, poets, musicians 
and dancers, or those working in the arts and culture in a more general 
sense. For example, there were the drama teams in Jerusalem, who came 
on the show to talk about their ability to resist Israeli occupation by 
acting in Palestinian drama (CF18). The interviewees are given the 
opportunity to discuss their work and to comment on the origin and 
development of their creative, social and academic self. The show 
concludes with what can be considered a ‘cultural critique’ of the arts 
(CF13).  
In Burning Brands, Younies Abu Jarad, a young poet and TV presenter, 
who is also the producer of the show, appears in formal attire, with tie 
and jacket, in the stage setting of a ‘faux’ library. His language is formal, 
classical Arabic. This show is structured quite differently from its Cultural 
Flashes counterpart. Every week there are new guests, one or two 
professors, poets or writers, to comment on literature, especially 
literature of resistance, whether classical or contemporary, originally 
written in Arabic or translated into Arabic by a Muslim writer. 
Sometimes the individuals or writers who are discussed, or appear 
themselves, are from the Palestinian diaspora. Their aim might be to re-
visit Palestinianism through, for example, poetry. Examples of guests 
invited to the show are: Izz-ddin Al Manasra from Jordan (BB09) and Dr 
Samir Al Omary (BB20), or Arab writers calling for the awakening of 
Arabism, such as Egyptian poet of the South Ahmed Bakheet (BB23), 
Saleem Aladdin of Lebanon (BB16), Mohannad Al Sari of Jordan (BB11) 
and Hassan Al Beidi of Syria (BB7). The programme is usually preceded 
by an advertisement for the military wing of Hamas, for a culture-related 
event, such as Islamic music, or for a documentary, based, for example, 
on the life of a Palestinian martyr shot by Israeli snipers (BB21). Within 
the programme, there is no sub-division into sections; the whole hour is 
in a talk-show format, in which the host plays the pivotal role.  
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5.4.2 The Form of Cultural Flashes, and Burning Brands  
Before we continue in Chapter 6 to analyse content, it is important to 
appreciate the variations in the form of the selected programmes in 
terms of their broad organisation and structure. 
 In Cultural Flashes and Burning Brands, as mentioned before, there is a 
new guest, a professor, a poet, or a writer, every week. Inviting national 
and international figures onto the programme is very much part of 
Burning Brands, which focuses on local and regional artists as sources for 
the value of Arab nationalism and resistance. Cultural Flashes invites 
national and international guests, including American poets like Rita 
Dove, one of the most important Afro-American voices (CF15). She was 
introduced in a way that made viewers understand the significance of the 
Pulitzer Prize in the international arena, and that focused on her form of 
resistance, which is writing about discrimination against black Americans 
on US public transportation. International poet voices are combined 
with Palestinian voices, in Gaza. The presenter, Amani Abu Hantash, 
introduced weblinks offering references to Danish literature, Indian and 
US writers, Dutch poets and Spanish intellectuals. During one report on 
cultural activities, a video-shot of a restaurant where a cultural event – an 
art auction - took place in Jerusalem, was shown – with a bottle of wine 
in clear view (CF17). This kind of secular portrayal, with alcohol on 
display, is absent in ASC’s Burning Brands. 
 The host may begin by – for example - introducing a guest as ‘a 
revolutionary poet in the face of injustice’ (BB15). In a rather long 
‘appetiser’ talk about the guest of the programme – including how he 
stood up against injustice at a time when other intellectuals were silent – 
the Burning Brands presenter introduced an Egyptian poet, Hamed Abu 
Ahmed (BB14) by reading some of his poetry. This poetry praises the 
people of Gaza for their steadfastness under, and resistance against, the 
siege. Another speaker – Abdelrahman Yousef – joined the conversation 
via live-feed screen against a background of Cairo’s crowded streets. The 
poet opened his greeting to the viewers by saying: ‘with your Jihad, you 
are alive, and with our indifference we are dead’ (BB22). The presenter 
offered the guest a chance to describe his 20 years of writing poetry, 
after which the guest began to outline how injustice, oppression and war 
are the seeds which feed a poet ‘bird.’ Burning Brands perhaps appeals 
most to a young generation of intellectuals and artists, who are invited to 
follow the steps taken by the guests – for example when the guest tells 
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that his poetry was inspired by the American invasion of Iraq, in 2003. 
This was a decisive moment in his life, when he decided ‘to shoot all 
bullets from me with whatever weapons available to me’ (BB22) and 
turned his poetry toward politics. When asked whom he aimed to shoot 
these poetic bullets at, the guest replied that his target was the ‘enemies 
of the Ummah, both inside and out.’  
The presenter of Burning Brands asked to what extent the guest was 
able to combine politics with art, by using political satire to express the 
situation in the Arab world, with a specific focus on Arab, Egyptian and 
Palestinian national suffering. The discussion deepened with the 
recitement of some poetry, titled ‘The Enemy says,’ written by the guest, 
and subject to regional critiques. Asked about the motives behind his 
poem, he said that the inspiration came from a text published by Israeli 
newspapers on an ‘expired Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud 
Abbas,’ who delayed in signing parts of agreements and protocols, 
causing him to be rebuffed in public by the then US Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice. The poem said that he had waited too long for the 
PA to deny this news, while it was already reaching the Arab and 
international press, convincing him that this news was accurate (BB22).  
‘The enemy says,  
though the enemy is professional in lies  
since time immemorial 
The enemy says,  
and some of our enemy is a friend of yours,  
without shame 
The enemy says  
that you have signed all documents,  
when you were rebuffed 
The enemy talks like a fox 
and you kept silent,  
and practiced the role of lamb 
 
We have always known you in despair with close brothers,  
but the enemy says  
that you have patience on humiliation  
which is more than the patience of a camel. 
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The enemy says,  
and some of the words of the enemy condemn the victim, 
that you are the best partner for peace’ 
The guest poet goes on to recognise the work of Mahmoud Darwish, but 
admits he did not agree with Darwish’s politics. However, he expresses 
his hope for national reconciliation, just before the Burning Brands host 
announces a break, with continued discussion to follow. The Burning 
Brands interval starts with a camera filming in alleys and tiny roads that 
look like a familiar part of Jerusalem, until the camera reaches the dome 
of the rock, surrounded by people holding Hamas flags on which is 
written: ‘Oh Al Quds, what should I write about your streets, which get 
their lights from our blood.’ There is another short break with footage of 
the United Nations Security Council, as the (Palestinian) speaker asks the 
Council members: ‘how come you are silent? When will the time come 
that you move and feel… my country is suffering the pain, but will 
anyone help?’ This is followed by film footage of dead children, a closed 
Rafah Crossing gate and people running away from their homes, and of 
fighter jets and bulldozers demolishing homes. In contrast, the 3 
intervals during a 4-part Cultural Flashes episode just show a plain blue-
sky background with the programme title on top. Here, the break just 
seems to serve as a rest pause for the viewers. No commercials are 
shown.  
In PSC’s Cultural Flashes, when leading Palestinian figures such as 
author and globetrotter Mahmoud Shukair (CF08) and Sameh Al Qassim 
(CF04) were invited to share their experiences, the host of the show 
reminded them of comparisons and contrasts between Palestinian life 
and life outside Palestine. Shukair highlighted that, while living in Prague, 
he felt close to Jerusalem, but then talked about the ‘faith of fences,’ and 
walls that separate nations, as being impediments to understanding. 
Shukair shared his experience of visiting Berlin for the first time in 1976, 
as the Palestinian representative for a cultural event. He discussed the 
Berlin wall, of which Israel’s separation wall now reminded him. The 
discussion moved quickly from culture to politics, as Shukair mentioned 
a farmer waiting for an Israeli soldier to open the gate so the farmer 
could access his own land. He also mentioned students struggling every 
day to get to and from school safely. The discussion went on to touch on 
Shukair’s theories, ideologies and his view of the world. He explained 
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that, as he matured, he freed himself from some of the mistaken ideas he 
had had before.  
However, his socialist idealism remained unabated in his work, which 
is constantly preoccupied with questions of social justice, and with 
defending people’s interests and their dignity against occupiers and 
colonial greed (CF08). Shukair was given considerable screen-time to 
share his experience of belonging to Palestine. He described how, while 
sitting in a café in Europe, he does not feel as strongly inspired to write 
about the main characters in his short story entitled ‘the daughter of 
Arab town’ as when sitting in a place in his homeland. A stay of 18 years 
in Amman had offered Shukair time to write a bundle of famous short 
stories about women. Many of these stories were inspired by the fact that 
he was in exile in Amman.  
Both Cultural Flashes and Burning Brands share similar in-depth 
interview settings with their guests during the programme. For example, 
Shukair talked about cultural life prior to the establishment of Israel in 
1948, when Palestinian culture was more accessible to the outside world, 
through cultural seminars, concerts, events, all of which suffered from 
the events of 1948 and from the Nakba. Neighbouring cities like 
Baghdad, Cairo and Beirut became leading in Arab culture, while 
Palestine’s role became marginal. He also acknowledged the role that 
Israeli occupation plays in imposing Israeli culture on Palestinians, and 
termed this as a ‘cultural invasion,’ cancelling Palestinian culture and 
identity. Defactionalisation in the content of Cultural Flashes can be seen 
in the overt focus on national agendas and goals, the condemnation of 
the occupation and the call for national unity. For example, this happens 
when a guest like Shukair is asked how much effort the Ministry of 
Culture makes to defend Palestinian culture in the face of Israeli culture. 
Co-presenter Walid Al Sheikh started the next part of the episode 
(CF08) by discussing Palestinian public figures, such as cartoonist Naji 
Al-Ali, who was assassinated in London in 1987. He brought experts 
familiar with his work into the show for an interview. Values like 
resistance are discussed in Cultural Flashes, but are presented more in 
video frames and images than in words. An example is one of Naji Al-
Ali’s cartoons in which Handala is holding a Kalashnikov rifle. His back 
is turned toward the viewer. The expert in the show once asked Naji Al-
Ali why Handala always shows his back in the cartoon, and never his 
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face. Al-Ali explained to him that this posture of Handala was symbolic 
of the fact that all Palestinians are excluded and their basic rights are 
denied. In here lies a distinction between Cultural Flashes and Burning 
Brands. The first tends to use indirect reference to resistance, while the 
second uses every opportunity to praise resistance, in a direct way.  
There are also points of similarity between the two shows. Cultural 
Flashes, like Burning Brands, presents cultural norms and habits that are 
known to almost every Palestinian. These are explained, for example, in 
interviews, so that it becomes clear why people see life in a certain way. 
For example, in Burning Brands, an Egyptian poet, Ahmed Bakheet, is 
asked by the presenter to describe the reasoning and inspiration behind 
his poems on Arab nationalism (BB23).  
Another point of similarity between Burning Brands and Cultural Flashes 
is how they combine the Palestinian cultural scene with the political 
context. For example, Cultural Flashes presenter Amani Abu Hantash 
introduced a report on a man and a woman struggling to retain valid 
Palestinian cultural identity within the controls of the Israeli occupation 
of Jerusalem – some videos showed the 1947 Nakba (catastrophe), the 
Arab refugee camps, Palestinian heritage, Dabka and music. But most 
importantly, the report contained the entire narrative of conflict and 
survival in a city that is witness to all forms of violence and suppression 
(including taxes imposed by Israel on Palestinian cultural organisations 
after Jerusalem was announced as the capital of Arab culture in 2010). 
The content of the programme, although mainly focused on cultural 
activities, cannot help but include how much Palestinian culture is 
hindered by politics and occupation as mentioned in CF11, or by 
absence of the newspapers that were shut down under Israeli 
occupation.  
Both programmes displayed a similar topic in announcing the 
availability of new books on Gaza and the West Bank. Burning Brands also 
covered a media evolution event focused on new media in Palestine, in 
which Islamic figures and scholars, close to the rhetoric of Hamas, 
appeared without any discrimination toward political affiliation. Similar 
to the Lebanese TV of Hezbollah, which held campains to unify the 
Lebanese people in a situation of conflict (Harb, 2011), Burning Brands 
brought the topic of a union for writers, established as an umbrella 
group aiming at reunification of Palestinian intellectuals and artists in 
Palestine and the diaspora. The first speaker in the programme, Dr 
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Atallah Abuelsebah (now former Minister of Justice,) began one of his 
ASC appearances by greeting the Palestinian people on the occasion of 
the second anniversary of Israel’s war on Gaza. He expressed his hopes 
for national unity and some ‘middle way’ (BB19). The emergence of a 
‘unifying’ discourse reflects an acknowledgment of a rise of Fatah-
affiliated authors in a way that is non-threatening to Hamas (Gitlin, 
1980). 
5.6 Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, a broad comparison of elements of programme set-up 
between the ASC and the PSC has been made. The visions and 
constraints implied in specific production decisions will be elaborated in 
more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 deals with children’s 
programmes, in terms of their thematic content, and in Chapter 7 the 
content of episodes of both the ASC’s and PSC’s cultural programmes 
will be considered.  
In line with the main focus of this research, the compromises made in 
production decisions will be analysed further in relation to 
defactionalisation (Chapter 6). Whereas this chapter has dealt mainly 
with producers’ decisions on the programming content, the following 
chapter will build on samples gathered from more detailed content 
analysis and on frequency measurements. The aim is to see how this 
helps us to more fully understand the complex processes involved in 
media defactionalisation.  
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6 ‘Circuits of Media’: Analysing the Content of Children’s Programmes  
 
‘Regardless of the political affiliation of our guests, in children’s … 
programming, we leave it up to our producers to decide, so long as they 
do not give guests the chance to attack Islamic principles - programming 
can be defactionalised as long as it is within acceptable limits’ (Interview: 
Abu Mohsen, ASC, 6 December 2013). 
  
6.1 Introduction 
A key aim of this study is to explain how a number of themes covered by 
selected Palestinian satellite TV programmes, from both the ASC and 
the PSC, can be related to contextual factors that influence the 
production processes of these programmes. One important variable in 
this analysis is the frequency of media messages that are transmitted to 
the public by way of the four selected programmes. This chapter will 
present a more detailed content analysis around key themes, and 
scrutinise the results of that analysis for signs of factionalism and 
defactionalised content. In the analysis, the selected children’s 
programme of the ASC will be compared with that of the PSC.  In 
Chapter 7, a similar thing will be done for the two selected cultural 
programmes. Themes that cover different kinds of values were selected, 
and their choice drew quite extensively on the interviews already 
conducted with media producers in Gaza and West Bank. The overall 
conclusions from this content analysis exercise are presented later in 
Chapter 7.  
As explained in Chapters 1 and 3, the main themes selected with field 
supervisors for the content analysis are: nationalism, resistance, citizens’ 
rights, religious values, cultural values, social values, political values, 
educational values and entertainment; nine in total. The incidence of 
these themes is first identified and then related to how media 
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factionalism may have started to be overcome in practice, in the 
programming of both the ASC and the PSC. As explained in Chapter 5, 
this chapter and Chapter 7 continue to deal with the second central 
research question, which is about the most frequently present – and 
most absent – among the themes used in the analysis of the content of 
children’s and cultural programmes. D’Acci’s ‘circuits of media’ 
framework is used once more, and tables of the results of the detailed 
content analysis are presented. Each theme is analysed in terms of its 
frequency of appearance within the various episodes of the selected 
programmes (for Tables of the results for all 4 programmes see 
Appendix 6). The emphasis in this chapter is on placing the broad 
content of the programmes within the wider context of media 
production, and show how the ‘defactionalised’ political climate in 
Palestine has influenced media producers’ decisions.  
As explained in Chapters 1 and 3, a total of 88 television episodes 
were viewed several times, and then finally analysed in terms of content 
along thematic lines (Episodes: 23 of Sesame Street, 23 of Pioneers of 
Tomorrow, 21 of Cultural Flashes and 21 of Burning Brands.) This viewing 
required detailed note taking on the contents of each episode, viewed 
over several weeks. Content analysis was then supplemented by 
interviews with the key producers of the satellite TV’s children’s and 
cultural programmes.  
Answering the questions as outlined has required a focus on the 
thematic content analysis, especially around frequencies of selected 
themes related to different sets of values (see Chapter 1.7 and Chapter 
3.4). At the end of the chapter, we return to Gans’s and Gitlin’s 
approach to the analysis of media content, and pick up again, from 
Chapter 3.6, the five key influences on media producers and, hence, also 
on programme and episode content. These include attitudinal and 
personal influences, as well as institutional, political and ideological 
influences. This chapter deals mainly with content-related themes central 
to defactionalisation. However, it is important to first mention how 
production is organised in both the PSC and the ASC. In this way, the 
results of the specific thematic content analysis can be linked back to the 
broader theoretical concerns of the study, towards the end of the 
chapter. The results of the content analysis are presented in a series of 
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tables, the most important of which are presented in the text, while the 
others are placed in Appendix 6.  
6.2 Themes in PSC’s & ASC’s Children’s Programme 
Content  
In this long section of the chapter, the themed media content of the four 
selected programmes is first presented and discussed in the form of 
frequency-of-(theme-) occurrence tables. For each of the four 
programmes, this part of the chapter will provide an overview, followed 
by a deeper analysis around each theme. Each programme is considered 
separately first, followed by an overall synthesis. Each theme around a 
specific set of values is considered in turn, first for the two children’s 
programmes and then for the two cultural programmes. This 
comparative analysis will later help in understanding how and to what 
extent a programme is factional in content. When discussing individual 
examples of programme production, connections will be made with the 
factors mentioned earlier, namely cultural artifacts, production processes 
and the broader socio-historical context. The aim is to highlight the most 
prominent and the least apparent themes, in terms of their frequency of 
occurrence, over the observed period of March 2009 to January 2010.  
 In relation to the two children’s programmes, Sesame Street and Pioneers 
of Tomorrow, the two tables below show that educational values are the 
most frequently occurring themes, in both programmes. They can be 
viewed in relation to Tables 10 and 28 (Appendix 6), presented earlier in 
this study, which showed the overall frequency of themes across all the 
ASC’s and PSC’s programmes, and was accompanied by a justification of 
the process of theme selection. The educational values theme appears in 
100 percent of the Sesame episodes and 87 percent of the Pioneers 
episodes. However, there is a marked difference between the two 
programmes in terms of how important the theme of ‘entertainment’ is. 
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Table 6.1  
Themes in Pioneers of Tomorrow in order of frequency (23 episodes) 
Category 
No  
(%) 
Yes  
(%) 
Educational values 13 87 
Social values 48 52 
Religious values 69.5 30.5 
Nationalism and National Discourse 82.5 17.5 
Entertainment 82.5 17.5 
Resistance and Resistance Literature 91 9 
Citizens’ Rights and Obligations 100    - 
Cultural values 100    - 
Political values 100    -  
 
Table 6.2 
Themes in Sesame Street in order of frequency (23 episodes)  
Category 
No 
(%) 
Yes 
(%) 
Educational values  100 
Entertainment  100 
Social values 48 52 
Nationalism and National Discourse 87 13 
Cultural values 91 9 
Religious values 96 4 
Citizens’ Rights and Obligations 100  
Resistance and Resistance Literature 100  
Political values 100  
 
Whereas education is a theme in every single Sesame Street episode, it 
appears in less than one fifth of the episodes of Pioneers. This indicates a 
significant difference between the ASC and the PSC in terms of how 
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children’s programmes are produced (see also Appendix 6). This contrast 
is discussed later in this chapter.  
6.3 Thematic Content of the Children’s Programmes  
Considering how the Palestinian Satellite Channel (PSC) and the Al Aqsa 
Satellite Channel (ASC) communicate around the identified themes in 
relation to values within children’s programme content, is a useful 
exercise. It may indicate to what extent satellite TV content in these 
children’s programmes can be considered as polarising and factional, or, 
on the contrary, as “defactionalised”, within the research period of 
March 2009 to January 2010. For each theme, the frequency of 
appearance is now analysed. After that, the overall findings are theorised 
in a sub-section, before the chapter moves on to consider the occurrence 
of the same themes in ASC and PSC cultural programmes.  
6.3.1 Nationalism and national discourse  
In both ASC and PSC programmes, the theme of nationalism appears in 
the form of occasional references to Palestinian villages attacked, 
destroyed and occupied by Israel since 1947, and in the form of 
references to the right to return of refugees. Despite the quite broad 
definition of nationalism, this theme hardly appeared in the episodes of 
either children’s programme, as Tables 10 and 28 (Appendix 6) show. In 
Pioneers of Tomorrow, just under one fifth (17.5%) of all episodes focused 
on themes around nationalism. Slightly fewer (13%) of the Sesame Street 
episodes explicitly referred to nationalist values. Both figures are low, 
however, and the difference between them is relatively minor, suggesting 
that both programmes were fairly depoliticised. As Tables 10 and 28 
indicate, the programmes focus very strongly on education and, in the 
case of the PSC, also on entertainment. In the section below an effort is 
made to explore why this lack of nationalist content occurs, and what 
this means.  
The appearance of nationalism as a theme in content can be 
interpreted as an indication of the demise of factionalism among political 
parties in Palestine. Thus, when children in Pioneers of Tomorrow use in-
studio songs, such as ‘Returning to my homeland … to the green land I 
am returning’ (PoT19), it emphasises what Palestinians have in common; 
it does not refer to just one part of Palestine, or to one set of political 
 ‘Circuits of Media’: Analysing the Content of Children’s Programs 175 
 
 
leaders in one part, but to all of Palestine and its people and (former) 
territory. The producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow, through Sara’s scripted 
words, also reminded their audience of the anticipated, eventual return to 
Al Quds, and of a future in which Palestinians will be able to pray freely 
in the Al Aqsa mosque. As Sara said: ‘we remind you. We are the 
pioneers who will liberate Al-Aqsa and prisoners…’ Then Nassur 
interrupted with the statement that ‘this call is not only for children of 
Palestine, but for all Arab children… I will fly to Al Quds on this carpet, 
but you need to promise me that you will teach the children about Al 
Quds’ (PoT15). The children were then told that each time they hear the 
daily call for the Adhan prayers, ‘Rise up for success … Rise up for 
salvation,’ they should think about their eventual return to their 
homeland (PoT03).  
In the PSC’s Sesame Street, nationalism and national discourse were not 
quite as apparent as in Pioneers of Tomorrow. The PSC’s relevant 
background images included both churches and mosques. The ASC used 
only mosques as symbols of religious and cultural values. Images from 
actual Palestinian homes were also occasionally used by both channels in 
their children’s programmes. During the specific period of the study, in 
both programmes, dialogues referred to traditional clothing, culture and 
recipes, endorsing themes of nationalism and nationalist discourse.  
In episode 20 of Pioneers of Tomorrow, entitled ‘The love of 
nationhood,’ the light-brown puppet Nassur said to child-host Sara and 
ten other children in the studio: ‘Our beloved children, we remind you of 
Jaffa, Akko, Tal Al Rabi (Tel Aviv), Lid and Ramla and the rest of the 
towns that are occupied by the Zionists’ (PoT20). While saying this, the 
puppet bit his fingers anxiously. The reference here was to names of pre-
occupation Palestinian villages and cities, unlikely to be known to some 
of the younger children who watched the programme. The Palestinian 
names of these towns were certainly familiar to the well-informed and 
articulate girl child-host Sara, in Pioneers of Tomorrow, who spoke with self-
confidence when expressing earlier: ‘We will liberate Al Quds and 
prisoners’ (PoT15). The producers of the programme had the puppet 
Nassur make a statement that enabled Sarah to respond with an overtly 
political statement about the nation. Nassur whispered in Sara’s ear his 
desire to migrate and leave Palestine. ‘Where to?’ asked Sara. After 
outlining the reasons why he wanted to leave, including the Israeli 
176 CHAPTER 6 
blockade, the destruction of the area around his home, and his miserable 
existence amidst the killings in Gaza, Nassur stated that he was tired of 
this life and wanted to leave the Gaza Strip. Sara then started to correct 
him, emphasising that ‘the Zionists have us like a ring on their finger,’ 
which refers to the overbearing control of Israel. Sara told Nassur that 
‘we are the generation of Pioneers of Tomorrow, and must hold on tightly to 
our land, our nation, our faith, and our love for our homeland will make 
us hold on more tightly to it’ (PoT20).  
In the same episode, Pioneers of Tomorrow presented a children’s story 
of an old, bony horse enjoying a peaceful life in his garden, and a 
younger one deciding to go and live somewhere else. The mother horse 
did not want the young horse to go and cried, but followed her son 
nevertheless. They soon felt sad and miserable and could not handle life 
away from their home and garden. The producers used this imagery to 
strengthen feelings of national belonging, and plant in children’s minds 
the idea that leaving their ancestral homeland would cause them to face 
all kinds of difficulties in a land where they would not fully belong. 
Without their national identity, ‘no one allows them to stay’ or makes 
them feel welcome. This rhetorical story summarises the plight of 
Palestinian refugees in other Arab states and in Europe. The story 
delivered the message that leaving one’s homeland is never a solution to 
one’s status as a victim, whatever the living conditions are, at home or in 
exile. Sara concluded that ‘the one who leaves his nation will live as a 
stranger.’  
One PSC Sesame Street episode (SS04) introduced a child who referred 
to another child whose father was in prison. Unlike what was said in the 
conversation between Sara and Nassur in the ASC programme, in this 
case there was no further discussion on which prison the father was in, 
or why the father was there. The child was allowed to express how much 
he missed his father and the conversation then simply shifted to another 
topic. This appears to be a form of compromise, which the PSC has 
made to avoid content that becomes purely political in its values, perhaps 
in response to suggestions from editors or funders. One cannot assume 
that such compromises occur by themselves without competing forces 
influencing them. According to field producer Abu Shammalah: ‘After 
all, we wish to produce our episodes in specific ways, but there are 
factors that do not enable us to do exactly what we want, so we are 
subjected to external factors’ (Interview: Abu Shammalah, 2013).  
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Both the ASC’s and the PSC’s children programme showed quite a 
low frequency for nationalism and national discourse. This suggests that 
compromises and avoidance of political values are things that are shared 
by both TV satellite channels. In Sesame Street, for example, there was one 
episode (SS14) that featured the appearance of a child, Noureldeen, who 
took children from the show to see his city, Jerusalem. When they passed 
by the Dome of the Rock, a clear example of a prominent national and 
iconic cultural artifact and a symbol of religious resistance, the dialogue 
did not have an overly political or national flavour. Noureldeen 
introduced the streets of the old city by saying: ‘This is my house, it is 
500 years old.’ The children then all moved on to the market to buy 
labneh, olive oil and thyme. These locally produced foods are also 
cultural artifacts in which Palestinians take national pride, like the sesame 
bread of Jerusalem. However, when the child talked about danger, he 
referred to the traffic and the possibility of being run over. He did not 
talk of the violence of settlers, of forced evacuations of Palestinians from 
their homes by Israeli forces or of any of the other, more political, 
dangers to Palestinians and their sense of national belonging.  
The lack of Palestinian nationalist values (and concepts) in the PSC’s 
Sesame Street it is significant, surely given the fact that the programme was 
almost entirely funded from the US, from 2008 until 2012. It suggests 
that USAID, through its funding for Sesame Street, supported the 
depoliticisation of children’s programmes, countering the more explicit 
political line of Hamas’s children’s TV programmes, especially Pioneers of 
Tomorrow. Although production took place in Palestine, the producers 
were limited with respect to what they could show or say.  
When the low frequency results for nationalist discourse were shared 
with the Head of Programming at the PSC, Al Shafi, he was surprised. 
He suggested that perhaps the lack of a nationalistic perspective or 
emphasis should be considered ‘a default,’ something to be remedied in 
the PSC’s programming in the future (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). He 
admitted, however, that for the PSC’s programming any direct 
mentioning of nationalism or national discourse is viewed as being 
political and therefore tends to be avoided (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). Al 
Shafi also speculated that the production team may make a conscious 
decision to try and avoid the topic of nationalism, as talk about this topic 
will result in very different understandings of what ‘nationalism’ really 
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means, whether a form of mixed secular nationalism or another variant 
of nationalism with an Islamic flavour.  
This difficulty of handling nationalist values does not help the cause 
of defactionalisation, because the focus is on avoiding all political values, 
including the Israeli occupation itself. Al Shafi suggested that the 
producers may have been mistaken in not dealing with vital thematic 
content like national identity and Palestinians’ sense of belonging. ‘We 
have no problem in involving children in the idea of nationhood, 
Jerusalem, Palestine, and all the nationalistic ideas that we were raised 
on,’ he insisted (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). 
What was interesting in the ASC’s broadcasting was that, whilst 
nationalist content was mostly missing from episodes of children’s 
programmes, it emerged quite consistently during breaks. It was 
observed that national values and anthems were present in 87% of the 
breaks (see the disruption in episode 06 in Appendix 6). Songs relating to 
nationalism and nationhood were introduced with a lead-in video of an 
elderly man stating: ‘I swear to God, if you were to give me all the 
world’s palaces instead of my home, I would not accept it,’ while he 
showed documents proving ownership of his home, that was occupied in 
1948, when Israel declared itself a state (PoT21).  
In the ASC programme, the discussion was not confined to the 
studio, but started to reach further afield, as when Sara took the first call 
from a child of Palestinian origin, living in the United Arab Emirates, 
who emphasised that she wanted to come back, with her entire family, to 
settle in Palestine. National discourse was present in the support for 
Palestinian resilience and a commitment to stay in Palestine, as a means 
to reinforce the right of return of millions of Palestinian refugees. In this 
context, the producers focused on shaming the Puppet Nassur who 
expressed his wish to leave Gaza (PoT 20).  
One original feature of PSC children’s programming are the phone-
ins by children from inside and outside Palestine. Whenever children 
either appear as guests or phone into Pioneers of Tomorrow, they are asked 
which village in Palestine their family comes from. Guests in Sesame Street 
rarely get this question. This suggests that in relation to the research 
questions outlined at the start, nationalism and national discourse have 
tended to be more closely associated with ASC than with PSC during the 
period under observation. The emphasis on nationalism is not strong in 
either case, however, and this may be because of various forms of 
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compromise on the part of media producers, who wish to avoid being 
accused by Israel and Western countries of ‘teaching children to hate’ 
(Jüntzel, 2008).  
Another episode (PoT19) of Pioneers of Tomorrow focused on the 
history of the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1947-8 and referred to Palestinian 
cities that ‘will not be forgotten,’ according to Sara, who presented a 
show marking the 61st anniversary of the Nakba. The narrative is 
unsurprising, given Hamas’s adherence to the principle of never 
exchanging land, and of never encouraging Palestinians to abandon their 
home and ancestral property. National discourse is also demonstrated by 
the loyalty shown by children toward the cause of Palestine. For 
example, one five-year old child, named Omar, called in from Saudi 
Arabia to say he had learned to love Palestine through Pioneers of 
Tomorrow and that he was waiting for the day his family would return to 
Palestine (PoT21). Whether he was coached to say this is not clear. The 
main point is that his comment was included in the programme. It was 
found that, during the selected period of analysis, Pioneers of Tomorrow 
producers tended to focus mostly on nationalism, and much less (than 
during the period before this research) on squabbling with rival Fatah. 
As explained before, even if more widely definined, nationalism is not as 
evident in the content as might be expected. This may be because of a 
decision to avoid touching on issues around ‘factionalism.’ The moment 
producers talk about ‘nationalism’ it is natural that they want to present 
their vision and perspective on what nationalism means. The PSC always 
uses the Palestinian Kuffiyeh (head scarf of the former Palestinian 
president) as the key symbol of nationalism ‘…and an important 
component of Palestinian culture,’ as the presenter of the PSC’s cultural 
programme said (CF01). The ASC does not use this scarf to represent 
the Palestinian nation, and prefers to have Hamas’s green flag always 
present and visible. In ASC ‘s children’s programming there seems to be 
more emphasis than is the case in PSC’s children’s programming on the 
Palestinian cause in general and the consequent ‘fears for our precious 
nation,’ as articulated by the puppet Nassur (episode PoT21).  
The producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow seem to have decided to test 
children calling in from abroad to express their loyalty to Palestine. Far 
from reassuring and endorsing their views, the puppet Nassur challenged 
those who said they wanted to return, for example, by saying: ‘But we 
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have destruction in Palestine!’ This provoked debate, in which the 
producers maintained the principle of nationalism by connecting it to the 
villages from where the telephoning children’s families originated. So, 
even though the children were too young to remember, or had never 
seen, their ancestral home, this was a method of linking them to their 
ancestral roots and pride of heritage. Clearly, this method was used to 
make them aware of their ancestral heritage, regardless of their present 
whereabouts, be it the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Hebron, 
Khan Younies, the Sultanate of Oman or Gaza City. In some ways, 
therefore, despite its lower budget, Pioneers of Tomorrow is more accessible 
and even more ‘democratic’ in its production process than Sesame Street, 
which is not open to live phone-ins from children viewing the 
programme.  
In Pioneers, the puppet Nassur then confided his mistake, saying he 
too preferred to stay, after hearing the children call in from outside, 
saying how much they would like to be in Palestine and the extent to 
which they felt that they belonged there. During the episode mentioned, 
puppet Nassur did not allow participants to step outside the topic 
discussed, even though children might often switch rapidly from one 
topic to another. The conversation stuck to the expression of love for 
Palestine and the refusal to migrate abroad (PoT20 and PoT21).  
In Sesame Street’s programming content, this kind of nationalist loyalty, 
in terms of sentiment, is complemented by another form of loyalty that 
consists of various types of artifacts and loyalties to Palestinians’ national 
heritage. The importance of national artifacts and the Palestinian socio-
historical context as influences on the PSC’s media production decisions 
about content was notable in Sesame Street in the period under review. 
Firstly, two puppets, Haneen and Karim, were shown playing Palestinian 
scouts, demonstrating the first kind of nationalism through proud 
identification with historical Palestine (SS20). Secondly, Aya, a small 
Palestinian girl from the West Bank, was shown learning traditional 
Palestinian embroidery through a dialogue with her grandmother. The 
two discussed styles and colours and the girl wore a small thobe (an item 
of national dress) made by her grandmother (SS15). This encouraged 
children to proudly wear national dress and not see it as old-fashioned or 
only meant for elders. Another episode taught children to take pride in 
national recipes and cooking, such as homemade desserts made of grapes 
pressed against stones and rocks from the mountains, a process that 
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imparts a traditional, special taste to the resulting juice. These ideas were 
presented with children wearing traditional national costumes. As already 
noted, these kinds of folkloric garments are much more associated with 
the nationalism of Fatah than with that of Hamas, which shows no 
special attachment to such traditional clothing.  
It does seem that restrictions demanded by donors influenced the 
silencing of nationalist discourse as a theme in PSC’s children’s 
programming. For example, in episode 06 of Sesame Street, when puppet 
Haneen came in with breaking news, he introduced five-year old Basil 
who had a ‘document, declaring independence’ (SS06). The term was 
taken out of its political context, and the episode was screened after 
President Arafat had presented the issue of independence to the United 
Nations General Assembly, and had, in resolution 43/177, gained 144 
votes in favour of Palestinian independence (Boyle, 2013). In this 
context, the term ‘independence’ was mentioned with reference to Basil, 
but confined to him being able to brush his own teeth and wash his own 
dishes.  
This was followed, however, by a scene in which Basil was in his 
parent’s arms, waving a Palestinian flag. No direct reference was made to 
what had happened in the United Nations, although one could hardly 
avoid the suggestion that independence was not only an issue for Basil, 
as anthems were playing in the background, indicating Palestine. The 
producers were clearly avoiding direct verbal references to what was very 
clearly on their minds. However, in Sesame Street episode 11, producers 
decided to show a disabled Palestinian child flying a kite that was made 
out of the colours of the Palestinian flag (SS11). For Sayeigh (Interview: 
2013), this was a conscious decision to integrate disabled children into 
the show.  
This is a clear example of defactionalisation, where the PSC’s 
producers, without directly blaming Israel, subtly pointed to the 
Declaration of Independence in a way that only adults could be expected 
to understand the significance of. The document of ‘independence’ is a 
major and iconic cultural artifact, as well as a symbol of the diplomatic 
struggles for international recognition of Palestinian statehood and 
nationhood (Palestinian National Council, 1988). Thus, although 
nationalist content was muted, the story lines in Sesame Street could be 
connected with the general efforts which the PA/Fatah were 
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undertaking at that time for recognition of statehood at the UN level. 
The compromise that was made here was an uneasy one. The PSC 
shifted from being a station that used to broadcast images of children 
throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, as a form of resistance to occupation, 
to being a station that made happy, peaceful children’s programmes. The 
struggles of nationalism were confined to a few indirect hints and 
references to the programme’s political surroundings, but always without 
appearing too aggressively nationalistic. 
Compared with ASC, the PSC worked with a different sense of 
Palestinian national imagery. For example, non-veiled women were 
frequently depicted, both with and without children. Yet, the B-roll film 
shots from the past were not given any context, which reduced their 
direct link with Palestinians’ identities and places. The closest indicator 
of nationalism was a quick video shot of the Palestinian flag and map in 
the background, during a children’s song applauding the importance of 
friendship in two episodes (SS11 and SS05).  
Palestine was also mentioned on a few occasions, such as when a 
child listener, Zyad Farah, from Deir el Balah in Gaza, was introduced. 
He was the Palestinian junior jumping champion, and at the end of the 
programme, Palestine was mentioned in the form of a local postal box 
address, where at that time children could send letters to Sesame Street 
(SS18). Despite the fact that the programme’s introductory song started 
with ‘Simsim our street, Simsim our neighbourhood, come visit our 
street and our neighbourhood,’ there was no reference to where these 
fantasy streets or neighbourhoods were actually located. All the children 
who appeared in the programme came from elite schools and families. 
They formed a strange contrast with the children, shown, in one episode, 
in the audience, who were wearing UNRWA school uniforms that 
marked them as refugees living on aid supplied by international aid 
agencies (SS23).  
Despite the fact that incidents with regard to nationalism values were 
not mentioned much in the analysed programmes, the researcher found 
it interesting to explore the references to nationalism, as this is a crucial 
point of departure for both the PSC and the ASC in the 
defactionalisation of media content. Both media outlets claim to stick to 
national agendas, and to avoid factional agendas.  
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6.3.2 Religious values  
As shown in Tables 10 and 28 (Appendix 6), religious values appeared in 
just under one third (30.5%) of the 23 episodes of the ASC’s Pioneers of 
Tomorrow that were analysed during the study period. This indicates a 
moderate focus on religious values within the episodes that were 
broadcast at that time. Over the same period, religious values appeared 
in just one of the 23 episodes of the PSC’s Sesame Street. The ASC’s 
higher level of content on religious values is understandable, given that 
Hamas claims to be ‘Islamist’ in orientation. Indeed, one would expect 
religious values to feature in more than a third of all episodes. During the 
research, this relatively low representation of religious values in thematic 
content was presented to the head of programming at the ASC. He 
found the results rather troubling since they implied that most content 
was secular in terms of themes handled. Compared to Sesame Street, 
however, the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow appears relatively strong on 
religious values. About half of all the religious content consisted of the 
use of Quranic verses, which the presenter Sara tended to quote in 
support of her arguments. In support of children during Ramadan, Sara 
said: ‘We want all of us to read the Holy Quran during Ramadan and 
there are some people who have read it twice and three times in a 
month’ (PoT04). She also informed the children that they should attend 
the five daily prayers at the mosque. Similarly, she reminded them that 
honouring one’s parents and demonstrating integrity and honesty in 
one’s actions are part of a religious duty for all Muslims (PoT23).  
It may seem surprising that even one Sesame Street episode carried a 
religious message. However, references to religious values in Sesame Street 
came in the quite different form of introducing a character’s 
neighbourhood, in Jerusalem. In one episode, a Palestinian boy pointed 
to the Church of the Resurrection as an important holy site for 
Christians. He then pointed to the Al Aqsa mosque as being a holy place 
for Muslims (SS14). In contrast with this (rare) pointing to religious 
places, in Pioneers of Tomorrow these holy sites were presented much more 
explicitly as ‘prisoners,’ symbols of occupation in the hands of Israel, and 
as areas which should be freed. ‘We will remain, we will remain, we will 
remain as much as the thyme and olive remain…,’ Sara said in PoT15.  
In Sesame Street, both content and production are less controversial 
than in Pioneers of Tomorrow. The PSC’s children’s programmes refer to a 
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multi-cultural reality that is close to the dominant ideology of the PA and 
Fatah. Whereas the media producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow appear to 
have made a deliberate decision to engage, to some extent, in religious 
values, the producers of Sesame Street appear to have decided not to do 
so. For instance, in the ASC’s programmes, children were explicitly 
urged to read and memorize the Quran (the Holy Book). For example, 
one participant contributed to the show by citing Quran verses from 
Surat Al Shajar (“The Trees”) (PoT02) and the Hadith (“The Sayings of 
the Prophet Mohammed”). These texts were said to give examples of 
how children need to be honest, and also take responsibility for the well-
being of the natural environment. The names of Islamic messengers and 
ancestors were presented as being the mentors and pioneers for 
Palestinian children to follow. ASC children’s programme relied on the 
sayings of the Prophet Mohammed in around one tenth of the episodes 
observed. Usually, such Hadith were referred to in passing, to support 
values and arguments about people, family and environment, that affect 
children. ‘Prophet Mohammed, Peace be Upon Him, said, Allah is clean 
and likes cleanness, he is generous and likes generosity’ (PoT02). In one 
episode of Pioneers of Tomorrow, the significance of Eid al Adha was 
reflected upon, followed by attention to the annual Hajj/pilgrimage 
when approximately 5 million Muslims travel to Mecca for rites of 
worship: ‘We love this Eid more than Eid Al Fitr as we slaughter a 
sheep’ (PoT02). This children’s education included the relevance and 
importance of sacrificing animals at Eid Al Adha, distributing the meat 
and offering Zakat (charity or alms) to poor people, during the holy 
month of Ramadan. On other occasions, the topics delved deeper into 
lessons on the migration of Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina, 
as mentioned in the same episode (PoT02). 
During sessions of Pioneers of Tomorrow, sometimes cartoons were 
shown of a small child helping his sick mother by bringing her drink 
water and medicine. This represented an extra responsibility for the 
child, but it was stressed that his kindness was appreciated; the mother 
replied, saying: ‘May God bless and reward you’ (PoT17). This kind of 
additional responsibility of children, rooted in religious values, was not 
present in Sesame Street, where there was no thematic use of the Hadith 
and the emphasis was on a happy childhood, largely free of 
responsibilities. Some of the reasons for this contrast relate to the 
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different ideas of Hamas and the PA/Fatah on the role of religion in 
children’s lives.  
It is also worth mentioning that the PSC producer of Sesame Street 
herself is a Christian and quite secular in her views (field notes, 
December 9, 2013). This may result in an increased tendency not to 
focus upon religious values in the programme. At ASC, however, 
religious beliefs are explicitly core to the values of the production team; 
the producer himself was raised within a predominantly Islamic society 
and is proud of his commitment to regular prayers at the mosque 
(Interview: Al Amriti, 2013).  
To highlight the contrast between the two approaches, one religious 
and the other more secular, Al Shafi, head of PSC’s programming in 
Gaza (Interview: 2013), admitted in an interview that more direct 
religious content could potentially appeal to new children not previously 
attracted to Sesame Street. He said: ‘Avoiding religious terms in a religious 
society is not the right way to go, if we want to attract new children to 
our programmes’ (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). An interesting observation 
was made with regard to the values of courtesy. In Sesame Street, the 
behaviour of the puppets suggested that one could visit neighbours and 
friends at any time, without giving advance notice or being invited. There 
were no restrictions, and it was not seen as rude to simply ‘drop in’ on 
your hosts (SS13).  
Courteous behaviour is the responsibility of the visited, but not 
necessarily of the visitors. In contrast, in the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
the Quran was used as an explicit guide for good behaviour. Children 
were advised that visitors arriving in a household should respect the 
convenience of the hosts, and should consider returning later, at an 
agreed time, if that would be more convenient for the hosts (PoT16). 
This may seem a like minor point, but it does show how religious values 
can be translated into educational messages and how secularism can 
imply different ways of behaving. Cultural norms should not be taken 
for granted in either sense.  
6.3.3 Citizens’ rights  
The content analysis showed that both the PSC and the ASC had a zero 
frequency-of-occurrence with regard to coverage of the theme of 
citizens’ rights and obligations (see Appendix 6, Tables 10 and 28). 
186 CHAPTER 6 
Perhaps it is not that surprising that talk of rights is negligible or non-
existent in children’s programmes since, even for adults, rights 
frameworks are not commonly discussed in the Palestinian media (Allen, 
2013). 
In interviews, it was suggested by producers that this absence of the 
theme of citizens’ rights might have resulted from a miscommunication 
between producers planning their programme and the production 
executives responsible for reviewing the final programme in order to 
meet the needs of the intended audience. This kind of explanation 
offered by the producers seems a little unconvincing.  Indeed, as Allen 
(2013) has suggested, talk about rights is hardly ever taken seriously in 
the local Palestinian context and tends to be met with scepticism. The 
term ‘human rights’ has become almost a joke in Gaza in particular, to a 
point that when the term ‘children’s rights’ is used, people will tend to 
ask sarcastically what children’s rights mean if children are maimed and 
killed by missiles. This scepticism, which the researcher noticed in many 
conversations with media producers, is also something mentioned in a 
recent study on the question of human rights in Palestine (Allen, 2013).  
In interviews, producers of both the ASC and the PSC expressed the 
view that the lack of any explicit reference to citizenship rights, especially 
those of children, was an error that should be amended in the future. 
Their insistence on this point was not entirely convincing, however, 
given the lack of belief in the ability of human rights to make a 
difference in the specific context of occupation in Palestine (Allen, 
2013). This strengthens the view that producers are part of a wider 
community affected by a deteriorating level of human rights, and that 
discussing these rights publicly in the media would not bring about much 
change.  
Strangely, animal rights are given somewhat more attention than 
children’s rights, as a theme. For example, in Sesame Street (SS05), 
producers focused on animal/pet care and physical interaction with pets 
through play. By contrast, in Pioneers of Tomorrow, the producer’s ideology 
does not advocate direct physical contact with dogs, besides general 
kindness, due to the fact that, in some Islamic teaching, dogs are 
considered dirty animals and even haram, so that close contact with them 
should be avoided. There was one mention in Pioneers of Tomorrow of 
being good to animals, in this case bees, which are needed for pollination 
purposes (PoT17). One Sesame Street episode, on the other hand, had a 
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story about a West Bank boy, Hamza Motasem, who cared for three 
dogs. The message in the episode was that children should have a caring 
and responsible attitude, and properly look after their domestic animals. 
According to Hamza:  
‘I like to keep my dogs clean, exactly like human beings, that’s why I give 
them a bath. Every day in the morning before going to school I offer them 
food and water and when I am back I feed them, play with them and go 
for a walk with them. My father has made a special house for them to 
sleep in at night. I love all my dogs, but Roy is my favourite friend… my 
brother also loves cats, and animals are an important part of the family 
that we should take good care of’ (SS05).  
No similar mention is made in any episode of adults’ obligations to 
protect their children’s rights, or, indeed, of Israel’s responsibilities and 
obligation to care for children under occupation. Perhaps producers did 
not overtly address the theme of citizens’ rights because that would be 
seen as political or confrontational. Alternatively, this theme may simply 
not be seen as relevant to the lives of many children living under military 
occupation. Through indirect means, however, and through the 
metaphors found in children’s literature and in hadith about social and 
family responsibilities, children are reminded in the programmes, 
especially in the ASC programme, of their civic duties as members, albeit 
younger members, of society.  
Sometimes stories are used in which animals seem to represent 
vulnerability in general. In Pioneers of Tomorrow, in an attempt to teach 
children something about vulnerability, a horse was mentioned. This 
horse decided to go to greener land, and away from his mom. As a result 
of that decision, he was feeling lonely and lived unhappily abroad. In 
Pioneers of Tomorrow, ideas about rights are more often expressed as 
obligations, for example the obligation of Muslims to treat friends and 
neighbours politely and respectfully. After a fight between Haneen, 
Kareem and their guest Abbas over a guitar, Kareem suggested: ‘Let’s 
make a deal that we don’t fight, but we all share the guitar and play on it.’ 
Haneen agreed to the offer as long as she was the first to play on it. 
After some reflection, Haneen and the guest said ‘we agree’ and then 
they started to share and play together (SS12). In Sesame Street, themes of 
being friendly, loyal and cooperative appear often, suggesting values that 
imply respect for one another’s rights. 
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A very fundamental reason why citizenship and rights may not be 
addressed in the programmes is that raising themes around rights in the 
first place means that a host of problems associated with the occupation 
by Israel would also need to be addressed. Some of the programmes’ 
producers, aware of Palestinian children’s suffering in recent decades, 
may have ‘...learned from production mistakes of the past’ (Interview: Al 
Bardawil, 2013; Al Shafi, 2013). To avoid dealing with issues of water, 
health, food, travel and freedom of movement, it may be safer for 
producers not to insist on covering the theme of citizens’ rights. Even if 
not all producers recognise this as such, it can be seen as making a kind 
of compromise that can have a positive effect on the defactionalisation 
of media content. The absence of the theme of children’s rights in the 
programmes may thus reflect the wider context in which production 
takes place, where there is little faith left in the power of human rights’ 
instruments and institutions to improve people’s lives, including those of 
children (Allen, 2013; Arts, 2012; Arts et al., 2007). 
6.3.4 Resistance and resistance literature 
As shown in Table 10 for the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow and Table 28 for 
the PSC’s Sesame Street, resistance is a theme with a very low (or nil) 
frequency-of-occurrence. In the case of the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
the percentage is smaller than one might expect from Hamas-backed 
media, even for children’s programmes. The PSC’s Sesame Street had no 
mention at all of resistance or resistance literature, presumably because it 
was not judged appropriate content for a children’s programme. This 
may not be that surprising given the extent to which the PSC is carefully 
‘monitored’ by its international donors for signs of excess radicalism 
(Abuzanouna, 2012:146).  
Sesame Street producers have a different ideology with regard to the 
theme of resistance against Israeli occupation. They believe in a non-
violent, non-military approach, based on the hope that moral pressure 
and negotiations will eventually prevail. Producers have attempted to 
counter the programmes of the ASC by not focusing on resistance values 
when violence is present (Interview: Sayeigh, 2013): ‘After all, what we 
aim to do is to get the children away from what they see in daily life, 
away from violence and destruction, and bring them a new atmosphere 
of entertainment and fun’ (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). If D’Acci’s (2004) 
site-of-production approach is applied, this can be a good example of 
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how personal political views and affiliation influence the content and 
production of programmes.  
The ASC sees the discussion about resistance as less of a problem for 
a children’s programme than the PSC, but still it is only minimally 
present in the content of the episodes viewed during the selected study 
period. One ASC producer, when asked about this low score for the 
themes of resistance values, explained that the programme avoids being 
seen as instrumental in turning children into fighters: ‘We can’t give the 
responsibility of carrying a gun and resisting occupation to a child’ 
(Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013). However, in the past, Pioneers of Tomorrow 
was criticised by Israel and some of its Western allies precisely for 
encouraging children to turn to violence (Daily Mail, 23 July 2008). 
Those responsible for Pioneers of Tomorrow state clearly that they consider 
it a mistake to involve children in resistance activities themselves 
(Interview: Al Bardawil 2013).  
The ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow does acknowledge the emotional and 
psychological strain on children who daily face the Israeli siege and the 
periodic, lethal attacks, witnessing damage to property, economic 
attrition, detention, death of family members and injuries and deaths of 
friends at school. In such circumstances, any pretense of keeping 
children totally isolated or protected from the harsh political realities that 
affect Gazans in particular on a daily basis, is not credible, it seems. In 
screening specific episodes, one sees that resistance is mentioned 
occasionally. For example, the puppet Nassur made indirect reference to 
the importance of resistance to end Israeli occupation and to free the Al 
Aqsa mosque. In that episode, as mentioned earlier, the mosque itself 
was represented as a prisoner in the hands of Israel. ‘Al Aqsa the 
prisoner that we must liberate,’ Nassur told the children (PoT15). One 
child, phoning in from Saudi Arabia, talked about Hamas and famous 
martyrs assassinated by Israel and about a song by a child: ‘I am the story 
of a lost nation, I am the pain, I am the tears, I am the candle’ (PoT13). 
In the same episode, a child described ‘the wound sustained by bastards.’ 
Thus, the resistance discourse was also present in the contributions of 
the participating children who phoned in, and were allowed to speak 
about certain resistance-related values.  
There were clear signs, amidst the responses to children who phoned 
in from abroad, especially those from Saudi Arabia and Algeria, that 
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indicated that defactionalised content was being sought by the producers 
of Pioneers. When children phoned in and attempted to contribute rather 
factionalised content, criticising President Abbas, for example, for having 
direct contacts with Israel, the response was to divert the discussion 
away from the issue, and back to Israel as a common enemy. Nassur 
once tried to avoid the link being made by a child to the PA, and 
brought the child back to the discussion around resistance in general. 
Focusing only on Israel and its 2008-2009 war on Gaza, Nassur talked 
about the experiences he had during the war and how difficult it was for 
him to breathe after airstrikes: ‘It is true that they [the Israelis] care about 
keeping their environment clean, but they are extremely careful in 
destroying our environment’ (PoT07). In the same episode, the 
discussion took another thread where Sara taught Nassur about the fatal 
damages caused by the use of uranium in the war. Nassur then stated: 
‘So Sara, this means I will be dying slowly slowly.’ This was a powerful, if 
subtle, example of how producers’ decisions to defactionalise the themes 
of media content and production values worked out to influence media 
practices by pushing the discussions towards blaming Israel and its 
attacks that destroy lives and trees, and the use of illegal weapons against 
the civilian population. Such defactionalisaton, by focusing on what 
Israel is doing, is the result of a decision made by the producers. If the 
discussion had been about anything else, the child would probably have 
been allowed to continue, but since talking about the Palestinian 
Authority in a critical way would simply feed factionalism, this discussion 
was turned into something the ASC would be more comfortable with.  
Talk of resistance in the ASC’s children’s programme was apparent 
when the discussion focused on the impact of war and siege. The study 
period includes the period immediately following Israel’s attacks on Gaza 
during ‘Operation Cast Lead,’ which made it impossible for programmes 
to avoid the theme of resistance values. One child calling in from Algeria 
recited a poem which included a line about the ‘shame of Arabs who 
keep quiet about the massacres in Gaza’ (PoT10). This shifted a 
discussion about ideas of resistance to the topic of the PA. This example 
of factionalism sat uneasily with the talk of Palestinians and Al Aqsa 
mosque as prisoners of Israel and ‘a legacy in our souls.’  
In another episode, Sara reminded the children of the prospect of 
returning to Al Quds one day and liberating Palestinian prisoners. In 
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Pioneers of Tomorrow, episode 7, Sara wanted the children to challenge all 
the obstacles created by Israel after the war, when she said:  
‘…let us not despair of life, but let us work together, start together and 
never say it is too late. Let us make every child plant a flower and build 
what the Zionist occupation has destroyed, so that we can breathe fresh 
air and enjoy the Palestine of hills and mountains’ (PoT07).  
Another example was Nassur making a point by saying: ‘We will not 
rest until we can free Palestine and Jerusalem, the capital of Arab culture’ 
(PoT15). This represented the core of non-violent resistance, which goes 
hand in hand with the Arab States’ boycott of Israel and their 
announcement of Jerusalem as the capital for Arab culture. There was 
never a direct call for children to resist violently or take up guns. There 
were only indirect messages of appreciation for continuation of the 
resistance to Israel. In another context, the right of return was framed by 
Sara as ‘the right of a Palestinian to return home’ (PoT 21).  
Apparently, this low-level frequency of mentioning resistance as a 
topic of discourse is the result of deliberate action. Previously, ‘Zionists 
attempted to demonise’ the children’s programming of the ASC, and 
some of that criticism may have been well-founded (Al Bardawil, 2013). 
However, after that critique, the ASC’s management sent a clear message 
to the programmers of Pioneers of Tomorrow, to not involve children 
directly in politics and Hamas ideology. The channel came to 
accommodate itself to the expectation that it would focus on the child as 
in need of protection, as a subject with rights, and sometimes a victim, 
rather than as a potential aggressor or combatant in the resistance 
movement. ASC’s producers learned lessons from previous mistakes in 
which images of Palestinian refugee children, located in Beirut, throwing 
stones, were used to create an unfriendly response by the Israeli military 
to Palestinian children living inside Palestine. ‘We don’t want stereotypes 
of children with stones, children with RBG’s (rocket propelled grenades) 
and children with Kalashnikovs’ (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013).  
By contrast, the lack of reference to resistance values, whether violent 
or non-violent, in Sesame Street, stems from the principle that children 
should not be involved in resistance politics at all, even if siege and 
violence do affect Palestinian children, directly and indirectly. This 
position reflects the view of Fatah as part of the larger institution that 
runs the Palestinian Authority, and of the political elites that tend to 
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dictate the agendas for the ‘circuits of production’ in which media 
producers have to operate (D’Acci, 2004).  
Although resistance cannot be absent from the context of the 
programmes, because of the ongoing Israeli occupation, Sesame Street 
chooses to approach the topic of resistance indirectly, by using positive 
and problem-solving metaphors in its episodes. There was, for example, 
an argument between puppets Kareem and Abbas as to the ownership of 
a guitar. The debate raged until Uncle Salim stepped in to solve the 
quarrel without using violence, by way of a mutual decision to peacefully 
share the guitar: ‘Don’t fight, let us find another way to solve our 
problem… there is another way’ (SS12). It can also be suggested that this 
small, apparently insignificant story might have been some kind of 
reference to the PA’s method of negotiating with Israel to end the 
conflict, for example through land swaps and compromises with Israel 
(Ayoob, 2012).  
It thus seems that a (more or less) removal of children from ‘politics’ 
and from ‘resistance’ has become part of the dominant script of both 
channels, as far as the children’s programmes are concerned. The overall 
consequence of a decision to moderate content away from overtly 
politicised and factional values has led to a form of defactionalisation. 
This implied a shift away from old images of Palestinian military wings 
giving children guns on TV shows as part of ASC programming.  
6.3.5 Social values 
In spite of some differences and contrasts between the two channels, 
such as with regard to resistance values, it is also important to note 
points of similarity between them. PSC and ASC children’s programmes 
have featured the theme of social values with the same frequency. Social 
values were an explicit theme in 52% of the programme episodes. 
Producers from both television channels commented on this balanced 
result with satisfaction. Yet, the ‘similar’ thematic focus on social values 
did not mean quite the same thing in each case. The process of 
defactionalisation had its prices, and one price was that programming 
had to avoid overtly political themes and focus on less controversial 
‘social values.’ In a traditional society like Palestine, it is to be expected 
that media production will reflect traditional values by encouraging 
adherence of the audiences to what are viewed as positive customs and 
norms within the society.  
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The differences between the two programmes become more apparent 
when talking, for example, about friendship. In Sesame Street, a ‘friend’ is 
defined, by children, as someone who works hard in school, obtains 
good grades, comes from a respectable family and is cooperative and 
helpful toward others (SS13). In contrast, for Pioneers of Tomorrow, the 
definition of ‘friend’ is a little different (PoT16). When Puppet Nassur 
referred to a friend of his who does not pray, Sara asked whether Nassur 
should even have this person as a friend. All the telephone calls received 
from children advised Nassur not to maintain this friendship. ASC may 
have made a pre-selection of the phone calls in this case, suggesting that 
media producers are responding with the use of sets of ‘routines’ and 
regulations of the institutions, which become an influence on thematic 
content (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). My field 
observations within the ASC indicate that it would even be considered 
unacceptable if it emerged that one of the media crew members did not 
pray. Such personal piety would not be seen as relevant for those in the 
Sesame Street production team or in most of the PSC’s programming (field 
notes: Almoghayer, 20 June 2013).  
From a strict Hamas perspective, the producers of ASC already 
compromised by showing a child who was friends with someone who 
did not pray. Any child could have taken this as a social value, and left it 
at that. Yet Pioneers of Tomorrow reviewed this choice, and made a 
deliberate decision to focus on the importance of Islamic values in 
shaping social values and defining who should be seen as suitable 
friends. With this, ASC takes a potentially polarising position among 
Palestinians, given that, in reality, children have different religious and 
also secular backgrounds. However, even such a narrow definition of 
who is acceptable as a friend can be viewed from another angle, as a 
potential point of social cohesion and defactionalisation among the 
majority of Muslim Palestinians. As a whole they are affected by the 
emergence of a strong Islamist revival, whether they live in Gaza, the 
West Bank, or in the wider diaspora (Hovdenak, 2013). 
In another episode of Pioneers, the puppet Nassur confessed to Sara 
that he had done ‘wrong things,’ such as cheating and paying a classmate 
to do his homework. He was then made to understand that cheating is 
unacceptable and against social norms, and that he should never do it 
again. Sara then went further and appealed specifically to parents to pay 
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less attention to work and a busy life and instead encourage their 
children and keep them on a path of honesty, including doing one’s own 
homework. For example, in Pioneers of Tomorrow, episode 13, Sara said to 
the children: ‘Lying and cheating is haram and those who do it will be 
punished by Allah and go to hell’ (PoT13).  
Sesame Street is much more strongly focused on the theme of social 
values, especially in relation to helping others, being friendly, and this 
irrespective of other people’s background or beliefs. In one episode, 
Puppets Haneen and Karim were looking for ways to help Salim in his 
workshop. This was viewed as a positive quality on the part of these 
children, and the children were encouraged to be similarly observant of 
whether people around them might be needing help. ‘Today is Basil’s 
independence day, he is washing his cup and dish on his own, and now 
we will see how he is going to put on his clothes on his own,’ Haneen 
said about a small boy named Basil (SS03).  
 Similarly, Pioneers of Tomorrow teaches children to help elderly people to 
cross the road, to help carry their things, and encourages them to help 
their parents in their daily chores. In this sense, both programmes are 
quite similar in the thematic focus on educating children to be helpful to 
others. Sesame Street thus focuses on the fair division of labour among 
people, on reciprocity and on sharing, with children being encouraged to 
take part in daily community and household activities, like cleaning or 
helping neighbours. However, Pioneers of Tomorrow also made several 
indirect references to the negative social values that underpin Western 
social behaviour. It was explained that elderly members of the family are 
often sent to residential or nursing homes. Sara explained that, instead of 
this, the elderly should be cared for by family members at home, just as a 
‘mother carries a child in the womb, and the father supports the family’ 
(PoT22).  
The focus in Sesame Street is on fully involving children in talks about 
family structure and relations with parents, and on avoiding negative 
behaviour like fighting and squabbling over possessions, as in the 
example of puppets Haneen and Kareem, mentioned earlier, who fought 
over a guitar. In all cases in which they arise, disputes are solved through 
respectfully engaging in dialogue, in sharing and showing love and in 
understanding the other person. Children are encouraged to imagine that 
society is peaceful around them, even if they suspect it may not be so 
(Warshel, 2012). Such social value themes echo the general feelings of 
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Fatah toward negotiations with Israel and their welcoming of the 
prospects of conflict resolution and peace in the future.  
6.3.6 Cultural values 
When this research started, it was expected that children’s and cultural 
programmes would both focus strongly on Palestinian cultural values (as 
it was expected in the case of resistance values.) However, once again 
content analysis showed that only in a couple of Sesame Street episodes 
(i.e., less than 10 percent) was there evidence of attention for the theme 
of cultural values. In Pioneers of Tomorrow, cultural values simply did not 
appear as a theme at all, in any of the episodes watched. This is 
significantly lower than expected, and may be because social values have 
largely replaced cultural values as one of the main concerns of producers.  
Sesame Street does talk about traditional arts and speaks to children 
about the importance of the thobe, the Palestinian national dress and 
traditional cultural attire. The PSC programme also recognizes other 
forms of craft production as part of Palestinian heritage, as shown in 
Sesame Street (SS15), where a child named Aya was given the chance to 
learn from her grandmother about the importance of embroidery. In 
some episodes of Sesame Street, there was a focus on Palestinian singers 
and songs (SS13). In Pioneers of Tomorrow, these musical forms of artistic 
and cultural expression did not appear at all, given ASC’s disapproval of 
such music, which has little religious content, as shown in several 
episodes in which children sang for Al Aqsa (PoT15) or when they cited 
Islamic Nasheed (PoT20) on the love for their nation.  
Thus, whilst Sesame Street featured singers and superstars, for example 
during a song contest for puppets Kareem and Haneen, Pioneers of 
Tomorrow lacked this type of content. Even national poets, such as 
Mahmoud Darwish, a Palestinian whose poems were banned in Palestine 
after Israel alleged that they were used to incite rebellion, were not 
featured in ASC programmes. Instead, Pioneers of Tomorrow focused 
exclusively on scholars and figures with an Islamic orientation rather 
than on those who might represent Palestinian cultural values.  
By applying D’Acci’s (2004) ‘cultural artifacts’ element to the analysis 
of thematic content, one can reflect on how PSC and ASC producers 
presented values in the content of these two children’s programmes. 
Artifacts were presented by the PSC as evidence of the messages this 
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media outlet was trying to convey to its audiences, using specific colours 
and clothing to identify its own programmes. The thobe and the 
Palestinian flags, and other elements of national dress and culture were 
used to claim that both the PSC and the ASC represent all Palestinians 
(SS03, PoT19). National artifacts are easily identifiable, especially when 
sound bites are combined with visual images and videos, and 
demonstrate Palestinian heritage, in clothing and food in particular. It is 
quite surprising that these cultural artifacts were completely missing from 
Pioneers of Tomorrow. One possible way to explain this is that, unlike ASC, 
the PSC has had - for decades - a virtual monopoly over representations 
of the Palestinian Kuffiyeh. Except during the 2015 Palestinian protests 
against the Israeli occupation, the ASC has never challenged this virtual 
monopoly by reflecting on such significant forms of Palestinian cultural 
artifacts as part of Palestinian heritage (Blank, 2011).  
These ‘missing’ artifacts most likely are the result of the socialisation 
and attitudes of media workers in Gaza and their decisions to show or to 
ignore specific cultural artifacts, in relation to their exposure to them 
(Gitlin, 1980; Gans, 1979). At any rate, presenting cultural values as 
‘Islamic’ rather than simply as Palestinian is a more important feature of 
ASC than of PSC. Thus, when ASC producers are asked what comes 
first - the flag of Hamas or the flag of Palestine - they are likely to say 
that the Hamas flag comes first. They tend to argue that since Hamas 
will liberate Palestine, it will become a sovereign state with a flag that 
actually means something. The flag of Palestine, they suggest, has 
become the symbol of an occupied, compromised land and of the burial 
and oppression of its subjugated people (Interview: Al Amriti, 2013).  
6.3.7 Political values 
Politics is an essential and normal part of the daily life and conversations 
of Palestinians, and this theme would be expected to play a visible – if 
not central – part in the content of children’s programmes. However, 
content analysis of the selected Sesame Street and Pioneers of Tomorrow 
programmes showed no presence of the theme of political values in the 
various episodes. In these children’s programmes, at no stage was there 
any discussion of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations or political rights of 
Palestinians as a whole. There was no purely political content, in the 
‘party political’ sense, at all, in either programme. The PSC has avoided 
directly involving children in political values, choosing instead to focus 
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on nationalist values that help promote awareness of Palestinian heritage, 
traditions and cultural values. 
The ASC’s producers, on the other hand, consider the need to avoid 
party politics as more of a handicap, since it constrains their ability to 
channel messages that advocate for Hamas. To overcome such barriers 
to free expression, ASC producers tend to use metaphorical forms of 
language, in order to make their ‘factional’ points. This reduces the 
overall impression of factionalism and disguises some much more subtle, 
continuing forms of factionalism. Thus, stories, small incidents and 
metaphors become ways of featuring political values without being 
overtly political, and by alluding to the theme of political values 
indirectly. This happened when Nassur asked the children ‘how do you 
feel about Al Aqsa being Judaised?’ This question elicited several 
reactions, including one from a Saudi girl who started to blame Arab 
leaders for not standing by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation 
(PoT15). In Pioneers of Tomorrow, reference was made to the name of an 
Israeli prisoner of war, when a poem was composed and read on air by a 
Palestinian child invited on the show by Sara and puppet Nassur. The 
boy said of the Israeli soldier captured by Hamas and later exchanged for 
Palestinian political prisoners: ‘We will make from Gilad Shalit a key to 
their prison’ (PoT04). This mixture of political values and poetry was 
meant to convey a general feeling of hopefulness, and the idea that 
Palestinian prisoners could soon be free (Al Amriti, 2013). The 
implications of this are that satellite TV programme producers express 
support for resistance to Israel, even when Hamas abducts Israeli 
soldiers and exchanges them for Palestinian prisoners.  
6.3.8 Educational values 
Both the PSC’s and ASC’s producers made it clear in interviews that the 
main aim of their programming for children is educational. The theme of 
education was present in all episodes analysed for this study. In the 
PSC’s Sesame Street there was a 100 percent frequency of occurrence of 
educational content (i.e., this theme emerged in all the episodes studied). 
Educational values also appeared as a theme in 87 percent of the 
episodes of the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow that were analysed. One 
explanation for the high frequency of educational values is that in 2010 
the results of the 2009 Tawjihi (high secondary school examination) came 
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out. It became known that, in 2009, only just over half (55%) of the 
students in Gaza had passed their exams (Asskoul, 2009). At that time, 
therefore, there was a great deal of concern about the future education 
of young Gazans (Abu Kamar, 2009). This pass rate was considered 
worryingly low for the Palestinian community, and the majority of 
parents started to pick up on the need to focus on education as a vital 
issue (Asskoul, 2009).  
The precise definition of ‘educational values’ was slightly different for 
each of the two programmes. For Sesame Street, for example, purely 
educational values were covered for children aged from 5 to 14 years, on 
a wide range of topics, including how to learn the alphabet, vocabulary, 
foreign-language skills, numbers, the importance of cooperation in 
problem solving, the use of the library, borrowing books, and reading, 
either to oneself or aloud to others. Other values of learning also 
included personal health care, i.e., teaching children the importance of 
good eating, adequate sleep, and regular personal hygiene habits, like 
brushing their teeth, and having a good breakfast before school (SS08; 
SS19). In Sesame Street, the children were sometimes taken outside, into 
the street environment, but in Pioneers of Tomorrow they always stayed in 
the studio. In addition to having them sing songs, including educational 
songs about road safety and traffic lights, children were told: ‘Remember 
kids that we have to speak softly and should not raise our voices in the 
library’ (SS18). The use of the quite tightly controlled studio 
environment implied that education could be an almost exclusive focus 
of both PSC and ASC programmes.  
Other themes of educational values were covered in both 
programmes in more or less the same way: the values of adequate 
educational preparation, the importance of study, reading and exams, 
and the stuff students should concentrate on. Other themes, such as 
being a good citizen or neighbour, keeping the local area clean, and safe 
driving, were covered with similar frequency by both programmes, albeit 
in different ways. Sesame Street focused on traffic lights, while Pioneers of 
Tomorrow focused on manners while walking on the streets. Sesame Street 
stressed the importance of having a clean environment because that is 
socially right. Pioneers of Tomorrow supported the argument based on the 
religious belief that Allah ordered his followers to be clean. 
The producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow pinpointed other educational 
values, such as, for example, the dangers of smoking to human health, 
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whether by direct or passive inhalation. These warnings were passed 
through cartoons and children’s discussions in the studio. Pioneers of 
Tomorrow also used dramatic anti-smoking video clips such as an 
emotional studio scene of a young girl crying because she missed her 
mother who died from a smoking-related illness (PoT10). Sometimes the 
programme covered such themes in a way that could be considered quite 
advanced for younger children. One full episode, for example, focused 
on the contributions of bees and honey to environmental and human 
health (PoT17). Another episode of the ASC’s programme followed the 
path of Islamic scientists by mentioning Al Raze, the Persian polymath 
and alchemist, as a well-known Islamic figure in the history of medicine 
(PoT07). In another episode, pioneering scientific work by Avicenna, Al 
Khwarizmi and Ibn Hayan was mentioned (PoT08).  
Sesame Street did not suggest a following in the footsteps of any 
specific role models, whether scientists or others. Rather, it focused on 
science and overall education, with few or even no references to any 
particular ideology or to Islamic scientists and scholars. In contrast to 
education in Sesame Street, in Pioneers of Tomorrow education is presented as 
an instrument of liberation, a means to attain freedom from occupation. 
In a special episode, whilst urging children to stick to education, Sara 
stated that ‘education is our balance in life… protects us from all 
dangers… even from the oppressing Zionist enemy, we will overcome 
them with the education they want us to abandon’ (PoT05). For Sara, 
education is even an instrument for rescuing the Al Aqsa mosque. 
However, when Sesame Street mentioned the need to encourage the 
continuing education of children in Palestine, it did so without any 
explicit reference to Israel or the occupation as a motivating factor. 
Whilst Pioneers of Tomorrow encouraged children to study hard, spend time 
productively and not behave frivolously, it also strongly emphasised faith 
and regular prayer as a means to overcome the impact of the occupation. 
The terminology used avoided looking over-factionalised or turning 
viewers against Fatah, and, instead, repeatedly emphasised the need to 
end the Israeli military occupation.  
In Pioneers of Tomorrow, the language used was mostly formal and 
carefully selected classical Arabic. In Sesame Street, the language used 
reflected that of the social upper class or the colloquial dialect in current, 
daily use. When Pioneers of Tomorrow focused on values that inform 
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children, the lessons were usually both practical and moral. So, when 
puppet Nassur was shown with bee sting injuries after he had tried to 
harm the bees, the lesson clearly was that he should not have done them 
harm. The script declared Nassur was wrong to try and harm the bees, 
since bees were vital to the wider environment; they made honey, a 
valuable, holistic medicine and a sweetener, something all humans could 
enjoy (PoT17).  
6.3.9 Entertainment 
During daily free time, children are normally expected to enjoy 
entertainment, fun and relaxation. One would thus expect this to be 
reflected in the content of children’s programming. This was most 
frequently the case in Sesame Street, where entertainment was present in 
all programme episodes watched during the study. In contrast, in Pioneers 
of Tomorrow, entertainment, as an explicit theme, featured in less than one 
fifth, or around 17.5 %, of all episodes. The relative absence of 
‘entertainment’ in the ASC programme can be compared with the 
relative absence of cultural values as a theme in the ASC’s programme 
that was noted earlier. Overall, PSC’s Sesame Street focused much more 
on both cultural values and entertainment. This not so surprising when 
one considers that entertainment was often provided by various 
expressions of culture such as in songs, clothing, cookery, literature and 
film. All these cultural artifacts featured as educational media, far more in 
Sesame Street than in Pioneers of Tomorrow.  
As has been discussed, whilst ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow was more 
serious, and much less likely to include songs, dancing or other art 
forms, Sesame Street focused on creating a ‘fun’ atmosphere using 
entertainment through music, dance, songs, physical activity and 
informal verbal interaction for educational purposes. Overall, Pioneers of 
Tomorrow adopted a much more sober approach to education, separating 
it quite sharply from entertainment. In Episode SS02 of Sesame Street, for 
example, a typical, stimulating combination of music and cartoons was 
used, whereas in Pioneers of Tomorrow this kind of combination hardly 
appeared.  
The more conservative Islamic approach of ASC means that music, 
song and dance – especially when there is mixing between males and 
females, boys and girls – can be seen as religiously forbidden (haram). As 
mentioned before in section 6.3 of this chapter, a strong feature of 
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Sesame Street, which also characterises most children’s programmes on 
TV in the West, is its attention for animals and domestic pets, and it 
shows physical interaction, including play, with animals as a constant 
value. For the ASC, however, direct physical contact with animals, 
especially dogs, is not in line with Islamic teachings. 
Interestingly, this interdiction can itself be viewed as a form of 
Islamic artifact, in the sense in which D’Acci uses the term (2004). In 
Pioneers, entertainment values were much lower than one might have 
expected for a children’s programme. It was explained to the researcher 
that the world-renowned Imam Hassan Al Banna, who inspired media 
producers, has as one of his 10 recommendations to not laugh too much. 
For this leader, ‘the heart that is connected with Allah is constant and is 
quiet’ (Al-Banna, 1942). This principle of calm reflection can be seen in 
the content of ASC children’s programming, where Sara talked about the 
importance of cleanness (PoT14), the importance of culture and faith in 
the upbringing (PoT01) and fasting in the holy month of Ramadan 
(PoT04). This results in an aversion to non-religious songs, to dance and 
to most music. It could be argued, through the lens of Shoemaker’s and 
Reese’s (1996), Gans’s (1979) and Gitlin’s (1980) analysis, that this 
represents an ideological positioning on the part of ASC producers, a 
positioning which helps to explain how tensions are reduced between the 
two political groupings that control the two parts of Palestine: Gaza and 
the West Bank. 
The influence of ‘external’ political factors is evident in the ASC, as 
both content and production are shaped by demands for a minimum of 
musical tone and voice – with music being confined to the kind used 
strictly by (usually male) religious figures, and only for rites of worship, 
such as calls for prayer. The ASC’s version of entertainment is restricted 
to the amusing, happy gestures and movements of puppet Nassur. The 
use of jokes, by contrast, is evident in all episodes of Sesame Street, where 
the focus is on a witty, light sense of humour, encouraging optimism 
about the future, with a light touch that is not evident in the same way in 
Pioneers of Tomorrow (Warshel, 2012). Focused on specific, serious values 
that can educate children in the ‘right’ social values, the producers of 
Pioneers of Tomorrow seem to turn their back on the lively blend of music, 
colour, humour, cartoons and background noises that characterise all 
episodes of Sesame Street. Designed to make the children laugh and to 
202 CHAPTER 6 
encourage interactive communication among them, the aim of the PSC 
programme is to have children actively participate, whereas Pioneers of 
Tomorrow mainly seeks to secure their obedience and improve their 
listening skills, as children who need to be taught how to think, and how 
to behave.  
6.4 Evidence of Defactionalisation of Content  
Despite the rigid Islamic mindset in the Pioneers of Tomorrow show, 
compromises are still made throughout. For instance, a child reading 
poems by national poet Mahmoud Darwish, rather than an Islamic 
poem, is a compromise worth noting. This is particularly intriguing, as 
Mahmoud Darwish, despite being labelled as a ‘national’ poet, is, because 
of his involvement with the PLO and the PA, not considered an ally by 
Hamas. This is confirmed by a previous analysis (described in section 
5.4.2. of the previous chapter) of Burning Brands, where the poet invited 
on the show expressed that he admired Darwish, but not his politics. 
This statement did not provoke comments from the producers of the 
show.  
Other examples of compromises made include children singing songs 
that are not specifically about Islamic values, or allowing children to wear 
fashion such as jeans and girls to uncover their heads, as noted in a 
recent study (Blank, 2011). This is something producers of the show 
would not normally allow, but Pioneers of Tomorrow’s producer Al Amriti 
(Interview: 2013) acknowledged that this, too, is a ‘kind of compromise.’ 
Such forms of compromise could be a reason that children living in less 
cservative Arab countries than Gaza have been attracted to Pioneers of 
Tomorrow.  
Compromises are made in such a way that they serve to defactionalise 
the media broadcasts, by avoiding that the PSC and ASC attack one 
another or each other’s agenda, and by laying the blame instead on one 
common enemy, Israel. This is seen in Pioneers of Tomorrow’s content, for 
example, with children calling in from abroad with songs in French. The 
producers decided to show the original video-clip of children singing ‘I 
am a prisoner and love freedom’ (PoT21). This choice of French is 
believed to be related to the arrest of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier of 
dual Israeli/French citizenship. Another song, ‘It’s a beautiful day, look 
at the sun,’ was sung in English by a child called Walaa. This is also a 
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form of compromise, because the producers have the possibility to select 
from hundreds of callers who wish to contribute. The ASC’s producers 
here want to change stereotypical thinking by offering materials that are 
not seen as overly strictly Islamic.  
One other point of distinction between the two shows is that Pioneers 
of Tomorrow seems to choose children from refugee camps who are 
educated in UNRWA schools, like Sara Barhoum, who attended an 
UNRWA school in Rafah. This differs from Sesame Street, where the 
selected children - as confirmed in the programme’s end credits – have 
attended mostly Christian and privately funded elite schools, such as 
Saint George School, Mary Joseph Nuns School, Friends School and the 
Catholic School. Sesame Street mostly covers educational light 
entertainment and fun. Pioneers of Tomorrow differs in that its message is 
often more serious and conservative. Furthermore, in Sesame Street, the 
same videos are broadcasted more than once during the education 
sections and the same children are often used when conducting ‘vox 
pop’ interviews with children. Sesame Street is credited in coordination 
with the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education. In 
Pioneers of Tomorrow, the producers seemed to make a conscious decision 
not to involve the Ministry of Education in production or in providing 
feedback on the show.  
Another point of difference between the two shows is that in Sesame 
Street the show’s participants consist of children and both male and 
female adults, whereas in Pioneers of Tomorrow only children participate. 
Even phone calls coming in to the programme are handled by children. 
It must be said, though, that the words spoken by child presenter Sarah 
Barhoum sound like the words from an adult. The kind of figure 
represented by Uncle Saleem in Sesame Street, who often appears as a wise 
familial assistant on issues too complicated for Kareem or Haneen, is 
completely lacking in Pioneers of Tomorrow.  
The fun and entertainment factor is present in both Sesame Street and 
Pioneers of Tomorrow, though it occurs much more frequently in the former 
than in the latter. Pioneers of Tomorrow uses more religious symbolism and 
less focus on Palestinian culture, traditions and lifestyle. The principle of 
courage is portrayed in both programmes, albeit in different ways. 
Pioneers of Tomorrow encourages children to show courage by challenging 
occupation and oppression and by speaking out against injustice. Sesame 
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Street illustrates courage from a child’s point of view: using social skills 
among peer-groups, such as not fearing to climb high hills together or 
not being afraid to climb onto playground slides and seesaws with their 
friends (SS04).  
6.5 Conclusions  
Unlike the mono-religious form of production which ASC producers 
have adopted, the PSC programmes’ religious content is much more 
limited, and also explicitly not only Islamic, but rather quite ecumenical. 
In practice, the sets of decisions by either channel, about whether to 
include, and how to frame, religious values in programme content, came 
about through a process of negotiations within production teams, rather 
than through decisions of lone individuals. It must be kept in mind that, 
like ideology, religion is ‘a paradigm [that] is not static but is continually 
being renegotiated’ (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996:242). Both PSC and 
ASC children’s programmes referred to religion in ways that could 
contribute towards the defactionalisation of content and production, 
with sectarian ideology playing little part. It is also worth noting that 
religious content in Pioneers of Tomorrow never, even symbolically, referred 
to Hamas, directly or indirectly.  
 Those who own the satellite TV channels and those who raise funds 
for channels have an indirect but also controlling influence on 
programme producers and the decisions they take. When interviewed, 
one PSC producer seemed to subtly hint that programme content could 
be influenced by US or Dutch sponsors, whilst suggesting the opposite: 
‘I don’t want to say that this [i.e., compromises made] is due to 
restrictions by donors’ (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). Although this is not 
specific only to children’s programmes, it does seem that in terms of 
‘hegemony theory and the practice of articulation’ (Havens et al, 
2009:244), both ASC and PSC producers have shaped content so as to 
meet the demands of those in power, whether Hamas or the PA/Fatah. 
The implication here seemed to be that, whilst producers did not wish to 
state this too baldly, it remained quite apparent that funding restrictions 
and preferences of donors have had a major influence, directly or 
indirectly, on producers too, and on the decisions they made about 
programme content.  
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What happens outside the production room has a great deal of 
influence on production and thematic content. In the case of PSC and 
ASC, similar pressures have led to a gradual consensus around the need 
to depoliticise programme content related to resistance values, in order 
to maintain the viability of the status quo (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; 
Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). However, in contrast to the PSC, which does 
not pay attention to resistance, ASC producers adopt the position of 
Hamas with regard to resistance. This came across in Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
for example, in unequivocal demands for restoration of all stolen 
Palestinian lands, reiterated by Sara from time to time. On ‘Land Day,’ 
she says: ‘the land will remain for us, we will remain on our land and will 
remain steadfast, and in God’s will we will liberate our land regardless of 
what the enemies have done to it’ (PoT12).  
The priority of the theme of resistance for the ASC explains why (the 
idea of) ‘compromise’ was regarded as more or less a ‘dirty word’ by 
ASC producers and Hamas officials. Whilst the ideology of Hamas may 
be represented in ASC children’s programmes, even so, compromises are 
made on a personal and production level within ASC. These can be 
related to the longer-term influences of “media workers’ socialisation 
and attitudes” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Gans, 1979). 
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7 Analysing Content of ASC’s and PSC’s Cultural Programmes  
 
‘Regardless of the political affiliation of our guests, in…cultural 
programming, we leave it up to our producers to decide, so long as they 
do not give guests the chance to attack Islamic principles - programming 
can be defactionalised as long as it is within acceptable limits’ (Interview: 
Abu Mohsen, ASC, 6 December 2013).  
7.1 Introduction  
As in Chapter 6, much of this chapter will be devoted to content analysis 
of the incidence of specific themes in programme episodes. This chapter 
will consider how such themes are represented in the cultural 
programmes of ASC’s and PSC’s satellite television. The focus is on the 
cultural programming of the two stations, in PSC’s case the Cultural 
Flashes programme, and for ASC the Burning Brands programme.  
7.2 Introducing themes 
In considering how these themes are presented in the cultural 
programmes of ASC and PSC TV outlets, this section provides a more 
in-depth thematic content analysis on all themes selected for this study. 
The discussion in this part is meant to provide a better ground for 
addressing the question whether defactionalisation of media content did, 
in fact, occur. The content analysis also relied on interviews with 
programme producers, to explain its findings and to link it to the 
theoretical framework of this research.  
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Table 7.1  
Themes in Burning Brands in order of frequency (out of 21 episodes)  
Category No (%) Yes (%) 
Cultural values 38 62 
Political values 62 38 
Resistance and Resistance Literature 76 24 
Nationalism and National Discourse 95 5 
Social values 95 5 
Religious values 100 - 
Citizens’ Rights and Obligations 100 - 
Educational values 100 - 
Entertainment 100 - 
Table 7.2  
Themes in Cultural Flashes in order of frequency (out of 21 episodes)  
Category No (%) Yes (%) 
Cultural values - 100 
Political values 62 38 
Educational values 62 38 
Entertainment 67 33 
Nationalism and National Discourse 81 19 
Social values 85.5 14.5 
Religious values 100.0 - 
Citizens’ Rights and Obligations 100.0 - 
Resistance and Resistance Literature 100.0 - 
 
7.2.1  Nationalism and national discourse 
In cultural programming, as shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, there were 
references to the theme of nationalism and national discourse in just 
under one fifth (19.0%) of the episodes of Cultural Flashes. In contrast, 
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this theme was present in only 5 percent of the episodes of Burning 
Brands, over the same time-period.  
The frequency of occurrence of the theme of nationalism and 
national discourse was much lower in the ASC’s Burning Brands than in 
the PSC’s Cultural Flashes, perhaps because the latter offered a broader 
image of Palestinian culture, and had a stronger focus on Palestinian 
identity, presented, for example, in national Palestinian art and in what 
distinguishes Palestinian culture from other cultures in the Arab and 
wider world. In the PSC’s programme, literature was not introduced as a 
mere personal reflection by an author, but more as a way to emphasise 
the wider place of Palestinian culture in the midst of the Arab world, and 
in its relations with neighbouring countries, especially Israel (and Egypt.) 
‘In our country we must remember that we don’t want to take a nap or 
sleep,’ Burning Brands presenter Amani Abu Hantash said when she 
introduced ‘Palestinian authors who saved Palestinians’ souls from the 
wreckage of occupation’ (BB16). In the PSC programme, powerful 
emotional references were made to Palestinian scholars and their 
literature, which is scattered throughout the diaspora. One such author, 
mentioned in an episode of Cultural Flashes, was the poet Mohammed Al 
Qaisi (CF16), who died, away from his homeland, without anyone being 
able to attend his funeral or even pay a last respect. Al Qaisi had been 
living in obscurity in some place in Jordan and was only (re)discovered 
after his death. The broadcast of Cultural Flashes on him and his work 
started a number of academic studies that led to a better understanding 
of his contribution to national poetry (CF16).  
In Cultural Flashes, the names of most of the important Palestinian 
literary intellectuals were mentioned, along with their ancestral 
birthplace, a village, a city or a region in Palestine. This was not the case 
in Burning Brands, where the focus was less (if at all) on their 
indigenousness, but more on the content of their writings (CF06; CF11; 
CF18). Unlike what was found for the children’s programmes, in the two 
reviewed cultural programmes nationalistic references were frequent. 
Whereas in children’s programmes the names of specific places were 
largely absent, most analysed episodes of Cultural Flashes did include 
explicit references to historic Palestine. Cultural Flashes presenter Abu 
Hantash was also explicit about the need for more attention for 
Palestinian poets, writers and scholars, who she felt can preserve 
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Palestinian national culture and civilisation, rescuing it from the brink of 
extinction (CF02).  
The PSC’s cultural programme did not boast that Palestine has the 
best form of cultural production, but it took pride in offering a balanced 
perspective of ‘the destruction’ caused to the national identity by 
mistakes made decades ago, by accurately translating and interpreting 
original colonial documents specific to Palestine and Jewish immigration. 
By contrast, the ASC programme suggested that Islamic culture forms 
the strongest basis for resistance, for national projects and for a better 
future for Palestinians. These media debates around the meaning of the 
Palestinian national culture have an impact on Palestinians up to the 
present day. The ways in which the past is interpreted and understood in 
these programmes very much affects Palestinians in the present time. 
In Cultural Flashes, producers focused on Palestinian national identity 
and traditions. Unlike Burning Brands, which focused more on Islamic 
artistic forms, Cultural Flashes represented what the producers seemed to 
want, which is: looking for ‘Palestinians’ or ‘literature’ (Interview: Al 
Asfar, 2013), coming from Arab authors, poets and writers, as in the 
example of the Saudi novelist (CF03). In Burning Brands, one example was 
Izzddin Al-Mansra, a Jordanian poet who was encouraged to recite some 
of the poems he wrote to the female Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. 
He recited:  
‘the girls, the girls, the girls… the guards of the farms… in Palestine the 
case is different where women are dragged in buses into the remote 
prisons, in their chains are the bottles of milk for their children and some 
of the messages they had to hide in their ribs. Blessed be the breast-
feeders. The beautiful women plant in the ground the most precious 
hopes and the saltiness of meanings’ (BB04).  
Cultural Flashes included episodes that covered Palestinian traditional 
and social arts in different locations, and local festivals held in the West 
Bank and in Jerusalem. Likewise, the shows sent a clear message about 
the legacy that Palestinian intellectuals have left, by promoting 
Palestinian culture and identity as a ‘method for liberation,’ as Amani 
Abu Hantash put it in one episode (CF11). The programme also 
regularly included literary criticism, airing opinions of Palestinian 
intellectuals highly regarded in their specific fields, both alive and 
posthumously. Thus, for example, Mahmoud Darwish, often considered 
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the highest-ranking Palestinian poet, and Edward Said, ranked equally in 
the field of intellectual writing and critical thinking, were often quoted 
and otherwise referred to during discussions, by the producers of Cultural 
Flashes. For example, episode 1 used Darwish’s poems about Ghassan 
Kanafani (CF01). The work of such Palestinian intellectuals was referred 
to as monumental, almost a cultural artifact in itself.  
Unlike Burning Brands, Cultural Flashes has kept the identity of Arab 
Jerusalem alive, by regularly broadcasting content focusing on the 
activities of Palestinians living and working in Jerusalem. Examples 
include the screening of British and Palestinian movies shown at a 
festival in Jerusalem (CF19), a movie ‘Occupation 101’ made by 
American students (CF13), and a message by the presenter that ‘a nation 
without Jerusalem is without a soul’ (CF02). This focus underlined the 
resilience of Palestinians within Israel, who are involved in other forms 
of resistance against Israel, for instance by opposing land and resource 
grabbing and the building of more Jewish settlements and by protesting 
against the annexation of ‘illegal’ outposts.  
The emphasis was generally on the strength and dignity of 
Palestinians and less on their humiliation and misery under occupation. 
The same Cultural Flashes’ producers recognised the important role of 
Palestinian women, for example, in reinterpreting Independence Day and 
ending the Palestinian split (CF09) and in the Day of independence for 
women, in the Day of the Palestinian Refugee (CF12), the Day of Arabic 
Language (CF09) and in the arts and in cinema.  
One example is the inclusion in the programme of a satire by an 
American-Palestinian artist, speaking in English, who mocks Israeli 
troops when they stop her as she comes through Tel Aviv’s airport to 
visit her family. In the same episode, on stage, she recalls what happened 
when she was questioned about her husband by Israeli security. She said 
to them: ‘…he is Palestinian, he is a Muslim. He has never been married 
[before], no kids, no divorce, no disease. He is like a Palestinian angel’ 
(CF16).  
Although the values of nationalism and national unity appeared less 
frequently in discussions in Burning Brands, there were signs of 
compromises when a former Minister of Justice (Dr Atallah Abuelsbah) 
was invited to the programme and introduced as a poet and head of the 
Palestinian Writers Union. Within the first two minutes of the episode, 
 Analysing Content of ASC and PSC Cultural Programmes 211 
 
 
the impression was given of a direct call for national unity between 
Hamas and Fatah. Abuelsbah expressed this as follows:  
‘due to the division and the dominance of bureaucrats on the cultural 
scene… we are forced to build the union which is meant to unite the 
Palestinian intellectuals, whether they are writers, poets, novelists or others 
engaged in intellectual life… [and] to be able to defend all the interests of 
Palestinian intellectuals’ (BB19).  
This call was amplified by his suggestion that all poets from all 
different political parties should be brought together, under the 
chairmanship of Dr Samir Al Omary, a Palestinian-Swedish author 
(BB20). All of this had the likes of a form of compromise, in focusing 
less on Hamas and more on voices from Europe and the Palestinian 
diaspora.  
In Cultural Flashes, young Palestinians’ sense of belonging was most 
often served by the presentation of poetry written by Palestinians in 
exile. Burning Brands, in contrast, did not broadcast the products and 
cultural artifacts of the diaspora in this way. Instead, in Burning Brands, 
the national songs of Cultural Flashes were replaced, more prominently, 
by Islamic anthems, that were played throughout the programme. The 
apparently low frequency of nationalism and national discourse in 
Burning Brands was due to the decision by the programme producer 
(Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013) to limit the discussion about Palestinian 
villages, towns and cities, such as Jerusalem, Jaffa and Safad, now 
occupied by Israel. Any talk or idea of selling historic Palestinian land, or 
compromising on giving up rights to it, was rejected in advance. As a 
result, the content dwelled on promoting loyalty to the homeland. This 
was symbolised by keeping and carrying the original keys of Al-Awda. 
Palestinians’ right to return to their homes, resources, agriculture and 
their original freedoms, were thus asserted by almost ignoring the Israeli 
occupation of such towns. The dominant view is that of Palestinians not 
only as refugees from earthly possessions and land, but also as refugees 
suspended in time, and held as if held in limbo (Leach and Mansouri, 
2004). 
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7.2.2 Religious values 
Religious values did not feature explicitly in the content of either Cultural 
Flashes or Burning Brands. Again, as was the case with children’s 
programmes, this absence may seem surprising, especially in the case of 
ASC cultural programming. In a conflict area like Palestine, religion can 
be seen as a convenient way for people to cope with daily life 
experiences. Without being overly factional, ASC producers could have 
focused on famous Islamic poets, philosophers and thinkers, including 
the ones that were mentioned in ASC children programming. Yet all 
these influential Islamic thinkers and artists were entirely absent from 
Burning Brands. By contrast, Fatah is largely secular in its cultural 
programming. In their move towards ending factional expressions in the 
media, ASC media producers may have seen religious messages as 
carrying an embedded form of factionalism, and may have decided that 
this was something to avoid, especially during the specific period focused 
on in this study, from March 2009 to January 2010, when the wounds 
caused by factional clashes still had not healed.  
The absence of religious values in Burning Brands may indicate a spirit 
of compromise between ASC producers and Hamas. Maybe for this 
reason this absence was not seen as surprising by one of the interviewed 
ASC producers (interview: Bardawil, 2013). The PSC may have opted 
not to address religious values because of its own outlook, and that of its 
sponsor, favouring a more secular discourse. It may have wanted to use 
the voice of a secular state rather than projecting the image, common in 
the American pro-Israel press, of Palestinian media as a vehicle for mass 
religious indoctrination (Lewis, 2013).  
Given that Hamas would like to establish its credentials as a state-
building party, the ASC response to such secular ethic may be to use a 
more universally acceptable set of discourses, rather than focusing on a 
specific, and Islamic, theological model of cultural life. What is 
interesting for this study is that the absence of explicit religious values in 
programme content can be interpreted as a sign that both the Fatah-
influenced PSC producers and the Hamas-influenced ASC producers 
have decided to keep away from the divisive influences, including 
divisive religious values that can split up the Palestinian population.  
PSC’s producers might not rely on religious discourse because their 
education and social attitudes steered them in a secular direction. This is 
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in line with the communicator-centred approach, which views media, 
and the content developed by it, as influenced by the ‘socialisation and 
attitudes’ of its producers (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996:6). The PSC’s 
staff members mostly work quite closely with international partners and 
allies. In PSC cultural programming, in the period under review, there 
were pervasive references to icons of global culture, ranging from 
German singers and an American playwright (CF22), to Saudi novelists 
(CF03) and Swedish and Danish novelists and artists (CF11). Islamic art 
and writing were absent from this global appetite, however, although one 
might expect religious literature to feature more visibly in a generally 
cultural programme. Perhaps by opting to focus on the diaspora, and on 
cultural events outside local (Palestinian) realities, PSC producers tried to 
avoid more explicit, and potentially divisive, references to religious 
values. 
PSC producers also differentiated quite sharply between the goals of 
different programmes, so that, for instance, in a sports commentary, 
internal politics of Fatah and Hamas are not discussed, but Israel may be 
mentioned explicitly for banning soccer teams or arresting players. 
Maybe the same kind of ‘specialisation’ applies to PSC cultural 
programmes as well, where religion is ‘outside the frame’ of the 
programme’s scope, as it were. Perhaps the lack of religious content in 
both ASC and PSC cultural programmes may be explained by neither 
channel wishing to be seen as factional.  
7.2.3 Citizens’ rights and obligations 
As was also the case in children’s programmes, discussions about human 
rights or citizens’ rights were entirely missing in the analysed cultural 
programmes of both ASC and PSC. As was discussed before, a general 
disbelief in the ‘power of rights’ may be behind this particular absence in 
terms of thematic content.  
The lack of rights values in the PSC’s Cultural Flashes was indirectly 
explained during an interview with the programme producers (Interview: 
Al Shafi, 2013). They told the story of the Palestinian intellectual Khalil 
Al Sakakini who started a school in Jerusalem, in opposition to the 
foreign schools in the city (CF13). The school’s curriculum included 
ethics and moral principles, but not rights The content of the 
programme made reference to the idea that rights are something of less 
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importance than personal dignity. Rights, it was suggested, can be 
requested or demanded, but without the inherent principle of dignity and 
self-respect, rights on their own are not enough; they are secondary. This 
argument may help to explain why most producers, including those who 
produced cultural programmes for ASC and PSC, in the period under 
review, did not consider including rights explicitly as a value in their 
programme content.  
7.2.4 Resistance and resistance literature 
Table 19 in Appendix 6 shows that a focus on resistance and resistance 
literature was present in around one quarter (24 percent) of all the 
reviewed Burning Brands episodes. Resistance was present in just two 
episodes (9.5 percent) of Cultural Flashes episodes (Table 37 in Appendix 
6). The Burning Brands episodes involved referred to ancient Greek poetry 
and literature of resistance, and to how divine laws allow for resistance 
and rebellion against tyranny and bad systems of government. It seems 
quite surprising that Burning Brands used examples from ancient Greece, 
which, on the surface, has nothing in common with an Islamic society. 
However, according to Professor Nabil Abu Ali, guest on the show: 
‘[several] forms of rejection and rebellion appeared first in the old Greek 
literature when Isknios rebelled against the God and decided to take fire 
and give it to people, so that fire becomes a source of knowledge’ 
(BB08). This may have reflected a compromise made by the producers, 
which allowed them to reflect on the historical precedents for Palestinian 
resistance literature, which first appeared after the 1936 Buraq 
revolution, sparked by the killings of three Palestinians by British 
Mandate forces.  
The literature of resistance was used in Burning Brands to give a voice 
to certain forms of resistance such as the use of bullets, rockets and 
guns. Most resistance literature referred to in Burning Brands focused on 
the legitimacy and power of armed resistance, and fully rejected the 
occupation. The wording was heavy, and referred to the scandalous 
practices of Israeli occupation and their impact on the dignity of 
Palestinians. In Burning Brands, the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani, who has 
often been accused by Islamists of focusing far too much on the female 
body in his poetry, was complimented for his help in introducing 
Palestinian poets to the world (BB20). Other poets, such as Mahmoud 
Darwish and Tawfiq Zyad, were also featured in the ASC’s programme, 
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as cultural icons. The selection these specific authors did not feed into 
the dominant political-religious ideology of Hamas, which (Interview: Al 
Bardawil, 2013) mentions Darwish with respect but still associates him 
with Fatah for drafting the Palestinian Independence Declaration 
document (mentioned in the previous chapter.) This suggests that a 
number of compromises were made by the producers to arrive at a form 
of ‘defactionalised’ media content in the ASC’s cultural programming.  
Burning Brands sharpened its focus on the culture of resistance by 
suggesting that many well-known Palestinian poets might not have 
achieved such global acclaim had it not been for the Palestinian 
resistance, which it claims to have consistently inspired those poets. In 
one episode, a professor was invited to comment on resistance literature. 
The discussion centred on whether or not to recognise other forms of 
resistance poetry, not written by acclaimed Palestinian poets, but by 
ordinary people who just happened to experience the same resistance 
against occupation (BB08). Similarly, revolutionary songs are often not 
considered as part of the resistance literature. The direction of resistance 
value programming in Burning Brands leaned toward reflecting on the 
suffering of the Palestinian people, their steadfastness, strength of 
character, and rejection of all forms of occupation. When the studied 
episodes were produced, during the period of 2009-2010, the Arab 
Spring had not yet started, but Burning Brands had already begun to 
present the image that Arab youth relied on resistance literature to 
inspire them to turn against their dictatorial regimes. This was done, for 
example, by referring to a famous saying by (later Islamic Jihad leader) 
Dr Fathi Al Shukaki, who stated that ‘the intellectual is the first to resist 
and the last to be defeated’ (BB06).  
In one reference to resistance, the producers of Cultural Flashes 
(CF12) made a direct appeal to the listeners for a redefinition of the 
meaning of resistance. Maya Abuel Hayat stated that, if Palestinians kept 
recycling the same content about resistance as in the past, this would 
become problematic as resistance itself and the power of this value 
would lose their impact. The generation of today would be defeated 
unless this notion could be reinvented, she insisted. In another episode 
of Cultural Flashes (CF10), clear reference was made to Abdelatif Akel, 
the founder of resistance literature, who not only fought through his 
poetry, but also predicted, again through his poetry, the upcoming 
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revolutions and the Intifada. He became well known as the inspirer of 
the ‘anthology of Palestinian resistance.’  
Tables 25 and 43 in Appendix 6 show the profile of guests invited to 
Burning Brands and Cultural Flashes, respectively. Since most guests can be 
assumed to have loyalties, it is relevant to see how both satellite TV 
outlets avoided inviting factional leaders as commentators or guests on 
the show. It is not that they could not invite them; they just chose not to 
do so. As a note on the production process, it is clear that both Burning 
Brands and Cultural Flashes used writers not affiliated to political parties or 
at least not taking leading positons in Fatah or Hamas (as shown in 
Appendix 6, Tables 25 and 43). Reference was made to all forms of 
oppression, segregation, injustice and discrimination of the Palestinians. 
In this specific context, Cultural Flashes rarely presented a resistance value 
which encouraged writers to expose oppression and injustice inflicted 
upon them. Instead, sarcasm within the conversation was used as a 
method of exposing the practices of Israeli occupation. No references 
were made to armed resistance. 
Burning Brands focused on resistance literature. In one episode, poetry 
was described as ‘a sword,’ with its words as the ‘sharp edges’ that 
defend principles as a sword would do (BB06). Using content, the 
producers of Burning Brands congratulated, and gave full credit to, the 
Palestinian resistance for their work and their efforts in obtaining the 
release of female Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Within this same 
context, in ASC’s cultural programming, resistance was applauded and 
referred to through various forms of poetry, stories, and novels by Arab 
writers who focussed on Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. 
The use of literature in Burning Brands, in the period under review, largely 
concentrated on the power of the word as competing with bullets on the 
battlefield. For example, a reference was made to the words of the 
Lebanese poet Salim Aladdin: ‘I say it in my voice, out loud, I want to 
resist, I want to resist’ (BB16).  
Burning Brands also invited Dr Nabil Khaled Abu Ali to comment on 
the literature of resistance. Instead of bringing in writers to talk about 
military resistance, the ASC’s producers seemed to have made a 
deliberate decision to invite a university professor, wearing a formal suit 
and tie, and presenting a balanced view on resistance literature. He 
objected to celebrating armed resistance in one episode (BB08). Cultural 
Flashes made similar ‘sacrifices,’ for example by inviting the West Bank-
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based poet Al Mutawkel Taha, who in one episode (CF16) spoke of 
Palestinian poets in general but also highlighted the work of Mujahid Izz 
El Deen Al Qassam of the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is 
part. Neither meaning would have been possible, were it not for 
deliberate decisions to avoid factional content in the cultural 
programmes of the ASC and PSC.  
7.2.5 Social values 
Social values appeared explicitly in 14.5 percent of Cultural Flashes 
episodes and in just one episode (5 percent of all episodes) of Burning 
Brands (see above, Tables 7.1 and 7.2, and Appendix 6). Social values 
were represented in Cultural Flashes only through a focus on the value 
that the humanity of Palestinian intellectuals and writers survives, in spite 
of the pain and suffering imposed on them and their fellow Palestinians 
by Israeli occupation (CF20). Similarly, the host of Cultural Flashes 
referred to the use of fear, which is challenged by Palestinian writers who 
refuse to submit to fear, and speak of replacing fear with openness and 
love (CF11). In essence, there was a call for the re-establishment of 
united relationships, in order to create renewed and stronger bonds 
among Palestinians. Likewise, the producers of Burning Brands called for 
openness in the use of Palestinian poetry covering miscellaneous topics, 
including love ballads and elegies, as long as that use refrained from 
offending, insulting or discriminating against others. This was another 
effort to culturally defactionalise the programme content in order to 
attract new viewers and make the producers of Burning Brands, who are 
Islamic, appear, just like their rivals and competitors at the PSC, keen to 
introduce new values and act as agents of change. 
When questioned about this, the producer of Burning Brands denied 
that this move was related to competition for audiences (Abu Jarad, 
2013) or reputation. However, the fact that the ASC included in its 
cultural programming, for example, poetic ballads that expressed love for 
women, points to a compromise in that direction. A concrete example is 
the Lebanese poet who had to censor himself by withdrawing the word 
‘son of a bitch’ when citing a poem in which he was blaming ‘the 
sleeping Arab leaders’ and his need to resist their oppression (BB10). 
That the social values content was lower for Burning Brands than for 
Cultural Flashes may, according to Abu Jarad (Interview, 2013) of Burning 
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Brands, have to do with a deliberate decision to protect the cultural rights 
of Palestinian poets and intellectuals. As he put it: ‘…that’s a personal 
choice which I made, as I like an intellectual politician who is able to 
handle issues, because I know that a politician who does not read history 
is blind… so I cannot deprive those with talents and different political 
affiliations of the chance to appear on our screen – after all, political 
affiliation is a personal decision and should not affect the decision as to 
who should be on air and who not’ (Abu Jarad, Interview, 2013).  
Attention for social values in Burning Brands mainly arose from 
compromises that were made, perhaps in an effort to maintain viability 
and dominance in relation to the more ‘trendy’ programme equivalent at 
the PSC, Cultural Flashes. Some of these compromises can be seen in an 
episode that focused on ‘Literature of the Mahjar’, in which a 
Palestinian-Swedish author was invited to speak. Although the producers 
could have invited someone to talk about internal issues, they, instead, 
choose to focus on literature written by Palestinians abroad (BB20). 
Other compromises were evident in two episodes (BB20, BB16). First, in 
BB16, the question was raised whether men should write love poems, or 
love ballads, to their wives. The love for and appreciation of women was 
presented in this discussion as a normal, universal and positive social 
value. This may suggest that other (mainly Islamic) male poets should be 
less harsh in their treatment of the topic of women and love in poetry 
(BB20). In a second example, poetic literature was justified by focusing 
on the positive value of brotherhood, and the need for brotherly unity in 
life. This occurred during a period of programming that coincided with a 
series of Fatah-Hamas confrontations, and the presenter of the show in 
episode BB06 quoted a famous saying by Islamic Jihad leader and one of 
its founders, Dr Fathi Al-Shukaki: ‘The intellectual is the first to resist 
and the last to be defeated.’ In another episode, Dr Samir Al Omary said 
that: ‘Despite our differences, there should be no difference between 
us… and I stretch out my hand to do serious work that sheds light on 
the Ummah and all generations’ (BB20). As both factions (Hamas and 
Fatah) were searching for common ground and for positive social values 
that could unite them in the future, rather than naming and shaming one 
another, this search found expression in Burning Brands, through appeals 
in the form of literature and poetry. 
This shows that, even in the midst of factional conflict, the 
production of Burning Brands episodes was intended to appeal to a wider 
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audience including Fatah supporters and those not loyal to Hamas. The 
producer was clear about this display of the urgency of reconciliation, of 
shared identity and of national unity between Palestinian factions, and a 
unite-or-lose-everything approach to Palestinian solidarity and the future 
of Palestinian politics, where ‘culture should be the topic that unites us 
as Palestinians and not what divides us’ (Al Bardawil, 2013).  
In Cultural Flashes, the content espoused social values through authors 
and writers who, regardless of their personal success, have common 
roots that unite human beings. Courage with humility was presented as a 
basic value, in advising the younger generations about authors, poets and 
writers who were able to challenge their surroundings while retaining a 
strong self-awareness. The social values content in Cultural Flashes, 
though minor, thus conveyed a positivistic view of social values in terms 
of social fabric, familial relations, a sense of belonging, and a culture of 
sharing between people, especially those trapped in refugee camps. 
Similarly, social transformation in life was presented in programme 
content by describing how Palestinians, prior to the Nakba of 1947 and 
Israeli statehood in 1948, lived free as extended families on farms, or as 
free-roaming tribal nomads and shepherds. This contrasted with their 
lack of freedom today, forced into displaced refugee areas and enclaves 
as they were (CF10). Even so, Palestinians were viewed as still bonded 
by common social practices, regardless of differences in family origins 
and location. Courage as a value was visible in both television 
programmes, describing the lives of Palestinians, including Palestinian 
poets who asked to stay with their families and share their daily lives, 
norms and practices and to experience, rather than run away from, the 
daily suffering under Israeli occupation, blockades and military attacks. 
These writers, such as Jumana Hadada (CF18) and Mohammed Al Bidar 
(BB21), were praised for transforming these shared experiences into 
novels and poems. Cultural Flashes celebrated this success as further 
enriching a trend toward positive and more diverse cultural expression 
among Palestinians.  
Despite the Islamic and factional Fatah thinking in this matter, the 
poet, writer and artist, as a human being, was privileged in both the 
ASC’s and PSC’s cultural programmes. It was in writers and artists, 
rather than in politically active individuals, that both programmes placed 
their hopes for the future of Palestinians. Along the same lines, equality 
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between intellectuals and poets and the rest of the community was 
communicated as a desirable social value in ASC’s cultural programming, 
perhaps for the first time since 2009-10. There were obvious criticisms as 
well. In the content of Burning Brands, for example, there was criticism of 
those who chose to ‘live in high towers,’ and were far removed from the 
harsh daily realities of most Palestinians’ lives. Such people, it was 
suggested, should not distance themselves from their common roots and 
should return to looking at the reality on the ground, and share in the 
daily life of ordinary Palestinians (BB14). Class thus returns as a 
secondary issue in some of the social values appearing in the ASC’s 
cultural programming.  
7.2.6 Cultural values 
As shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 (and in Appendix 6), cultural values 
appeared in all episodes of Cultural Flashes and in close to two-thirds (62 
per cent) of the episodes of Burning Brands. Whilst Cultural Flashes paid 
extensive attention to Palestinian cultural production, by focusing on 
ideas that make up the whole of Palestinian history, in Burning Brands the 
focus was perhaps more narrow, and less explicit mention was made of 
many of the cultural artifacts that were noted earlier in this chapter as 
closely associated with the PA and Fatah, such as the Palestinian Kuffiyeh 
and renowned Palestinian authors who are somewhat in favour of 
Fatah/PA or the PLO.  
On PSC satellite TV, the producers of Cultural Flashes gave 
prominence to Majalet Shabab Filisteen (Palestine Youth Magazine). 
This reinforced a youth-centred cultural scene that had emerged across 
the Palestinian diaspora and in Palestine, and included a poet like 
Najwan Darwish (CF20) and novelist Ahmed Haram, who discussed the 
literature written by young Palestinians (CF17). These youthful 
Palestinian cultural expressions were better reflected in the PSC’s cultural 
programme Cultural Flashes than in the ASC’s Burning Brands, which, by 
and large, still seemed to favour age and experience over youth. The 
PSC’s cultural programming showed the cultural diversity of Palestinian 
writers living in the West, for example, and how they came to share their 
experiences with making art and literature with Palestinian youth in 
Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. One example was Ali Mousa, who 
commented on a youth gathering, saying that the event offered ‘a model 
for bypassing the division imposed by the Israeli occupation, even if that 
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is through art, literature and poems’ (CF06). In one episode of Cultural 
Flashes, Palestinian writer Hisham Nafa’a discussed the structure and 
techniques of short stories (CF21). In Cultural Flashes the focus was on 
prominent Palestinian intellectuals, like Ali Al Khalili, who was selected 
as cultural figure of the year in 2010 (CF20). He talked about how much 
language had been ruined by the younger generations. At the same time 
he admired the new generation of young writers, who for him produced:  
‘…the deep, intelligent writings which pay attention to the smallest details 
of our daily lives from the T-shirt of a child, or a flower, using terms that 
can scratch the skin of a culture… this is not depressed writing, but it 
needs those who support it’.  
Al Khalili also recommended more open criticism, because it will only 
make youth and their writing stronger. During this period, Cultural 
Flashes also focused on Hisham Shrabi, one of Palestine’s and the Arab 
world’s most famous intellectuals, who fought for the national cause by 
teaching Arab civilisation in the US and by establishing the Institute of 
Palestine Studies (CF17). He was recognized as ‘one of the most 
prominent Arab intellectuals’ by Birzeit Professor of Philosophy 
Abdelkarim Al Barghouti. The programme also focused on Palestinian 
poets like Amer Badran (CF16), by presenting clips about their work. 
Drama directors and a female Palestinian pianist were interviewed in the 
show as well. 
In the programme Cultural Flashes, the producers introduced a list of 
all weekly cultural events and activities in Palestine (CF20), so as to 
display the richness of Palestinian culture, even under occupation. Visual 
arts and drama were also used to further the topic of Palestine’s struggle 
against occupation and for the cause of freedom. Literature was referred 
to, so as to highlight Palestine’s distinct cultural history and identity. 
Stand-up comedy made its mark here as well, as demonstrated by the 
Palestinian-American female artist Maisoon Zayed, who was presented in 
Cultural Flashes as an exponent of a new form of cultural value (CF16). 
According to Wadi Henni, commenting on the Irish film ‘Hunger,’ 
which covered hunger strikes in British jails in 1981, in which 9 prisoners 
died (CF09):  
‘this year’s film production is done by a new generation with totally new 
stories and that is obvious… we are trying to bring films to Palestinians 
from outside of Hollywood and the commercial films circles. There are 
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films that we can apply on our Palestinian cause and some are also 
connected to our human story.’  
Among those weekly programmes that Cultural Flashes introduced is a 
review of the work of another young Lebanese filmmaker, Jan Shamoun, 
including his film ‘Women Behind Bars,’ produced in 2008, and 
documenting the experience of Palestinian women arrested and thrown 
in Israeli jails. The programme confronts Israeli oppression, when a 
female prisoner in the documentary reports being threatened with sexual 
violence by Israeli soldiers, and states:  
‘He grabbed me by the hair and pulled me down the steps. They walked 
me out, put me in a jeep. One grabbed me by the leg and one by the 
hands, and made me lie down in the back and started beating me with 
guns on my body. They made dirty gestures’ (CF09).  
Shashat, an organization for female filmmakers, was also included in one 
of the programme’s episodes (CF19). Artists have been applauded for 
their impact on the screens of international film festivals. The work of 
the late Palestinian writer Khalil Al Sakakini was introduced in an 
episode (CF13), and the presenter of Cultural Flashes invited a guest who 
referred to the negative impact of foreign language schools in Jerusalem. 
The impact of the latter on Palestinian youth was seen as particularly 
serious, and Al Sakakini called for Palestinian schools to act more, stand 
out more and better market Palestinian values and traditions.  
At times, Burning Brands made unusual compromises in both 
production decisions and content. For example, in production, it was 
decided to feature the Lebanese Shiite poet Salim Aladdin (BB16), who is 
also an actor and journalist, but someone who does not appear to be of 
the same respected status as most other guests invited to Burning Brands. 
This was perhaps a compromise-type decision, making concessions to 
popular taste in order to attain overall dominance in media spaces. The 
work of D’Acci suggests that, by incorporating cultural artifacts, which 
in this case includes literary works, the producers may have been making 
decisions that reflected their priorities with attracting a audience rather 
than with being a ‘typical’ Burning Brands Islam-oriented programme. 
Surprising departures from orthodoxy can occur in this way. For 
example, in the same episode (BB16), the poet Salim Aladdin recited 
these words:  
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‘Do not release the word from my hands, and run away from me, and after 
I walk away a teardrop on your cheek is the colour of wine, either clean 
this tear with no appreciation: a drop of moisture that is gone from the 
flower, or get drunk in me and add more….’  
If such content appeals to audiences, it enables Burning Brands to 
maintain viability as a channel, something seen by the producers as a 
point of strength. Interviews also revealed that, indeed, the ASC’s 
producers have made deliberate choices to bring contradictions into the 
content, by inviting people who are not necessarily in agreement with the 
Islamic view of most of the ASC’s shows. After all, as Al-Bardawil put it 
(Interview, 2013): ‘It is not to our advantage to minimise our TV 
programming to a single group or faction.’  
At the production level, producers’ choices can bring not only a poet 
who mentions wine and getting drunk, but also a Christian who could 
say anything he wanted about resistance and nationalism. According to 
Abu Jarad, the presenter of Burning Brands:  
‘When someone affiliated to the Islamic movement of Hamas talks about 
resistance in his poem, that is expected, but a Christian Palestinian talking 
about resistance, that is unexpected and worth noting. I have the aim of 
achieving consensus by showing everyone that Palestine is a land for all 
and this is our land’ (Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013).  
Burning Brands started to introduce cultural content into the 
programme that referred to wider Palestinian traditions, motifs like olive 
trees, agriculture, and the use of home crafts, all in a traditional, 
comfortable stage setting, together with coffee and a fire. In addition, the 
typical image of a Palestinian farmer taking a midday rest from his work, 
in the shade of an olive tree, was used. In one episode, this type of 
content was presented by poet Khader Abu Jahjoh, to reinforce the 
traditional images of the work that most Palestinians did, as caretakers of 
the land and livestock, prior to 1948 (BB14). As noted earlier, in the 
discussion of cultural values and artifacts in children’s programmes, 
Hamas generally did not identify as strongly as Fatah with these folkloric 
cultural symbols.  
An episode of Cultural Flashes involved discussion about new cultural 
ideals and values that were bursting on to the media screen via the 
exponential growth of the Internet (CF16). Twitter, other social media, 
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student dialogue and so forth, all link Palestine with the wider outside 
world. Cultural Flashes went further and travelled beyond the Palestinian 
and Arab borders to promote global Palestinian authors and intellectuals, 
including Edward Said, who were able to carry the message of Palestine 
to the global community. Covering these figures was meant to widen 
knowledge among Palestinians, about their history, their struggles and 
historical intellectual traditions, beyond the region. The head of TV 
programming of the ASC, Al Asfar (Interview: 2013), said ‘we are talking 
about artists, poets, writers, musicians, cartoonists and filmmakers who 
are usually not controversial to anyone. Culture in Palestine forms a 
shared ground.’  
7.2.7 Political values 
As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show, political values occur with the same 
frequency in both the PSC Cultural Flashes and in the ASC’s Burning 
Brands, of 38 percent each. This is not particularly surprising, as the 
political situation determined how much both parties wanted to inject 
their political agendas into their TV programming in the period under 
review. Political values can here be viewed by using the Shoemaker and 
Reese (1996) ‘hierarchy of influences model’ that was inspired by Gans 
(1979) and Gitlin (1980). This model suggests that media organisations 
influence production and content in a vital way. It also suggests that 
political values that appear in a show do not occur by themselves, but are 
‘coloured’ by the media organisations, to make them appear in a 
particular way. The particular approach used in this model came in 
response to critiques of the ‘mirror approach,’ according to which media 
reflect public social reality in a ‘neutral’ manner and without distortion 
(Altheide, 1976; Watson and Hill, 2000). 
So, for instance, Cultural Flashes gave prominence to Palestinian youth 
(CF14), not only to show how much social media had impacted upon 
their lives, but also to show how much impact they had upon social 
media. The programme also focused on the experience of poets who had 
been forced to migrate to Jordan and other countries due to Israeli 
invasion and occupation. Reference was made to a play about Izz al Din 
Al Qassam, a Palestinian mujahid/fighter. Cultural Flashes focused on 
presenting the lives of Palestinians who were ‘extracted’ from Palestine, 
and were forced into the outside world, to face separation, alienation and 
continued injustice during exile (CF12). 
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Another political reference was made by Cultural Flashes when it 
reported on how Jewish gangs broke into the home of the Palestinian 
intellectual Khalil Al Sakakini and destroyed his personal belongings, 
including his writings and books (CF13). The choice of Al Sakakini as a 
national artifact, in the sense used by D’Acci, (2004) was made because 
he was someone with whom also the wider pan-Arab public could 
identify. This particular representation was meant to promote political 
values focusing on the injustice toward Palestinian intellectuals, who at 
the time were already suffering under Israeli oppression and intimidation, 
as still is the case to date, as seen from the perspective of the head of the 
PSC’s programming in Gaza, Al Shafi (Interview: 2013).  
The producers of Cultural Flashes made a deliberate choice to include 
Palestinian women in the (sometimes humouristic) challenge of 
traditions and forms of thinking (CF16). Burning Brands, on a few 
occasions, talked about a number of female Palestinian prisoners who 
were held indefinitely by Israel. Their courage was praised upon their 
eventual release. In an episode (BB20), recorded while talks of releasing 
19 female prisoners were going on, it was explained that they would be 
released from an Israeli jail in exchange for just one Israeli soldier, 
captured and held by the Palestinian resistance in Gaza. However, in 
relation to making women visible, there was a clear difference between 
Burning Brands and Cultural Flashes. The ASC brought no women at all 
into the programme, during the entire period of the study. This was a 
deliberate production decision, clearly based on a judgement about the 
acceptable parameters of ‘openness’ and less factional content. If Abu 
Jarad, the ASC’s producer of Burning Brands, was to challenge the internal 
rules and routines or even break them, by appearing together with a 
female writer in the programme, there would be consequences he 
presumably was not willing to risk. Undoubtedly, this discouraged him 
from inviting women to be present in the programme:  
‘We grew up in an Islamic society, conservative and religious – from this 
we have inherited an awareness, habits, traditions and social norms that we 
should stick to in our work, so it is natural that you stick to this. It would 
be strange to drift away from this direction… I can’t bring an unveiled 
female poet into the programme that is against my own philosophy, my 
own upbringing and the policy and intellectual philosophy of the channel’ 
(Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013). 
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In the end, it is not only the upbringing of staff members that shapes 
the content, but also sets of rules and regulations. Sometimes, I got the 
feeling that these regulations were a bit exaggerated, in terms of their 
strictness, by staff members. There seemed to be a competition going on 
between staff members as to who followed such regulations most 
closely. Abu Jarad (2013) acknowledged this as follows: ‘Even if I am an 
independent figure and work for any channel, then I will be guided by 
the regulations of the channel. After all, we work in accordance with the 
policy of the TV channel.’  
As was the case in Burning Brands, the producers of Cultural Flashes 
also, in the programme content, made reference to historical Palestine as 
extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan (CF08). The 
producers of Burning Brands seemed to appreciate presenting the theme 
of victory, for instance, when prisoners are exchanged in deals (BB20). 
This spirit of victory in the content was not equally apparent in Cultural 
Flashes. Rather, there was more of a tone of Palestinian defeat in the face 
of Israeli authority. Nonwithstanding that defeat, however, the 
programme expressed the view that a new generation of Palestinian 
youth might look for new methods to continue the cause, turning 
present failure into future successes (CF20).  
Another political aspect of the content of Cultural Flashes was found in 
an episode that focused on the issue of the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, 
and that drew protests from Israel and the US. The episode built on the 
content of an article written by Motowakel Taha that stated that the 
Wailing Wall is Muslim property and should be returned as part of the 
the Al Aqsa mosque property. Thus, according to Taha, the Wailing Wall 
should not be part of Jewish places of worship but must be seen as a 
‘part that cannot be separated from Al Aqsa mosque’ (CF21). Applying 
D’Acci’s (2004) framework, ‘the Al Aqsa mosque’ then acted as an 
artifact represented here to underline the political value of reminding the 
Palestinian public that a holy Islamic site is under illegitimate Israeli 
control, and is inaccessible to most Muslims living in Palestine. Just by 
mentioning the Al Aqsa mosque, one triggers an emotional response. In 
its content, Cultural Flashes called for all issues related to the cause of 
Palestine to be redefined and rethought. It has even referred to the 
Israeli occupation as ‘fascist,’ after an example in an American film 
known as ‘Occupation 101’ that was screened in episode CF14.  
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Political satire has also been present in discussions around the Israeli-
Palestinian agreements. In this context, the Oslo Accords are presented 
as, ironically, a blow to the overall cultural, political and economic life of 
Palestinians. Through satire, this challenges the PA’s official line 
(Sienkwitcz, 2012). A form of defactionalisation can be seen in the 
deliberate editorial decisions to retain overall influence on content of the 
PA, whilst also allowing for some criticism of the Oslo Accords, an 
agreement signed by the PA with Israel. This suggests a relatively 
democratic media environment that allows occasional criticism now and 
then. Thus compromise takes place, even though satire that openly 
mocks the Oslo Accords would not be likely, not even now.  
On one rare occasion, Cultural Flashes covered a political topic in 
which the Hamas de facto government in Gaza decided to confiscate two 
novels for containing inappropriate concepts and meanings, which were 
seen as immoral (CF16). In the introduction to another episode of 
Cultural Flashes, the host made a negative reference toward the Palestinian 
intellectual Khaled Darwish and his having tea with Al Aqsa Brigades 
militants of Fatah. Other left-wing factions were referred to in a more 
positive way, however, suggesting a hint of factionalism (CF12).  
A sense of restlessness and frustration, related to the condition of 
people being perpetual refugees, was also present in the content of 
Cultural Flashes. Even after authors had returned from exile, they 
expressed how they still felt like strangers in their own home. The 
message here was that it is better not to leave Palestine, but to remain 
steadfast, and focus on the positive, remaining optimistic even though 
living in refugee camps in your own land and not having the rights that 
are assigned to many refugees elsewhere. Likewise, Burning Brands 
focused on the alienation brought about by forced exile. In one episode, 
a Palestinian poet living in Sweden was introduced. He wrote about the 
tough conditions of political prisoners and how emotionally difficult he 
found it to watch, from afar, what was taking place in Palestine. He 
especially mentioned the Gaza war:  
‘We lived the war as if we were there, our hearts and spirits were there, and 
our eyes were glued to the TV screens. For three days we did not sleep, 
even my small children… This is the spiritual connection for someone 
who loves his land’ (BB20).  
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The Israeli war on Gaza took up much airtime in both programmes, 
which is not surprising, given the fact that production took place in a 
local area under Israeli attack. Burning Brands stuck to the value of the 
intellectual being the first to fight and the last to be defeated. 
Political values were presented, that related to a sense of nationalism, 
and that advised Palestinians not to seek asylum or live as strangers in a 
foreign country, but to remain at home, however hard the 
conditions. Political values that encouraged people to stay and defend 
their land were somewhat contradicted by Islamic traditions, however. In 
Islamic tradition, traveling is considered a positive thing that enriches 
one’s experience and knowledge. In the content of Burning Brands, 
Palestinians were depicted as a group of people sitting in a hot water 
boiler under high pressure, with literature representing the steam 
escaping from the boiler through the pressure-release valves, as 
explained from the perspective of Professor Khader Abu Jahjouh 
(BB14).  
The Fatah movement organised cultural evenings to be shown in 
Cultural Flashes, hosting, among others, Palestinian poet Sameh Al 
Qassim (CF06) who gave hope to Palestinians living in Jericho, and the 
‘Palestinian Writers Union,’ which itself was put together by Fatah 
affiliates in Gaza (CF04). With regard to the featuring of this Palestinian 
Writers Union, a compromise was made over the content, in that 
religious references would be in the form of citations of Quranic verses, 
to demonstrate the power of the Arabic language in the Palestinian 
national discourse (CF09). This (intended) use of the Quran might have 
been an attempt to attract new viewers, mostly supportive of Hamas and 
other Islamic groups, but in this episode no religious values were 
expressed (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). The quotation from the Quran 
appeared to be a gesture, as most events usually started with the citation 
of verses from the Quran, and did not necessarily imply any intention of 
carrying a specific religious message.  
Also in Burning Brands, content and production of episodes were the 
result of a number of compromises. One example was a discussion about 
the establishment of a new union for Palestinian writers, in which 
Hamas-affiliated writers would hold the chair. Dr Atallah Abuelsebah 
had spoken out against Fatah in earlier times, not directly, by calling 
them by name, but indirectly, referring to them as the ‘old bureaucrats’ 
or the old leadership of the Union of Palestinian Writers who did not 
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provide ‘unification’ for Palestinian intellectuals (BB19). The old writers’ 
union, which was Fatah-affiliated, was accused of squabbling frequently 
and having a fairly narrow vision, which prevented it from dealing with 
the many issues brought forward by intellectuals, such as writers, poets, 
novelists and artists (Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013). The new Union of 
Writers claimed that it called for national unity, Fatah and Hamas 
included.  
The period of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2008-2009 shaped much of 
the production and content of Burning Brands, with programme content 
focusing on the pain and agony of the Gazan civilians during Israel’s 
assault at the time. There was coverage of missiles and rockets falling on 
civilians, men, women and children, who had no adequate shelter or 
means of defending themselves. In episode BB05, Dr Abu Moussa Abu 
Dakka expressed this as follows: ‘Tell the sunlight in Gaza to drink the 
salt of that blood… tell the waves of the sea in Gaza to drink the salt of 
that blood… Gaza might rise and let the land resist, it is a position of 
integrity that can’t be negotiated’. While the content called for national 
unity, it remained critical of any open dialogue with Israel, and of the 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in general. Whereas Cultural Flashes rarely 
mentioned Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, also not in a negative way, 
Burning Brands often looked at them in a fault-finding way, by claiming 
that they were used by Israel to distract attention from issues vital to the 
Palestinian cause, such as refugees, Jerusalem and the right to return 
(BB01).  
The separation wall was mentioned in both programmes (CF01) 
(BB18), as an injustice inflicted on civilians. The ‘fighting of brothers’ 
(Hamas vs. Fatah) was referred to on one occasion, and this was 
followed by a call to bridge the gap between different Palestinian groups 
and to focus on Israel as the common enemy (BB19). Even though both 
programmes did not host government officials (as shown in Appendix 6, 
in Tables 25 and 43), Prime Minister Salam Fayyad was mentioned in 
Cultural Flashes (CF17) and de facto Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in 
Burning Brands (BB06).  
7.2.8 Educational values 
Educational values had a zero score, in terms of their appearance in both 
cultural programmes. This is not surprising, given the aim of both 
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programmes to appeal to wider, adult audiences with a strong interest in 
cultural affairs. Generally, educational content was absent because adult 
audiences are not addressed in a didactical-educational manner in cultural 
programmes with a sophisticated content. Adults are treated as well-
informed individuals, already familiar with all aspects of Palestine’s 
situation.  
7.2.9 Entertainment  
Finally, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show that entertainment values appeared in a 
third of all episodes of the PSC’s Cultural Flashes, while they did not 
appear at all in the ASC’s Burning Brands. Cultural Flashes focused on 
Palestinian arts and traditions including Dabka (the national dance,) 
music, poetry and comedy. The introduction of paintings and – 
sometimes humorous - art was meant to challenge rigid settings and to 
broaden the content. Both Cultural Flashes and Burning Brands made 
reference to the poet Dr Samer Al Omary. Cultural Flashes highlighted his 
most cheerful poems, on dancing for women, storms, an Andalusian 
boy, birth and a crazy girl (CF14), whereas Burning Brands focused on a 
selection of his more serious literature about resistance (BB20). The 
nearest Burning Brands got to bringing a whif of entertainment was when 
the author’s poems and ballads of love were discussed. In these poems, 
women, when they talk, are alikened to a ‘season of flowers’ by the poet 
(BB20). 
In one episode, Cultural Flashes conveyed its intended message, about 
love and relationships, in a more indirect way, through a mix of transfer 
of serious values, playful use of acting and drama on stage, and use of 
body language and facial expressions (CF13). Actress Bayan Shbeeb read 
to the public in Ramallah’s Anisa café: ‘I met you on Facebook. You 
were enthusiastic in the streets of life, face to face. I met you, fantastic. 
Your eyes crossed my eyes like dozens of others, pathetic, naïve, socially 
retarded. Sorry, is that who you are?’ The scenes will have appealed to 
the younger generation, whose members meet on-line and may struggle 
with tensions between mediated and direct communication.  
New methods, styles and techniques of entertainment included 
adding more colour and feeling to what was previously rather dry 
content, that focused more on political struggle. One explanation as to 
why Burning Brands had a zero frequency of occurrence with regard to 
entertainment is that other values prevailed in the content. In the period 
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under review, the producers tended to focus largely on negative content, 
while – at the same time - the people had many negative experiences in 
their lives. Just like in children’s programming, the use of entertainment 
and fun was seen as frivolous, and consisting of a futile attempt to 
distract the audience from, or anaesthetise it against, the violence of 
occupation, and it was even seen as a form of denial of reality. From an 
Islamist perspective, in Palestine, what matters most is not entertainment 
but critical thought, channelled through cultural programming, that 
enables the population to deal with their daily reality. Another 
circumstance that might explain why entertainment was not present in 
Burning Brands was the constant presence of war, with Gaza being 
severely and directly affected by the Israeli occupation and blockade all 
year round, and by large-scale bombings and killings, although in 2009 
these offensives were just forerunners of the onslaught that would 
follow in the years thereafter.  
It was considered not the right time or the right place for 
entertainment: ‘Given the plight that Palestinian children are enduring, 
you don’t want to cancel the external feelings of a child or the 
intellectuality of adults by showing overt use of entertainment’ 
(Interview: Al-Bardawil, 2013). From a strict Islamic perspective, pure 
entertainment appears offensive to the feelings of people still suffering 
from the pain and losses of occupation and war. To laugh and have fun 
while other people are still suffering is considered rude, insensitive and 
not appropriate, in view of the overall, ongoing situation in Palestine. It 
also certainly does not ‘feed into the general guidelines of the ASC where 
Al Quds, Refugees and Prisoners are the main focus’ (Abu Mohsen, 
2013). The ASC’s leadership did not seem to realise that laughter is a 
fundamental human emotion that helps in dealing with trauma and that 
should not automatically be taken to imply a lack of compassion – on the 
contrary, as demonstrated in research (Konijn, 2008), which established 
the importance of humour in Arab cinema.  
7.3 Overall Thematic Content Analysis of Cultural 
Programmes  
According to Gans’s (1979) and Gitlin’s (1980) approaches, the relative 
absence of armed resistance values in the ASC’s and PSC’s cultural 
programmes is a sign that ‘content is influenced by social institutions and 
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forces.’ In applying D’Acci’s (2004) ‘circuits of media’ framework, one 
sees that production decisions are also influenced by the ways in which 
media producers perceive reality. Thus, for the ASC, at the time, there 
was an occupation and the way to deal with it was by military action, 
while for the PSC ‘organisational routines’ seemed to play an important 
role in shaping content. The PSC, which is part of the PA, would be at 
risk if it would suddenly start promoting resistance values from 
Ramallah, an area that is still under direct control of Israel, despite the 
PA’s presence.  
With the PA as negotiator and potential peace partner with Israel, it 
might be that the PSC could not afford to raise any debates that might 
be seen as inciting ‘violence,’ which might also include resistance, and/or 
other action that could be interpreted as a form of rebellion. External 
factors outside the media thus shaped media content. This is true even 
though Fatah still retained a link with the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, 
which continued to call for resistance. However, even this form of 
resistance was silenced by the PA’s officials, in order to, so the argument 
goes, avoid putting the rest of the party, the PA’s leaders and Palestinian 
civilians at risk of attack by Israel (Frisch, 2005). One major 
consideration, which will be returned to later in this chapter, was and is 
the concern of both channels – the PSC and the ASC – to retain strong 
ratings and to attract new audiences for their cultural and children’s 
programmes. They wished to attract wider audiences than those already 
affiliated with Fatah or Hamas (Interviews: Al Shafi, 2013; Al Bardawil, 
2013).  
The focus on poets and literary people, revealed in both Cultural 
Flashes and Burning Brands, was of considerable interest, as it marked a 
genuine departure from the past. Instead of in content that focused on 
the poet as representing a faction or affiliation, in the content analysed 
here the invited poet’s humanity came first. This contrasted with the 
situation in the past, in which for many years, whenever the PSC and the 
ASC presented poetry and other forms of literature, they would tend to 
divide those invited quite strictly into ‘ours’ and ‘theirs.’ Only ‘loyal’ 
supporters of their own faction would be invited to speak (Miftah, 
2008). There has thus been a considerable shift in the direction of media 
defactionalisation, which supports the position taken in Chapters 2 and 
3.  
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In general, during the study period, Burning Brands started to introduce 
different types of Palestinian intellectuals into the programme. These 
included artists, novelists and poets. Some fed into the rhetoric of 
Islamic thinking and others more into general cultural values. Yet, whilst 
one would (naturally) expect such Islamic scholars to explicitly convey 
Islamic values in the programme, this did not happen. Neither in Burning 
Brands nor in Cultural Flashes did religious values become explicit ones. 
What becomes visible here are forms of defactionalisation that evidently 
took place in production within the ASC, and in turn influenced the 
‘other side’, encouraging them talso to defactionalise content.  Thus, 
Burning Brands introduced some young Palestinian writers such as 
Mohammed Labeed (BB21), and critics such as Dr Mussa Abu Daqqa 
(BB05) and other independent figures, who re-visited shared cultural 
values such as familial and personal generosity and courage.  
Direct references to the context and realities surrounding the 
programming were equally present in the content of both Burning Brands 
and Cultural Flashes. All aspects of political values lean in one direction: 
the naming and shaming of Israel as the oppressor, the political rights of 
Palestinians and a constant focus on refugees, the prior wars on Gaza, 
the Israeli siege and the Al Aqsa Intifada.  
One of the most striking findings of this study was the neglect of 
religious values and human rights’ values in both the children’s and 
cultural programmes of the ASC and PSC. Each satellite channel has 
cultural programmes with content decided on by groups of individuals 
organised in teams. However, the lack of explicit religious content is 
likely to be the outcome of decisions negotiated at the production level, 
rather than the result of an oversight or accident. When informed about 
the lack of explicit religious values in these two programmes, the heads 
of programming of both the ASC and the PSC saw this lack as a mistake, 
which should be rectified, and should not have been allowed to happen 
in the first place. Their feeling seemed to be inspired by the notion that, 
as Palestine is the ‘capital’ of three global religions, a programme about 
Palestinian culture should include religious values and content. 
Professionally speaking, they felt that a cultural programme was a 
suitable media space for religious values to be embedded in content, 
without perhaps needing to be made explicit (Interview: Al Bardawil, 
2013; Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). Accordingly, both the PSC’s and ASC’s 
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senior staff agreed and even insisted that the lack of religious content 
was not a deliberate decision. They considered this absence to be an 
error or oversight in the production process. Yet, for some scholars 
(Spangler, 2015; Allen, 2013), an unwillingness to engage with rights 
values simply reflects the Palestinians’ generalised exhaustion with the 
discourses on and institutions of human rights, which seem to provide 
no practical solutions for the dire situation of Palestinians in Gaza and 
the West Bank. One researcher, with some direct experience of living in 
Gaza and the West Bank and working with human rights NGOs in these 
areas, referred to Hamas’s ‘uniquely critical perspective on and approach 
to human rights practices that challenges presumptions about the 
universal status of human rights’ (Allen, 2013: 31). A sense of alienation 
from human rights approaches is shared by the PSC’s producers as well, 
it seems.  
7.4 Overall Thematic Content Analysis: Defactionalising 
Media Content?  
Despite the denial by producers that donors play a significant role, it was 
found that the two ASC programmes, which are much less reliant on 
donor funding from outside Palestine, at least from the West (one would 
presume,) did have relatively higher percentage scores for content values 
around resistance, political values, and to some extent, nationalism. Since 
the PSC was driven by tight regulations and closely guided by donor 
groups who financed the TV station, the lower percentage of these 
values in overall content is perhaps unsurprising. Yet, in terms of social 
values, the picture was quite in reverse, with the PSC having higher 
frequencies of resistance values than than the ASC in its cultural 
programming. Both the ASC and the PSC had very similar frequencies of 
resistance and nationalism values in their children’s programming. Both 
TV stations delivered messages to children that contained noticeable 
social values and featured educational content. For cultural values, the 
frequencies for the ASC’s programmes were lower than for the PSC’s 
programmes, especially for children’s programmes. This may reflect that 
the PSC’s Cultural Flashes focused almost entirely on cultural values, and 
that both cultural shows did have higher frequencies of cultural values 
than one would expect. Representing the cultural values of Palestinians is 
something the PSC – more than the ASC – has prided itself on, 
historically. This emphasis on cultural artifacts (such as clothing, dance 
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and forms of expression, plants, flags, and so on) was in marked contrast 
with what one would expect in the case of the ASC, where a stronger 
focus on religion and on resistance would be expected than in the PSC. 
However, the only cultures that appeared to figure in the ASC’s mind-set 
were those of resistance and of nationhood.  
Political values did not appear in either of the children’s programmes, 
a finding which, again, is not that surprising. A calm period in the 
relations between Hamas and Fatah contributed to this, no doubt, during 
the study period from March 2009 to January 2010. Nationalistic values 
related to Palestine, such as prisoners and the right to return, have been 
present in the ASC’s children’s TV content, but overall have been more 
significantly present in cultural programmes than in children’s 
programmes. Whereas educational values were missing from both 
cultural programmes, both children’s programmes clearly contained 
them. As far as entertainment is concerned, however, the PSC focused a 
lot of effort on making the contents and production more geared 
towards entertaining children and making them happy. The ASC, by 
contrast, included far fewer ‘entertainment’ elements in its children’s 
programming. During the studied period, entertainment values were also 
almost invisible in the ASC’s cultural programme Burning Brands.  
By looking at the values and applying D’Acci’s ‘circuits of media’, one 
sees that defactionalisation of media content and production is still 
effective, despite the continuation of low-level factional practices on the 
ground. Sometimes media censorship, or rather exclusion of key leaders 
as rivals, has resulted in less room for media squabbling and for injecting 
factionalised agendas in children’s and cultural programmes. Economic 
constraints may have contributed to defactionalisation in the four 
programmes studied. Clearly, also deliberate decisions were made to 
defactionalise content by focusing on other generalised values, with the 
intent to avoid bringing the PSC and the ASC back to square one, to a 
point of confrontation. The focus on cultural and children’s 
programming brought on a lively discussion about Palestinianism versus 
a new nationalism, an idea that will be examined in the light of the 
concepts of defactionalisation of media production and content in the 
next chapter of this thesis.  
A number of Palestinian lobbying groups, other civil society groups, 
social groups and national reconciliation committees have been formed 
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by intellectuals and academics. The social-historical contexts of media 
production have influenced the content of children’s and culture 
programmes of both channels during and prior to the period of their 
broadcast. This means that people tend to experience issues or note 
concerns, and then go out and discuss them in public. Some time later 
such issues and concerns tend to appear in the content of the PSC’s and 
ASC’s programmes.  
In this chapter, values have been discussed in relation to the 
frequency of their appearance in children’s and cultural programmes.  
Table 1 (Appendix 6) shows that, in general terms, all four programmes, 
taken together, have focused most on educational values: education as a 
value occurs in 49% of all programme episodes. The second most 
frequently occurring value was the cultural one, which featured in 41% 
of all episodes. Entertainment and social values featured in 39% and 
32% of all episodes, respectively. Overall, whereas political values 
featured in only 18% of all episodes, programmes have tended to focus 
more on education and culture, suggesting a weak form of factionalism. 
Other values do arise, and nationalism and resistance are perhaps the 
most significant among them, given the nature of the occupation and 
how this affects media in Gaza and West Bank. However, when looked 
at all together, as in Table 1 (Appendix 6), most other secondary values 
are minor in their influence on the four programmes’ content.  
The PSC and ASC should of course not be seen as operating in a 
vacuum. They did not simply invent values or fabricate issues that they 
felt ought to be discussed. In fact, both channels had to react to what the 
public was feeling, discussing and doing, in order to stay in tune. Since 
this study focused on a period of post-active conflict, it is perhaps not 
that surprising that media content appears not to be overtly factional.  A 
critical factor, almost certainly, during the study period, was the war on 
Gaza and the stepped-up Israeli military attacks; in this context, it was 
logical that both channels’ attention refocussed on Israel as an occupying 
power.  
7.5 Comparing Decision-making and Producers’ 
Environments across the ASC’s and PSC’s Programming  
From interviews and observations, around the TV shows and the 
decision-making process of both the PSC and ASC, it appears that this 
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decision-making process follows an almost-identical pattern, as shown in 
the diagrams below. Creative ideas for a programme have to go through 
a development process. In the PSC and ASC, this process often starts at 
the level of the producer or other people closely involved in the 
programming. Next, he/she presents the programme idea in the form of 
a written proposal, which is subjected to a test for consensus by the 
Programme Management Unit (PSC) or the Executive Council (ASC). At 
that level, the heads of departments meet to reach a final decision.  
 
Figure 1: PSC decision-making process 
 
 
 
 
The final decision, as to whether develop the programme idea further 
or shelve it, depends on how much it is in line with the general 
guidelines of the TV station. For example, in the case of the ASC, if the 
proposal is rejected, concerns are raised and the Executive Council 
immediately blocks it (without the possibility of appeal.) The only option 
for those who proposed it, is then to go back and either modify or 
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withdraw it (Abu Mohsen, 2013). With regard to the PSC, the situation is 
slightly different, with less rigidity in the system and more possibilities 
for manoeuvering. If the decision on a programme idea is negative, an 
appeal can be filed, directly by the programming staff involved, with the 
Director General (Interview: Shafi, 2013). ‘After all, we are all connected 
to our director, and I could do so by writing directly to him on 
Facebook’ (Shafi, 2013). 
Figure 2: ASC decision-making process 
 
 
As mentioned, in the case of the ASC, a negative decision about a 
programme cannot be appealed. This reflects the culture of Hamas, in 
which there is a tendency to work along fixed principles and fixed ideas. 
In contrast, at the PSC, Fatah’s culture has the upper hand. In this 
culture, people, not principles and ideas, prevail. People are often flexible 
and willing to engage in discussion as to why programme ideas are 
rejected. The result of this difference in approach to the programming 
process is that, at the PSC, staff members can freely select the topics of 
programme episodes, whereas at the ASC, the choice of topics must be 
in accordance with the general guidelines and policy of the TV channel 
(Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). After programmes have been approved, 
the selection of episodes is usually left to the programme production 
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team, which consists of the producer, the presenter and – sometimes - 
the director of programming. The programme production team is 
responsible for the programme content, the way feedback is dealt with, 
and the improvement of quality.  
7.6 Comparing Producers’ Environments across the ASC’s 
and PSC’s Cultural Programming  
There are almost always ideological and practical compromises and 
negotiations that take place behind the scenes and that also influence 
values of the final content. ‘Final decisions are made at the top level, but 
anyone on my crew could also be friends with the Director General on 
Facebook and could use this as a way to communicate ideas that 
influence decisions being made’ (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). These kinds 
of compromises arise out of what D’Acci (2004) termed the ‘socio-
historical context,’ and are vital to understanding the significance of such 
apparently mundane stories from satellite TV programming, including 
those related to the values of nationalism, resistance and politics.  
This reflects what D’Acci (2004) referred to in her ‘circuits of media’ 
approach, when discussing socio-historical context, showing that 
producers are influenced by this socio-historical context. Events as 
perceived by media producers (and political elites who own the ASC and 
PSC) are relevant to the narrative which appears in programme content.  
Furthermore, as has been shown by the thematic content analysis, 
educational values are significant in the content of the children’s 
programming of both the PSC and the ASC. The producers could have 
focused more on political education, as the ASC tended to do in the past. 
Instead, the producers at the ASC and PSC are taking a rather controlled 
approach to protecting child audiences from strictly party-related, 
factional politics. As shown in the previous analysis in this chapter, by 
engaging in educational values and in social values, each programme 
tried to emphasise what Palestinian children have in common, and thus 
to avoid transmitting factional views to the wider diaspora and beyond. 
The findings of this study, overall, are that educational values were the 
most common of all in the children’s programmes of both satellite TV 
channels. This suggests that in the production of children’s TV 
programmes, by both sides, decisions seem to have been taken which 
have had the effect of distinctly defactionalising media content and 
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avoiding overt references to political groupings contending for electoral 
power. The setting of educational goals, as they are inclusive, and to 
some extent, resistant to factionalisation, can help promote different 
dialogues.  
The producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow claimed that the programme 
helps some children to deal with some of the real-life difficulties they 
face under the occupation. The programme engaged in questions of 
ageing, the burdens of family care and responsibility in a society under 
stress. Pioneers of Tomorrow shows that people disappear, that there are 
prisons and that there is an Israeli army. All are mentioned and featured 
explicitly and openly, acknowledging the reality children experience 
themselves, especially - but not only - in Gaza. In contrast, Sesame Street 
handled social values in a more decontextualised and more diplomatic 
manner, mainly by acting as if the daily socio-historical context of 
Palestinian children was more or less ‘normal’ and ‘peaceful’, and as if 
family picnics amidst quiet fields were a real possibility for most 
Palestinians (SS23). 
This lack of overtly political, national content can perhaps best be 
explained as part of a wider move towards a deliberate ending of 
factional attitudes and values in the content of both satellite TV 
channels, in line with the approach of both political parties to end 
factional rhetoric and behaviour. This context too may have influenced 
“media workers’ socialisation and attitudes,” within both the ASC and 
the PSC, as was suggested by Gans (1979) and Gitlin (1980). Shoemaker 
and Reese (1996:6) suggested that: 
‘Psychological factors intrinsic to communications personnel – their 
professional, personal, and political attitudes, and the professional training 
communicators receive – lead them to produce social reality in which 
agreement among social groups is the norm and in which new ideas or 
behaviours are treated as undesirable oddities.’ 
Defactionalisation can thus influence the institutional norms that guide 
media production processes (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013; Al Bardawil, 
2013).  
     In the case of the PSC and ASC, production decisions in the period 
under review were the outcome of the application of norms, and of 
institutional practices and expectations. Tensions and negotiations 
occurred over programme content, over what should be included and 
what not. D’Acci’s (2004:433) framework, the ‘circuit of production’ of 
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media, conceptualised this circuit as ‘encompassing all phases of the 
production moment or the industry as the overall institutional context 
from which programming emerges and is regulated.’ When we compare 
all four programmes, we find some interesting results in this respect.  
The first thing to note is that the sense of place, norms and practices 
seemed less rigid in Cultural Flashes and in Sesame Street than in most 
episodes of Burning Brands and Pioneers of Tomorrow. Although the 
producers and presenters of the PSC’s programmes are aligned with 
Fatah, there seemed to be more willingness on their part than in the case 
of the producers of the ASC’s cultural and children’s programmes, to 
allow for content that was not necessarily strictly in line with factional 
priorities and agendas. This might have been so in order to achieve 
‘compromises between those who sell information to the media and 
those who buy it; these forces counteract one another’ (Shoemaker and 
Reese, 1996:6). The cultural programme Burning Brands showed more 
flexibility in this respect than the ASC’s children’s programme.  
In Cultural Flashes, in the period under review, despite the fact that the 
main producer of the programme, Wael Al Manasra, worked in the PA’s 
Palestinian Ministry of Culture, the two presenters were not affiliated to 
Fatah. They were experts in poetry, art and literature in general. A 
common factor within the Cultural Flashes production team specifically – 
which did not apply to the Sesame Street production team – was that its 
members had received their education in Palestine. Perhaps as a result, 
most social relations between the Cultural Flashes’ production crew 
members were observed to be generally tension-free (Kester, 2008). This 
may have helped to create an efficient and trust-based working 
environment (Interview: Al Asfar, 2013). Although personal biases of 
some crew members occasionally led to internal struggles (Jamal, 2000), 
as one or two members would object to certain individuals being invited 
into one of the two programmes, overall there was relatively little overt 
conflict over programming decisions (Interview: Al Asfar, 2013). Often 
it was the talent of the guests that would force the decision of whether 
(or not) they would be invited to appear, regardless of their political 
affiliations as such.  
In the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow, producers sometimes made 
decisions which were viewed by some as violating the principles of the 
channel (Abuzanouna, 2015; Abuzanouna, 2012). However, Pioneers of 
242 CHAPTER 7 
Tomorrow producer Al Amriti (Interview, 2013) was aware that these 
decisions were meant to send signals: ‘after all, clothes of participating 
children send a message.’ Perhaps the message that the show wanted to 
send, in allowing a girl invited in the show to wear non-traditional, 
‘Western’-style clothing, was that the ASC was trying to open up more to 
all aspects of society. Defactionalisation involved acknowledgement of 
the lifestyles of young people, both young women and young men. As 
the producer of the ASC told me, in the past this channel would have 
insisted on young women always wearing the appropriate Islamic dress, 
and would have asked the child to get changed before being filmed, if 
need be. Thus, although one girl was ‘inappropriately’ dressed in close-
fitting jeans, she still took part in the programme. Similarly, decisions 
were made by PSC staff members to focus on issues that one would 
expect only Hamas to focus on, such as the work of the world-renowned 
Islamic scholar Izz Al Din Qassam, who inspired the Muslim 
Brotherhood, of which Hamas is a part (Blank, 2011).  
The ASC’s Burning Brands was subject to a more rigid production 
procedure than the PSC’s Cultural Flashes. Even though it may appear 
that ASC presenter Younies Abu Jarad had the final say in the process of 
production, he shared a crew that worked in most other ASC television 
programming as well. The relationship between them at the time was in 
accordance with the station’s ethic, in which work is guided by 
brotherhood principles (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). This provided 
an opportunity for production members – such as cameramen or other 
crew members – to also have a say. The relationships between the 
producer and the rest of the team were relatively ‘flat,’ ideally allowing 
for immediate feedback and discursive ideological negotiation, even 
when coming from ‘lower-ranking employees [who] may have special 
expertise or other means to thwart directives from the top, often making 
negotiations and compromise necessary’ (Shoemaker and Reese, 
1996:145). At the editorial and managerial level, once the programme 
guidelines were approved, the team had a relatively free hand in 
discussing what should, or should not, go on air (Interview: Abu Jarad, 
2013).  
In the period under review, Pioneers of Tomorrow had norms and 
practices within its production unit that were similar to those of Burning 
Brands. The producer, Ayman Al Amriti, followed specific procedures 
and consulted with the head of programming. Such discussions did not 
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need to happen often, as the General Guidelines of the ASC served as 
the ‘policeman’ governing the relationship between staff members, 
editorial decisions and media practices (Interview: Al Amriti, 2013).  
Unlike in cultural programming, in children’s programming ASC 
producers may sometimes have had more room to use creativity in 
amplifying their messages than was the case in the PSC (Abuzanouna, 
2012). This came about through ‘personal influences which seem[ed] to 
be singularly effective’ and which brought about a ‘reinforcement 
function’ (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 2006: 82-83). This was the case, for 
example, in the previously mentioned decision made in 2007, that the 
puppet Farfur would no longer appear on the show after he was killed 
(in the show) by an Israeli interrogator. This decision to write Farfur out 
of the show raised a lot of questions and some were too harsh on 
Palestinian TV, inciting Americans to take legal action against the ASC 
for copyright issues (Perlmutter, 2014). Eventually, the producer’s 
decision was that Farfur would indeed be killed during interrogations by 
Israeli security forces. This was a deliberate decision to address a larger 
political problem, the blockade on Gaza, a decision made by just one 
person in the team, the producer, and then approved by the rest. Later 
on, though, the new producer of Pioneers of Tomorrow, Al Amriti 
(Interview: 2013), thought this had been an unwise decision.  
These kinds of production-level decisions, which markedly reinforced 
a sense of vulnerable nationalism, not focused at all on the ‘internal 
threat’ of the other faction, can be said to have contributed overall to the 
defactionalisation of media content. This underlines the wider, 
depolarising role of satellite TV and how it presents and colours its 
cultural and children’s programmes. As already suggested, when the ASC 
received criticism from the global community, political leaders rallied to 
defend the show and the integrity of the producer (Abuzanouna, 2012).  
In Sesame Street, production decisions were often made collectively and 
agreed on by all editorial staff with the Sesame Street director, Layla 
Sayeigh. Her own influence could also be seen, in how the programme 
was presented and formatted (Palestinian Sesame Street, 2012). For 
instance, one explanation given to me for the frequent use of the colour 
green in set design, art props and decoration, was that it was based on 
the producer’s personal affection for the style of the Indian Sesame Street 
(Interview: Sayeigh, 2013). The production team also engaged in some 
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community-based ‘testing’ of their values and characters. They organised 
meetings with the public, for example by going to schools, each new 
season, to show the Puppets, using different voices, outfits and styles, to 
gauge the reaction of the children and their preferences. This involved 
coordination with civil society organisations and the Ministry of 
Education in Ramallah. This kind of outreach, outside of the studio, was 
not done by Pioneers of Tomorrow. This was partly due to budgetary 
limitations, and partly to the more ‘traditional’ presentation styles 
favoured by the ASC in its programming. In the case of Sesame Street, the 
Palestinian production team had another set of external advisors, besides 
those in Palestine, and regularly consulted experts in New York (Cole et 
al., 2003) to ensure that the content was not outside the box of global 
Sesame Street. The Sesame Street production process thus was more 
complex, in that the producers had to film, screen, review, and reconfirm 
with the global editorial management in New York to get their approval 
(Interview: Sayeigh, 2013).  
What emerges clearly from the content analysis and this ‘thick’ 
description of the production styles of each satellite TV station is that 
the PSC and the ASC each have their own organisational culture (Blank, 
2011; Jamal, 2001). These cultures, in turn, influenced the content of the 
programming of the two Palestinian stations (D’Acci, 2004). In the 
period under review, the PSC and ASC each had distinct social and 
institutional constraints and outlooks, which became more apparent 
when the actual production process was discussed. After all, the 
processes of production involved constant ideological negotiations and 
ongoing discursive struggles between media practitioners and those who 
employed them, in which they either agreed to or rejected content (Hall, 
2010).  
The production of the four programmes during 2009-2010, a period 
of relative political calm between Fatah and Hamas, was reflected in 
many public calls for pulling together and promoting national 
reconciliation. Cultural Flashes was filmed in Gaza in a way that would not 
stir up attention of the Hamas’ de facto security apparatus, and work was 
not outsourced to external partners in Gaza. This was a form of 
compromise on the part of the PSC, which risked losing audience among 
Gazan viewers by broadcasting what could be seen as a West Bank-
dominated cultural programme representing only one part of Palestine 
(Sakr et al, 2015). The PSC’s decision to focus production in the West 
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Bank, and not in Gaza, appeared to arise less from partisanship than 
from a the determination by the PSC not to exclude Gaza by 
confronting Hamas in the programme, and thus to appeal to Palestinian 
audiences over and above political parties, whether they were living 
under control of Hamas or not (Interview: Al Shafi).  
In 2009-2010, the same kinds of compromises were made in relation 
to Burning Brands, in which the ASC compensated for a lack of face-to-
face interviews by using satellite-transmitted interviews. This allowed live 
contacts, on the show, with poets and writers who could not be brought 
into the Gaza-located studio. Most surprising was that the ASC focused 
on writers, poets and storytellers from neighbouring countries, including 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. This, in itself, can be viewed as a 
form of defactionalisation since most of these individuals were not 
Palestinian and were unlikely to mention either Fatah or Hamas in their 
discussions. Moreover, these invited speakers were not directly affected 
by the factional conflict of the past, and focused mostly on the problems 
of the occupation and Israeli military, political and economic dominance 
(Baroud, 2015).  
The absence of the rather more oppressed and marginalised Hamas-
affiliated writers and poets in PSC’s programmes also meant that there 
was less room for political squabbling and much more focus on 
Palestinian culture as broadly defined. By involving international poets 
and novelists like those screened from the USA, Germany, UK, France 
and Denmark, cultural programmes became the drivers of a period of 
defactionalisation of the media, after almost two years of polarising 
political strife between the two television stations and the factions that 
they were aligned with. Production divisions are interconnected with 
how the socio-historical context is interpreted and understood (Skuse et 
al., 2011; D’Acci, 2004).  
In spite of continued, low-level, factional operations on the ground, 
the defactionalisation of the media thus continued. For example, de facto 
security operations by Hamas in 2008-2009 led to the idea being spread 
among people that having contacts with official bodies in the West Bank 
could be criminalised and could even be considered as a form of spying 
for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah. Ironically, 
the arrest of an ASC media crew by the Palestinian Authority, while 
appearing to be retaliatory, also made it harder for ASC producers to 
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complete any groundwork in the West Bank (Al-Omari, 2010). Ironically, 
this even helped to defactionalise production by diverting attention from 
the differences among Palestinians. Since it was difficult to invite West 
Bank artists, poets and intellectuals to appear on the show, the Burning 
Brands programme sought refuge in approaching Arabic cultural figures 
in a wider region. 
7.7 Conclusion  
Overall, Chapters 6 and 7 have addressed the two main research 
questions concerning the processes of content and production as 
personal-human and professional activities that were both influencing, 
and were being influenced by, cultural, economic, social and political 
forces. The findings were the result of interaction with media producers 
at all levels, of hundreds of hours spent on screening materials, looking 
for frequencies of occurrence of values in programmes, and of 
researching contexts surrounding production units.  
 This chapter has outlined an outstanding fact, which is simply that 
media professionals, cameramen, producers and programme directors 
working below the surface are the people who have the capacity, in 
theory, to make big changes to the degree of factionalisation of media 
content and production. For the sake of clarity and and in offering credit 
to those on the unit, it should be said that production involved the 
creative cooperation of several other, unacknowledged, media 
practitioners, some of whom were not given any opportunity by their 
administration to speak on the record, even if their opinion and role was 
significant. Even an office guy making tea can affect the content by 
expressing independently what he saw and experienced, or shared in a 
public discussion on the street, waiting for the bus to bring his son home 
from school. In Chapters 6 and 7, content has been analysed, and a basis 
has been laid for asking and answering the questions reiterated at the 
start of Chapter 6, about hegemony, decision-making, media production 
and content in children’s and cultural media of the ASC and PSC in 
particular.  
The next chapter moves somewhat beyond the frameworks of 
production circuits and content analysis, to explore the emergence of a 
form of media ‘Palestinianism’, as identified by looking at themes that 
arose in the ASC’s  and PSC’s satellite TV programmes during the 
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research period of 2009-10. Built on the ‘ashes’ of factionalism, the next 
chapter suggests that new patterns of cross-Palestinian identification are 
starting to emerge across satellite TV production. The significance of 
‘Palestinianism’ is explained more generally in Chapter 8, which precedes 
the overall Conclusions presented in Chapter 9. 
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8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, it is suggested that from the analysis of media content it 
can be concluded that there are signs of compromises, and that there is a 
willingness to set aside factional differences, leading to not only 
defactionalisation in the media, but also something more. The idea of the 
emergence of new forms of Palestinianism, and the question of how to 
define Palestinianism, were touched upon in Chapter 3. This relatively 
new set of ideas about nationalism can be seen emerging across media in 
the occupied territories in recent years. This chapter highlights some 
manifestations of such “Palestinianism” (Matar, 2010; Said et al, 2000), as 
a new kind of nationalist ethos, led by political parties and not by 
factional interests alone. What also may make the media in Palestine 
somewhat different from the usual forms of media, is that profit-
maximisation and high audience-rating are not the only considerations 
for them in terms of being ‘successful’ (Alshaer, 2012). In particular, 
encouraging viewers to retain their sense of solidarity with other 
Palestinians, and hoping for a better future, are two of the key goals. 
This chapter returns to some central questions of the study, and starts 
with discussing the key economic and political factors that have shaped 
television production decisions and processes in the selected 
programmes. The question of how non-dominant groups have 
influenced both content and production is also addressed in this chapter, 
with a focus on the women’s movements, religious minorities, 
intellectuals and artists. Diverse voices, as represented in the selected 
programmes, are identified and their bearing on the defactionalisation of 
the media is analysed. These diverse voices, from both in and outside 
Palestine, include the contributions of children, of women, of 
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intellectuals and artists. All are critical in contributing to a lessening of 
factional content and production.  
 The issue of domestic, regional and international competition for 
audiences among satellite TV stations like the ASC and PSC is placed in 
a wider context. The chapter reviews some technological influences and 
constraints on media production, as well as the relations between media 
production and the various security apparatuses in the region. In 
addition, financial constraints, which may have contributed to 
defactionalisation of content and production of children’s and cultural 
TV programming, are discussed.  
8.2 Multiple or Singular? Palestinianism(s)  
The emerging forms of ‘Palestinianism,’ or new nationalism, are also 
fuelled by rising and already pre-existing anger against Israeli policies, 
military occupation and attacks. The emerging Palestinianism is perhaps 
more moderate in that the emphasis is no longer on over-running Israel 
and driving out Israeli Jews, but on empowering Palestinians through 
expressions and practices aiming at greater national unity.  
The defactionalisation of media content and production is thus about 
seeking a common national interest across spatial and political 
boundaries. When Israel is seen undertaking humanitarian work in Syria 
and helping refugees from regional conflicts, but, at the same time, 
imposing harsh economic and humanitarian restrictions on the life of 
Palestinians, especially those in Gaza, responses of anger and resentment 
become understandable. In the long run, anger with Israel may increase, 
and come not only from the ASC’s more Islamic and religion-grounded 
understanding of Palestinian national identity, but also from the PSC, 
which relies heavily on funding from European donors, some of who are 
also engaged with the new awareness of a common Palestinian identity.  
Palestinianism as a new form of nationalism could thus arise from, 
and pose renewed challenges to, the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Less 
factional and less securitised media content also means that there is a 
common cause and a sense of being opposed to whatever ideas are 
coming from Israel as the occupying power. This renewed sense of a 
common cause can already be seen quite clearly emerging in media 
content of the Palestinian satellite TV stations, the ASC and the PSC, as 
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was evident from interviews conducted for this study, and the content of 
the children’s and cultural TV programmes broadcast by the two 
stations.  
 The old Palestinian nationalism, as opposed to the new 
Palestinianism, was arguably more secular. Nonetheless, like the old 
nationalism, Palestinianism, the relatively new forms of nationalism, also 
appear to have their roots firmly anchored in the language and history of 
the Palestinian people and territories. However, this new form of 
Palestinianism differs from the older kind in that Palestinian society is 
something that Palestinians can create themselves, and in which, in spite 
of Palestinians’ obvious geographical divisions and their wide dispersal, 
members of society can connect with one another without the need for 
political or other mediating institutions. This is one of the key benefits of 
new forms of media technology, as will be discussed in this chapter. 
Also, thanks to changing technologies, exchange of ideas among the PSC 
and the ASC is constant and on-going, as well as between both 
Palestinian channels and Israeli channels.  
Palestinianism can be linked to a renewal in social values in both 
children’s and cultural programmes, and, as such, reflects social norms 
and conventions ‘…produced at the level of the overall production 
process – in the myriad imperatives that directly govern the construction 
of audiences and programmes’ (D’Acci, 2002:93).  
 Bringing media agendas and discourses back into the normal flow of 
debate in the public sphere of politics, is a special challenge under Israeli 
occupation. Some media scholars may reject the (documented) 
suggestion of this study that there has been significant defactionalisation 
of the Palestinian media, especially in the period under review. Some 
scholars see this approach as unworkable and unrealistic with regard to 
achieving political change in Palestine (Kempf and Thiel, 2012; Möckel, 
2007). The question is how media can be viewed through the lens of 
producing alternatives that can result in the ‘unmaking’ or dismantling of 
the logic of securitised factionalism. Borrowing from ‘securitisation 
theory,’ citing the view of Aradau, de-securitisation becomes ’…a matter 
of different speech acts, which one could privilege depending on 
external, pragmatic criteria, for example how much attention we want to 
capture for an issue’ (Aradau, 2004:393). 
There is surprisingly little factionalism among the media expressions 
of public opinion leaders in the region, and this is perhaps because 
 Circuits of Media to Palestinianism(s)? 251 
 
 
competition for audiences mainly involves emerging TV stations that 
compete with those of similar religious and political mind-set – the Al 
Filisteneya TV with the PSC and the Al Kitab Satellite Channel with the 
ASC. In both cases, the emerging, competing satellite TV channels are 
engaging in similar debates with their localised competitors, but with less 
explicitly political rhetoric being involved. This chapter also reflects on 
how gender inequalities deeply ingrained in society also arise in the 
production and content of satellite TV programmes. ‘(P)roduced at the 
level of the overall production process – in the myriad imperatives that 
directly govern the construction of audiences and programmes,’ social 
values related to a renewed sense of Palestinianism, in both children’s 
and cultural programmes, involve the reflection of social norms and 
conventions (D’Acci, 2002:93).  
8.3 Diversified Palestinianism: Women’s Voices and 
Gender Issues  
From a broader theoretical perspective, as stated by D’Acci (2004), TV 
history in general is less the product of professional authority and 
expertise, and more a process that is deeply embedded in social 
structures and cultural values. The role of TV, from this perspective, is 
also to raise wider public awareness of the struggles faced by socially 
underprivileged groups, including women. This starts with women who 
are themselves working in the media industry and particularly in 
television. The aim of encouraging such women as ‘to achieve not only 
equality of representation on screen but equality of participation in the 
creative and production process behind the screen’ is an on-going effort, 
and is not entirely successful in Palestinian satellite TV media, even today 
(D’Acci, 2004:67). The reasons for this may include the fact that fewer 
women than men are trained in media-relevant professions, but so far, 
this problem has been little researched.  
In looking at all four programmes together, as shown in Table 7 
(Appendix 6), content analysis showed differences in terms of the rates 
of men and women’s participation. Ideally, the element of gender and 
the role of women in the 4 programmes should have been differentiated 
vis-a-vis the values that were selected as content analysis parameters, as 
well as with regard to each of the four programmes studied. 
Nonetheless, it was noted that the lowest level of participation of women 
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was in Burning Brands, in which it was zero, with men monopolising the 
programme completely. In the case of Cultural Flashes, female 
participation in the overall programme was much higher than that of 
their male counterparts, with women figuring in 90% of all episodes (all 
but one.)  
In Pioneers of Tomorrow, boys participated as guests in all but one of the 
selected episodes (95%), while girls were guests in just over one fifth 
(21%) of all selected episodes analysed in this study. In Sesame Street, the 
overall participation of boys was 39%, while girls appeared in 56% of the 
selected episodes analysed in this study. These findings suggest that 
content is not entirely up to the media producers, particularly in live 
programmes such as Burning Brands and Pioneers of Tomorrow, in which 
ordinary people also decided on the content. For example, a young girl 
called in from Algeria talked about how proud she was of Palestinian 
resistance in episode PoT10. The ASC’s programme editors did not 
seem to appreciate this intervention, but since she was a listener/viewer, 
her contribution could not be avoided. In the same episode, Nassur, the 
puppet, tried to cut this conversation short, but in such circumstances, 
editorial intervention may not always work. However, Sesame Street’s 
curriculum committee can decide on content, and whatever is not 
covered by the general guidelines, will not be included in the show. This 
results in less room for diversified influences on programming content. 
In this sense, Sesame Street’s content is much more controlled, and more 
gender-sensitive perhaps, in any case alert to the need to make space for 
girl listeners/viewers and participants.  
The example of Palestinian poet Fadwa Tuqqan, in Episode 13 of 
Cultural Flashes, shows how, also among women producers in Cultural 
Flashes, the women’s movement is mainly viewed through the lens of 
Palestinian national independence. Productions by women mainly 
addressed the independence of Palestine and only indirectly dealt with 
women as independent from and equal to men, as media professionals, 
highly capable of making major contributions to Palestinian media and 
society.  The PSC’s Cultural Flashes had female producers at its disposal 
and featured female artists, poets and authors in its content. It brought 
previously unknown, talented women to the attention of audiences.  
It seems that the host of the programme, Amani Abu Hantash, 
made a great effort to ensure that women had a role in every Cultural 
Flashes episode. However, female actors were more visible in content, 
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and sometimes in a rather challenging manner, than in production. For 
instance, in episode CF17, Abu Hantash quoted the female author 
Ghada Al Saman when she commented on the game of soccer: ‘As an 
author, I look at a football game, as a cat looks at a tasty piece of cheese 
– the size of a soccer field.’ This episode showed that soccer does not 
just promote the ‘culture of masculinity,’ but that it, rather, shows the 
game of life, with its players (i.e., the people in daily life) experiencing 
crowdedness, contradictions, small joys and disappointments, on a field 
that is represented by the screen of the TV set.  
The women’s movement criticised soccer, as being not only 
a symbol of masculinity, but also a centre for government support, in 
which the high contract value of soccer players is considered as more 
precious than, for example, the cultural value of famous works of art. 
The massive crowds attracted to soccer games were compared to the 
smaller crowds that routinely attend arts and cultural events. This 
highlighted that fewer people seem interested in cultural events than in 
sports. The fears of the women’s movement were apparent in terms of 
content. In general, there is a very active participation of women in 
Palestinian art, poetry, education and in cultural sciences. This is, 
however, much more visible in the West Bank than in Gaza. 
A comparison of male and female participation the Cultural Flashes 
programme showed a quite balanced gender mix in most episodes. There 
were some exceptions, as in episodes CF07, CF11 and CF20, in which 
relatively fewer women appeared or talked. There were critical points in 
episodes, when the content covered women who were challenging the 
poetic discourse and the non-obedience to the rules of language in 
poetry, and justified this by saying that if there is no destruction there 
can be no construction, or reconstruction. In Cultural Flashes, women had 
little fear of being excluded from the content, regardless of the theme 
addressed in that content They played their role in discussions about 
poetry, plays and novels, and, rather more explicitly, in debates about the 
reconstruction of the Palestine nation.  
Burning Brands, in contrast, showed very little content that was about 
women, or in which women participated, neither as producers, nor as 
presenters, guests or contributors. During the course of the episodes 
viewed for this study, only once, in episode BB20, did the show talk 
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about women at all, and then it was in general terms, in relation to love. 
On this occasion, the poet Samir Al-Omari described women as follows: 
‘hey you, the safe arms for my alienation…you have grown up in my heart 
as branch lover… and from all the worlds you have carried my fruits... 20 
years or more  you have been in my soul and my heart, my star and my 
surroundings… You have fed me until I have shown my eternal love… 
you have drunk until my birds have flown away… I see you the queen of 
beauty and other women in your lifetime are servants.’  
Later on in the same episode (BB20), the host, Abu Jarad, expressed 
his admiration for the guests, for sharing this conservative poetry. He 
stated that ‘several contemporary poets have written about women, like 
Qabbani, who said he would build from women’s skin a dress, and from 
women’s nipples a mountain… this was strange, but the poetry you (i.e., 
the guest on the show) provided is not problematic.’ The guest 
commented that poets like Qabbani humiliate women and do not respect 
them, and stated: ‘…they are the mothers of their children, the wives 
who raise the children and make men the pillars of life.’  
This lack of focus on women was and is attributable to the ASC’s 
generally more Islamic approach to the programming of content. 
Classical Arabic poetry is supposed to be recited by men, and the 
producers explained that they do not invite female authors to talk in the 
show, since:  
‘if I do that, I will be placing myself in an embarrassing situation in case I 
invite a woman with revealing clothes or who wears too much make-up 
onto the show… and it could be that the audience of the programme will 
reject this’ (Interview: Abu-Jarad, 2013).  
This approach is based on strict Islamic principles and thinking, 
according to which breaking of linguistic rules in Arabic (e.g., recitation 
by women instead of by men) is similar to giving way to nationalistic 
principles. Both are to be avoided equally, and at all costs. This does 
not necessarily imply that Cultural Flashes gave way to nationalistic 
principles, but it was much more apparent in Cultural Flashes than in 
Burning Brands that the women’s movement was making many changes 
to Palestinian intellectual life and had to be reckoned with.  
In contrast, in Burning Brands, female participation, as shown in Table 
25 in Appendix 6, was significantly absent in both production and 
content. In a few instances, women were simply mentioned, for example, 
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as in a poem entitled ‘The Daughters of the Land’, written by male 
Palestinian poet Samir Al Omary, and presented on the show as worthy 
of praise (BB20). The poem describes Palestinian female prisoners in 
Israeli jails as women who bring joy to the hearts of Palestinians. In this 
poem, women are presented as symbols of freedom and victory. This 
particular content was presented because of the surrounding, political 
context. If prisoner exchange deals would not happen, we would be less 
likely to hear about Palestinian women prisoners, freed after Palestinian 
factions agreed to the release of one captured Israeli soldier in exchange 
for the release of 19 Palestinian female prisoners in 2010 (Abunimah, 
2011).  
Unlike cultural programmes, children’s programmes focused little on 
women as a non-dominant group, with the exception of the attention 
paid to the preferences of female character Sara and other female 
children in Pioneers of Tomorrow. Likewise, in Sesame Street, the female 
puppet Haneen contributed to the content of entertainment and 
education in small ways. For example, in episode SS019 she discussed 
the ‘love of music’ and told all children that they can love and enjoy 
music despite living in difficult conditions and under constant fear.  
Young women too have played a part in shaping media content. In an 
episode of Cultural Flashes, CF07, the experience of a young female 
novelist, Ilian Bader, was brought to attention. In her writing, family 
structure was described as a form of prison, and school as restricting her 
creativity. She explained that she had to make her own way through 
these institutions to find an escape toward creativity by writing a novel. 
Her book, Pieces of Sugar, questions the existence of love, talks of 
forbidden love, discusses Allah and other sets of ideas, things that were 
beyond discussion for any young woman from a more conservative 
Palestinian family. The terminology used by her suggests that she was 
striving to balance expression and thought in the novel, and that she did 
not accept that ‘she should shut up.’ So, it was a rather challenging 
message, one that encourages women to speak out, that came across 
from the content of Cultural Flashes. 
In Cultural Flashes, much more than in Burning Brands, the producers 
seem to have focused on variation in the production of episodes, by 
involving new kinds of people, especially those from younger 
generations, in the art, poetry, drama, folklore and silent tragedy features. 
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In Cultural Flashes, young people were not viewed as representatives of a 
homogeneous group, but as unique individuals, each of whom had his or 
her own diverse and different style. This countered the idea that all 
human beings, males and females alike, should necessarily think or feel in 
the same way, or that their artistic or creative work should conform to a 
single pattern. According to the head of the PSC’s cultural programming, 
Al Asfar: ‘During the period of broadcasting, Cultural Flashes scored the 
best rating in the history of Palestinian TV, and that is because of its 
openness and increasing interest in cultural affairs, in addition to 
diversified programming’ (Interview: Al Asfar, 2013)  
In another episode (CF013), content focused on a boy flirting with a 
girl, with both showing interest in making more physical contact, leading 
them to making love. These attentions or acts were presented as 
innocent and natural, although such things are not commonly addressed, 
at least not openly, in a conservative society like that of Palestine. The 
content went on to justify the innocence of a girl falling in love, and 
making love, and asked why it was that she was killed for this innocence 
of love and emotions. A comparison was made between this story and 
similar events in the outside world. The producers selected this content 
to focus on people who want to change a mostly conservative society. 
The episode referred to the real-life case of 14-year old Asya, who had a 
love affair with a man she was not married to, and whose baby, after 
having being born, was thrown into the sewage by relatives. The young 
mother herself was then killed by her family.  
In its content, Burning Brands continued to express admiration for 
women in poems. For example, in a poem, a woman might be 
described as the person who offers comfort to a man in exile. An Islam-
inspired programme like Burning Brands is not supposed to cite poems by 
Nizar Qabbani. His poems are known to be very passionate and open 
on love and women. Mentioning a Qabbani poem in itself represents a 
compromise made in the content, but in Burning Brands this was done to 
create a form of contrast between Qabbani’s passionate style and that of 
the more rational ballad-style poems. For example, Qabbani, who is 
often quoted in the PSC’s programmes, is criticised by the ASC for 
describing a woman’s body, skin and sexuality in his poems.  
There is a link between factionalism and gender, in the sense that men 
tend to be more factional than women. This argument on a Palestinian 
gender perspective can be substantiated on the basis of research done by 
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Julie Peteet (1991:5), who showed evidence of how Palestinian ‘women’s 
political participation informed a realignment and, in part, a 
reconceptualization of gender relations.’ There is also a link between 
defactionalisation and gender, in the sense that women contribute more 
to defactionalisation than men do.  While the reviewed ASC programmes 
did not show this connection, the PSC programmes did, as the latter 
involved more women voices, which tend to convey less factionalism 
than those of men, in terms of content. On the other hand, when the 
ASC’s media producers refuse to allow women in the cultural 
programme, does this mean that the ASC’s programme is necessarily 
more factional? This would only be the case if the religious principles 
were interpreted in a way that was overly hostile or oppositional to Fatah 
or to the PSC; on the whole this does not seem to be the case as the 
detailed media content analysis has shown.  
Unlike in Cultural Flashes, in Burning Brands, there was zero 
involvement of women in the content. This difference has certainly 
shaped the content of both programmes in a profound way. Although in 
both programmes male staff was involved at all levels, the content 
of Cultural Flashes was co-shaped by the views of female poets and artists, 
bringing new discussions and topics such as women in Palestinian 
society, sexuality and family. Burning Brands, by comparison, appeared to 
be more ‘dry’ and focused only on the literature of resistance against the 
occupation. Cultural Flashes introduced more diverse voices, contributing 
to a wider content, with wider concepts and a more rounded set of in-
depth discussions on many values, by strongly opinionated female 
writers and a young woman sharing poetry of love, and in relating, for 
example, the story of a woman who had travelled, on her own, to 
London and further, to explore the world (CF 11). Suad Sabbah’s poems 
were shared in the same episode, where she said:  
‘Who will rescue me from European rains after your departure? Who will 
be my roof…my umbrella? Who will hide me in the pocket of his 
coat…or under the leather strip of his watch…when the winds strike 
me…and the storm bites me?’  
This content is considered more ’liberal,’ unlike the more ‘conservative’ 
content of Burning Brands, which barely mentioned women at all. 
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8.4 Palestinianisms? Religion, Religious Minorities and 
Voices of Intellectuals  
Religious minorities were given little attention in both programmes’ 
content. Therefore, detecting and determining the influence of religious 
minorities’ men and women on content or production was nearly 
impossible. One exception was the head of Sesame Street, who is a 
Christian woman from Ramallah and plays a significant role in directing 
the programme’s production. More generally, religious minorities are not 
presented as such. Members of religious minorities, for 
example Christian artists, came into the shows as ‘Palestinian’ nationals, 
and hence it was hard to spot them unless you were familiar with their 
backgrounds, and/or were able to distinguish ‘Christian’ names from 
Islamic names. Overall, however, religious minority groups would not be 
expected to contribute significantly to the content of the programmes. 
When they did contribute, it was as ‘embedded’ Palestinian 
nationals, with a sense of ‘Palestinianism,’ rather than as representatives 
of minorities as such. For instance, Pioneers of Tomorrow cited one of 
Mahmoud Darwish’s most famouse poems on Palestinian identity and 
nationalism.  
  
‘Record! 
I am an Arab 
And my identity card is number fifty thousand 
I have eight children 
And the ninth is coming after the summer 
Will you be angry? 
Record! 
I am an Arab 
Employed with fellow workers at a quarry 
I have eight children 
I get them bread 
Garments and books 
from the rocks. 
I do not supplicate charity at your doors 
Nor do I belittle myself at the footsteps of your chamber 
So will you be angry? 
Therefore! 
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Record on the top of the first page: 
I do not hate people 
Nor do I encroach 
But if I become hungry 
The usurper’s flesh will be my food 
Beware. 
Beware. 
Of my hunger,  
And my anger!’ 
The selection by producers of this particular poem feeds into one 
narrative: emphasising Palestinian identity and national discourse. Any 
language mistake made by one of the children in Pioneers of Tomorrow is 
often corrected by Sara, who repeats it, this time in classical Arabic. In 
another episode, a child called in from West Bank indicated that she 
wanted to offer a ‘song,’ and Sara offers a correction by saying: ‘You 
mean a psalm. Go ahead’ (PoT08). Sesame Street producers, on the other 
hand, do not mind the ‘un-Islamic’ idea of using ‘songs’ and secular 
music, which tend to be made for children’s entertainment and fun. In 
Sesame Street, it is hard to tell what type of audience is watching the show, 
as there is no live interaction with the viewers. However, in Pioneers of 
Tomorrow, incoming phone calls show that there are children watching in 
several Arab states outside of Gaza and Palestine. 
As can be seen in Table 1 (Appendix 6), my content analysis showed 
that in all four programmes, only 8.0% (on average) of the total content 
harboured explicitly religious references. The researcher finds this result 
not surprising, unlike media producers and political elites of both the 
PSC and the ASC, who, in interviews, found this relative lack of religious 
content in children’s and cultural programmes, a problem. As the head 
of cultural programming of the PSC, Al Shafi, stated: ‘I see this as an 
error that has nothing to do with donor policy – it is only the mind-set 
of producers which influenced this content’ (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013). 
Nonetheless, in going deeper into the data, to show how religious 
content was referred to, we found that Hadith sayings appeared in 10% 
of all children’s shows, while the Quran was mentioned in 13.5% of the 
children’s programme episodes. Reference to religious Quran and Hadith 
sayings does, of course, not necessarily correspond with explicit religious 
values. It happened often that the Quran or the Prophet Mohammed 
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was mentioned, but with no value associated to it. For example, Sara, in 
a Pioneers of Tomorrow episode (PoT04), which talked about the virtues of 
fasting during the Ramadan, mentioned the name of Allah, merely as a 
saying. There was no value added to it, nor was it part of a new lesson 
for the children to learn. The name of Allah was merely mentioned.  
As shown in Table 7 (Appendix 6), factional leaders and religious 
figures were not referred to explicitly in any of the four programmes, 
neither in the children’s nor in the cultural ones. In response to the 
research sub-question about women and minorities, this tends to suggest 
that the influence of religious minorities in content and production will 
be indirect and is not visible in explicit terms. This also came across 
clearly during interviews and during the observation of the production at 
both stations, in which religion was taken for granted by most of the 
media producers, and there were very few signs of deliberately driving a 
religious agenda, also not by members of religious minorities. The only 
occasions where religion seemed to be playing a significant role was 
when, in the ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow, the show happened to coincide 
with the timing of the Asr prayers, almost two-thirds of the time, as 
shown in Table 15.  
Some 17% of all breaks in the 4 programmes were used to call for 
prayers, whereas 28.5% were of the regular TV break type. Regular TV 
breaks are necessary for conducting essential services such as giving the 
staff some rest, checking the equipment, changing the set-up of the 
stage, etc., but also the breaks for prayers were important to producers.  
The break for prayers is unavoidable in the case of an Islamic TV 
station, such as the ASC. There could have been no compromises in that 
regard, as the producers felt it was their duty to notify people that it is 
time for prayers. Although children are not strictly expected to go to the 
mosque, children must be made aware of prayer time, not only during 
their daily routine, but also during their TV show.  
8.5 Children’s Voices and Palestinianism  
As far as children’s programming was concerned, producers focused 
heavily on the involvement of children, in being the main voice in the 
show, as would be expected. In 100% of all shows, Sesame Street relied on 
children’s voices (43.5% male and 56.5% female). In Pioneers of Tomorrow, 
apart from presenter Sara herself who is a girl, 95.7% of the episodes 
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featured children, with female children appearing in only 21.7% of the 
episodes. As mentioned in previous chapters, the discussions in the 
shows focused mostly on education, on respectfully helping the older 
generation, on Eid celebrations, on how not to lie and hold good morals, 
on science, on learning new vocabulary and on entertainment in which 
children can sing, dance and express themselves.  
Media producers can never be entirely in control of content. They 
have the ability to edit the content of pre-recorded interviews, but that 
option is not available for live television shows, such as Pioneers of 
Tomorrow. The final content, however, is also determined by the presence 
of new voices, who may sidetrack the decisions of producers. In episode 
PoT13, Pioneers of Tomorrow brought in children from refugee camps to 
talk about how to be honest and not lie. If it would have been only 
Nassur and Sara talking in the programme, it would have been unlikely 
that they would have added a new perspective to lying as a bad social 
habit that children should avoid. The children from the refugee camps 
did bring that new perspective. The children’s contributions in the show, 
especially from those who were calling in by phone, were inspired by 
what their parents or siblings told them about what to say and how to 
respond to questions from Nassur and Sara in the studio. In Sesame Street, 
as shown in episode SS02, content was also shaped by the introduction 
of a new aspect of disability, which was noticeably missing from Pioneers 
of Tomorrow. In the show, children learned about the use of Braille, text in 
which characters are represented by patterns of raised dots that can be 
read by blind people. The involvement of new voices, those of blind 
children, influenced the content of the programme, by showing that 
blind children are important members of society too, and are an asset to 
the community, not to be ignored.  
This is to say, the sharing of personal experiences throughout the four 
children’s and cultural TV programmes studied has helped shape their 
content, as is shown in Table 9 (Appendix 6). Some 36% of the total 
appearances by guests on the four shows were meant to share a personal 
experience that the person went through and was ready to talk about in 
front of the camera. Some 22.5% of the participants expressed their 
views on matters that were tabled for discussion. The PSC’s Cultural 
Flashes most frequently reflected the views of people on movies or plays 
they had watched, or on music (played by foreign music bands) or poetry 
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they had listened to. The combination of sharing personal experiences 
and sharing views contributed to shaping the content of the (factional) 
media. At any rate, those that were interviewed during the show left little 
room for producers to factionalise content. After all, average Palestinians 
escape factionalism at work and in the streets, and run to watch 
entertainment and then tend to express their views only on what they 
saw.  
8.6 Palestinianism: The Role of ‘Domestic,’ Regional and 
International Competition 
Among the factors that influenced the content of the PSC’s and ASC’s 
programmes, that have been analysed in this study, was: competition. 
Each of the two satellite stations felt compelled to respond to the other 
station’s content, overall tone and approach. All components 
of competition are present: two audiences, each supporting their own 
channel, and producers from two different political backgrounds. In the 
period under review, each wanted to stave off the competition. This 
section shows how this competion can change both content and 
production. In fact, the interviews done for this study revealed how 
strongly competition between the two stations has influenced content 
and production processes.  
For every television station, the ultimate goal is to achieve the 
best reputation possible and this can only be achieved through maximum 
audience numbers. For this, the television station’s broadcasts must 
compete with what other television stations are broadcasting, to the 
entire, possible audience. In a smaller context, such as that of Palestine, 
one can see forms of wide-ranging competition, with stations vying for 
the same audiences. The ASC and the PSC, each representing the views 
of a major political party, Hamas in the case of the ASC and Fatah in the 
case of the PSC, which are in competition on the ground (Alshaer, 2012), 
feel that the least they can do, on air, is to compete and show their best 
sides, and seek to gain audiences for their programmes. 
Even within a conflict area such as occupied Palestine and especially 
in Israeli-blockaded areas, like Gaza and parts of the West Bank, market 
pressures can play a vital role in shaping media content. However, 
competition, as something structural to the media, was not emphasised 
overtly during interviews (Interview: Al Asfar, 2013), maybe because it 
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seems to be part of the reality of every day, and is mostly taken for 
granted by producers and media professionals, like the eternal lack of 
resources. Ironically, perhaps, competition arises more in a situation of 
constant unrest, with its constant stream of breaking news, a situation 
that has been experienced in Palestine for decades.  
Both the ASC and the PSC view each other as competitors as to who 
produces the most widely accepted media messages to the public 
(Sienkiewicz, 2012). By utilising all methods of communication, such 
as SMS and social media, to alert the public to events anticipated, 
pending or actual, the satellite TV stations expand the culture of 
competition that starts with media programming. Thus, for example, the 
ASC aired a show called Al Aqsa this morning, which arose from 
competition with the PSC’s Good morning Palestine. Each station competes 
for being the favoured messenger. There is a sense of competition for 
viewers, which is apparent in children’s programming as well as I cultural 
programmes (Hroub, 2012).  
This constant competition has compelled the producers of both 
channels to look at each other’s popular content and adjust and expand 
their own repertoire of programming to include a wider set of cultural 
values, so as to appeal to more audiences. For example, the ASC’s 
programmes started to include coverage on Lebanese, Qatari or 
Jordanian poets, whereas the PSC started to rely on narratives of 
Palestinians from Germany, France, Spain and Portugal  (Salama, 2006). 
Competition in the context of Palestine seems to be guided by a 
‘national line,’ which helps to determine media content (Interview: Al 
Shafi, 2013). As Al Shafi, head of PSC programming, explained, the 
producers of cultural and children’s shows are generally quite aware that 
there are different understandings of the ‘national line.’ Some of these 
are more inspired by Islamic nationalism, others by more secular forms 
of nationalist rhetoric. The producers working with the ASC and PSC 
are generally obliged to conform to the ’party line’ of their own media 
group. Thus, ‘domestically’ they have to show that they are closely 
following, or working within the limits of, the official position of the 
party or ‘party line.’  
This form of competition usually occurs at different levels, from the 
domestic one to the regional and international ones. However, much of 
the competition between the PSC and the ASC is at a domestic level, 
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since it is more or less unavoidable that media producers of the ASC are 
aware of the PSC’s programming, and vice versa. In a relatively 
small area like Palestine, as the heads of programming of both the ASC 
and the PSC confirmed, producers are rapidly informed of the same 
events and receive immediate public reactions from their communities 
and the people they meet in the streets (Interviews: Al Bardawil, 2013; Al 
Shafi, 2013). Neighbours and relatives are not the only source of 
feedback, however. Both TV stations have created small teams of 
journalists who form monitoring units. Their role is to watch their rival 
station’s broadcasts and summarise the breaking news. This enables 
satellite TV stations to more systematically follow each other’s 
broadcasts across regional and international media channels. 
Competition also occurs at a regional level. The ASC’s Burning Brands 
does mimic some of the tactics of Al Jazeera, for example, by employing 
similar settings. Likewise, Sesame Street producers feel that, in order for 
them to maintain a good profile within the Sesame Street workshop, they 
must compete with Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian television stations 
providing comparable programmes, in Arabic, for children. This explains 
why the content of children’s programmes can appear to contain very 
little that is distinctly Palestinian in terms of content for the viewership. 
After all, it is not only Palestinians who watch Sesame Street or Pioneers of 
Tomorrow. These programmes must entertain international audiences, 
including Palestinians and others living across a range of Arab states and 
beyond, according to the head of the Palestine Sesame Street workshop 
(Interview: Sayeigh, 2013). 
The evidence suggests that international competition occurs even 
more in children’s programming than in cultural adult programming, 
perhaps because of the ‘universality’ of many of the educational values in 
much of the children’s TV programmes. Clearly, both the ASC and the 
PSC feel they have a cultural identity they want to promote by featuring 
Palestinian intellectuals, artists and writers in their programmes. That is, 
by showing Palestine as a place where culture is flourishing, as explained 
by the producer-presenter of Burning Brands (Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013). 
This can make some programmes distinctly Palestinian, and reinforces 
the sense of a growing ‘Palestinianism’ in content and production 
decisions, as suggested by the title of this chapter. However, such 
Palestinian specificity in content is less apparent in the children’s 
programming of both the ASC and the PSC than in their cultural adult 
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programming. Both channels show internationally recognised character 
types, resembling the universally appreciated puppets. It is in their best 
interests to compete on an international level for children’s attention, at 
least in Arabic, and so to gain a greater slice of media viewership at little 
additional cost. Sesame Street in Palestine observes Sesame Street in Israel 
and India, while Pioneers of Tomorrow looks at Al Jazeera and Tour Al-
Jannah or Jordanian children’s TV programmes, as examples for its 
production values.  
It is interesting to see how market competition may mitigate 
factionalism in content, since both the ASC’s and PSC’s producers may 
be aware that in order to appeal to global audiences they need to 
defactionalise content. Each channel seems to have made a deliberate 
attempt to prevent journalists from becoming involved in children’s TV 
programming, so that journalists are restricted to political and political 
news production, and to some extent to cultural programming 
(Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013). By such means, both channels have 
managed to secure global audiences, adding to their reputations and their 
legitimacy. If they had operated only on a smaller, domestic level, 
producing TV programmes only for a local audience, and avoiding 
international audiences and thus media headlines and attention among 
other media outlets, then the ASC and the PSC would probably have 
remained, even in their children’s and cultural programming, factional in 
both form and content. As it is, each receives global media attention as 
well as callers and listeners from around the world, including those who 
watch on-line. While there are no accurate records of audience sizes for 
such programmes, they are not likely to be small, given the good number 
of hits on YouTube (Abuzanouna, 2012).  
For both channels, the competition among them and with other 
channels is not mainly about revenues or markets, though it is also about 
that. The motivation for satellite TV producers as well as journalists is 
about being able to reach the largest and most global audience of viewers 
(Tawil-Souri, 2011). The aim of being widely viewed affects content 
decisions, not so much in terms of what the editorial board wants or the 
political party linked with the station, but in relation to what other 
channels are broadcasting at that time. Sometimes producers are 
influenced by content elsewhere, to be seen as ‘keepin up,’ or being 
aware of debates from elsewhere.  
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During the study period, the ASC focused heavily on the importance 
of children knowing the holy and historical sites of Palestine. One might 
expect Sesame Street producers to maintain a globalised version of this, 
but instead, the programme producers showed a young boy walking 
around Jerusalem and pointing out the holy sites to the children 
watching. Episode SS14, for example, showed Adnan walking in the 
streets of the old city of Jerusalem. He says ‘that’s my house, it is 500 
years old – my mom sent me to buy labneh (oil) and thyme – Jerusalem’s 
cake is famous because it is delicious.’ In another episode of Sesame Street 
(SS09), a girl discusses Palestinian traditional and historical costumes. 
The conclusion of this study is that rivalry, in terms of ‘keeping up’ with 
other stations, and with one another, has pushed both the ASC and the 
PSC to sometimes ignore their respective political parties and 
paymasters, and to provide content different from what one might 
expect in a more factionalised media set-up (Interviews: Al Shafi, 2013; 
Abu Shammalah, 2013).  
The competition among both television channels has also forced 
producers to go beyond looking at only the usual methods of ‘naming 
and shaming’ opponents, towards learning from the experiences of other 
channels and other countries’ media. According to Al Asfar (Interview: 
2013), in charge of cultural programming at the PSC, this includes 
learning from the Israeli media too:  
‘we usually look at programmes that are broadcast by Al Jazeera, Al 
Arabiya, and perhaps Lebanese TV stations more than Egyptian 
outlets…because we are always impressed by their research, preparations 
and the ability to attract celebrities in the cultural scene’ (Interview: Al 
Asfar, 2013). 
Usually, since Israeli channels can afford the cost of first class travel 
and honorarium fees, they can attract important guests. Nonetheless, 
watching other channels, including Israeli ones, can help to improve 
production and programme content by learning from their style, their lay 
out and how they invite guests to the shows. Palestinian factions had to 
make the choice as to whether to stay within their own traditional media 
formats, or to broaden their platforms by using satellite TV, internet and 
web spaces. They have reached out to a broader public by announcing 
and notifying the public of what they can offer, and they hope to be able 
to compete.  
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8.7 Towards Palestinianism: The Role of New Technologies 
Unlike the dominant thinking apparent among media scholars 
that technology has limited the role of traditional media like TV, this 
study has found that technology has actually helped expand the messages 
of satellite TV, as well as contributed to changing and developing the 
content (Tawil-Souri, 2009; Tawil-Souri, 2007). Instead of confining 
itself to the traditional interview setting, in the studio, children’s and 
cultural programming has become more communicative and tends to 
jump from one topic to the next one quite smoothly. This is, in part, 
facilitated by the use of diversified technological tools, including editing 
and image manipulation tools. In addition, the content of media has 
widened from mainly localised content to a more regional and even 
globalised content.  
Both the ASC and the PSC, as Palestinian media, have 
created landmarks in a cultural and historical context. Media content is 
shaped by interactivity and media is now very visibly aware of the 
relevance of bringing voices together to share views and influence the 
views of one another. For example, in Pioneers of Tomorrow, the producer 
made the character Nassur display some socially unacceptable behaviour 
such as lying (as in episode PoT13). Very soon, telephone calls came in 
to express that what Nassur did was not correct or acceptable. This 
audience interaction with the media channel was immediately made 
visible on screen. In this way, the producer was able to show how the 
character’s behaviour can be corrected, by using the possibilities opened 
up by technologically more advanced, interactive methods of 
programming.  
Content in the four programmes would not have been as evidently 
powerful and effective during the study period, had the programme 
producers lacked the computer technologies of cable connection, 
satellite transmission technology, microwave technology and 
telecommunication and internet technology, all allowing for more direct 
communication between the producer and the audiences. Were it not 
for internet technology, defactionalisation might not have occurred as 
rapidly as it seems to have taken place in the year or two before the 
period of this study. For example, the PSC would have been unable to 
step outside of the box, to include a wider focus on international 
narrators, artists and authors. Similarly, the ASC would not have been 
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able to discuss ‘modernism’ in literature, removing itself from a narrow 
adherence to topics considered appropriate for an internal or ‘domestic,’ 
factional Fatah-Hamas debate. 
The use of various forms of new IT technology means that content 
can be presented in a more exciting and stimulating manner, by which 
watching video-clips in combination with bright and colourful lettering, 
sounds and computer graphic imagery, can become irresistible, especially 
for younger viewers (and their careers.) Children tend to absorb the 
entire sensory intake. Clearly, the use of technology has been a 
significant factor in the on-going competition between both the PSC and 
the ACS (Alshaer, 2012).  
Technology has brought interconnectivity between different 
individuals and added it into the narrative by presenting a new picture 
and pattern of life, in which audiences, both ‘domestic’ and international, 
can be heard, seen and responded to. This is not the traditional television 
programme setting of just two people in discussion, with a fixed 
audience rating, but a setting that has been opened up to more viewers 
and to speakers with a more diverse range of views and opinions, 
including women, artists and intellectuals, as well as children. The result 
is that, over the period of this study, each channel ended up using 
technological means to assist in producing a more diversified range of 
voices and contributions than was possible in the past. This clearly may 
have also helped to ‘defactionalise’ content. In any case, the advantage of 
this participatory element in new technologies cannot be overstated and 
should not be ignored by producers. After all, media technologies like 
satellite TV and internet have helped bridge the gap between two 
geographically separated areas: ‘We never want a separation between 
children who watch us by telling them, you are from Gaza and you are 
from West Bank’ (Interview: Al Shafi, head of PSC’s cultural 
programmes, 2013).  
The challenge ahead is not to test the potential of the technology as 
such, but to assess to what extent technology can affect content, both 
positively and negatively. This research suggests that, with regard to 
Palestinian satellite TV, new technologies have already contributed in 
two ways: (i) by maximising audience and (wider) participation in the 
content and (ii) by amplifying the message of TV programming beyond 
the domestic level, to the regional and international levels. Prior to the 
new technological era, the PSC’s production crew relied only on 
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whatever resources were available in-studio, and used mostly materials 
immediately at hand in Palestine.  
New technology in Cultural Flashes, for example, enabled programme 
presenter Amani Abu Hantash to sit behind a state-of-the-art Mac 
computer, and scroll down through all internet sites and encyclopaedias 
for information (Interview: Al Asfar, head of programming of the PSC 
in Ramallah, 2013). This meant she was able to dig deeper for details on 
arts, literature, poets and histories, than even the most up-to-date 
intellectuals would be able to deliver on the spot at that time. This 
signified the power of technology in invading the rooms of old 
Palestinian intellectuals who may think they know a lot about 
intellectuals around the world. It has also helped to mix the sense of 
Palestinianism with that of other cultures, not as well known to the 
younger generation.  
In episode CF20 of Cultural Flashes, Abu Hantash, using her fingers 
on the keyboard and the mouse arrow on the screen, said: ‘Slowly, we 
will flip through internet pages, so that we can discover together 
landmarks of culture and creativity.’ As she scrolled down the screens of 
specialised websites, the producers were able to save on travelling 
expenses, and avoid the hassles of crossing militarised, physical, 
geographical borders. Travelling the websites, with the click of a finger 
(in episode CF08), Abu Hantash focused on a black American 
author, Rita Dove, and other scholars in India, Denmark, America, the 
Netherlands, Morocco and Iraq. If it were not for technology, global 
contributions like these would have been difficult to include in 
programme content. Technology has helped the PSC to present a wider 
range of viewpoints, and, for example, include views by Palestinian 
authors critical of the lack of governmental support for the arts. In this 
way, producers of both children’s and cultural programmes have used 
forms of information technology to present wider views from viewers, 
intellectuals and other contributors, who may not even need to be 
invited to provide content.  
As shown in, for example, Burning Brands episode 11, technology has 
enabled producers in both the PSC and the ASC to be more open to 
critiques themselves without being ashamed of it. They often got 
feedback from viewers. For example, in the same episode of Burning 
Brands (BB11), presenter Abu Jarad said: ‘I want to be honest with the 
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viewers and also with ourselves, on: why do we always blame every 
failure and delay in culture, economy and social life on the [Israeli] 
blockade?’ In the pre-information-age technological past, television 
programmes would mainly focus on topics through the voice and 
opinion of a presenter, one person, usually in the studio rather than 
outside. Now the use of well-known editing programmes, such as 
Premier and Final Cut Pro, makes it possible for crews moving around in 
various locations to bring diverse voices directly into the production 
process.  
When social media is used and people’s comments and 
opinions become visible on screen, to a wider public, editors and 
producers will find it harder to ignore the demands from the public. 
Hence, new forms of technology have helped to shape content materials 
and to introduce wider, more immediate (including live,) public voices 
into the studio. While previously they were an unusual practice in TV 
production, the live phone-ins of viewer’s comments have now become 
the norm. 
According to Abu Jarad, both producer and presenter of Burning 
Brands, some of these advantages of technology can be used to 
break down old routines and professional boundaries (Interview: Abu 
Jarad, 2013). New types of thinking were introduced, not only by 
involving Islamic-oriented or Hamas-affiliated writers and poets but also 
through live satellite broadcasts, which have helped Burning Brands to 
include more interviews from Palestinians and others, also outside of the 
geographical confines of Palestine. These new guests were not 
directly involved in domestic Fatah-Hamas in-fighting and, therefore, as 
this research has shown, their involvement in the programme brought in 
views of those not immediately and locally ‘traumatised’ by the events of 
factional fighting. This makes such cultural programming appear as a 
platform for renewing political affiliations and demonstrating loyalty to 
the idea of Palestinian nationalism, in its Hamas-Islamic variants. 
Technology has also helped the ACS’s production crew to combine 
the voices of guests who were physically present in the studio with the 
voices of a wider public, and with calls coming into the station in 
response to events in the programme and outside. In one episode 
(BB01), the presenter of Burning Brands managed to compensate for his 
guest’s lack of experience in the topic under discussion by 
involving Palestinian author Dr Fayez Abu-Shammalah in the 
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conversation. The latter’s contribution was to emphasize the role 
of poetry in challenging the Israeli siege on Gaza and the dangers of the 
ongoing Israeli occupation. Dr Abu-Shammalah’s contribution, 
by telephone, added content that would otherwise have been missing in 
the programme. And, by emphasising wider political values that were not 
clearly expressed by the studio guest, who presented his poetry 
and spoke of his own book, the phone call resulted in a more rounded 
perspective on the role of poetry in general, in Palestinian culture and 
political life. In this way, more diversity of content complemented and 
challenged those in the studio who were busy with the topic of the day.  
Compared to Burning Brands, Cultural Flashes has relied much more 
on technology, by employing a far greater range of methods of finding 
information, including the use of social media. Yet, both the ASC and 
the PSC have selectively used YouTube videos in their cultural 
broadcasting, to enrich programme content. For example, in episode 11, 
Burning Brands showed a video clip of the poet Yasser Al-Atrash, in 
which he praises those ‘martyrised’ and the people of Palestine who 
remain, despite being harassed by the occupation. This same poet named 
and shamed Arabs in other countries in the region, for what he called 
giving up on Palestinian rights and not rising up against the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine. The surroundings the poet was living in made 
the content come across the way it did, i.e., as combative. The experience 
of living in exile forced this poet to come up with poems reflecting 
feelings that are unlikely to come from some other poet who is living 
inside Palestine.  
In Burning Brands episode 1 (BB01), content included a combination 
of visual images clearly designed to show how modern software is used, 
and this was combined with Nasheed (Islamic or religious songs). A 
similar mix of elements was found in children’s programming, where 
multiple cameras used in the studio, along with computerised games and 
cartoons, created a noticeable atmosphere of multi-dimensional 
entertainment in Sesame Street, according to head of PSC programming in 
Gaza, Al Shafi (Interview: 2013). Were it not for modern technology, 
children watching Sesame Street would most likely not have been able to 
experience the lives of children across the globe, whether in Japan or in 
the US. The same applies to Burning Brands, where most of the 
participation from outside the studio occurred via telephone calls coming 
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in from a wide range of countries, especially across the Arabic-speaking 
world (Abuzanouna, 2015).  
8.8 A New Sense of ‘Palestinianism’ in the Media?  
Overall, this research agrees to a large extent with the overarching 
theoretical presuppositions of Deuze (2011), as shown in ‘Media Life,’ 
where media has become omnipresent to a level at which people no 
longer just live with media content, but also within media context. 
Context here is seen as when people use the media in the context of their 
reality. The research on defactionalised media presented here takes 
Deuze’s argument one step further, in suggesting that media have 
become a means, for Palestinian people, to break restrictions imposed by 
the occupation (and sometimes restrictions imposed by inter-party 
factionalism as well) and to make media turn into an important part of 
the infrastructure of modern life, a distinctly Palestinian cultural 
institution, capable of expressing resistance to occupation, but also a 
great deal beyond that. 
Burning Brands, in episode 7 (BB07), relied on the voices of experts 
and specialists, but rarely involved the voices of average citizens in 
discussions on intellectual issues.  In episode 11 (BB11), however, the 
producers made the decision to open up to calls from the public. 
However, some of the calls bypassed the topic of the show, and this 
seemed to be the reason why producers did not continue with this 
approach. Cultural Flashes included ordinary grassroots citizens in 33.5% 
of the shows during the period of this study. Their content contribution 
mostly came from their public reflections and reviews after seeing plays, 
listening to music, watching movies and attending concerts.  
Cultural Flashes episode 1 (CF01) showed a Turkish Oud musician 
playing music. The general public was interviewed during the show and 
asked to express their views. One person said about the performance: 
‘This was very much needed to get away from stress and daily life 
routines.’ Of course, most of the feedback from the audience was 
positive, and full of praise for what had been viewed or heard. On other 
occasions also, Palestinianism was present, rooted in Palestinian arts, 
leaving no room for the squabbling between two factions. This was 
shown clearly in an episode of Cultural Flashes (CF10), in which a group 
of student artists, lead by Ramzi Abu Radwan, appeared on a stage in the 
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West Bank, singing ‘hey people, leave me alone.’ The song received 
appreciation as being a form of Eastern Palestinian music. By airing this 
scene, the producers seemed to want to express to the viewers that there 
is Eastern Palestinian music that should be studied in schools, and that it 
was time for people to pay attention to it.  
Episode 9 (CF09), offered another form of Palestinianism, conveyed 
by a new film, ‘To My Father,’ by Palestinian filmmaker Abdelsalam 
Shadeh. The film documents the relationship between Palestinians and 
photographs for over 50 years. It looks at the daily life of Palestinians 
and at the political, social and economic changes and transformations 
that they endured over the years. To take an extract from the text of the 
film: 
‘When the Israelis occupied us in 1967, I felt there was an earthquake in 
my country, I was not able to understand why many people were running 
in the streets, not knowing where to go… people became afraid, even 
afraid to look at the photos – things have changed, our neighbour Abu 
Azoom was looking for his children…. Our neighbour Abu Samir has 
vanished, and I could no longer see the Egyptian officer that used to live 
next to us. His son Ashraf and I did not say goodbye. My sister also 
changed her clothes and wore my mom’s dress. My brother was studying 
in Cairo and was not able to come back.’  
The film represents a form of Palestinianism, by documenting, in every 
single scene, some aspect of the post-violence, ‘cold conflict’ of brothers, 
and expressing the desire for normality.  
When interviewed for this study, the producers of children’s 
programmes in both the West Bank and Gaza agreed that military 
occupation had shaped content in ways that tended to undermine the 
notion that TV for children can offer high ideals and principles, 
untainted by political realities: 
‘After all, Sara [main character of Pioneers of Tomorrow ] is part of the real 
problem; she is the daughter of Rafah that has seen thousands of people 
injured and killed, and home demolitions – she stood on the ruins of 
homes to sing. She is part of the Palestinian tragedy’ (Interview: Al 
Bardawil, 2013).  
In both areas of Palestine in which this research was done, 
production teams see living under Israeli occupation and being subject to 
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the harsh realities of the military and policing operations by the security 
apparatuses as making it almost impossible for children to grow 
up within a healthy atmosphere, protected against the brutal realities of 
the occupation (Interview: Al Shafi, 2013).  
8.9 Palestinianism in the presence of Israel and Western 
States 
The analysis of the content of Sesame Street showed that, during the 
selected period, the presence of Israeli soldiers was never explicitly 
mentioned in the programme. This silence about the presence of Israeli 
soldiers was explained as being due to external pressure applied by 
donors. Donors, who wanted to maintain the programme, and, in order 
to avoid problems, insisted that there should be no mention of the Israeli 
occupation. This, combined with internal pressure stemming from within 
the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank, resulted in a feeling at the 
PSC that producers should not politicise the content of children’s 
programmes, so as not to jeopardise future funding prospects. According 
to the head of Sesame Street’s Palestine workshop, Laila Sayeigh 
(interview, 2013): ‘Other children’s programmes focus all day on 
checkpoints. They are free to do so, but in Sesame Street, we focus on 
positive things.’  
However, although explicit mention of politics may have been 
removed from Sesame Street, taking politics out of culture is much more 
challenging. After all, both Palestinian cultural life and Palestinian 
politics are deeply embedded in one another. Thus, TV producers often 
start their career by working under very strict surveillance by 
security apparatuses in the West Bank or Gaza, including military and 
police forces which could, in fact, cause direct threats to themselves and 
their families. Yet, most of the producers interviewed claimed not to fear 
the Israeli security forces (and their private contractors) and their ability 
to arrest, detain and otherwise harm them. Such heroic claims of not 
fearing the Israeli army and police are not entirely believable, however. If 
both the ASC and the PSC really were free of fear they would use new 
technologies to produce wider and more inclusive cultural programmes, 
in which the voices of more Palestinians, including those living outside 
Gaza or the West Bank, in Jerusalem and elsewhere inside Israel, would 
be heard. At present, it is easier to use new technology to link up 
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listeners in Saudi Arabia or Egypt with Gazan audiences, than to link 
them across Gaza, the West Bank and Haifa, for example.  
The intention to challenge the presence of Israeli occupation forces 
and Israeli control of Palestinian mobility, is not disguised. When Sara 
said: ‘We will pray at Al-Aqsa mosque,’ this, although technically not 
actually possible for Gazans, was meant to express that one day Palestine 
will no longer be militarily occupied by Israel (PoT18). Sara embedded 
this idea in the minds and imagination of the children listening to the 
programme. As noted in Chapter 6, there is a need for children to work 
on freeing the mosque. Sara’s saying was a revolutionary call to imagine 
the mosque as representing a Palestine that is besieged. The way in 
which this was framed made it appear as a duty and a call for action on 
the younger generation. It is fair to conclude that, if no 
security apparatus controlled Gaza as completely as the Israeli army now 
does, the political content of ASC children’s programming would be 
much less explicit and obvious. 
Producers themselves are aware of military occupation as an aspect of 
the daily reality that shapes media content in important ways. Producers 
may be offered training opportunities, for instance in journalism, whilst 
facing the reality that security apparatuses, both Israeli and Egyptian in 
the case of Gaza, actively close down all possible ways to reach the 
outside world. This impossible situation means that the ASC’s 
production crews tend to vent their frustrations and anger with the 
situation in their content, bringing into children’s and cultural 
programmes songs that challenge the ‘prison guards’ who occupy the 
Gaza Strip, and including narratives about Palestinian children who died, 
for example, due to a lack of life-saving medical supplies that Israel 
would not allow to pass through the checkpoints into Gaza. This 
particulare incident took place in one episode of Pioneers of Tomorrow (PoT 
22), that was broadcast during the period of study. 
In moving beyond the usual ‘box’ of children’s programme content, 
in the period under review, media producers at the ASC have also tried 
to maximise their use of the few remaining freedoms they have, despite 
the threat of ‘security’ measures against them. This was for example 
shown in episode PoT12, in which, as Sara commemorated Land Day, 
she insisted that: ‘We will remain, we will remain in our land.’ As the 
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producer explained, in this episode he consciously reproduced some 
visual images from a short Israeli television publicity film:  
‘…I decided to respond to an Israeli TV ad… I used similar-looking 
children, a father who looked the same. Israeli news showed [this short 
film]…on Israeli TV, saying Hamas’ activists may be destructive but they 
are professional. In the first three days, 220,000 people viewed this short 
film on my personal facebook page’ (Interview: Al Amriti, 2013). 
Of course, these negative and (unintendedly) positive influences were 
also mediated by the way in which the security apparatuses and the 
media themselves were funded. Without financial support from the US, 
for instance, the Israeli and Egyptian security forces would find it hard to 
operate as they do in Gaza and the West Bank. The PA is heavily 
dependent for all its activities on aid received from the West, especially 
from Europe (Zanotti, 2010). Hamas could hardly manage without 
funding and support from Iran and elsewhere (Yousef, 2015). The wider 
influence of funding arrangements and logistical support from the 
outside world on satellite media in Palestine is the focus of the next 
section of this chapter.  
In ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow, there was massive focus on nationhood. 
Usually this was mixed with emotions, in which the lack of existence of a 
nation, due to the presence of the Israeli occupation, was highlighted 
with blame on large states. Political elites, as Al Bardawil (2013) said, 
want ‘their’ respective TV stations to focus less on internal political 
squabbling, and more on what unites Palestinians, such as images of 
Palestinian children as victims of the war. This politics of representation 
was very carefully managed in Pioneers of Tomorrow, as shown (in episode 
PoT19) when producers presented an image of a Palestinian refugee as a 
victim of Al Nakba. The refugee said: ‘…not only me, but many are like 
me, of the Palestinian people who live their plight in bitterness and 
torture. May Allah break England, America, and Israel.’ This was said 
while images of poor people living in refugee camps were displayed, with 
typical shots of clothing hanging from rooftops. 
None of the countries mentioned above was involved in funding the 
ASC during the period under review. The United States and United 
Kingdom were portrayed as enemies who supported the establishment 
of Israel. The PSC’s Sesame Street would not praise Israel, but would also 
never openly blame the United States for the situation in Palestine. After 
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all, Sesame Street was funded by the USAID, and the curriculum of Sesame 
Street was monitored by the Sesame Street workshop in New York, to 
ensure that there would be no form of incitement. The same logic 
applied to Cultural Flashes, in which the many activities in art galleries, 
theatres, musical events, and even around poets, that were mentioned, 
were from Western Europe and/or America. Pioneers of Tomorrow praised 
a lot of countries that children could consider capitals of the Muslim 
world, including Saudi Arabia, of which the towns of Jeddah and Medina 
were explicitly mentioned. Sara and children on the phone praised such 
countries for being respectful of Islam (PoT08). TV producers were 
interested in showing these cities as holy places. Perhaps, in this way, 
they also sought to educate Palestinian Muslim children in praying five 
times a day, emphasising at the same time one of the five pillars of Islam, 
the pilgrimage or Haj to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. 
In contrast with Burning Brands, which remained quite tightly focused 
on classical Arabic cultural expression, the PSC’s Cultural Flashes included 
in one of its episodes (CF11) a representation of Danish and Spanish arts 
and poetry, without much reference to the shared history of Muslims in 
Spain. In contrast, in Pioneers of Tomorrow, presenter Sara reminded 
viewers of the historical and cultural importance of Andalusia and Iraq, 
and indicated that these countries should fly the flag inscribed with ‘No 
God, but Allah’ (PoT07). There was a promise to the children that, God 
willing, the flag will be raised and Islam will be everywhere. This focus 
on the Islamic world and on the importance of religion as a basis for 
shared identity contrasted sharply with that of Sesame Street, in which, for 
example, Mongolian dancing was greatly admired (in episode SS17). In 
this episode, the children watched a Mongolian woman perform a 
traditional folk dance, balancing a pot on her head, and a child trying to 
do the same. This kind of diversity of representation in culture can be 
viewed, from one angle, as not relevant to polarising forms of media 
factionalism.  
Whilst in Sesame Street (in episode SS17), Germany was introduced as a 
nice country with nice weather, and a people and culture that all children 
should be able to enjoy and learn from, this kind of positive 
representation of the West could hardly be found at all in Pioneers of 
Tomorrow. This key difference between the PSC’s and the ASC’s politics 
of representation arose in large part from the very different social 
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context and upbringing of media producers in Gaza compared to the 
West Bank or Jerusalem, and also from the difference in the politics of 
funding of the two stations. This point was raised earlier in this chapter, 
in relation to the influence of the blockade and the security apparatuses 
on both PSC and ASC programme production. The ASC’s producers 
hardly got any opportunities to travel outside Gaza, at least not legally, 
and the ASC station was (and is) still banned by the West since it was 
(and still is) linked to Hamas, according to the head of the Board of the 
ASC, Al Bardawil (Interview: 2013). This was the opposite for Sesame 
Street, where staff got more opportunities to exchange knowledge, travel 
and meet with other producers in workshops of Sesame Street in New 
York and other cities around the world, according to the head of Sesame 
Street (Interview: Sayeigh, 2013). 
Pioneers of Tomorrow marked the 61st anniversary of Nakba in episode 
PoT19, in which the Puppet Nassur started to question all Arab leaders 
on why this injustice was inflicted on Palestinians as the world watched 
events unfold. He pointed to the continuation of Israeli occupation. The 
only form of solidarity that Pioneers of Tomorrow found was among like-
minded children who were suffering and who were praised for their 
suffering and for sacrificing their lives in protest to injustice. This was, 
for example, expressed in ‘greetings from children of Iraq, of Lebanon, 
Kashmir, and from Chechen children,’ as the Puppet Nassur said, all of 
whom were represented as heros who had sacrificed their life for 
freedom and for their country and its land (PoT19). As Puppet Nassur 
also emphasised in this episode: ‘It is 60 years, Sara, and the world is 
watching us. The Arab leaders are watching… look how many wars have 
happened to us - the world is doing nothing!’ 
As emerged clearly from the content analysis presented in Chapters 6 
and 7, the frankness about the politics of occupation and dying in Pioneers 
of Tomorrow contrasted with that in Sesame Street, in which there was 
almost no mention of Israel’s existence at all. This might be viewed as 
deceptive, as presenting a fantasy life, which contrasted markedly with 
daily realities on the ground in the West Bank. However, in contrast to 
Sesame Street, the PSC’s cultural programme, Cultural Flashes, on occasion, 
did raise some critiques of Israel. It could perhaps afford to do so, being 
significantly less restricted by donors’ conditions and priorities for 
‘peace’ than Sesame Street. As Chapters 6 and 7 showed, this was mainly 
done through the words of Palestinian poets and writers in exile, whose 
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work was covered in the show. Through their eyes, the cultural 
landscape and obstacles to self-expression of Palestinians were discussed. 
Such references were quite distinct, however, from those made in Burning 
Brands, in which the politics of representation explicitly and repeatedly 
reflected the ideology of Hamas and openly blamed Israeli occupation 
for taking away Palestinian rights, confiscating lands and trying to 
destroy a sense of cultural, religious and national identity (Arts et al., 
2007).  
8.10 Cultural Diversity and Palestinianism  
While Sesame Street marked the Day of the Tree as a festival that ought to 
be recognised, in Pioneers of Tomorrow only Islamic Eids were celebrated, 
reflecting a common belief in Gaza that there was nothing left to 
celebrate but Eids. Even when discussing environmental values, and 
trying to teach children some useful lessons about how important it is to 
plant trees, Pioneers of Tomorrow’s producers again mentioned Israel as an 
entity that violated the laws of nature by using white phosphorus and 
depleted uranium as weapons during the war on Gaza (PoT12), thus 
damaging the natural environment as well. The Pioneers of Tomorrow 
presenter also referred to examples of environmental damage that 
resulted from the Israeli blockade and from demolition of Palestinian 
houses (PoT14), and the uprooting of trees for building the Wall and a 
security zone along it. Sesame Street and Pioneers of Tomorrow both talked 
about the importance of planting flowers and trees. However, whilst 
Sesame Street producers avoided all mention of Israel, the ASC attributed 
the environmental problems of Gaza squarely to Israel. 
Promoting positive role models, Sesame Street (as in episode SS013, for 
example) involved celebrities who encouraged children to do their best. 
Thus, by introducing a famous singer, Reem Talhami, the programme 
tried to show children that they, too, could aspire to be like her one day, 
and can become famous singers if they develop their skills and work 
hard. When Kareem said that he did not know Reem Talhami, Haneen 
replied: ‘Are you kidding? Reem Talhami is a big and famous Palestinian 
singer, she has a beautiful voice and she looks beautiful.’ Pioneers of 
Tomorrow might not have found this acceptable, as Islamic Nasheed 
(confining music to koranic recitations) was presented as the artistic ideal 
in that programme. The producers of the ASC encouraged children to 
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become teachers who master the Arabic language, the language of the 
Holy Quran, and stimulated them to aspire to be leaders, scientists and 
teachers. 
Whereas in Sesame Street producers tended to borrow materials from 
other countries, this was much less the case in Pioneers of Tomorrow, in 
which Palestinian children were the main focus, and were viewed 
through a lens of patriotism. In episode PoT21, for example, a widow’s 
son is presented, whose father was killed in a previous war. In another 
episode (PoT14), the daughter of a Palestinian prisoner is introduced. In 
one case, the producers brought the young children of Hamas leader and 
Prime Minister, Ismail Hanyieh, into the studio, and presented them as 
the children of the leader, children who should follow the leader’s path. 
In another episode (PoT20), ‘the love of the homeland’ was emphasised 
and the show indicated that there was no significant difference between 
the average Palestinian children and the children of political leaders like 
the youngest son of Ismail Hanyieh. The child was asked by the puppet 
to introduce himself and he replied ‘Mohammed Ismail Hanyieh.’ The 
puppet asked him to repeat that once again. He said in the same episode 
that he would never leave his homeland: ‘This land is for all, and we 
should keep it all safe – I will keep resisting, to preserve my homeland.’ 
In Sesame Street, cultural diversity was celebrated, and the programme 
was structured to ignore politics and to focus on bringing educational 
tools to the children. Pioneers of Tomorrow producers criticised this kind of 
children’s programme as a deliberate attempt to place children outside 
the realm of the real issues that affect them in their daily lives. The 
producers of Pioneers of Tomorrow claimed that the programme’s contents 
were restricted to the daily realities that could be perceived by children in 
Palestine. The only opening to the world was a virtual one, in this case 
the telephone line which brought in the voices of child callers. All 
the décor and furniture on the set were hand-made locally in Gaza. It is 
on this basis that children learn principles and values, not from talking 
about the states and cultural habits of other countries. They claimed that: 
‘To show how much the Zionist enemy is a primitive one, I don’t 
necessarily need to bring a Muppet and show it being stabbed by 
knives… but I would show a small girl going for her first day of school 
and a soldier stopping her on her way to school’ (Interview: Al Amriti, 
2013).  
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The producers of the ASC did not seem to see the lack of more 
diverse materials and the almost exclusive focus on Palestinian children’s 
lives as troubling. They claimed that, after all, the programme was locally 
produced by a satellite TV station with a strictly limited budget, 
especially compared to the PSC’s budget, which tended to be much 
higher. Cultural Flashes cost $1,600 per episode, while Burning Brands cost 
$300 per episode. Sesame Street refused to provide information on its 
finances, but is believed to have cost around $10,000 per episode, while 
Pioneers of Tomorrow spent around $300 on each episode (Interview: Al-
Bardawil, 2013). As already explained earlier in this study, the PSC had 
far more staff and a much greater budget for programmes, including 
children’s and cultural programmes, than the ASC (Interview: Al Shafi, 
2013; Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013).  
Sesame Street could afford, for example, to send a small child to the all-
nations festival in Ramallah, to see tents and exhibits and to meet with 
people from other cultures and interact with them. Sesame Street showed 
a Syrian market, full of life, with a beautifully dressed man selling locust 
bean (tamarind) drink, carried on his back, while pouring drinks in a very 
unique and humorous way (SS17). This way of showing a Syrian market 
emphasised the richness of the culture, of food and traditions. Yemen 
was featured in Sesame Street in a positive and beautiful way, with a child 
and mother buying things in a market, showing Yemen as famous for its 
silver and honey, in addition to praising the Yemeni dress codes and 
costumes (SS17). Kenya was also presented in Sesame Street, as an 
amazing African country, with footage of a Palestinian child 
wandering the market, to see the beautiful handmade carvings, wooden 
masks, drums and other musical instruments and to hear the national 
Kenyan songs. Later in the same episode (SS17), a Palestinian child got 
her hair plaited in African style. Sesame Street showed a Palestinian boy, 
Adnan, in Jordan, talking about Al Batra, riding on a horse, going 
between the rocks and the mountains (SS02). The show presented the 
city as the centre of trade between East and West and then explained the 
structure and richness of Al Batra, and its worth in history and heritage. 
It concluded by inviting children to go to Al Batra and explore it for a 
day.  
In both cultural programmes there seemed to be a deliberate effort 
not to involve political/factional leaders, governmental officials or 
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religious figures. As a result, the content maintained a focus on wider 
traditional, national culture. The explanation for this, according to what 
the media producers of all four shows told the researcher, is that the 
overall intention was to defactionalise content. As one interviewee said: 
‘Factionalism will limit my ability to reach out to new children – we stick 
to the needs of children and nationalism and show the children as the 
victims of the occupation’ (Interview: Al Bardawil, 2013).  
8.11  Factionalism Producing Palestinianism(s)  
In conclusion, media content was greatly influenced by this diversity of 
perspectives from women, to a lesser extent from minorities, and from 
intellectuals and artists. This study suggests that, were it not for 
these diverse and varied voices and the way in which they have 
influenced content, mediated competition between the PSC and the 
ASC, and diversified the values that were considered appropriate for 
cultural and children’s programming, defactionalisation of content might 
have been markedly less significant. For example, had the ASC kept a 
monopoly on discussions about culture within a narrow group 
of individuals closely affiliated to Hamas’s political chief, one can be 
almost certain that defactionalisation would not have taken place in its 
children’s and cultural programmes, and perhaps, in response, also not in 
the PSC’s programmes.  
Producers, presenters and journalists working in both TV outlets 
seemed quite aware that content was being shaped in such a way that a 
new form of Palestinianism was being prioritised over former narrow 
factional agendas that have dominated, for example, much of the news 
programming in the past. The more diversified voices of the public that 
have emerged have also made production teams realise that they can 
contribute to their overall goal of increasing audience by being less 
factional in their whole approach. During the period of the study, the 
producers seemed to have realised the importance of Palestinian unity, as 
for example in Cultural Flashes (CF09). The producers showed sympathy 
with Gaza by displaying photos of war victims, taken by a German 
photographer. In the same episode (CF09), a discussion followed, on the 
importance of Palestinian national reconciliation. This suggests that 
during the period of the study, both stations seemed to practice their 
own forms of ‘Palestinianism,’ by searching for values and approaches 
that united them. This may imply that Palestinianism is simply about 
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finding a common enemy. However, as this study has tried to show, the 
emerging new forms of Palestinianism are more than simply a response 
to a shared threat. Palestinianism is the translation into the media of the 
sense that Palestinians are engaged in a shared political project, or set of 
ideals and principles, in spite of the very different circumstances of 
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. 
8.12 Conclusion 
Factional structures and processes of defactionalisation can be 
combined, it seems, and the complex, intertwined normative and 
political substance of programming, both as processes and content, can 
follow divergent logics. Factionalisation as a form of securitisation (Hass, 
2009) involves a speech act, and should not be conceived as right or 
wrong, but certainly as something unavoidably political. It can be argued 
that factionalisation has been largely delegitimised, especially through 
defactionalisation of media content and production processes. The 
concept of defactionalised media content is an important one in the 
Palestinian context, and indeed, in any democratic society, since a media 
free of factional in-fighting, that can still represent different political 
trends, can play a significant role in promoting democratic dialogue by 
fostering free discussion between different political parties and factions 
around common societal problems. By defactionalising content and 
bringing in ‘voices’ that speak to common concerns, contrasting 
solutions for the problems faced can be more openly debated without 
automatic resort to rhetorical ‘othering’ and other forms of factionalising 
media discourse. This has produced a new form of Palestinianism, which 
emerged in the media after 2010.  
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9 Conclusions, Paradoxes, Ways Forward  
 
 
9.1 Overview of the Main Findings  
The central question of this study is about how the PSC and the ASC 
communicate key themes, including nationalism, resistance, right to 
education and citizens’ rights, within the selected cultural and children’s 
programmes, and whether they did so in a way that served to overcome 
media ‘factionalism’. Children’s and cultural programmes were selected 
because it was hoped, or expected, that in these programmes there 
would be evidence of defactionalisation. This proved to be the case, 
when compared with the results of earlier studies of the Palestinian news 
media. Overall, the analysis of content and the analysis of production 
both supported the conclusion that renewed forms of nationalism were 
emerging across ASC and PSC satellite TV content and output during 
the study period. Several key findings were identified in seeking to 
explain evidence of defactionalisation of media content and production 
in all 4 selected TV programmes: 
1) The pressure of market forces  
The first key finding was that, as formerly factional media producers, still 
supported financially and politically by particular ‘factional’ political 
groupings, producers in ASC and PSC had to compete for market 
dominance for Palestinian audiences, both at home and abroad. To be 
able to compete, they had to make some compromises in relation to 
themes reflecting certain values, and this influenced program content. 
Their decisions to defactionalise media content were reflected in how 
selected themes emerged – or did not emerge - in programme content, as 
analysed. Especially in cultural programmes, but also in children’s 
programmes, there appeared to be an avoidance of factionalism and a 
move towards forms of what has been termed ‘Palestinianism’. The 
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desire to communicate with international audiences may have played a 
significant role in fostering defactionalisation of content and this growth 
– in both ASC and PSC - of a sense of Palestinianism. A different 
example of the influence of competition on Palestinian satellite media 
producers was the ASC’s following of certain allies as models, specifically 
Turkey’s and Qatar’s Al Jazeera TV channels (Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013; 
Al Asfar, 2013). All of this has contributed to enhancing the influence of 
Palestinian TV channels, and improving quality and defactionalising 
content.  
2) More relaxed political climate among Palestinian political factions  
A second finding is that a less factional climate in inter-Palestinian 
politics, in turn influenced production decisions, as reflected in the 
content of of ASC and PSC children’s and cultural programmes during 
the study period. The analysis in the last few chapters of this thesis, in 
particular, leads to a more nuanced understanding of the influences that 
politicians and other major decision-makers have on satellite TV 
production and content in Palestine. Evidence presented in this study 
suggests that decisions made locally by both ASC and PSC producers 
tended to show quite similar use of language and themes reflecting 
shared values between the two stations, in spite of the persistence of 
some significant differences, for example in relation to women’s 
presence. Despite their geographical separation, both ASC and PSC, as 
institutions, closely monitor and follow each other’s output, with 
politicians as keen as producers for each channel to retain and attract 
audiences. Because technological changes are constantly shifting media 
environments in which producers have to operate, however, it is not 
possible to precisely determine the influence of visible political leaders in 
the process of media production. The ability through social media to 
rapidly share huge amounts of current information makes it more 
difficult, not only for governments, but also for political parties, and 
even for producers, to enact traditionally strict gatekeeper roles that 
tended in the past to reinforce factionalism. 
3) Technologically-driven changes in production environment  
A third finding is the critical significance of choice among a growing 
number of satellite channels in Palestine. TV has the ability to produce 
voice and images, accessible to everyone, including people in prisons, 
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refugee camps, villages and cities. In Palestine, as elsewhere, all it takes is 
a TV set and a receiver with dish, all of which can be purchased for 
under $200. The owner, usually the man in the house, sometimes the 
teenagers, use the remote control to travel through a multitude of 
satellite channels to get the latest updates and programmes, at the push 
of a button. Unlike satellite TV stations, ground-based (cable) TV 
stations serve relatively small territories. They are limited to transmitting 
local and regional programmes only, and, therefore, have a more narrow 
perspective. Palestinian satellite TV has played a vital role in forming the 
broader Palestinian public opinion. However, it may be argued that 
satellite TV media in Palestine, like anywhere else, has also contributed 
to forms of isolation, leading to the compliance of audiences with 
hegemonic political projects (Gramsci, 1971), and that the availability of 
so many channels cannot but influence producers and their agenda 
setting, whether they are aware of this or not (Strinati, 1995). The 
participation of audiences can be viewed, from this perspective, as a 
mostly passive form of participation. In this respect, satellite TV differs 
from most social media, where the consumer can also be the producer of 
information (Sienkiewicz, 2012).  
As a mass media – in the age of globalisation and technological 
revolution - satellite TV, alongside social media, can be considered one 
of the most important means by which public opinion is being formed 
and informed in Palestine. There have been recent leaps in technological 
development from UHF TV transmission to satellite channels, now 
more specialized than ever in news production, education, 
entertainment, economy, sports, tourism and religion (Al Faqeh, 2011), 
as well as in cultural and children’s programming, the specific focus of 
this study. This has tended to increase the diversity and impact of such 
media communication’s content, both in people’s homes and in public 
institutions, serving to reduce factional influences that dominated news, 
for example, in the past (Alshaer, 2012).  
4) The dark side of satellite technology: risks and potentialities  
A fourth finding concerns the ‘dark’ side of the technological 
possibilities that may – or may not – be outweighed by something less 
factional; defactionalised media content. Both the media content analysis 
in Chapter 6 and 7 and the in-depth analysis of producers’ decisions in 
Chapters 5 and 8 suggested that the more menacing aspects of TV 
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technology – its appeal to narrow, locational, religious and ‘factional’ 
forms of political groupings - have been countered by a tendency 
towards the removal of factional content, and towards less factional 
decisions by producers and media professionals. In a strange sense, as 
the territorial area controlled by the PA in the West Bank and the de facto 
authority of Hamas in Gaza has shrunk, the virtual territory occupied by 
these satellite TV channels has expanded, to a flourishing environment 
of up to nine satellite TV channels and tens of local TV channels 
broadcasting from these tiny strips and pockets of land. The influence of 
satellite media in Palestine has two aspects: the bright side offered by 
diversity and defactionalisation, and the dark side resulting more from 
abuse of such open media to forward narrow and sectarian visions, 
something termed ‘media factionalism’ in this study. No one can deny 
that satellite media has great influence, yet the danger lies in what type of 
perceptions it creates. For example, does satellite media work on 
developing wider interaction and social connections between all viewing 
communities, or is it only focused on the narrow connection between 
medium and audience? This question was asked in relation to children’s 
and cultural programmes, and it was found, overall, that there was 
already a move away from marked factionalism in the period 2009-2010. 
The wider question arose of how to conceptualise these 
defactionalisation processes, which could tentatively be connected with 
wider political processes sometimes called desecuritisation (Hass, 2009), 
remains something that need further research and has not been 
attempted here. Within the framework of political science, is still an open 
question as to what defactionalisation might mean in the context of 
blockaded Palestine, especially in Gaza, where the concept of 
defactionalisation may prove elusive in the longer term. 
Related to this fourth finding is the importance of funding for 
producers’ choices. Here the observation of French symbolist poet, 
Stéphane Mallarmé, that even a book can be explosive - in this case also 
applies to satellite TV as a medium. Since satellite TV has the explosive 
potential also to misinform audiences, the consequences of producers’ 
choices can be very real. If those who finance wars also fund media 
networks and satellite channels, then the future danger of 
(mis)information being blended with entertainment is very real. Whilst 
‘infotainment’ is a popular means to educate, it can also be a means of 
undermining resistance to injustice, rights violations and military 
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occupation. During the period of intense factionalism in the Palestinian 
media, between 2006 and 2008, producers of various factions tried to use 
all kinds of media to influence the minds of Palestinian people, so as to 
maintain their own factional support bases, and a highly polarised status 
quo. They also sought to attract newcomers. All these goals of media 
production tie in well with the theoretical framework this study has used, 
which combined the D’Acci circuit of media approach with the Gans 
and Gitlin focus on content production, adding an acknowledgement of 
how hegemonic power operates to exercise controls on media producers, 
in general without the need for overt constraints on ‘media freedoms.’  
5) A paradox: the role of security apparatuses in shaping content  
By providing a lasting common enemy, persistence of Israeli military 
occupation has contributed to the emergence of new and more diverse 
forms of media content in Palestinian satellite TV, and a more global 
audience base than was possible in the past. As was often noted in 
interviews with producers, these Palestinian satellite TV stations will 
probably continue to multiply in future, as a means of asserting 
Palestinians’ cultural identity and rights, and as a form of ‘virtual 
Palestinianism’. This expansion of the satellite TV medium signals the 
desire not to be divided and ruled in future, and to contribute to diverse, 
yet also unified, forms of national resistance to being collectively 
‘disappeared.’  
 Strangely, even content can be shaped positively by the presence 
of security apparatuses, with better quality production and content in 
ASC and PSC programmes, but especially in ASC’s case, emerging in 
counter-reaction to the operations of security forces. After all, ASC 
producers know they are stuck within the narrow confines of the Gaza 
Strip, under regular heavy bombardment, and they also know that 
satellite TV is their most effective means of reaching a wider audience. 
Ironically, though PSC staff members and producers in West Bank have 
poor, but still relatively better mobility and access to the outside world 
than those in Gaza, the PSC producers’ sense of urgency to get their 
message out to the wider world may appear less than in the case of ASC, 
where international audiences seem to play an even more significant role. 
The desire to communicate with such international audiences is shared, 
however, between PSC and ASC as a means of supporting the 
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Palestinian cause, and this internationalisation has tended to indirectly 
contribute to defactionalising content. 
Overall, this study suggests that the relations between any security 
apparatus and media producers is likely to be a complex one, affecting 
content in both positive and negative ways, in terms of quality. 
Occupation can also limit the range of content, preventing first-hand 
access to many news sources, for example. Yet also demonstrated in the 
case of cultural programmes, occupation can provide motivation to 
explore themes in content around resistance, with reference to daily 
realities on the ground and new audiences and constituencies, including 
youth and women. Israeli programmes set the standard that Palestinian 
producers tend to strive for, in order to challenge the monopoly on 
information. The security apparatuses do influence and restrict 
programme content in various ways, but this can in turn encourage 
producers to expand content beyond what would usually be considered 
age-appropriate for a children’s programme. They may explore more 
openly the relationship between ordinary citizens, especially children, and 
the intimidation and violence of the occupying security apparatuses.  
Responses have difference, since whilst the presence of security 
apparatuses of Israel can be said to have shaped the entire content of the 
ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow, this is in stark contrast with the near 
invisibility of the Israeli occupation in Sesame Street, already mentioned. 
The terminology used by the main presenter, Sara, and by puppet 
Nassur, in Pioneers of Tomorrow in episode 15 (PoT15), refers explicitly to 
the blockade on Gaza, and to war. All this is also explicitly related to the 
presence of a military occupying power, which controls all land, sea and 
air routes in and out of Gaza. This makes the content of the programme 
somewhat revolutionary, when compared with the PSC’s programme 
equivalent.  
9.2 Returning to Theory  
In Marxist and critical theory, the power of media has been presented in 
terms of how its message serves the interest of specific groups, political 
factions or economic interests (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Going 
beyond the class-based Marxist insights into media relationships with 
economic and political power, the Gramscian-influenced notion of 
‘circuits of media’ was introduced in Chapter 2, and suggests that the 
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desire of producers to communicate political content has become 
complicated by several issues: by individuals’ and group’s reception of 
specific programming content, by moments of distribution and by 
exhibitions and displays of speech. In applying a Gramscian 
understanding, we have seen, through a detailed content analysis of four 
selected Palestinian satellite TV programmes, that there is a hierarchy of 
decision-making and that media channels tend to operate in ways that 
aim to maintain their dominance and appeal to audiences. 
Equally importantly, and drawing on Gramscian insights, D’Acci 
provided a manifesto that favours interconnected fields of study. As 
suggested in the analysis of media production and content in previous 
chapters, perhaps TV media studies have realigned themselves as a result 
of their encounter with cultural studies. More studies are considering the 
ways in which institutional, historical, aesthetic and, most importantly, 
industrial frameworks, are reproduced. Throughout the discussions and 
analysis in Chapter 5, and in the deeper analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, this 
study sought to inform the field of media studies and production about 
the very specific set of conditions of tension and violent occupation that 
influenced Palestinian satellite TV, and that are, to some extent, reflected 
in the content of programmes and structures of production. The study 
has reflected on the importance of the conglomerate media world that 
surrounds and includes Palestine. By acknowledging this, and by looking 
in detail at how the content of children’s and cultural TV programmes 
appears less factional and more collaborative than the political structures 
would imply, the study suggests that the wider political environment in 
which Gaza and the West Bank find themselves, and Hamas and Fatah, 
as divided parts of Palestine, cannot entirely determine media content 
and production processes.  
Factional media can only present factional content when working 
with grossly over-simplified frameworks and modes of representation. 
However, when producers make deliberate choices and engineer 
compromises in order to defactionalise content and production, the 
whole problem of the factional media becomes more complex and 
contradictory. This has been obvious on several occasions. For example, 
in episode 11 of Burning Brands (BB11), one of the callers from Oman 
jumped from talks about the role of the Ministry of Culture in 
promoting Palestinian culture and literature to a total different topic 
related to politics, by asking ‘when is the Palestinian Authority going to 
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end the futile negotiations with Israel?’ The presenter, Abu Jarad, smiled 
and said: ‘It seems that this question is bothering you.’ However, he 
never tried to answer the question in the show. Instead, he ended the 
discussion with the caller. This can be explained through the lens of 
Palestinianism, since media producers have chosen to avoid overt 
factional discussions or criticism. Instead they have looked for values 
that might bridge the gaps, yet still keep some of the agendas of their 
own political parties or factions visible and present.  
Defactionalisation in the media emerges wherever differences are 
consciously or unconsciously evened out for the sake of unity of those 
who compose the Palestinian ‘imagined community’. Hence, this study 
demonstrated, in its analysis and discussions, especially in Chapters 6, 7 
and 8, that combinations of factors – some ideological, others economic 
and political – ultimately impacted on how factional media operated in 
practice. One can debate the distinction between factional media and 
other forms of less factional media, and this question is valid. Yet since 
Palestine is still under continuous military and political occupation, and 
since the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are still divided by military and 
physical separation, politically, geographically and in terms of security 
arrangements, it is almost unavoidably the case that two sets of donors 
of two factions will each tend to push their own agendas, one set 
through PSC in the West Bank, the other through ASC in Gaza. Though 
this often appears to be negotiable, the consequences may be that some 
forms of factional production processes and content are reinforced. 
Most of the leadership of Palestinian TV channels seems almost 
unaware of the significance of cultural values as a theme in content that 
appeals to Palestinian audiences. This may be an error, as leaders tend to 
focus on politics and the dominance of changing political situations, 
rather than cultural dynamics and forms. It seems if the producer is not 
an intellectual, poet, novelist or writer, then it is seen as a problem. 
However, if cultural programmes are to be taken seriously, satellite media 
can contribute, in an important way, to the democratising of 
telecommunications in society, paying attention to all categories and 
sectors of that society, and not only the elites. Diverse audiences can 
potentially be invited in, enlarging the scope for expressing their views 
and thoughts more openly. 
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In applying some critical studies and media values frameworks to 
both children’s and cultural programming on ASC and PSC satellite TV, 
I have suggested that factional media structures are counteracted, 
perhaps even desecuritised, by the type of production process and 
content of both children’s and cultural programmes of the two stations.  
9.3  Defactionalising the Factions?  
In terms of the present research, what has been addressed and discussed 
has been interpreted as a form of defactionalisation, perhaps 
contributing to a wider culture of reconciliation. Al Bardawil, head of the 
Board of the ASC (Interview, 2013), has argued that factionalism ‘is after 
all a tool and not a goal.’ One of the lessons to be drawn from this 
analysis of Palestinianism may be that, in order to overcome the 
polarising legacies of a violent and factional past conflict, in general, new 
ideas about the nation have to emerge. The desire to communicate with 
international audiences could play a significant role in fostering the 
defactionalisation of content and the growth of a sense of Palestinianism.  
One of this study’s sub-questions concerned the influence of 
economic and political factors on satellite TV production decisions in 
the selected programmes, during the period under review. The influence 
of political leaders remains significant, helping to determine how 
programme content decisions are made, as revealed during several 
interviews. However, there is also clearer evidence now, thanks to the 
interview material along with observations and content analysis, that 
editorial managers have the final say, for example, in ASC’s Pioneers of 
Tomorrow. The evidence suggests that producers do not coordinate as 
closely as might be expected with government officials or other party 
members in making day-to-day decisions (Interview: Al Amriti, 2013). At 
the same time, the producers of Burning Brands are not regulated by the 
ministry of culture or religious bodies (Interview: Abu Jarad, 2013), but 
have the station’s editorial guidelines that they are required to follow. 
The guidelines in place tend to match the agenda-setting of each political 
party, meaning that something ‘out-of-the-box’ is less likely to get aired.  
In any case, each TV channel’s General Director observes the content 
and has the final say over and above the opinion of the heads of 
programming units. As a TV presenter, Younies is aware that any 
logistical mistake is not directly his fault. If he does not get the usual 
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warning, a whisper in his earpiece from the producer, that he is on air 
again, following a short break, then there can be problems. On one 
occasion, I observed a short two-minute silence in production, and then 
the General Director was heard yelling at staff to get things back on air. 
By that time, he himself was on air! This amusing example shows 
something serious; that regular media workers in their daily operations 
are generally on-task, but that the moment they step outside the 
professional scheme, they know there will be someone to get them back 
in line. This occurs not only out of concern for the loss of public 
viewers, but also as a result of complaints from people (e.g., ministers) 
ranking higher on the organisational ladder than the General Director. 
Hence, there are several layers of pressure on any producer or presenter, 
to keep him or her on track. Something similar may apply in terms of the 
general requirement to keep remarks inside the box and close to the 
political party or faction’s agreed overall ‘line’ of argument, as described 
in an earlier section of this chapter.  
In other words, political leaders per se are not directly interfering in 
the production process on a daily basis. However, their presence in 
overseeing the production process can be sensed if and when things do 
go wrong; the response can be almost immediate. This was observed in 
the studios and confirmed in interviews with producers during the 
fieldwork period in 2013 (Interview: Al Amriti, 2013; Interview: Abu 
Jarad, 2013). There is clear chain of command, in which the ASC head of 
programming, Samir Abu Mohsen, is directly involved, with his senior 
General Director above him. When asked what would happen should a 
minister see something that did not appeal to him in the TV shows, and 
what would be the most likely outcome, Abu Mohsen (Interview, 2013) 
answered that this had never happened, and he offered an example in 
which phone calls were received from ‘outside the studio.’ He said that 
suggestions from ‘above’ would be taken into consideration, but that his 
staff members would be under no obligation to follow suit.  
There are signs of media defactionalisation in TV programming, but 
we should be wary of over-generalising. There have been some deliberate 
choices, for instance, not to favour factional work in children’s and 
cultural programming (Interview: Abu Shammalah, 2013). However, 
political surroundings do affect the final product; ‘Whatever happens in 
the political surroundings affects the content of our programming – if 
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there are children who are killed, then we focus on topics related to 
them’ (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013).  
At the beginning of the school year, in September, children’s 
programming organises content, so as to meet with the needs of students 
getting ready for school, to learn, study and be able to focus well on their 
tasks. Defactionalisation is evident in the situation where, when ‘we hear 
about a creative child that we want to bring to our show, we tend not to 
ask about his family’s political affiliation’ (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). 
In one case, the ASC invited the child of a former Fatah security leader 
who fled to the West Bank for torturing Hamas members in jail, prior to 
2007. ASC producers considered this as a form of compromise. As far as 
cultural conditions are concerned, it is known that the ASC is Islam-
based, but the channel has offered some compromises in Burning Brands, 
as long as those compromises do not clash with ‘the media policies of 
the channel’ (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). Such compromises are 
meant to maintain the dominance of the ASC, by inviting Fatah 
intellectuals to be part of the shows. The PSC has used similar methods 
of compromising in cultural programming, though perhaps less so in 
children’s programming, in which there appear to be some rather forced 
forms of defactionalisation. This is not surprising when it is noted that 
Sesame Street on PSC is Palestine’s version of a children’s programme that 
has ‘gone global’. Media producers work in accordance with Palestinian 
culture, but they must adhere to guidelines they cannot avoid. 
The decision-making process in ASC’s Pioneers of Tomorrow starts with 
the producer coming up with a proposal to the director of programming, 
in which he or she outlines an idea and indicates how a specific topic will 
be covered, for example, by interviewing children in summer camps. The 
producer is questioned as to whether or not the goal is to encourage 
children to participate in the selection of certain camps over others, and 
to learn about the benefits of going to summer camps, according to head 
of ASC programming (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). Abu Mohsen 
(Interview, 2013) believes that the final say in the decision making 
process lies with the director of programming, with the general director 
being given room to comment on a shared document provided by the 
producer and left open for comments regarding the system. In any case, 
the general director always has final say on what should be aired or taken 
out. Abu Mohsen (Interview, 2013) acknowledged that in the children’s 
show Pioneers of Tomorrow, some compromises were initiated so as to keep 
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the attention and interest of child viewers. These included changes in the 
final product, such as music and sound effects.  
In media production units in which there is limited political space for 
‘free speech’ and ‘media freedoms,’ most programmers are obliged, for 
professional reasons, to observe a fairly strict self-censorship. Severe 
resource constraints historically led to the irregular appearance of print 
media, especially in Gaza. And the implications of resource constraints 
can also be seen in the very static form of production in ASC programs 
in particular. Resources are far less constrained for PSC producers. Yet, 
the independence and outspokenness of ASC programmes, including of 
children’s and cultural programmes, is also apparent. Self-censorship is 
one puzzle discussed further below. It is perhaps more likely when 
resources are available for producers to experiment with different 
formats and styles, than when budgets are very tight. Thus, a strict lack 
of financial resources can not be equated, at least not directly, with a 
tendency for self-censorship, and deducing from the different views 
presented in this study, it might be more accurate to suggest that the 
opposite is true. The relatively generous funding, for example, of Sesame 
Street on PSC, may even have led to more self-censorship than for the 
much more poorly funded sister program on ASC, Pioneers of Tomorrow.  
Loyalty can be expressed in different ways. There is loyalty to 
‘Palestinian’ national identity, loyalty to the authorities who control the 
media institutions, and loyalty to the wider population of Palestinians, at 
home and overseas. Most journalists and producers will feel obliged to 
show gratitude to their employers and sponsors, and relatively few will 
‘bite the hand that feeds.’ This may, at least in part, account for the 
attraction felt by the ASC and PSC producers for relatively new areas of 
programme production, such as children’s and cultural programmes, as 
well as programmes on sports, music and entertainment, in the form of 
dramas, soap operas and films. All of these are less obviously politicised 
than, say, programmes about news and current affairs. The risks, with 
regard to being seen as disloyal, will tend to be far greater in the latter 
two fields of media production.  
So, if they wish to keep their jobs, and their ability to write for a 
newspaper or produce TV shows, media professionals usually need to 
place strict guidelines on themselves. This applies also to a collective like 
a TV channel, in which producers may exercise some protective control 
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over content, in order to avoid clashes with external regulations. Even 
though political leaders and decision-makers tend not to interfere directly 
in and during the TV production process, their feedback is nearly always 
taken into consideration, but is mostly received after - rather than before 
- a show is aired (Interview: Abu Mohsen, 2013). However, head of 
programming Abu Mohsen also said that sometimes particular segments 
of programmes reflect producers’ personal opinions. Since both content 
and production processes are left to the executive and editorial board to 
decide on, if a cross phone call comes in during airtime from a minister, 
the ASC interprets it as an official token of conscientiousness, but does 
not feel under any obligation to take it into account or suspend the 
programme. 
9.4 Four Puzzles of Media in Palestine: Directions for 
future research  
With regard to the media in Palestine, four puzzles emerged from this 
study, and each deserves more attention in the future. Each is briefly 
noted here, in outline:  
1. Resource constraints and irregular publication  
As in the past with the print media, lack of funding may not be the only 
– or even the principal – constraint on producers and the quality of 
programs.  As in the past with newspapers, as shown in Chapter 2, they 
might have a license to publish daily, yet most newspapers especially in 
Gaza but also in the West Bank, would publish weekly rather than on a 
daily basis.  Limited financial resources were one of the reasons for this, 
but another may have been the lack of a strong ‘communication culture’; 
something that requires more research. Irregular production is less of a 
problem in satellite TV programmes, but similarly lack of funding may 
still not be the main constraint on satellite TV production quality either.  
2. Loyalty and self-censorship  
None of the major newspapers or other media outlets, such as satellite 
TV, in Gaza or the West Bank seems willing, or able, to voice significant 
opposition to the PA, except in times of factional conflict. This is the 
case, even though there are some private Palestinian TV channels that do 
challenge the PA and occasionally create controversy. One obvious 
reason for the Palestinian media’s restraint is that there is self-
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censorship, based on an idea of being ‘loyal’ to Hamas or the PA. After 
all, Hamas and the PA can control access to finances. Yet, it can be 
suggested that self-censorship may have more to do with the awareness 
that the Israeli government and Israeli media could exploit divisions in 
Palestinian positions. Again, a historical perspective is useful, by 
exploring whether self-censorship occurred before the Israeli occupation 
and the creation of the PA. Past repression can help to explain why some 
journalists and editors, if they have the choice, leave the profession to go 
into education, or even politics, rather than remaining active journalists 
or TV producers. More research on self-censorship could shed light on 
the price paid for this by media professionals.  
3. Factionalism sells  
This third puzzle relates to the conflicting pressures on private media 
outlets in Palestine. The hypothesis is that, occasionally more 
factionalised media content may be rewarded with larger audiences and 
more financial support (Hroub and Quneis, 2011). One problem with 
this suggestion will be that professionalism is not the only priority when 
deciding on who should be in charge of editorial desks. Yet, both by 
looking at historical precedents and conducting further research, it may 
emerge that factionalism in the media cannot be equated with the 
existence or proliferation of political factions in politics.  
4. Exceptionality: Gazan and otherwise  
In relation to Gazan exceptionality, what begs for an explanation is the 
fact that not one of the 32 privately owned TV stations that broadcast, 
and not one of the three major newspapers presently distributed in Gaza, 
is able to do so from within Gaza itself. The obvious answer to why this 
is the case, is that it is because of the Israeli occupation and the 
restrictions it brings with it. Yet, this discussion will suggest that this may 
be only part of the reason. A deeper historical understanding shows the 
distinctiveness of Gazan media (Shehadeh, 1997) and it appears from 
historical accounts that Gazan exceptionalism long pre-dated even Israeli 
occupation, as far as the operation and role of the media was concerned.  
       One can note that, in general, this study, based on selected cultural 
and children’s programmes of ASC and PSC satellite TV, showed how 
defactionalisation can also be interpreted as akin to ‘desecuritisation,’ 
broadly the reverse of ‘securitisation’ (Buzan, 1993). From this angle, the 
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defactionalisation of media content and production can reflect, and can 
also influence, a wider relaxing of political tensions. If defactionalisation 
can be understood as the reversing of factionalisation, then from the 
perspective of securitisation theory, defactionalisation can be viewed as a 
form of ‘desecuritising,’ involving a shift from emergency to ordinary 
political attention, in search of compromise. When a specific issue is 
taken (or kept) out of the bubble of emergency politics, of factional 
security, this can be said to be defactionalisation, akin to desecuritisation 
(Aradue, 2004). Securitisation and desecuritisation are not part of this 
study, but could prove a useful lens in the future, for looking at how 
Palestinian satellite TV and other Palestinian media express the tensions 
between factions. Related to this is the questin of how this reinforces a 
sense of Palestinian identity cutting cuts across physical barriers, and 
working its way across the sharply divided loyalties to Hamas and Fatah. 
We now end with proposing a Code of Conduct for the Media in 
Palestine, as a way forward. 
9.5 A Way Forward? Media Codes of Conduct  
The draft Palestinian Journalist Code of Conduct focuses on rights, 
ethics, integrity and respect of copyrights (see Appendix 5). However, 
there is some ambiguity in the text. For example, Article 7 states that 
publishing any news or images that contradict ‘the morals of the 
Palestinian people’ must be avoided. Of course, moral standards can be 
relative to the varying political, cultural and moral beliefs associated with 
specific satellite media outlets. The PSC may view belly dancing as 
culturally educational in a broad, global way, but the ASC may consider it 
inappropriate and against the morals of Palestinian people. In any case, 
satellite media is in violation of the code of conduct of the Palestinian 
Journalist Syndicate – whether with voice, image or video.  
Political divisions and the absence of laws and jurisdictions constitute 
an extra burden on the media crews because they are not sure who to 
turn to for legal and professional support. Professional, logistical, 
political, ideological, social, cultural and economic pressures cannot be 
ignored in assessing the performance of media crews or the validity of 
the Palestinian code of journalistic ethics. Naturally, when both the 
Hamas syndicate and the Fatah syndicate claim legality, without 
elections, this reflects that both sides are able to engage in violations of 
human rights with impunity. They are not seriously questioned. After all, 
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both establishments are protected by two different political systems that 
control Gaza on the one hand, and the West Bank on the other. All 
these pressures impact media behaviour and the attitude of media 
professionals in carrying out their work.  
Media ethics have arguably generated more attention in Palestine than 
in some European countries where freedom of the press is assumed to 
exist, and where media outlets have wide audiences and some authority. 
In Palestine, there has always been a need for media integrity and ethical 
values among media professionals. It has become even more important 
since the conflict between Hamas and Fatah erupted in 2008-9, to ensure 
that ethics play an important role in ensuring that media outlets conduct 
their work in a professional manner. It is apparent that a lack of media 
ethics may open doors to corruption within the media profession, and 
this in turn can run the risk of the loss of trust and diminishing 
audiences of viewers (Khalaf, 2008). 
The relatively new phenomenon of satellite media has played a vital 
role in developing the media profession in Palestine, and has reinforced 
the need for a code of ethics. Although most editing crews are aware of 
the seriousness of proper conduct, and discussion of media ethics has 
been considerable, serious actions have been few, and even in the best of 
situations, existing codes of conduct and ethics within international 
media may not be implemented (Al-Omari, 2010). In Palestine in recent 
years, media ethics have been subordinated to pragmatic realities. Many 
media professionals, including many media producers, passively wait for 
instructions from their political elites and funders before going to print 
or on air. This practice reveals the need to push even harder for 
generalised media ethics, unrelated to factional ideology, including in 
children’s and cultural programming. And where media content is less 
factionalised, there may be more space for ethical journalistic standards 
to influence common practices. Media ethics have become a menu of 
varying dishes, depending on which political group or governmental 
official governs the choices made. Instead, such codes should be a 
universal recipe designed for all. Of course, in reality, a journalistic code 
of ethics will always be open to manipulation.  
Another aspect generating media corruption arises from ignorance of 
rules or a lack of rules. This is explained as resulting from a state of 
constant unrest that condemns people to live under the threat of 
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persistent attack. Therefore, long range planning gives way to living for 
the day. Unrest and perpetual chaos produces an absence of laws and 
regulations in the governance of most satellite TV stations in Palestine. 
One may argue that unintended ignorance of such codes removes the 
blame from the shoulders of media producers. However, it should be the 
obligation of media producers to remain aware of the codes within their 
profession. 
To be fair, although there are relatively few resources in Arabic 
dealing with media ethics, such codes and provisions are plentiful and 
accessible in many other languages. There is also a shortage of 
specialised media journals dealing with media ethics, apart from some 
working papers and lectures presented in workshops. There is a need for 
more specialised media journals to deal with media ethics, especially in 
Palestine and the wider Arab region. The lack of such material is ironic, 
given the historical role Palestinians have played in the history of media 
in the region, including in the print media, which was staffed by 
intellectuals, thinkers and practitioners, who carried the struggle of their 
own community, making their works pioneering for later liberation and 
development initiatives.  
Indeed, the value of codes of ethics or legislation related to 
journalistic practices, especially in countries controlled by authoritarian 
regimes, may be that it stresses the worth for the general public of 
having access to full information about what is taking place. Even public 
health and the well-being of citizens are said to depend on a relatively 
free and ethical media, onen of the better-known requirements of human 
development. To remove all ‘major sources of unfreedom, poverty as 
well as tyranny, power-economic opportunities as well as systematic 
social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or 
overactivity of repressive states,’ is outlined in Sen’s Development as 
Freedom as vital for human development (1999:526). Expressing their 
point of view publicly, even if they are critical of those in power, is a 
fundamental duty of journalists under many of such codes of conduct. 
The suppression of the right to freedom of expression leads to the 
presentation of narratives that may not be recognisable given the life 
situations actually experienced by most of the population. The basic 
principles found in most journalism codes of conduct, include 
independence and integrity of the profession; respect for truth, or 
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objectivity; integrity in data collection and respect for individuals. These 
are now considered one by one, and conclude this chapter.  
Independence and professional integrity  
It often happens that media professionals receive tempting offers or gifts 
from elites, with the aim of establishing a relationship of patronage, in 
which the patron offers information that the journalist then reports, 
without necessarily checking its source or veracity. Rather as with the 
entertaining of businessmen with golf, sex workers and fancy restaurants 
(Laitila, 1995), the patron will be able to provide income as well as gifts 
that prove difficult to resist for the hard-up media professional. He or 
she may gradually abandon his or her professional integrity or willingness 
to check all facts, as perks, gifts, and privileged information are leaked. 
This can mean that a comfortable patronage relationship is established. 
Within a very insecure, high-risk media environment, this will prove 
attractive, and even essential for some media personnel’s survival. The 
Palestinian Code of Ethics, however, warns that it is vital ‘to not abuse 
the profession by illegally obtaining personal privileges of any type, 
whether material or moral’ (Article 8: Code of Ethics: Palestinian 
Journalist Syndicate).  
As elsewhere in the world, Palestinian media professionals do 
establish ties with companies that ask the media to promote their 
business, and include some products and services through placement in 
the press and in programme content. Thus, media professionals 
presenting or producing TV shows may enjoy perks like travel provided 
by private executive jets belonging to elites including business people as 
well as political leaders. Such generosity often comes at a price, and by 
accepting perks, media professionals come to be viewed, and come to 
behave, as if they were simply part of the PR team of local political and 
economic elites. In the case of the media in Palestine, from the start in 
the early twentieth century, reporters were rarely professional trained, 
and the wages and extra benefits they earned were generally dependent 
on a show of loyalty. Open criticism would mean their financial and 
other forms of benefits would be directly at risk. There were relatively 
few exceptions to this rule, and those were mostly Palestinian journalists 
and media professionals working for media outlets based outside 
Palestine.  
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Respect for truth 
Integrity in dealing with issues is inseparable from respect for truth. 
Upholding truth and integrity means that media professionals, or a film 
crew making a programme for satellite TV, for example, do not deceive 
the public by inserting political propaganda in the middle of programme 
content, or providing only one side of a debate, ignoring other experts 
with different views. Respect for the principles of truth means that the 
deliberate misinterpretation of documents and facts, for instance by 
selective quotation editing and misrepresentation, should be avoided. 
Practices that undermine respect for truth include the amplifying of 
irrelevant events and minimising or ignoring important public issues. 
Yet, this is not only a problem in Palestine, but for the entire, global 
media, where news of plastic surgery can displace articles about major 
disasters, genocide or war and massive political change, from the front 
page or from the news broadcast. Where Palestinian media tended to use 
the power of political parties to publish anything to name and shame 
individuals, even if there was no evidence of any wrongdoing, the code 
of ethics restricted such journalistic practices by stating: 
‘To respect private freedoms and not take photographs or record people 
without their permission, in case that should conflict with the public 
interest, unless in the following fields such as revealing crimes against, or 
damages to public health, or threats to national and regional security’ 
(Article 20: Code of Ethics: Palestinian Journalist Syndicate).  
Within factional media, as Chapter 2 already hinted to, content mostly 
focuses on the political ideas of individual or factional owners. At times, 
this is viewed as the norm, so that within the context of Palestine, the 
use of media platforms for political agendas is sometimes viewed as quite 
justified, especially in the absence of relevant legislation that protects the 
integrity and critical role of media professionals. 
Standards for data collection; respecting information rights  
In researching materials for an article or programme, a journalist or 
researcher is supposed to abide by ethics that prevent the journalist from 
unintentionally violating the rights of others. Honesty requires that 
sources should not be ignored when they are available, and that 
knowingly presenting false representations should be avoided. In the 
Palestinian media, as elsewhere, information gathered is often based on 
 Conclusions, Paradoxes, Ways Forward 303 
 
 
information from unverified or confidential sources who wish to remain 
anonymous. Sometimes, there may be no realistic way to know how 
reliable such information is, without exposing the individual source. This 
is a common dilemma for all journalists worldwide. It is acute in relation 
to Palestinian satellite TV, since both Fatah and Hamas factions are 
rarely able to meet face to face, making it difficult for the journalist to 
verify the facts other than with the faction to which he or she ‘belongs’.  
In satellite media, as in all other media, sources and resources are 
important, including the duty of media professionals to correctly 
attribute referenced texts and work to their original authors and owners.  
Of course, in some cases, media does have the right to withhold sources 
to protect the safety or privacy of others. However in the Palestinian 
media, there is a tendency not to respect the ideas and thoughts 
presented by others as a matter of principle. Even in the well-funded 
PSC Sesame Street, there is no information about who writes the dialogue, 
or makes the puppets. Yet even the puppets of Sesame Street do not have 
immunity from integrity and from the code of ethics! Children’s 
programmes may suffer from lower ethics-standard ratings because of 
the lack of thoroughness regarding the sourcing of information, 
resources, text and dialogue.  
Respect for individuals, and avoidance of discrimination  
Humiliation of others should also not be permitted by journalists, who 
should respect the right to privacy and the desire for human dignity. This 
includes unjustified accusations against political opponents, and slur 
campaigns alleging personal failings without the necessary evidence. In 
some Palestinian TV media, discrimination is in evidence, not so much 
with regard to religion, as in connection with political affiliation and/or 
gender. There are also ‘ethnic’ forms of discrimination that undermine 
and negatively label specific groups, such as rural Bedouins. By invading 
people’s privacy, under the cover of the ‘authority’ of political factions, 
means the media sometimes enters the lives and homes of people in 
ways that may undermine personal dignity. The Palestinian code of 
ethics states that a journalist should ‘completely commit to not 
publishing anything which might cause incitement, encourage 
discrimination based on race, origin, colour or skin, religion, sex, 
profession, physical and psychological disability. These topics are not to 
be mentioned, unless objectively related to the published topic’ (Article 
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24: Code of Ethics: Palestinian Journalist Syndicate). In practice, for 
example, a family that lives in a refugee camp will find it difficult to 
object to the media entering their home and filming, a clear invasion of 
their right to privacy. This is because any objection from the family can 
result in being punished through withdrawal of food rations, generally 
provided with oversight from specific political factions in power. 
 
To sum up, there is significant evidence in the history of the 
Palestinian media that media ethics, whether from an individual or 
societal perspective, have been relatively neglected as a field of 
study. Most scholarly and historical studies of the media in Palestine 
have avoided bringing up sensitive ethical questions around the political 
and social role of mass media. However, there have been some studies 
on changing styles of expression and writing in the printed press, and 
some more recent studies on the media in relation to nationalism, 
reconciliation, and resistance to occupation (Abuzanouna, 2012; 
Thawabteh, 2010; Khalaf, 2008). 
 A question that arises is how media producers and journalists in 
Palestine could adhere to these codes of ethics, given the constraints and 
challenges they face on a daily basis. Some would argue that the presence 
of a strong ethical sensibility in Palestinian media production derives 
from Islamic thinking. Journalistic integrity is considered to be a religious 
as well as a professional obligation. This much is evident from the 
wording of the code of ethics in Palestine, which opens with: ‘I swear in 
the name of Allah.’  
Media ethics have played a large role in debates over the past years, 
particularly after the 2007 Fatah-Hamas conflict. Different media outlets 
faced accusations of fanning the flames of factional political violence and 
reinforcing political polarisation. The Palestinian media, as a whole, 
began assessing its own ethics. Institutes and international organisations 
working within Palestine have offered workshops, training and 
awareness campaigns that have helped to focus more attention on the 
necessity of media reform. 
 When it comes to satisfying donors and avoiding topics that are too 
overtly contentious, media producers in Gaza suffer from forms of 
pressure that are similar to those felt in the West Bank. These pressures 
are closely connected to the restrictive political environment, and to the 
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way in which such restrictions increase with ideological pressure, for 
example in a situation of political factionalism and polarisation between 
factions. The hope in this study has been to expose, through the specific 
example of children’s and cultural programmes, how television networks 
can help reduce rather than reinforcing factionalism, and can also make 
hitherto ‘invisible’ Palestinians more visible. As the study also reveals, 
although producers and audiences may continue to appear as ‘caged 
political animals’, this study shows they still have alternatives about how 
to represent their cultural realities under occupation (Bishara, 2012:188).  
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Appendix 2  
Questions Asked by Researcher to Producers during Fieldwork 
1. Can you tell us about the idea of the programme? And what is the 
content that you have included? 
2. What are the aims you hope to achieve with the programme? 
3. Can you tell how popular the programme is? And any local or regional 
reactions to the programme?  
4. How long does it take you to prepare and produce an episode?  
5. How is the direction of the flow of information to you influenced, and 
what chain of command is applied in order to produce each show? 
6. Who are your main creators/producers and how do they work and 
interact with each other? 
7. How would you describe the relationship between the producer and 
the ministry of information and media? 
8. Prior to a show airing, who reviews it? And, after the show has been 
aired, are there any further reviews or analyses of it? 
9. What is the minimum level of professional training and experience 
required to be a producer and does it include a college degree in 
journalism or media? And do they bring in external assistants to help 
them film, shoot and edit? 
10. What budget is allocated to the show, and how has it changed since the 
programme first aired? 
11. If the budget has changed, what circumstances lead to this change? 
12. In terms of equipment, do you have everything you need, or are you 
lacking in items that would improve the programme?  
13. Do travel restrictions have any impact on your production, and if so, 
how would you describe that impact? 
14. Are there any reviews or interventions by religious authorities involved 
in producing the show? 
15. Would you please describe the process of casting the show? And are 
there any challenges to casting or the selection of guests in the case of 
cultural programmes like Cultural Flashes and Burning Brands? 
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16. Do you pay any attention to how Israel and Egypt monitor their 
children’s programming and if so, how does it affect your own 
production here? 
17. In 2006, the ASC was criticised for producing anti-Semitic children’s 
programming, whilst the PSC was seen as too soft on Israel and its 
representation of the reality of the occupation. Has this criticism 
impacted the way you produce children’s programming?  
18. Does the station coordinate with other institutions that work to 
improve citizens’ rights and democratisation?  
19. When producing the show, what is the national target you are focused 
on? In other words, what is the audience that you aim at? And, when 
you refer to Palestine, how do you physically, geographically, interpret 
that? Is it the West Bank and Gaza? Is it Israel, West Bank and Gaza, 
and does it involve Palestinians in the diaspora? 
20. If you could change anything about the process and content of your 
production, what would it be, and why? 
21. Can you give me some insights into if and how the content has been 
influenced by the following factors?  
Content is influenced by media workers’ socialisation and attitudes 
Content is influenced by media organisation and routines 
Content reflects social reality with no distortion  
Content is influenced by other social institutions and forces 
Content is influenced by ideological positions to maintain the status quo 
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Appendix 3  
Operational Definitions of Key Themes and Other Terms  
This document highlights the values and vocabularies used in the content 
analysis, in an attempt to provide a precise definition, to accompany the 
process of analysis as a guide to comprehending the meanings of each value 
or concept, compatible with Palestinian perspectives. Category values are 
organised in the same form as approved by supervisory teams in The Hague 
and Rotterdam, and have been checked by regional supervisors.  
  
Key theme: a set of classified categories, which the researcher has prepared 
in accordance with the content of selected TV programmes, and including 
the aim of the analysis. Value categories are used in analysing with the best 
academically valid and comprehensive method, in order to facilitate 
extracting results from the study materials in a manageable way. The study 
has adopted a number of key themes, which are stated in the content 
analysis form.  
 
Nationalism and national discourse: refers to ideas based on common 
national values positively promoted by Palestinians. National interests focus 
on Palestinian heritage, traditions and identity of Palestinians, as well as on 
anything that is connected to the collective nation (Palestine), such as trade, 
products or services, e.g., Palestinian zatar (thyme) and tatreez (embroidery). 
The theme also includes values that focus on the individual identity, the 
meaning of belonging to Palestine, including a sense of consciousness of 
patriotism and devotion to one’s country for the defence of National 
Movement interests.  
 
Citizens’ rights and obligations: values that promote people’s right to 
express themselves through economic and social rights, including the right 
to organise, the right of access to clean water, the right to healthy food and 
safe shelter, the right to receive education and the right to peacefully move 
around freely in a dignified life. Obligations to respect the laws and 
communal norms fall heaviest on state public servants, but, nonetheless, 
apply to all individuals.  
 
Religious values: refers to values that focus on Palestinian observance of 
Christianity and Islam, including religious holidays, calendar events and 
observances (Eid al Fitr, Eid al Adha, Christmas, Easter, Prophet 
Mohammed day etc.), teaching children historical religious values such as 
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the meaning of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, citing the Quran 
and Prophet Mohammed’s own inspirations, observing Omrah, Hajj, Al 
Qader (The Night of Power), which is the holiest night at the conclusion of 
Ramadan. Religious values also refer to attitudes toward what differentiates 
a good or unacceptable practice of Islam, preparation rituals for and 
practice of prayers, blessings and greetings in Islam vs. Christianity, e.g., Al 
Salam alaykum (Peace be upon you) vs. Marhaba (Hello). Religious values 
also encompass ideas about spirituality, faith, and the purpose of life.  
 
Resistance and resistance literature: refers to all values dealing with 
resisting and defending the self and family from Israel’s military occupation. 
Resistance includes peaceful resistance, armed resistance, and economic 
boycott (which is a form of peaceful resistance,) as well as Palestinian 
resistance (called Muqawama) to the copious restrictions that Israel applies to 
everyday life. Resistance is grounded in the concept of not giving in to 
injustices imposed on Palestinians. Naming and including mention of all 
Palestinian villages and cites occupied by Israel, such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, 
Akko, Al Majdal, Safad, Yebna and Beit Daras, is a form of resistance. I 
include reference to the visual symbol (muftah al awda), the key of return, 
which is part of the resistance message that refers to the Palestinians’ right 
to return to their homes.  
 
Social values: includes all values focusing on positive social concepts such 
as friendship, loyalty, parsimony, family structure, neighbour relations and 
customs, pride and self-esteem, cooperation, love, division of labour, 
reciprocity and courage, as well as attitudes toward the negative aspects of 
deceit, theft and corruption.  
 
Cultural values: all aspects of cultural production and ideals that make up 
the whole of Palestinian history, culture, tradition, symbolism, and every day 
norms for cultural attire (male and female,) recognition and meaning of 
traditional symbolism and traditional arts and crafts, including Palestinian 
intellectual figures and artists, novelists and poets.  
 
Political values: includes all values and topics focusing on political rights, 
refugees, prisoners, indefinite detentions, siege, Intifada, Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations, Jewish-only settlements and outposts and segregationist 
construction, Palestinian factions, Palestinian division, Palestinian-
Palestinian relations, Fatah, Qassam Brigades, Hamas, house demolitions, 
arrests, torture, tanks, drones, jets, road-blocks and restrictions. 
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Educational values: includes all values focusing on pre-school education 
in basic math and writing numbers, language (classical and colloquial 
Arabic) skills, peer-group relations and social behaviour, up to higher 
education in scientific, historical, geographic, foreign-language skills, 
problem solving skills, self respect, negotiation skills, debate and critical 
thinking skills. 
 
Entertainment and fun: refers to all values associated with providing an 
enjoyable atmosphere of entertainment and relaxation for children, 
including games, crossword puzzles, books, vocabulary games, stories, and 
play with toys, live animals and pets. 
 
Methods used: refers to the methods, which TV stations use to bring 
media materials to the audience, to achieve their goals. Such methods are 
divided into three different categories: discussion, analysis or opinion.  
Discussion: refers to questions arising around specific values; 
discussion of solutions to problems and implementation of solutions.  
Analysis: a style, which TV uses to present specific political, social, 
cultural or intellectual values through analysis of both positive and 
negative aspects, indicating what result can be achieved through this 
analytical approach for each specific value.  
Opinion: a TV station adopts a specific point of view that the audience 
should take for granted.  
 
Position: This category shows whether there is positive support, neutrality 
or negative opposition toward particular material content under analysis. 
Determining which of those positions is adopted, is indicated in the content 
provided. For example: 
Positive Support: producers of media outlets focus their direction in 
support of specific ideas, for example fasting during the Ramadan 
month is considered positive. 
Neutrality: occurs when producers don’t adopt a position but remain 
neutral to the context, or when they show both positive and negative 
positions on specific values. 
Oppositionist: when media outlet producers focus their direction on 
disagreeing with specific ideas. For example, aggressive behavior in the 
classroom is seen as negative. 
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Secondary materials: all materials used as supportive resources in TV 
children’s programming and cultural TV. This includes photographs, videos, 
cartoons, Quranic verses, hadith sayings and proverbs.  
Photos: all types of still images used for illustration. 
Videos: film footage, including reports from outside studios.  
Cartoons: all forms of two-dimensional illustrations of visual art, 
mostly fictional or semi-fictional drawings.  
Quranic verses: suras (passages) and proverbs mentioned in the Holy 
Islamic Book (The Qur’an), which Muslims believe to be the verbatim 
word of Allah passed to Prophet Mohammed through the angel 
Gabriel. 
Hadith sayings: all saying or acts ascribed to the Prophet 
Mohammed, which do not appear in the Qur’an, but are attributed to 
him by accepted sources, and have been collected as ‘hadith.’  
Proverbs: all sayings that express a truth that is based on common 
sense, courtesy or the practical experience of human beings. Proverbs 
can be translated from other languages and cultures, or be considered 
as merely national.  
Others: refers to all other secondary materials that are not mentioned 
above.  
 
Length of episode: how much actual airtime is given to the TV 
programmes, including breaks.  
30 minutes: refers to all TV programmes of around 30 minutes.  
45 minutes: refers to all TV programmes of around 45 minutes.  
60 minutes: refers to all TV programmes of around 60 minutes. 
Other: refers to all airtime that does not fall around any of the above 
mentioned.  
 
Disruption in episode: refers to all situations in which a show stops while 
playing in its network-allocated time slot. Such disruption could be for 
various reasons, including: commercial advertisement, call for prayers, 
regular breaks and TV station breaks.  
Call for prayers: refers to the interruption during TV programming to 
announce the times of Islam’s five daily prayers.  
Commercial advertisement: refers to interruption during the 
broadcasts by advertisements of commercial products or services.  
Regular breaks: refers to the usual breaks, which come in between 
programmes or during episodes, as, for example, breaks for news 
briefs.  
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TV station breaks: these are standard TV breaks, which distinguishe a 
TV station from other TV stations.  
 
Who is the Participant: focuses on the guest participants taking part in the 
episode, either in the studio (either recorded or broadcast live by satellite, by 
phone, or via sms.) or outside the studio. 
Experts/specialists: refers to experts on the topic of discussion. For 
example, a discussion of the literature of resistance requires a professor 
who teaches this specific form of literature, or a pioneering poet who 
writes on the topic. It is assumed that an expert is aware of most 
aspects associated with the topic, and, therefore, is invited as an 
expert/specialist.  
Regular observers: refers to any observer on any specific issue, 
meaning specialists and non-specialists on the topic of choice.  
Factional officials and Government representatives: refers to all 
individuals participating in their capacity as factional leaders or 
spokespersons of factional parties (Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad or any 
other Palestinian political faction,) government officials of both the 
Palestinian Authority in West Bank and the de facto government of the 
Gaza Strip. Factional and government officials merge as participants, as 
it could be that a faction leader is also a government official. For 
instance, a minister of education may also be a factional leader.  
NGO workers: refers to all spokespersons or staff members of non-
governmental organisations who are invited to comment on issues 
raised in the episodes.  
Religious figures: refers to any figure holding religious status, either 
Christian, Muslim or Jew, invited as a guest or referred to in the 
episode.  
Average citizens: refers to all citizens; any random national on the 
street, who speaks within his/her own personal capacity and 
experience. 
Male: refers to an adult male person, who is not a child.  
Female: refers to adult female person, who is not a child. 
Child: anyone, male or female, below the age of 18 years.  
 
Forms of participation: refers to those taking part in the internal or 
external content and input of an episode. This form of participation 
includes all contributions to overall discussion, whether in the studio, or by 
phone, sms, social media, or pre-recorded interviews.  
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Phone/sms: refers to all forms of participation through phone calls and 
short messages from cell phones (either from within Palestine or from 
abroad.) Such contributions are usually read aloud by the presenter of 
the programme, or appear in the lower part of the screen as text.  
E-mail: from all participants communicating through e-mail, either 
inside Palestine or from abroad.  
Studio: refers to any form of participation, usually live, that happens 
inside the studio of either of the two TV stations. 
Pre-recorded interviews: are all those interviews that are part of an 
episode, and that are not broadcast live, but recorded in the form of a 
reportage prior to the airing of the episode.  
 
Function of participation: means the purpose of the participation, and 
what it contributes to the production of the content, i.e., does the 
participation enhance clarification of specific issues, such as supplying 
correct information, discussing solutions, presenting points of view, sharing 
personal experience, contributing to child education, entertainment and fun. 
Clarification: refers to all forms of participation or interpretation that 
remove obstacles to understanding a specific issue (e.g., clarifying a verse 
of the Qur’an or the texts of Prophet Mohammed’s Hadith inspirations.) 
Correction of information: refers to any form of participation that is 
meant to correct error or inaccuracy in specific practices or rituals (e.g., 
clarifying information on correct order for washing body before prayer.)  
Discuss solutions: refers to any attempt that is meant to bring various 
solutions for one problem (e.g., in conflict resolution in personal life, for 
example in classrooms and between peers, and collective conflict 
resolution, as in political conflict.) 
Present points of view: all attempts by participants to share their 
opinions on specific issues (e.g. all conditional US funding must stop.) 
Share personal experience: refers to all situations in which participants 
share their own personal experience of something that happened, or the 
personal experience of someone else , in order to help others (e.g., 
sharing personal stories of fear in the darkness or sharing the poetry of a 
prisoner still detained.) 
Child education: refers to all situations in which the participants use 
their experience and skills to teach children new skills.  
Entertainment and fun: an idea, task or puzzle, intended to provide 
amusement or enjoyment. This may be in the form of a performance, 
activity, music, drama or dance, anything most likely to draw attention 
and create a fun atmosphere of information.  
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ppendix 4  
Supplementary list of newspapers published in Palestine  
 Al Sabah (The Morning) originally published in Gaza from 1995 under 
Mohammed Al Qedwa. Funded by the PA, receiving $25,000 annually, 
mainly carrying opinions of Political and National Guidance Committee, 
part of the PA. 
 Al Dar (The House) established in 2003 by Hassan Al Kashef, former 
PA official, he later worked as a reporter for the French radio. Viewed as 
an independent newspaper and gained wide support for in-depth 
coverage of Palestinian affairs. 
 Al Resala (The Message) first published in 1997 as a Hamas newspaper 
and a vehicle for Al Khalas National Islamic Party. The newspaper aims 
to strengthen values and promote Palestinian traditions by fighting all 
types of corruption and intellectual invasions. For many years, Hamas 
has resisted any normalisation with the Israeli occupier and Al Resala is 
known as the foundation stone of Hamas media. It contains social and 
intellectual coverage of issues. Its publication and distribution is limited 
to Gaza because Israel will not allow its distribution in the West Bank. 
 Al Istiqlal (The Independence) started in Gaza, and received a license 
from President Arafat in 1994. Known for close ties with Islamic Jihad 
faction and therefore shut down on various occasions, and members of 
its staff either arrested or attacked. Identified itself as a resistance ‒ and 
not an opposition ‒ newspaper. 
 Al Karama (The Dignity) established in 1995 by Dr Diab Allouh (current 
Palestinian Ambassador to China.) Speaks on behalf of the Fatah 
movement and is popular among security forces and Fatah loyalists. 
 Sawt Al Watan (Nation Voice) was published in Cyprus in 1989 as a 
social-cultural magazine by two active members of the Palestinian 
People’s Party. The newspaper stopped printing temporarily, and re-
emerged in 1995 as a voice for the Communist agenda, which is 
dedicated to supporting Palestinian workers’ rights.  
 Al Sada’a (Happiness), established in 2002, is a social magazine that 
reflects an Islamic perspective. It focuses mainly on issues related to 
Palestinian families and women and children’s education. The magazine 
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attempts to address theoretical Islamic traditions and replace them with 
ones that are more practical. 
Appendix 5  
Palestinian Media Code of Conduct  
The following is the translation from Arabic language by the researcher. 
Palestinian Journalist Syndicate 
We hold as a belief, the role that national journalism has played across 
the stages of the struggle of the Palestinian people, in expressing their 
hopes and sharing in their pain and as a support to its great movement 
for national liberation and emancipation from all forms of exploitation 
and oppression. We consider the importance of journalism in 
participating in the process of national construction, and its ability to 
deliver its eternal message, in protecting the domestic, national and 
civilization capabilities and achievements. This reflects the importance 
and gravity of the responsibility which journalism holds by being a true 
mirror for the views, hopes, pains and culture of the Palestinian society, 
as a tool of guidance, mobilization and leadership, in serving the 
structure of the foundation principles and values which have been 
enshrined by the Palestinian people through the long struggle, in 
addition to the leading role of journalism on the cultural, media and 
development fronts. Departing from the fact that journalism should 
remain a strategic weapon in the hands of people and for the sake of the 
freedom of homeland and the citizens, as well as a fence that protects 
rights and private and public freedoms, through social solidarity which 
achieves journalistic freedom, such freedom should be a natural, sacred 
extension of the freedom of the people.  
 
We, the Palestinian Journalists, declare the following: Journalism does 
not only derive its conduct from its quality, but from the honour of the 
goal which is served by the published word and image. Furthermore, the 
honour of commitment to journalistic work is not complete, unless it is 
elected independent from all sources of custody, censorship, directing, 
containment and deviance. Thus, the independency of journalism in its 
role and from the perspective of social responsibility, for the sake of 
people under censorship, is only the first condition for noble and 
responsible journalism.  
Apart from this perception and loyalty of journalists, to the blood of the 
noble martyrs, the sacrifices of our people and their aspirations for a 
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shining future, all must meet their responsibilities, which hold the 
journalist in his apparent behaviour, and practice of the principles of 
code of conduct, honesty, transparency, creditability, ethics and 
traditions of the profession. 
We undertake and declare: 
1. To completely commit to general Palestinian laws, including the 
documented Declaration of Independence, issued in 1988 in Algeria, the 
Palestinian Publications and Publishing Law, international norms and 
charters, which rely on the structure of principles accumulated from the 
active participation in intellectual development and cultural heritage of the 
Palestinian people. 
2. To commit to defending the freedom of press, as an emphasis on the 
right of public to be aware of facts and express their views freely, guided by 
the principle that the right to knowledge is a basic human right. 
3. To completely commit to obtaining information and facts through 
legal ways, and to transferring them to the public with creditability and 
honesty, in order to protect journalism from any type of deviation from the 
code of conduct and from harming national interests. 
4. To commit to avoiding publishing unreliable information or distorting 
reliable information, or attributing statements or practices to a person or a 
group without verifying its source. 
5. To completely commit to supporting judicial justice, independency 
and sovereignty, in publishing information on open investigations, ongoing 
trials, and to not taking sides against accused persons in a criminal 
prosecution, or litigants in civil prosecutions, holding no prejudice toward 
the right of the press to cover events from the public view. 
6. To commit to not publishing names, or photographs, of accused 
people, or those brought to trial, for the sake of their privacy, their future, 
and to facilitating their reformation and return to their community. 
7. To commit to avoiding publishing any news, or images, which 
contradict the morals of the Palestinian people. 
8. To commit to not abusing the profession by illegally obtaining 
personal privileges of any type, whether material or moral. 
9. To commit to publishing the correction of news that has been 
previously published, without violating the rights of the journalist.  
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10. To completely commit to objectivity in all that we write and publish, 
and, specifically, to remaining objective in any criticism related to public 
figures. 
11. To completely commit to all published advertisements being in 
accordance to the general principles and values of the society and the 
message of the media, and being consistent with this code of ethics 
document. 
12. To professionally and morally commit to separating journalism work 
from advertisement and  to not dedicating our work to favouring 
advertisements. 
13. To commit, when publishing advertisements of foreign bodies, to 
making sure that they are in accordance with the national interests, 
regardless of the advertisements being for direct or indirect aid from donor 
countries and organisations. 
14. To commit to differentiating between editorial journalism material, 
and local or foreign advertisements, with the intention to protect the reader 
from misleading description. 
15. To commit to limiting and organising the publishing of 
advertisements in newspapers and in the mass media in which we are 
working, in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the Palestinian 
society, which is struggling for national liberation, and to ending economic 
exploitation and monopolism, regardless of its source. 
16. To completely commit to respecting the copyright of authors and 
writers of work we publish and to being aware that when we quote other 
sources, we must refer to those sources. 
17. To completely commit to journalistic integrity and to maintaining the 
privacy of the profession by rejecting any type of pressure to abort such 
privacy. Alongside the confidentiality required of journalists are the secrets 
of the profession. Revealing such secrets of the profession is not permitted, 
because they are protected by the rule of law. 
18. To completely commit to not making any statements or practicing 
any acts which may prejudice the status of the journalist within the 
organisation for which he/she is working; including professional, functional 
or living conditions, with the exception of cases violating the law or 
conflicting with this code of ethics document. 
19. To completely commit to not dealing with or working for any 
journalistic or media organisation that has illegally fired a journalist, before 
guaranteeing his/her full rights in accordance with the written document by 
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the syndicate of journalists, as a frame reference to the freedom, dignity and 
rights of journalists and members. 
20. To commit to respecting private freedoms and to not taking 
photographs of or recording people without their permission, in case such 
would conflict with the public interest, unless in the following fields: 
revealing crimes against persons and property, or damages to public health, 
or threats to national and regional security. 
21. To commit to recognising the right of the journalist to express views, 
regardless of the difference in intellectual and political interpretations, as 
long as this expression is in accordance with the law and national interests. 
22. To completely commit to laying out all available facts, information 
and data to the public, to emphasise the right of the masses to know fact 
and be aware of it. 
23. To commit to not publishing the names, photographs, or personal 
details of mentally ill or drug/alcohol addicts or those who donate their 
body parts, without their agreement or the permission of their families, 
unless there is a general interest served by publishing, in an appropriate 
form. 
24. To completely commit to not publishing anything, which might cause 
incitement, encourage discrimination based on race, origin, colour of skin, 
religion, sex, profession, physical and psychological disability, and to not 
mentioning such topics unless they are objectively related to the published 
topic. 
25. To completely commit to not working in additional professions, 
which might distort the message of journalism, create fear or appear to the 
public as a conflict of interests, or exploitation of interests of the public. 
26. To commit to not publishing news reports, or articles, from any form 
of media, which are already in the name of another journalist, and to not 
deliberately changing the content of such reports or articles without prior 
permission from the journalist. 
27. To commit to acknowledging that journalists who are proved to be 
violating the code of ethics of journalism should be fired from their work as 
well have their membership of the syndicate revoked. 
28. To completely commit to solving problems and professional 
arguments occurring between journalists themselves, through the council of 
the syndicate or any other party authorised by the syndicate to solve that 
problem.  
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29. To commit to, in cases of personal sadness or trauma, not asking 
questions perceived as lacking tact, consideration, empathy or consideration 
for feelings. 
30. To completely commit to not conducting interviews with, or taking 
photographs of, children in situations of psychic distress, if such interviews 
or photographs would reflect negatively on the child, or other children, 
especially in cases of humiliation, or of sexual crimes, regardless of whether 
the children are victims, crime suspects or eyewitnesses. 
31. To commit to not abusing the position of journalist directly or 
indirectly to gain personal benefits contradictory to the ethics of the 
profession. 
32. To completely commit to not abusing, or misleading, trainee 
journalists into doing any work outside of the framework of the profession, 
and to providing them with appropriate training, in accordance with the 
rules of the profession, and to offering them compensations for the work 
they do. 
33. To completely commit to not providing foreign press and media 
organisations with any information, or journalistic material, whether oral, 
written or video-taped, which could harm national security, or national 
characters. 
34. To commit to giving priority of work and cooperation to Palestinian 
journalists and Palestinian press and media organisations in conducting any 
work or service in the field of the profession. 
35. To completely commit to being in solidarity and empathy with 
colleagues for the sake of protecting and maintaining the dignity of the 
journalist and the ethics of the profession, according to the needs and as the 
Syndicate sees fit. 
36. To completely commit to using Palestinian and Arabic idioms and 
vocabularies for historical, cultural, geographic and political names in 
journalistic work in a manner that serves the national and regional interests. 
37. To commit to dealing with all Arab journalists, within the same 
professional and functional criteria and measures, in the same way as in 
dealing with Palestinian journalists.We the Palestinian journalists swear by 
Almighty Allah to be the most loyal trustees, in our absolute and complete 
commitment to all the articles in this code of journalistic ethics, on the basis 
of national and domestic responsibility, and in accordance with the 
principles of respect and fair competition for the sake of general interest, 
and to adhere to the Arab media code of ethics, Arab solidarity code of 
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conduct, and the code of conduct of the Union of Arab Journalists. On the 
basis of what we have declared, God is our witness. 
 
Appendix 6  
Frequency Tables All Programmes 
(rounded to the nearest 0.5 per cent)   
 
 
Table 1 (Also Table 3.1) Themes 
Category Yes  No  
Nationalism and National Discourse 
Frequency 11 77 
Percent 12.5 87.5 
Religious values 
Frequency 7 81 
Percent 8.0 92.0 
Citizens Rights and Obligations 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Resistance and Resistance Literature 
Frequency 9 79 
Percent 10 90 
Social values 
Frequency 28 60 
Percent 32 68 
Cultural values 
Frequency 36 52 
Percent 41 59 
Political values 
Frequency 16 72 
Percent 18 82 
Educational values 
Frequency 43 45 
Percent 49 51 
Entertainment 
Frequency 34 54 
Percent 38.5 61.5 
Table 2 Methods used 
Category Yes  No  
Discussion 
Frequency 60 28 
Percent 68 32 
Analysis 
Frequency 22 66 
Percent 25 75 
Opinion 
Frequency 26 62 
Percent 29.5 70.5 
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Table 3 Position 
Category Yes  No  
Positive support 
Frequency 81 7 
Percent 92 8 
Oppositionist 
Frequency 6 82 
Percent 7 93 
Neutrality 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Table 4 Secondary materials 
Category Yes  No  
Photos 
Frequency 22 66 
Percent 25 75 
Videos 
Frequency 57 31 
Percent 65 35 
Cartoons 
Frequency 32 56 
Percent 36.5 63.5 
Quran verses 
Frequency 12 76 
Percent 13.5 86.5 
Hadith sayings 
Frequency 9 79 
Percent 10 90 
Proverbs 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Diagrams 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Others 
Frequency 8 80 
Percent 9 91 
Table 5 Length of episode  
Category Yes  No  
Less than 30 minutes 
Frequency 36 52 
Percent 41 59 
Less than 45 minutes 
Frequency 7 81 
Percent 8 92 
Less than 60 minutes 
Frequency 44 44 
Percent 50 50 
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Table 6 Disruption in episode 
Category Yes  No  
Commercial  
advertisements 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
TV station break 
Frequency 25 63 
Percent 28.5 71.5 
Call for prayers 
Frequency 15 73 
Percent 17 83 
Regular breaks 
Frequency 15 73 
Percent 17 83 
Table 7 Who are the participants 
Category Yes  No  
Experts, specialists 
Frequency 41 47 
Percent 46.5 53.5 
Regular observers 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Factional official or 
government 
representative 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
NGO workers 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Religious figures 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Average citizens 
Frequency 7 81 
Percent 8 92 
Male 
Frequency 51 37 
Percent 58 42 
Female 
Frequency 37 51 
Percent 42 58 
Child 
Frequency 45 43 
Percent 51 49 
Table 8 Form of participation 
Category Yes  No  
By phone/sms 
Frequency 35 53 
Percent 40 60 
E-mail 
Frequency 9 79 
Percent 10 90 
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Studio 
Frequency 48 40 
Percent 54.5 45.5 
Social media 
Frequency - 88 
Percent - 100 
Pre-recorded  
interviews 
Frequency 36 52 
Percent 41 59 
Table 9 Function of participation 
Category Yes  No  
Clarification 
Frequency 23 65 
Percent 28.5 71.5 
Correction of  
information 
Frequency 3 85 
Percent 3.5 96.5 
Discuss solutions 
Frequency 3 85 
Percent 3.5 96.5 
Present points  
of view 
Frequency 20 68 
Percent 22.5 77.5 
Share personal  
experience 
Frequency 32 56 
Percent 36.5 63.5 
Children education 
Frequency 43 45 
Percent 49 51 
Entertainment  
and fun 
Frequency 34 54 
Percent 38.5 61.5 
Pioneers of Tomorrow 
 
Table 10 Themes  
Category Yes  No  
Nationalism and national 
discourse 
Frequency 4 19 
Percent 17.5 82.5 
Religious values 
Frequency 7 16 
Percent 30.5 69.5 
Citizens’ rights and  
obligations 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Resistance and  
resistance literature 
Frequency 2 21 
Percent 8.5 91.5 
Social values 
Frequency 12 11 
Percent 52 48 
Cultural values 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
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Political values 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Educational values 
Frequency 20 3 
Percent 87 13 
Entertainment 
Frequency 4 19 
Percent 17.5 82.5 
Table 11 Methods used 
Category Yes  No  
Discussion 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
Analysis 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Opinion 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 12 Position 
Category Yes  No  
Positive support 
Frequency 19 4 
Percent 82.5 17.5 
Oppositionist 
Frequency 4 19 
Percent 17.5 82.5 
Neutrality 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 13 Secondary materials 
Category Yes  No  
Photos 
Frequency 67 23 
Percent - 100 
Videos 
Frequency 13 10 
Percent 56.5 43.5 
Cartoons 
Frequency 10 13 
Percent 43.5 56.5 
Quran verses 
Frequency 9 14 
Percent 39 61 
Hadith sayings 
Frequency 7 16 
Percent 30.5 69.5 
Proverbs Frequency - 23 
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Percent - 100 
Diagrams 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Others 
Frequency 4 19 
Percent 17.5 82.5 
Table 14 Length of episode  
Category Yes  No  
Less than 30 minutes 
Frequency 1 22 
Percent 4.5 95.5 
Less than 45 minutes 
Frequency 5 18 
Percent 21.5 78.5 
Less than 60 minutes 
Frequency 17 6 
Percent 74 26 
Table 15 Disruption in episode 
Category Yes  No  
Commercial  
advertisements 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
TV station break 
Frequency 20 3 
Percent 87 13 
Call for prayers 
Frequency 15 8 
Percent 65 35 
Regular breaks 
Frequency 2 21 
Percent 8.5 91.5 
Table 16 Who are the participants 
Category Yes  No  
Experts, specialists 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Regular observers 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Factional official or 
government 
representative 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
NGO workers 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Religious figures 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
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Average citizens 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Male 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Female 
Frequency 5 18 
Percent 21.5 78.5 
Child 
Frequency 22 1 
Percent 95.5 4.5 
Table 17 Form of participation 
Category Yes  No  
By phone/sms 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
E-mail 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Studio 
Frequency 16 7 
Percent 69.5 30.5 
Social media 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Pre-recorded  
interviews 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 18 Function of participation 
Category Yes  No  
Clarification 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Correction of  
information 
Frequency 1 22 
Percent 4.5 95.5 
Discuss solutions 
Frequency 2 21 
Percent 8.5 91.5 
Present points  
of view 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Share personal  
experience 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Children education 
Frequency 20 3 
Percent 87 13 
Entertainment  
and fun 
Frequency 4 19 
Percent 17.4 82.6 
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Burning Brands 
Table 19 Themes  
Category Yes  No  
Nationalism and national 
discourse 
Frequency 1 20 
Percent 5 95 
Religious values 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Citizens rights and  
obligations 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Resistance and  
resistance literature 
Frequency 5 16 
Percent 24 76 
Social values 
Frequency 1 20 
Percent 5 95 
Cultural values 
Frequency 13 8 
Percent 62 38 
Political values 
Frequency 8 13 
Percent 38 62 
Educational values 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Entertainment 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Table 20 Methods used 
Category Yes  No  
Discussion 
Frequency 6 15 
Percent 28.5 71.5 
Analysis 
Frequency 6 15 
Percent 28.5 71.5 
Opinion 
Frequency 10 11 
Percent 47.5 52.5 
Table 21 Position 
Category Yes  No  
Positive support 
Frequency 18 3 
Percent 86 14 
Oppositionist 
Frequency 2 19 
Percent 9.5 90.5 
Neutrality 
Frequency - 21 
Percent 0 100 
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Table 22 Secondary materials 
Category Yes  No  
Photos 
Frequency 1 20 
Percent 5 95 
Videos 
Frequency 2 19 
Percent 9.5 90.5 
Cartoons 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Quran verses 
Frequency 3 18 
Percent 14.5 85.5 
Hadith sayings 
Frequency 2 19 
Percent 9.5 90.5 
Proverbs 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Diagrams 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Others 
Frequency 4 17 
Percent 19 81 
Table 23 Length of episode  
Category Yes  No  
Less than 30 minutes 
Frequency 1 20 
Percent 5 95 
Less than 45 minutes 
Frequency 1 20 
Percent 5 95 
Less than 60 minutes 
Frequency 16 5 
Percent 76 24 
Table 24 Disruption in episode 
Category Yes  No  
Commercial  
advertisements 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
TV station break 
Frequency 5 16 
Percent 24 76 
Call for prayers 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Regular breaks 
Frequency 13 8 
Percent 62 38 
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Table 25 Who are the participants 
Category Yes  No  
Experts, specialists 
Frequency 20 1 
Percent 95 5 
Regular observers 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Factional official or 
government 
representative 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
NGO workers 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Religious figures 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Average citizens 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Male 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Female 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Child 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Table 26 Form of participation 
Category Yes  No  
By phone/sms 
Frequency 3 18 
Percent 14.5 85.5 
E-mail 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Studio 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Social media 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Pre-recorded  
interviews 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Table 27 Function of participation 
Category Yes  No  
Clarification 
Frequency 7 14 
Percent 33.5 66.5 
Correction of  Frequency 2 19 
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information Percent 9.5 90.5 
Discuss solutions 
Frequency 1 20 
Percent 5 95 
Present points  
of view 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Share personal  
experience 
Frequency 13 8 
Percent 62 38 
Children education 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Entertainment  
and fun 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
 
Sesame Street 
Table 28 Themes  
Category Yes  No  
Nationalism and national 
discourse 
Frequency 2 21 
Percent 8.5 91.5 
Religious values 
Frequency 1 22 
Percent 4.5 95.5 
Citizens rights and  
obligations 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Resistance and  
resistance literature 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Social values 
Frequency 12 11 
Percent 52 48 
Cultural values 
Frequency 2 21 
Percent 8.5 91.5 
Political values 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Educational values 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
Entertainment 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
 
 
Table 29 Methods used 
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Category Yes  No  
Discussion 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
Analysis 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Opinion 
Frequency 1 22 
Percent 4.5 95.5 
Table 30 Position 
Category Yes  No  
Positive support 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
Oppositionist 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Neutrality 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 31 Secondary materials 
Category Yes  No  
Photos 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Videos 
Frequency 21 2 
Percent 91.5 8.5 
Cartoons 
Frequency 22 1 
Percent 95.5 4.5 
Quran verses 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Hadith sayings 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Proverbs 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Diagrams 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Others 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 32 Length of episode  
Category Yes  No  
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Less than 30 minutes 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
Less than 45 minutes 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Less than 60 minutes 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 33 Disruption in episode 
Category Yes  No  
Commercial  
advertisements 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
TV station break 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Call for prayers 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Regular breaks 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Table 34 Who are the participants 
Category Yes  No  
Experts, specialists 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Regular observers 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Factional official or 
government 
representative 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
NGO workers 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Religious figures 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Average citizens 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Male 
Frequency 9 14 
Percent 39.5 60.5 
Female 
Frequency 13 10 
Percent 56.5 43.5 
Child 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
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Table 35 Form of participation 
Category Yes  No 1 
By phone/sms 
Frequency 9 14 
Percent 39 61 
E-mail 
Frequency 9 14 
Percent 39 61 
Studio 
Frequency 11 12 
Percent 48 52 
Social media 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Pre-recorded  
interviews 
Frequency 15 8 
Percent 65 35 
Table 36 Function of participation 
Category Yes  No  
Clarification 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Correction of  
information 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Discuss solutions 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Present points  
of view 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Share personal  
experience 
Frequency - 23 
Percent - 100 
Children education 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
Entertainment  
and fun 
Frequency 23 - 
Percent 100 - 
 
 
Cultural Flashes 
Table 37 Themes  
Category Yes  No  
Nationalism and national 
discourse 
Frequency 4 17 
Percent 19 81 
Religious values Frequency - 21 
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Percent - 100 
Citizens rights and  
obligations 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Resistance and  
resistance literature 
Frequency 2 19 
Percent 9.5 90.5 
Social values 
Frequency 3 18 
Percent 14.5 85.5 
Cultural values 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Political values 
Frequency 8 13 
Percent 38 62 
Educational values 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Entertainment 
Frequency 7 14 
Percent 33.5 66.5 
Table 38 Methods used 
Category Yes  No  
Discussion 
Frequency 8 13 
Percent 38 62 
Analysis 
Frequency 16 5 
Percent 76 24 
Opinion 
Frequency 15 6 
Percent 71.5 28.5 
Table 39 Position 
Category Yes  No  
Positive support 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Oppositionist 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Neutrality 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Table 40 Secondary materials 
Category Yes  No  
Photos 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
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Videos 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Cartoons 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Quran verses 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Hadith sayings 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Proverbs 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Diagrams 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Others 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Table 41 Length of episode  
Category Yes  No  
Less than 30 minutes 
Frequency 11 10 
Percent 52.5 47.5 
Less than 45 minutes 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Less than 60 minutes 
Frequency 10 11 
Percent 47.5 52.5 
Table 42 Disruption in episode 
Category Yes  No  
Commercial  
advertisements 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
TV station break 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Call for prayers 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Regular breaks 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
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Table 43 Who are the participants 
Category Yes  No  
Experts, specialists 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Regular observers 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Factional official or 
government 
representative 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
NGO workers 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Religious figures 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Average citizens 
Frequency 7 14 
Percent 33.5 66.5 
Male 
Frequency 21 0 
Percent 100 0 
Female 
Frequency 19 2 
Percent 90.5 9.5 
Child 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Table 44 Form of participation 
Category Yes  No  
By phone/sms 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
E-mail 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Studio 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Social media 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Pre-recorded  
interviews 
Frequency 21 - 
Percent 100 - 
Table 45 Function of participation 
Category Yes  No  
Clarification 
Frequency 18 3 
Percent 85.5 14.5 
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Correction of  
information 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Discuss solutions 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Present points  
of view 
Frequency 20 1 
Percent 95 5 
Share personal  
experience 
Frequency 19 2 
Percent 90.5 9.5 
Children education 
Frequency - 21 
Percent - 100 
Entertainment  
and fun 
Frequency 7 14 
Percent 33.5 66.5 
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Appendix 7  
List of Personal Interviews  
 
Y. Abu Jarad on Burning Brands and decision making, at ASC, Gaza City, 12 
July 2013 
A. Al Amriti, on Pioneers of Tomorrow production, at ASC, Gaza City, 11 
November 2013 
S. Al Asfar on Cultural Flashes media production, at PSC, Gaza City, 30 
November 2013 
A. Alhessi, on Al Aqsa Satellite Channel media production, Gaza City, 2 
December 2013 
S. Abu Mohsen on Al Aqsa Satellite Channel media and cultural 
programming, at ASC, Gaza City, 6 December 2013 
M. Abu Shammalah on Cultural Flashes production, at Screen for Media 
Production, Gaza City, 17 December 2013.  
S. Al Bardawil on Al Aqsa Satellite Channel programming and decision 
making, at ASC, Gaza City, 23 December 2013  
S. Al Shafi on Palestine Satellite Channel media production, at PSC, Gaza City, 
26 December 2013 
L. Sayeigh on Sesame Street, over the phone, 29 December 2013 
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